背景人物：大使級(jí)代辦喬治·凱南和秘書多蘿西·海斯曼

主題：向國(guó)務(wù)卿提交的《對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的指控》（喬治凱南

級(jí)別：秘密

地點(diǎn)：莫斯科，

時(shí)間：1946 年 2 月 22 日-晚上 9 點(diǎn)[2月22日--3日下午52點(diǎn)收到]

861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram

The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]

國(guó)務(wù)院2月3日第284號(hào)電令要求回答的問題，既復(fù)雜又非常敏感，既與我們常規(guī)思考極為不同，又對(duì)分析我們所處的國(guó)際環(huán)境十分重要，我實(shí)在無法將我的回復(fù)壓縮在一份簡(jiǎn)單的電文中，又避免造成我認(rèn)為是非常危險(xiǎn)的過分簡(jiǎn)單化。據(jù)此，我希望國(guó)務(wù)院能夠容忍我將我的回復(fù)用五個(gè)部分提出。這五部分的小標(biāo)題分別是：

1、蘇聯(lián)戰(zhàn)后（戰(zhàn)略）思維的基本特征；

2、這一思維的背景；

3、這一思維在政府政策層面的反映；

4、這一思維在非政府層面的反映；

5、從美國(guó)政策角度的可行性推斷。

請(qǐng)?jiān)试S我先就對(duì)電報(bào)通訊所造成的負(fù)擔(dān)表示歉意。然而，所涉及的問題，特別是考慮到目前發(fā)生的事件，是那么的急迫、那么的重要，我認(rèn)為對(duì)這些問題的解釋——如果這些問題確實(shí)需要我們予以重視的話——（采用如此長(zhǎng)電的形式）是值得的。

下面是我的解釋。

511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:

(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.

(2) Background of this outlook

(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.

(4) Its projection on unofficial level.

(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows

第一部分 蘇聯(lián)政府宣傳機(jī)器所宣揚(yáng)的戰(zhàn)后（戰(zhàn)略）思維的基本特征如下：

一、蘇聯(lián)仍處于敵對(duì)的“資本主義（世界）的包圍”之中，長(zhǎng)期看來，取得并保持永久的和平共處是不可能的。正如斯大林1927年對(duì)一個(gè)美國(guó)工人代表團(tuán)所表述的：“在國(guó)際革命繼續(xù)發(fā)展的過程中，將會(huì)出現(xiàn)兩個(gè)世界規(guī)模的中心：一個(gè)是社會(huì)主義中心，吸引著所有傾向于發(fā)展社會(huì)主義的國(guó)際；一個(gè)是資本主義中心，集結(jié)著那些希望走資本主義道路的國(guó)際。這兩個(gè)中心之間為了爭(zhēng)奪世界經(jīng)濟(jì)主導(dǎo)權(quán)的斗爭(zhēng)將會(huì)決定世界范圍內(nèi)資本主義和共產(chǎn)主義的命運(yùn)?！?/p>

二、資本主義世界正在受到它本身固有的多種矛盾的困擾。這些沖突無法通過和平的妥協(xié)得以解決，其中最大的是美國(guó)與英國(guó)之間的沖突。

三、資本主義內(nèi)部的沖突不可避免地要導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。由此產(chǎn)生的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)可能會(huì)有兩種形式：一種是資本主義內(nèi)部?jī)蓚€(gè)資本主義國(guó)家之間的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，一種是對(duì)社會(huì)主義世界的侵略戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。聰明的資本家們，為了規(guī)避資本主義內(nèi)部的沖突，盡管是徒勞的，但會(huì)傾向于發(fā)動(dòng)第二種戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

四、對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的侵略，盡管對(duì)侵略者來說最終將是災(zāi)難性的，但也會(huì)減緩蘇聯(lián)社會(huì)主義建設(shè)的步伐，因此，必須不惜一切地予以制止。

五、資本主義國(guó)家之間的沖突，盡管對(duì)蘇聯(lián)意味著危險(xiǎn)，但對(duì)社會(huì)主義事業(yè)的發(fā)展卻提供了巨大的可能性，特別是只要蘇聯(lián)保持軍事上的強(qiáng)大、意識(shí)形態(tài)的一致和對(duì)目前杰出領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的忠誠(chéng)。

六、必須牢記的是，（蘇聯(lián)）并非認(rèn)為資本主義世界都是敵人。除了那些不可救藥的反動(dòng)分子和資產(chǎn)階級(jí)，它還包含了：（一）一些可以由共產(chǎn)黨組織團(tuán)結(jié)起來的開明的積極分子；（二）其他一些力量，其態(tài)度、追求和行為恰巧在“客觀上”對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的利益有益（目前出于策略上的考慮，這些力量被稱為進(jìn)步和民主分子）。為了蘇聯(lián)的目的，必須對(duì)這些力量加以鼓勵(lì)和利用。

在資本主義社會(huì)中的那些反動(dòng)力量中，最具危險(xiǎn)性的是那些被列寧稱之為人民的假朋友，也就是所謂溫和社會(huì)主義者或社會(huì)民主領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人（換言之，即非共產(chǎn)主義左翼分子）。這些人比那些徹頭徹尾的反動(dòng)派更為危險(xiǎn)，這是因?yàn)楹笳咧辽偈且哉鎸?shí)的面目出現(xiàn)，而前者是在打著社會(huì)主義的旗號(hào)迷惑人們，為反動(dòng)資本者服務(wù)。

關(guān)于前提就是這些了。那么，依據(jù)這些前提到底能對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的政策做出怎樣的推斷？大致如下：

一、所有（的政策）都必須為了發(fā)展蘇聯(lián)相對(duì)的力量，令其成為國(guó)際社會(huì)的一個(gè)要素。相反，所有能夠削弱資本主義國(guó)際的力量和影響的機(jī)會(huì)，都必須緊緊抓住，無論是以集體的，還是以單個(gè)的形式。

二、蘇聯(lián)以及其在世界范圍內(nèi)的朋友的所作所為，都必須是致力于利用和加深資本主義國(guó)家之間的分歧和沖突。假若這些分歧和沖突不斷深化，最終引發(fā)一場(chǎng)“帝國(guó)主義”的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，那么，這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)必須演變成在不同的資本主義國(guó)家內(nèi)部發(fā)生的革命起義。

三、對(duì)世界上的“民主進(jìn)步”力量，必須最大限度地予以利用，以期按照蘇聯(lián)的利益對(duì)資本主義國(guó)家的政府造成壓力。

四、必須與世界上的（溫和）社會(huì)主義和社會(huì)民主主義的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人作不懈、無情的斗爭(zhēng)。

Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine

Are as Follows:

(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:

"In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world."

(b)?Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to seine interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity most be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(c) "Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

第二部分 （戰(zhàn)后蘇聯(lián)戰(zhàn)略）思維的背景。

在分析這樣的（蘇聯(lián)）政黨思維的實(shí)踐層面上的細(xì)節(jié)之前，對(duì)這個(gè)思維的某些方面，我希望提請(qǐng)注意。

首先，這個(gè)思維并不代表俄國(guó)人民的自然思維?？偟膩碇v，俄國(guó)人民大致上對(duì)外部世界是友善的，樂意了解外部世界，渴望以他們認(rèn)為所具備的優(yōu)勢(shì)去衡量外部世界；最重要的是，他們也期盼著和平生活，希望能享受勞動(dòng)的果實(shí)。政黨路線只是體現(xiàn)了那些由政府宣傳機(jī)器向大眾不遺余力、堅(jiān)持不懈灌輸所展現(xiàn)的信條，而大眾“在心底深處”常常對(duì)那些信條存在著驚人的抗拒情緒。但是，這樣的政黨路線對(duì)那些權(quán)利機(jī)器的主宰者們——包括政黨、秘密警察和政府——的思維和行為，卻具有約束力，而我們所不得不要應(yīng)付的也就是這樣一部分人。

其次，必須提請(qǐng)注意的是，上述政黨路線所依據(jù)的前提條件，大多并非真實(shí)。過去的經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明，資本主義和社會(huì)主義國(guó)家之間的和平共處和互惠互利是完全可能的。發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家內(nèi)部的沖突，已不再源于資本者對(duì)生產(chǎn)資料的占取，而只是反映了發(fā)達(dá)的都市化和工業(yè)化之間的矛盾；俄國(guó)迄今仍未經(jīng)歷工業(yè)化和都市化發(fā)展所產(chǎn)生的矛盾，原因并不在于其所實(shí)行的社會(huì)主義制度，而僅僅是出于它的落后。資本主義國(guó)家的內(nèi)部沖突并非一定導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)；起碼并非所有的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是由于這個(gè)原因而爆發(fā)的。在今天談侵略蘇聯(lián)的可能性，特別是在消滅了德國(guó)（法西斯）和日本（軍國(guó)主義）以及近期的（美蘇合作）示范之后，真是無稽之談。如果不受到堅(jiān)持?jǐn)硨?duì)和顛覆勢(shì)力的挑釁，今天的“資本主義”世界完全能夠保持自身的和平，也能夠與蘇聯(lián)和平相處。最后，任何一個(gè)精神正常者都沒有理由懷疑西方國(guó)家的溫和社會(huì)主義者的誠(chéng)意。例如，在斯堪的納維亞國(guó)家，只要有機(jī)會(huì)，他們總是致力于改善勞工大眾的生活條件，否認(rèn)他們?cè)谶@方面所取得的成功，是不公正的。

這些前提之所以是錯(cuò)誤的，是由于每一個(gè)都基于（二）戰(zhàn)前的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，而且每一個(gè)前提的謬誤之處都被那場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)所充分證明。事實(shí)上，英美間的分歧并非西方世界的主要分歧。除了那些軸心國(guó)，資本主義國(guó)家并沒有為了解決自身的分歧而加入反對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的十字軍遠(yuǎn)征。蘇聯(lián)不僅沒有將一場(chǎng)帝國(guó)主義的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)演變成內(nèi)戰(zhàn)和革命，卻為了共同的目的和承諾，不得不與資本主義國(guó)家同仇敵愾，并肩戰(zhàn)斗。

盡管如此，所有這些毫無根據(jù)并被證明是錯(cuò)誤的判斷，在今天，仍然被大膽地提出。這意味著什么？這意味著蘇聯(lián)黨的路線并非基于對(duì)俄羅斯外部局勢(shì)的客觀分析；這意味著蘇聯(lián)黨的路線的制定與俄羅斯以外的條件無任何關(guān)聯(lián)；這還意味著蘇聯(lián)黨的路線的產(chǎn)生只是出于在俄羅斯戰(zhàn)前就存在的、今天仍然存在的內(nèi)部的本質(zhì)上的需要。

克里姆林宮對(duì)世界事務(wù)神經(jīng)質(zhì)的認(rèn)知的最深處是俄羅斯傳統(tǒng)的、本能的不安全感。起初，這種不安全感，產(chǎn)生于一個(gè)和平地生活在廣袤而無法設(shè)防的平原上的農(nóng)作居民與一群兇暴的游牧民為鄰的結(jié)果。最近的這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，由于俄羅斯人打交道的是經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)達(dá)的西方人，使得（俄羅斯人）對(duì)地區(qū)內(nèi)出現(xiàn)較之以前更強(qiáng)大、更發(fā)達(dá)、組織更嚴(yán)密的社會(huì)產(chǎn)生新的恐懼。但是，這種新的不安全感與其說是在折磨著一般俄羅斯民眾，毋寧說是在折磨著俄國(guó)的統(tǒng)治者。這是因?yàn)?，俄羅斯統(tǒng)治者無疑感覺到，他們的統(tǒng)治是一個(gè)形式上相對(duì)無序的統(tǒng)治，其心理基礎(chǔ)脆弱而且虛假，無法與西方國(guó)家的政治制度相提并論。因此，他們一向懼怕來自外部的滲透，懼怕與西方世界直接接觸，對(duì)一旦俄羅斯人民了解了外部世界的真相或是外國(guó)人民了解了俄羅斯內(nèi)部的真相所可能帶來的后果擔(dān)憂不已。結(jié)果，為了求得安全，他們學(xué)會(huì)的只是如何徹底地置對(duì)手于死地的方法，從沒考慮與對(duì)手建立契約和妥協(xié)。

馬克思主義在西歐傳播了半個(gè)世紀(jì)毫無建樹，但在俄羅斯卻能星火燎原、一舉成功，這絕非偶然。只有在這樣一個(gè)從未擁有過和睦的鄰邦，甚或在其內(nèi)部和外部也從未產(chǎn)生過得以容忍的力量均衡的國(guó)土上，一個(gè)崇尚社會(huì)間的經(jīng)濟(jì)沖突是無法通過和平手段解決的學(xué)說的民族中，馬克思主義才能得以發(fā)揚(yáng)。自建立了布爾什維克政權(quán)之后，由于列寧的詮釋，馬克斯的教義變得更加兇狠好斗，更具排他性，成為激發(fā)不安全感的無與倫比的動(dòng)力，正因?yàn)榇?，那些布爾什維克統(tǒng)治者們對(duì)不安全的感受，要比俄羅斯歷史上的任何統(tǒng)治者都要強(qiáng)烈得多。也正是在這種教義所寓含的利他主義的內(nèi)涵中，他們找到了本能地懼怕外部世界的正當(dāng)理由，找到了除了獨(dú)裁而不知如何統(tǒng)治的根據(jù)，找到了沒有他們不敢實(shí)踐的殘暴的因由，也找到了他們要求別人作出犧牲的根據(jù)。正是以馬克思主義的名義，他們的所作所為蕩滌了哪怕只是一個(gè)細(xì)微的倫理價(jià)值。今天，他們已經(jīng)離不開這樣一個(gè)教義了，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)教義已經(jīng)成為他們?cè)诘赖屡c思辨上讓別人不得不傾倒的遮羞布。沒有了它，他們?cè)跉v史面前，與俄羅斯一長(zhǎng)串的為了內(nèi)部的脆弱尋求外部安全，以至不斷提升軍事力量的兇殘而驕奢的統(tǒng)治者們相比，充其量只能排在這些統(tǒng)治者的尾末。這就是為什么蘇聯(lián)的目標(biāo)總是需要用馬克思主義的衣缽嚴(yán)格包裝的原因，也是為什么任何人不得輕視蘇聯(lián)（對(duì)外）事務(wù)中教義重要性的原因。這樣，蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人迫于歷史和現(xiàn)狀的實(shí)際需要，就提出一種教條，把外部世界描繪成為一個(gè)罪惡的、敵視的、威脅著蘇聯(lián)的世界，并認(rèn)為這個(gè)世界內(nèi)部滋生著蔓延疾病的細(xì)菌，注定要被越來越多的內(nèi)部騷動(dòng)所破壞，最后難逃蒸蒸日上的社會(huì)主義理論的致命一擊，從而讓位給一個(gè)新的、更美好的世界。這種論點(diǎn)為蘇聯(lián)擴(kuò)充國(guó)家警察與軍事力量提供了依據(jù)，為將俄羅斯人民與外部世界隔離提供了理由，為完全體現(xiàn)俄羅斯統(tǒng)治者本能和特性的不斷擴(kuò)大警察權(quán)限的壓力提供了正當(dāng)性。從本質(zhì)上看，這只是躁動(dòng)不安的俄羅斯民族主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的穩(wěn)步前進(jìn)，而在這個(gè)流延了數(shù)個(gè)世紀(jì)的運(yùn)動(dòng)中，進(jìn)攻與防御的理念一直是不可救藥地混為一談的。但是在國(guó)際馬克思主義的偽裝下，對(duì)絕望的、飽受戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)創(chuàng)傷的世界人民做出涂上蜜甜的承諾，這個(gè)運(yùn)動(dòng)因此比歷史上任何時(shí)候都要更加危險(xiǎn)，更加險(xiǎn)惡。

蘇維埃政黨的教義喧嚷，就大多數(shù)提出的人而言，并不能認(rèn)作一定是虛狂的，或是偽詐的。這些人大多對(duì)外部世界不甚了解，思想上過于依賴，以至不會(huì)對(duì)自我催眠術(shù)質(zhì)疑，也不會(huì)對(duì)他們樂于而且容易相信的東西輕易提出疑問。最后，我們?nèi)匀幻鎸?duì)一個(gè)尚未解開的謎：在這個(gè)國(guó)家到底有誰——如果確有此人的話——能夠獲得對(duì)外部世界準(zhǔn)確而不偏見的信息。由于這個(gè)政府在充滿了東方式的秘密和陰謀氛圍中運(yùn)作，歪曲和毒化信息來源和內(nèi)容的可能無時(shí)不在。俄羅斯人對(duì)客觀事實(shí)的不信任——實(shí)際上他們根本不承認(rèn)客觀事實(shí)的存在——使得他們堅(jiān)信所有表述的事實(shí)都不過是為了某種險(xiǎn)惡目的所服務(wù)的工具。人們由足夠理由懷疑，現(xiàn)今的政府本身就是一個(gè)大陰謀中的一部分。作為眾多人中的一員，我就懷疑斯大林本人能否得到客觀地反映外部世界的信息。這里可以充分衡量俄羅斯人如何實(shí)施微妙的詭計(jì)，在這點(diǎn)上，俄國(guó)人過去擅長(zhǎng)的爾虞我詐、勾心斗角的伎倆，大有施展的余地。外國(guó)政府無法將他們對(duì)俄關(guān)系的立場(chǎng)和理由在俄國(guó)決策者面前清晰地表述——實(shí)際上往往只是受到那些看上去彬彬有禮但身份模糊、鮮為人知的所謂顧問們的接待，對(duì)這些人，既不能輕易約見，也無法產(chǎn)生影響。在我看來，和是最令人焦慮的莫斯科外交特征。西方政治家要想有所建樹，就必須了解這里所面對(duì)困難的實(shí)質(zhì)之所在。

Part 2: Background of Outlook

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final?Coup de grace?by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers--extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

第三部分 蘇聯(lián)（戰(zhàn)后戰(zhàn)略）思維在政府政策層面的反映。

至此，我們已經(jīng)了解了蘇聯(lián)計(jì)劃的內(nèi)涵與來龍去脈。那么，在政策的實(shí)施層面，我們又會(huì)面對(duì)什么？

正如國(guó)務(wù)院詢問電報(bào)所隱含的，蘇聯(lián)的（對(duì)外）政策是在兩個(gè)平臺(tái)上操作的：一、政府平臺(tái)，體現(xiàn)了那些以蘇聯(lián)政府名義采取的動(dòng)作；二、隱秘平臺(tái)，表現(xiàn)為那些由某些機(jī)構(gòu)采取的但蘇聯(lián)政府偶然是由其指示的行動(dòng)。

這兩個(gè)平臺(tái)所展現(xiàn)的政策，均旨在服務(wù)于（本文）第一部分所表述的“一”和“四”基本政策目標(biāo)。通過其他平臺(tái)所采取的行動(dòng)會(huì)有很大差異，但在目的、時(shí)機(jī)和效果方面是相互呼應(yīng)的。

至于政府平臺(tái)的政策，我們應(yīng)該注意以下幾方面：

一、所有旨在增強(qiáng)和提升蘇聯(lián)政權(quán)權(quán)威和信譽(yù)的國(guó)內(nèi)政策，包括：強(qiáng)化軍事工業(yè)化進(jìn)程；最大限度地發(fā)展武裝力量；為了向外國(guó)人宣傳所做出的大規(guī)模展示；那些為了掩蓋弱點(diǎn)、迷惑對(duì)手的對(duì)內(nèi)長(zhǎng)期秘密行動(dòng)。

二、在時(shí)機(jī)成熟和成功有望的時(shí)候，所有為了擴(kuò)展蘇聯(lián)力量的試圖。目前，這樣的試圖主要集中于被認(rèn)為具有現(xiàn)時(shí)戰(zhàn)略需要的幾個(gè)相鄰地區(qū)，如伊朗北部、土耳其，也有可能包括波恩赫爾姆。然而，一旦隱秘的蘇聯(lián)政治影響在新的地區(qū)取得成功，其他地區(qū)也會(huì)被受到考慮。以此類推，一個(gè)“友善的”波斯政府會(huì)被要求為蘇聯(lián)在波斯灣開放一個(gè)港口。假若西班牙共產(chǎn)黨取得政權(quán)，蘇聯(lián)有可能立即啟動(dòng)對(duì)在直布羅陀海峽建立基地的訴求。當(dāng)然，諸如此類的動(dòng)作，只有在非政府的（平臺(tái)）準(zhǔn)備完成后才會(huì)以政府的名義來推行。

三、只要看到有擴(kuò)張?zhí)K聯(lián)實(shí)力或限制和減弱其他國(guó)家實(shí)力的機(jī)會(huì)，俄羅斯人是會(huì)以政府的名義參與國(guó)際組織。對(duì)于聯(lián)合國(guó)，莫斯科從不認(rèn)為該組織是為了建立一個(gè)基于相互利益和共同目標(biāo)的永久穩(wěn)定的國(guó)際社會(huì)的機(jī)制，而只是看作是一個(gè)為了私利能夠利用的場(chǎng)合。只要這個(gè)判斷和訴求不變，蘇聯(lián)將留在聯(lián)合國(guó)內(nèi)。但是，一旦認(rèn)為該組織只是令他們難堪、限制了其勢(shì)力擴(kuò)張，一旦發(fā)現(xiàn)通過其他途徑能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)自己的擴(kuò)張目標(biāo)時(shí)，蘇聯(lián)會(huì)毫不猶豫地拋棄聯(lián)合國(guó)。此舉的隱含意義是：他們堅(jiān)信自己已經(jīng)強(qiáng)大到這樣的程度，以至不惜通過撤出聯(lián)合國(guó)而與其他國(guó)家決裂，將對(duì)其目標(biāo)和安全有威脅的聯(lián)合國(guó)變成一個(gè)無效機(jī)構(gòu)，并用一個(gè)符合他們利益的國(guó)際武器取代之。因此，蘇聯(lián)對(duì)聯(lián)合國(guó)的態(tài)度在很大程度上取決于這樣幾個(gè)因素：其他國(guó)家對(duì)該組織的忠誠(chéng)度，以及這些國(guó)家為了通過聯(lián)合國(guó)推動(dòng)和平和實(shí)現(xiàn)代表我們思考方式的具有希望的國(guó)際生活觀所做出的努力，所表現(xiàn)的決心和所展示的團(tuán)結(jié)。請(qǐng)?jiān)试S我重申：莫斯科對(duì)聯(lián)合國(guó)的理想并無任何抽象意義的首肯，它對(duì)該組織的態(tài)度主要源于實(shí)際的和策略上的考慮。

四、對(duì)殖民地和落后的、依賴他人的地區(qū)和人民，蘇聯(lián)的政策，即便是通過政府平臺(tái)實(shí)施的，都將是為了削弱西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家（在這些地區(qū)）的實(shí)力、影響甚至與這些地區(qū)的接觸的實(shí)現(xiàn)，因?yàn)?，從理論上看，一旦這樣的政策實(shí)施成功，那么這些地區(qū)將會(huì)出現(xiàn)權(quán)力真空，有利于蘇聯(lián)支持的共產(chǎn)主義勢(shì)力的滲透。在我看來，蘇聯(lián)施壓要求參與（聯(lián)合國(guó)）托管的安排，表現(xiàn)的是企望在這些地區(qū)處于能夠弱化西方影響的地位的要求，并非為了構(gòu)建一個(gè)能夠發(fā)揮蘇聯(lián)影響力的渠道。盡管也期望建立這樣的渠道，但蘇聯(lián)傾向于依賴其他的渠道，而不是通過政府的托管安排。據(jù)此，我們可以預(yù)見，蘇聯(lián)將會(huì)要求參與所有涉及托管和類似的機(jī)制，并通過所獲取的地位削弱西方對(duì)這些地區(qū)和人民的影響力。

五、俄羅斯人將會(huì)竭盡全力地與所有可能傾向于反對(duì)西方權(quán)力大國(guó)的國(guó)家發(fā)展正式關(guān)系，加強(qiáng)蘇聯(lián)的影響。這種政策傾向?qū)?huì)廣泛涉及諸如德國(guó)、阿根廷、中東和其他國(guó)家。

六、在國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域，蘇聯(lián)的政策將集中于對(duì)蘇聯(lián)和蘇聯(lián)控制的相鄰國(guó)家作為一個(gè)整體的絕對(duì)主宰地位的訴求。但是，這將是個(gè)潛在的政策，就其公開表述的路線來看，具體的政策尚不明晰。自戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束后，蘇聯(lián)政府對(duì)涉及對(duì)外貿(mào)易的議題表現(xiàn)出奇怪的緘默。假若有可能爭(zhēng)取到大批量的長(zhǎng)期的信用貸款，我相信蘇聯(lián)政府會(huì)如30年代那樣對(duì)建立一個(gè)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)交流的必要性表示口頭上的贊同。否則，我認(rèn)為，蘇聯(lián)的對(duì)外貿(mào)易有可能僅限于蘇聯(lián)自己的安全區(qū)內(nèi)，包括在德國(guó)的占領(lǐng)區(qū)，官方對(duì)國(guó)家間發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)合作的基本原則會(huì)采取漠視的態(tài)度。

七、關(guān)于文化交流，蘇聯(lián)對(duì)加深國(guó)際民族間文化了解的必要性也一樣會(huì)表示口頭上的贊同，即便是這樣的表態(tài)，一旦在實(shí)踐中被認(rèn)為有損蘇聯(lián)民族的安全，便會(huì)被取消。蘇聯(lián)涉及這方面的政策表現(xiàn)仍將限于那些毫無生氣的交流方式，包括牢牢控制下的官方訪問和活動(dòng)，鋪天蓋地的伏特加酒，以及冗長(zhǎng)而缺乏人任何長(zhǎng)久意義的講話。

八、在此之外，蘇聯(lián)與各個(gè)外國(guó)政府的官方關(guān)系將按所謂“正確”路線的實(shí)行之，即：將無例外地強(qiáng)調(diào)蘇聯(lián)的威望和代表性，同時(shí)也強(qiáng)調(diào)利益——而非良好的風(fēng)度——的任何一個(gè)細(xì)微之處。

Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.

(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners.

第四部分 以下部分可以被認(rèn)為是我們對(duì)蘇聯(lián)為了其基本政策目標(biāo)在非官方或是隱秘的（如那些蘇聯(lián)政府否認(rèn)參與）的平臺(tái)上將會(huì)實(shí)行的方式和方法的預(yù)測(cè)。

在這個(gè)平臺(tái)上實(shí)施（蘇聯(lián)）政策推介的機(jī)構(gòu)如下：

一、其他國(guó)家共產(chǎn)黨內(nèi)部最為核心的部分。盡管此類人具有與他們的真實(shí)身份無關(guān)聯(lián)的公共面貌，但他們實(shí)際上聯(lián)系緊密，形成了一個(gè)世界共產(chǎn)主義的地下活動(dòng)中心，恰如一個(gè)隱秘的“共產(chǎn)國(guó)際”，受到莫斯科的嚴(yán)密控制和指導(dǎo)。這個(gè)內(nèi)部核心的成員，盡管他們所隸屬的是個(gè)合法的政黨，但他們的活動(dòng)是通過地下管道進(jìn)行的，記住此點(diǎn)，十分重要。

二、共產(chǎn)黨的一般成員。請(qǐng)注意此類人與上述人員是有區(qū)別的，而這個(gè)區(qū)別近來越來越大了。過去，外國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的活動(dòng)多為公開和秘密、合法和陰謀的混合，這個(gè)現(xiàn)象是十分令人費(fèi)解的——或者對(duì)莫斯科而言起碼是不方便的，現(xiàn)在，幾乎所有的秘密活動(dòng)均僅限于黨內(nèi)的核心部分，并有效地轉(zhuǎn)入地下，今天的一般黨員已經(jīng)不被信任，甚至對(duì)運(yùn)動(dòng)的真實(shí)情況都不甚了解，只是作為各自國(guó)家內(nèi)部政治運(yùn)動(dòng)的真誠(chéng)參與者而被推出，對(duì)該黨與外國(guó)政府的隱秘的關(guān)系一無所知。只有在那些共產(chǎn)黨仍具有人數(shù)上優(yōu)勢(shì)的國(guó)家，這些黨員分子才會(huì)經(jīng)常參加活動(dòng)，并以集體的形式出現(xiàn)。作為一條規(guī)則，他們只是被用來對(duì)那些不太會(huì)被懷疑是蘇聯(lián)政府的工具的組織，根據(jù)具體需要和可能，進(jìn)行滲透發(fā)揮影響，甚至予以控制，以便達(dá)到通過某些組織的活動(dòng)——而非以一個(gè)獨(dú)立的政治實(shí)體采取直接行動(dòng)——的目的。

三、各國(guó)都有大量屬于國(guó)家級(jí)協(xié)會(huì)和團(tuán)體的此類組織，完全可能通過上述滲透的方式受到影響和控制。這些組織一般包括：工團(tuán)，青年聯(lián)合會(huì)，婦女協(xié)會(huì)，民族團(tuán)體，宗教組織，社會(huì)機(jī)構(gòu)，文化社團(tuán)，自由主義的刊物，出版社，等等。

四、國(guó)際組織同樣存在著（共產(chǎn)黨）通過對(duì)不同的國(guó)家社會(huì)部分施加影響而遭受滲透的可能。最有可能發(fā)揮這種影響的有工會(huì)、青年聯(lián)合會(huì)和婦女聯(lián)合會(huì)。對(duì)此特別需要提出的，而且?guī)缀蹙哂兄旅闹匾缘?，是?guó)際工人運(yùn)動(dòng)。對(duì)這個(gè)運(yùn)動(dòng)，莫斯科看到了能夠讓媳婦政府在國(guó)際事務(wù)中無法集中注意力的可能，也看到了建立國(guó)際性的“壓力”組織以逼迫某些國(guó)家的政府采取有利于蘇聯(lián)的行動(dòng)或停止不利于蘇聯(lián)的政策的可能。

五、俄羅斯東正教教會(huì)和它遍布海外的分會(huì)，以及通過這些教堂與一般的東正教教堂的聯(lián)系。

六、泛斯拉夫運(yùn)動(dòng)以及其他源于蘇聯(lián)境內(nèi)少數(shù)民族——如阿塞拜疆、亞美尼亞、土庫(kù)曼人等——的運(yùn)動(dòng)。

七、那些愿意或多或少為蘇聯(lián)的政策目的效勞的外國(guó)政府于執(zhí)政集團(tuán)，諸如目前的保加利亞、南斯拉夫政府、北波斯政權(quán)、中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨集團(tuán)等。這些政府和勢(shì)力，不僅其宣傳機(jī)器被蘇聯(lián)所利用，而且在具體政策上頁會(huì)相當(dāng)大程度地服務(wù)于蘇聯(lián)。

可以預(yù)料的是，由這些勢(shì)力組成的這樣一個(gè)廣泛、龐大的機(jī)器將會(huì)受到（莫斯科的）利用，盡管利用的程度會(huì)因人而異、因勢(shì)而異，但在方式上會(huì)出現(xiàn)如下幾種：

一、打擊主要西方國(guó)家的政治與戰(zhàn)略潛力。在這些國(guó)家內(nèi)，將會(huì)出現(xiàn)旨在打擊人民自信心、破壞國(guó)防建設(shè)、激化社會(huì)與工業(yè)動(dòng)亂以及挑起任何形式的分裂的活動(dòng)。所有心懷不滿和受到不公正待遇者，無論是經(jīng)濟(jì)的還是民族的，都將被挑唆通過以消滅社會(huì)中敵對(duì)勢(shì)力為目的的暴力方式去尋求正義和解決問題，而非通過調(diào)解和妥協(xié)的方式。于是，窮人將會(huì)與富人形成對(duì)立，黑種人將會(huì)與白種人形成對(duì)立，年輕人將會(huì)與年長(zhǎng)者形成對(duì)立，新來者將會(huì)與久居者形成對(duì)立，不一而足。

二、特別地通過非政府平臺(tái)挑起暴力，以削弱西方大國(guó)在殖民地、落后地區(qū)或依賴他人的民族地區(qū)的實(shí)力和影響。為此，西方殖民統(tǒng)治的所有錯(cuò)誤和不當(dāng)將會(huì)受到毫無保留地揭露和利用。西方大國(guó)內(nèi)部的自由主義勢(shì)力將會(huì)動(dòng)員起來反對(duì)殖民主義政策。附庸國(guó)人民對(duì)宗主國(guó)的不滿也將會(huì)受到挑唆。盡管這些著名的和附庸國(guó)家的人民會(huì)被鼓勵(lì)爭(zhēng)取實(shí)現(xiàn)脫離西方大國(guó)統(tǒng)治的獨(dú)立，實(shí)際上，由蘇聯(lián)控制的傀儡政治勢(shì)力會(huì)在積極準(zhǔn)備，一旦獨(dú)立實(shí)現(xiàn)，他們即會(huì)上臺(tái)控制政權(quán)。

三、任何一個(gè)有可能阻礙蘇聯(lián)的政策目的推行的外國(guó)政府將會(huì)受到下臺(tái)和解散的壓力。這種壓力可能在三種情況下出現(xiàn)：政府公開直接反對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的對(duì)外政策目標(biāo)（如土耳其、伊朗）；政府關(guān)閉國(guó)境線以阻止共產(chǎn)黨的滲透（如瑞士、葡萄牙）；政府在那些對(duì)共產(chǎn)黨控制十分重要的人群中爭(zhēng)取到的認(rèn)同的力度很大，如英國(guó)的工黨政府。（有時(shí)，上述兩種情況在同一國(guó)家出現(xiàn)。一旦如此，共產(chǎn)黨的反擊將會(huì)尤其激烈和殘酷。）

四、作為一條法則，共產(chǎn)黨分子在國(guó)外的活動(dòng)，是為了消滅個(gè)人任何形式的獨(dú)立，無論是經(jīng)濟(jì)上的，政治上的，還是道德方面的。他們的制度只能對(duì)付那些已經(jīng)被迫完全依附于更高的權(quán)威的人。據(jù)此，所有經(jīng)濟(jì)上獨(dú)立者——諸如企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者、不動(dòng)產(chǎn)擁有者、成功的農(nóng)民和藝術(shù)家，以及所有在當(dāng)?shù)厣鐓^(qū)具有信譽(yù)和起領(lǐng)袖作用的人，例如受人愛戴的牧師或地方政治人物，都是需要被詛咒、被打擊的人。即便是在蘇聯(lián)內(nèi)部，地方官員也會(huì)不間斷地異地任職，以防他們?cè)谝坏卦?。蘇聯(lián)這樣的做法實(shí)在不只是一個(gè)巧合。

五、（莫斯科）將會(huì)竭盡其能，使得西方主要大國(guó)出現(xiàn)相互敵對(duì)。在美國(guó)人民中，將會(huì)造出反英的輿論，在英國(guó)人中，將會(huì)煽動(dòng)反美的情緒。包括德國(guó)等歐洲大陸國(guó)家，將會(huì)出現(xiàn)反對(duì)盎格魯-撒克遜權(quán)利的言論。所有存在這些情緒的國(guó)家，將會(huì)受到進(jìn)一步煽動(dòng)，那些不存在這些情緒的國(guó)家，將會(huì)受到挑唆。所有能夠詆毀和破壞任何形式的、將俄羅斯排斥在外的團(tuán)結(jié)和一致的可能都會(huì)受到利用。因此，任何形式的國(guó)際組織，只要有礙共產(chǎn)主義分子的滲透和控制，武力是天主教會(huì)，國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)合作組織，或是貴族和皇室的國(guó)際同盟，必將處于來自它們的議論炮火攻擊之中。

六、總而言之，蘇聯(lián)通過非官方平臺(tái)的所作所為，從性質(zhì)上看，是消極的，具有破壞性的，是為了摧毀蘇聯(lián)控制以外的所有力量的根源而設(shè)計(jì)的。這與蘇聯(lián)與對(duì)手不能妥協(xié)、建設(shè)只有在共產(chǎn)主義勢(shì)力取得控制后才能開始的本能認(rèn)知是完全相符合的。然而在此背后，所實(shí)施的是對(duì)外國(guó)政府不懈的、堅(jiān)韌不拔的滲透壓力，直至取得對(duì)政府內(nèi)主要機(jī)構(gòu)——特別是警察系統(tǒng)——的控制。蘇聯(lián)的政權(quán)是一個(gè)無與倫比的警察政權(quán)，由于沙皇時(shí)代的半明半暗的專制陰謀傳統(tǒng)，他們已經(jīng)習(xí)慣了將使用警察力量放在首要考慮的位置。任何人在探測(cè)蘇聯(lián)人動(dòng)機(jī)時(shí)都不得忽視這一點(diǎn)。

Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.

2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women's organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR

5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.

7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage. [)]

(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].

(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in ganging Soviet motives.

第五部分 從美國(guó)政策角度的可行性推斷。

概括起來，我們所面對(duì)的是這樣一個(gè)政治力量，它堅(jiān)信與美國(guó)的妥協(xié)根本不可能，堅(jiān)信為了蘇聯(lián)權(quán)利的安全必須破壞我們的社會(huì)的內(nèi)部和諧，必須消滅我們賴以生存的傳統(tǒng)生活方式，必須摧毀我們國(guó)家在國(guó)際上的權(quán)威。這個(gè)政治力量孕育并成長(zhǎng)于極其深厚、極其強(qiáng)烈的俄羅斯民族主義的思潮之中，完全控制了世界上最偉大之一的民族和人民的能量和世界上資源最為富饒的國(guó)土。此外，這個(gè)政治對(duì)手還擁有一架能夠在其他國(guó)家發(fā)揮影響力的經(jīng)過精心制作的龐大的組織機(jī)器，這部機(jī)器具有驚人的靈活性和持久性，操縱這部機(jī)器的人，他們采用地下方式的技巧和經(jīng)驗(yàn)是史無前例的。最后，從其基本反應(yīng)上看，這個(gè)政治對(duì)手對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)似乎視而不見，充耳不聞。對(duì)其而言，人類社會(huì)浩瀚的客觀事實(shí)，不是作為不斷衡量和改進(jìn)思維的參照系，而是作為一個(gè)用來人為地、隨意地選個(gè)別現(xiàn)象去支撐其早已形成的思維的百寶囊。這種對(duì)待客觀事實(shí)的態(tài)度與我們恰恰相反。顯然，這里所描繪的并非一幅讓人賞心悅目的前景。然而，如何面對(duì)這樣一個(gè)對(duì)手和力量，無疑已成為我們外交上從未經(jīng)歷的最大挑戰(zhàn)，恐怕也將是我們未來所面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)。如何應(yīng)對(duì)這樣的挑戰(zhàn)，應(yīng)該是我們目前的政治和政策設(shè)計(jì)者制定（對(duì)外政策）的出發(fā)點(diǎn)。對(duì)于這樣的挑戰(zhàn)，必須以戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間解決重大戰(zhàn)略問題時(shí)的全面、慎重和小心對(duì)待它，而且如果必要，還要在計(jì)劃方面做出同樣大的努力，來處理這個(gè)問題。至于答案是什么，在這里我是無法提出的。但是，我希望能借此明確地表述我的觀點(diǎn)：我們完全具有解決這個(gè)難題的力量，而且完全可以避免采用一場(chǎng)大的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的形式。為了支持我的這一觀點(diǎn)，請(qǐng)?jiān)试S我提出如下一些令人振奮的觀察：

一、蘇聯(lián)的實(shí)力，與希特勒的德國(guó)不一樣，既不是基于長(zhǎng)期陰謀策劃，也不具備冒險(xiǎn)性。它如何按計(jì)劃行事是不會(huì)得逞的，它也冒不必要的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因?yàn)樗鼘?duì)理性分析無動(dòng)于衷，對(duì)邏輯的力量又是高度敏感。基于這個(gè)理由，當(dāng)任何時(shí)候出現(xiàn)抵抗時(shí)，它是可能——常常也這樣——退卻的。所以，假若它的對(duì)手擁有足夠的力量并明確地展示使用這個(gè)力量的決心，那么，（它的對(duì)手）實(shí)際上使用這個(gè)力量的可能幾乎不存在。（我們）只要將類似的局勢(shì)妥善地處理好，那么，出現(xiàn)拿聲望做賭注而介入軍事沖突的必要性也是很小的。

二、面對(duì)作為一個(gè)整體的西方世界，蘇聯(lián)人仍然是處于弱勢(shì)的一方。因此，蘇聯(lián)人能否扭轉(zhuǎn)劣勢(shì)，取決于西方世界所展示的團(tuán)結(jié)、堅(jiān)定和魄力的程度。而我們具備影響這個(gè)因素的實(shí)力。

三、作為一種內(nèi)部政權(quán)的形式，蘇維埃政權(quán)的優(yōu)越之處迄今尚未得到證明。它仍然不得不證明，這個(gè)政權(quán)是能夠經(jīng)受得住權(quán)利從一個(gè)人或一個(gè)團(tuán)體向另一個(gè)人或團(tuán)體交接這樣一個(gè)根本的考驗(yàn)。列寧的逝世，是這個(gè)權(quán)利的首次交接，它所產(chǎn)生的影響讓蘇聯(lián)國(guó)家15年間不得安生。斯大林的去世或退休，就是這個(gè)權(quán)力交接的第二次考驗(yàn)，而即便這次也不會(huì)是最后一次這樣的考驗(yàn)。由于它近期的領(lǐng)土擴(kuò)張，蘇聯(lián)統(tǒng)治制度將會(huì)碰到一連串更多的麻煩，而這些麻煩曾令過去的沙皇們頭痛不已。在這里的我們完全有利于相信，自從內(nèi)戰(zhàn)結(jié)束之后，俄羅斯廣大民眾對(duì)共產(chǎn)主義教條的心理反感，從未像今天這樣強(qiáng)烈。在俄羅斯，政黨已經(jīng)從未一個(gè)龐大而有效——起碼在目前——的獨(dú)裁統(tǒng)治機(jī)器，但是，這個(gè)政黨已經(jīng)不再是鼓舞人們情感的源泉。據(jù)此，（蘇維埃）運(yùn)動(dòng)的內(nèi)部健康和長(zhǎng)久并不可以看作是一個(gè)確定的事實(shí)。

四、所有蘇聯(lián)安全區(qū)域以外的蘇維埃式的宣傳，本質(zhì)上是消極而具有破壞性的。因此，通過充滿智慧和具有建設(shè)性意義的宣傳將其打敗，相對(duì)是容易的。

基于上述理由，我認(rèn)為，我們應(yīng)該冷靜、理智地處理俄羅斯問題。至于具體如何實(shí)施，我謹(jǐn)希望以本文的結(jié)束語的方式提出以下建議：

一、我們的第一步必須是對(duì)我們所面對(duì)的（共產(chǎn)主義）運(yùn)動(dòng)的實(shí)質(zhì)予以了解，并認(rèn)識(shí)其客觀存在。我們必須像醫(yī)生診斷一個(gè)難以控制的不可理喻的病人那樣，用同樣的勇氣，同樣客觀態(tài)度，同樣的中立立場(chǎng)和同樣的決心去研究這個(gè)問題，避免受其感情上困惑或干擾。

二、我們必須教育我們的公眾，了解俄羅斯問題的真相。對(duì)這一點(diǎn)的重要性，我無論如何強(qiáng)調(diào)都是不過分的。為此，單靠新聞界已無法做到，政府必須擔(dān)負(fù)起主要責(zé)任，因?yàn)檎畬?duì)所面對(duì)的實(shí)際問題的認(rèn)識(shí)更為清晰，處理問題的經(jīng)驗(yàn)更為充分。我們沒有必要在問題的黑暗面前怯而止步。我堅(jiān)信，一旦我們的民眾了解到這個(gè)情勢(shì)的真相，那種歇斯底里地反蘇情緒會(huì)得到大大緩解，因?yàn)闆]有什么再比不知情要更為危險(xiǎn)，更為可怕。當(dāng)然，認(rèn)為更多地暴露我們針對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的困難以至不利于美蘇關(guān)系的觀點(diǎn)也成立。我認(rèn)為，假如真的存在著危機(jī)，那么，我們就必須有勇氣去面對(duì)它，而且越早越有利。但是，我實(shí)在看不出我們會(huì)觸發(fā)怎樣的危機(jī)。即使我們追求的是與俄羅斯人民的偉大友誼，我們?cè)趪?guó)內(nèi)的（政治）賭注也是很小的。實(shí)際上（在俄羅斯），我們沒有什么投資需要保護(hù)，不會(huì)失去任何具有實(shí)質(zhì)意義的貿(mào)易，不需要保護(hù)多少本國(guó)公民，也沒有太多的文化交流需要保留。我們唯一的賭注，是我們希望得到的，而非我們實(shí)際上已經(jīng)擁有的。我堅(jiān)信，只要我們的公眾受到教育，只要我們與蘇聯(lián)的交往完全置于現(xiàn)實(shí)的客觀的基礎(chǔ)之上，我們實(shí)現(xiàn)期望的可能性將會(huì)大得多。

三、（我們應(yīng)對(duì)蘇聯(lián)問題的挑戰(zhàn)）相當(dāng)程度上必須依賴于我們社會(huì)的健康和活力。世界共產(chǎn)主義就像是一種惡性的寄生蟲，只會(huì)發(fā)生在生了病的肌膚組織上生存。在這一點(diǎn)上，國(guó)內(nèi)和對(duì)外政策便交織在一起。每一個(gè)能夠解決我們自身社會(huì)問題（的政策），每一個(gè)可以提升我們自己人民的自信心、紀(jì)律性、士氣和集體精神的勇敢而堅(jiān)定的舉動(dòng)，都是針對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的一個(gè)外交勝利，這要比集體精神的勇敢而堅(jiān)定的舉動(dòng)，都是針對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的一個(gè)外交勝利，這要比數(shù)千個(gè)（與莫斯科之間產(chǎn)生的）外交文件和共同聲明要更有價(jià)值得多。假若我們無法消除宿命論的影響，無法改變我們的社會(huì)面對(duì)（外部）挑戰(zhàn)的漠然，莫斯科將得分，因?yàn)槟箍茻o法不利用（我們的）這些（弱點(diǎn)）在外交政策上獲利。

四、我們必須對(duì)其他國(guó)家展現(xiàn)和描繪出一個(gè)我們所希望看到的，但要比以前更加積極、更加富有建設(shè)性的世界的前景。只是希望別人按我們的政治模式發(fā)展是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不夠的。不少的國(guó)家與人民，起碼在歐洲，由于過去的經(jīng)歷已經(jīng)疲憊不堪，而且（對(duì)歷史的重演）懼怕萬分，因此，他們對(duì)自身的安全的興趣遠(yuǎn)比對(duì)抽象的自由要大得多。他們需要的是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，并非只是責(zé)任。我們必須比蘇聯(lián)提供更多他們所需求的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。如果我們不這樣去做的話，俄羅斯人是一定會(huì)責(zé)無旁貸的。

五、最后，我們必須對(duì)堅(jiān)守我們的人類社會(huì)的信念和方式充滿自信和勇氣。畢竟，在應(yīng)對(duì)蘇聯(lián)共產(chǎn)主義挑戰(zhàn)中最大的危險(xiǎn)，是我們讓自己變成了我們所需要應(yīng)對(duì)者那樣。

Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent?modus vivendi?that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

喬治凱南

800.00B 國(guó)際紅日/2 - 2546: 航空電報(bào)

KENNAN

800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram