? ? ?Meanwhile, encouraged by the successes which marked the entry of?SIS into the technical age, an even bolder enterprise was being?contemplated. If it succeeded it would turn 'Y' into a vast organisation,?almost a small intelligence service on its own and an unrivalled source?of information on the Soviet armed forces.

【與此同時，由于受到新技術成功的鼓舞，SIS正在設想一種更大膽的計劃。如果它成功了，它將把“Y”變成一個龐大的組織，幾乎是一個小型的情報機構，一個無與倫比的關于蘇聯(lián)軍事力量信息的來源?！?/p>

? ? ?In the middle of 1953, with the Vienna telephone taps producing a steady?stream of valuable traffic, Peter lunn, his reputation enormously?enhanced and now one of the most powerful figures in the Service,?was appointed Head of the Berlin station. If the post of SIS?representative in Washington is considered the plum of the Service?from a prestige point of view that of Head of the Berlin station was, at that?time, far and away the most important from an operational?aspect.

【1953年中期，維也納的竊聽帶來了源源不斷的情報，彼得·倫恩被任命為柏林站的站長，他獲得了很高的贊譽，現(xiàn)在他是情報處最有權勢的人物之一。如果從聲望的角度來看，情報系統(tǒng)駐華盛頓代表的職位被認為是情報處的美差，那么從技術的角度來看，柏林站站長的職位在當時無疑是最重要的?！?/p>

? ? ?It is not surprising after his success in Vienna that Peter tackled the?problem of getting intelligence on the Soviet armed forces stationed in?East Germany in very much the same manner. With his usual energy,?one of the first things he did was to set up a special technical section in?the station at the head of which he put a British Post Office engineer?on loan to SIS. This section was given the task of studying the intelligence?obtained from sources in the East German telephone?service with a view to working out plans for possible cable tapping?operations.

【在維也納取得成功后，彼得以同樣的方式解決了獲取駐扎在東德的蘇聯(lián)武裝部隊情報的難題，這并不令人驚訝。憑借他一貫的精力，他做的第一件事就是在車站建立了一個特殊的技術部門，他把一名英國郵局的工程師借調(diào)到SIS擔任這個部門的負責人。該部門的任務是研究從東德竊聽部門獲得的情報的來源，以便為之后的竊聽行動制訂計劃?！?/p>

? ? ?It was not long before this section was able to put forward three?concrete proposals. The most promising of these envisaged an operation?against three Soviet cables, running close to the boundary of the?American enclave at Alt Glienicke near Berlin which juts deeply into?the Soviet zone. In order to carry out this operation it would be?necessary to do two things: dig a tunnel advancing more than 600?yards into DDR territory, and obtain the co-operation of the Americans.

【不久之后，該部門就提出三項具體建議。其中最有希望的是針對三條蘇聯(lián)電纜的行動，這三條電纜靠近柏林附近的美國飛地阿爾特列尼克的邊界，這條線深入到蘇聯(lián)地區(qū)。為了實施這一行動，需要做兩件事:挖一條延伸600多碼的隧道進入德意志民主共和國的領土，并獲得美國人的合作?！?/p>

? ? ?The number and size of the cables as well as the distance they were?located from the sector boundary made this operation an infinitely?more complex undertaking than anything that had been done in?Vienna. Moreover, because of the permanent tension generated by the?Berlin question, it was politically far more hazardous. When the preliminary?discussions within SIS itself had been concluded and?approval had been obtained in principle, the Foreign Office and the?service ministries were consulted. The dividends expected from this?operation were such that any hesitations on the part of the former were?swept away by the enthusiasm of the latter. The general consensus?was that the risks and expenses would be amply justified by the vast?amount of hard intelligence that could be expected from this?operation.

【由于電纜的數(shù)量和大小以及它們與區(qū)域邊界之間的距離，這一行動比在維也納所做的任何工作都要復雜得多。此外，由于柏林問題造成的長期緊張局勢，它在政治上要危險得多。在SIS內(nèi)部的初步討論結束并原則上獲得核準后，就同外交部和各服務部門進行了協(xié)商。預期從這次行動中得到的好處使得前者的任何猶豫都會被后者的熱情所沖淡。普遍的共識是，這次行動所帶來的大量可靠情報將充分證明風險和費用是合理的?！?/p>

? ? ?The two principal experts, Mr Taylor who was to make the tap, and?Mr Balmain, who would have to supervise the construction of the?tunnel, had already studied the project and given their verdict that it?was practicable. The next step was to approach the CIA in?Washington. As they had been regularly receiving the Vienna?bulletins and at once saw the infinitely greater possibilities offered by?the Berlin plan, which had been given the codename 'Stop-watch?Gold', they needed no persuading and were at once enthusiastic. In?February 1954 the CIA sent a strong team of their experts to London?to begin detailed discussions and lay down the framework for future?co-operation. The team of five officers was headed by Rowlett, who at that?time was Head of the Soviet section in the CIA. Also present was?Bill Harvey the Head of the CIA station in Berlin. This Texan had?rather a Wild West approach to intelligence and, as if wishing to?deliberately draw attention to this, always carried a six-shooter in an?arm holster with him. Its unseemly bulge under his too-tight jacket?looked somewhat incongruous in the quiet elegance of Tom Gimson's?office in Carlton Gardens where the meetings were held.

【兩位主要專家，負責管道施工的泰勒先生和監(jiān)督隧道施工的巴爾曼先生，已經(jīng)研究過這個項目，并得出了結論，認為這個項目是可行的。下一步是聯(lián)系華盛頓的中央情報局。由于他們經(jīng)常收到維也納公報，他們立即看到代號為“黃金秒表”的柏林計劃提供了無限的可能性，因此他們不需要說服，便充滿熱情。1954年2月，中央情報局派出一支由專家組成的強大團隊前往倫敦，展開詳細討論，并為未來的合作制定框架。這個由五名官員組成的小組由羅萊特領導，他當時是中央情報局蘇聯(lián)部門的負責人。柏林中央情報局局長比爾·哈維也出席了會議。這個德州人對情報工作有一種西部蠻荒的態(tài)度，似乎故意要引起人們的注意，他總是在胳膊上的槍套里裝著一支六發(fā)手槍。在他那件過緊的夾克下，那件衣服顯得不太得體地鼓了起來，與卡爾頓花園湯姆·吉姆森那間安靜優(yōu)雅的辦公室里開會的地方顯得有些不協(xié)調(diào)?！?/p>

? ? ?The SIS side was led by George Young, then still Director of?Requirements and soon to become Vice-Chief. Peter Lunn was there?as the initiator of the project and Tom Gimson as the expert on the?processing side. Other British authorities were called in as their aspect?of the operation came up for discussion. I kept the minutes of the?meeting.

【SIS方面由喬治·楊領導，當時還是需求部門的主任，很快就成為副主任。彼得·倫恩是項目的發(fā)起人，湯姆·吉姆森是處理方面的專家。其他英國當局也被叫來討論行動。我做了會議記錄?！?/p>

? ? ?The morning sessions were always prolonged over lunch to which?each side entertained the other in one of the smarter West End?restaurants. The afternoons were taken up with detailed discussions?between the experts of both sides. The atmosphere was cordial and?businesslike. The Americans were clearly anxious to get down to brass?tacks and work out as quickly as possible a detailed plan for?submission to Washington.

【上午的會議總是延長到午餐時間，雙方在倫敦西區(qū)一家比較高檔的餐館里招待對方。下午雙方專家進行了詳細的討論。氣氛親切而嚴肅。顯然，美國人急于進入正題，盡快制定出一份詳細的計劃提交給華盛頓?！?/p>

? ? ?First the broad outlines of co-operation were laid down. The?Americans would provide the money, the necessary cover facilities in?Berlin and the manual labour required. The British would supply the technical?equipment, the experts in the various fields and the?monitoring staff. The processing and evaluation of the intelligence?obtained would be carried out by joint CIA-SIS teams. The end?product would be shared by the two services. As the processing centre?would be located in London, it would be headed by an SIS officer?with an American as his deputy.

【首先，雙方確定了合作的大致框架。美國人將提供資金，在柏林提供必要的掩護設施和所需的體力勞動。英國將提供技術設備、各領域的專家和監(jiān)測人員。對所獲得的情報的處理和評估將由CIA和SIS的聯(lián)合小組進行。最終獲得的情報將由這兩個機構共享。由于處理中心將設在倫敦，它將由一名SIS官員領導，一名美國人作為他的副手?！?/p>

? ? ?In Berlin an American Army store would be built in the Alt?Glienicke area to provide cover for the digging operation and to house?the large monitoring station. The tunnel would run some twenty-four?feet deep from the Army store along a cemetery to the Schoenefelder?road under which ran the three Soviet cables. These contained direct?trunk lines connecting the Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst with?Moscow, as well as a large number of other military telephone lines.?The taps themselves would be located in a shaft-like tapchamber?only a few feet underground. The monitoring station, equipped?with transformers, amplifiers, recording machines and the latest?miscellaneous electronic equipment would be installed in vast?chambers under the Army store. An elaborate alarm system would be?installed which would give immediate warning if any unauthorised?person penetrated the tunnel. Heavy sliding steel doors would secure?the monitoring area from entry from the Eastern side. At the point?where the tunnel crossed the zonal boundary it would be closed off by?barrier of sandbags. Finally?a special air service would be laid on to?fly the take daily to London for processing.

【在柏林，美國軍隊將在阿爾特格列尼克地區(qū)建造一個倉庫，為挖掘工作提供掩護，并為大型監(jiān)測站提供住所。這條隧道大約有24英尺深，從軍需倉庫沿著墓地一直延伸到舍恩菲爾德路，在這條路下面有三條蘇聯(lián)電纜。這些線路包括直接連接位于卡爾肖斯特的蘇聯(lián)總部和莫斯科的干線，以及大量其他軍用電話線。監(jiān)測站配有變壓器、放大器、錄音機和最新的各種電子設備，將安裝在陸軍倉庫下面的巨大房間里。該處會安裝一套精密的警報系統(tǒng)，一旦有違例人士進入隧道，便會立即發(fā)出警告。沉重的滑動鋼門將確保監(jiān)控區(qū)域從東側進入。在隧道穿過區(qū)域邊界的地方，它將被沙袋阻隔。最后，將安排一種特殊的航空服務，每天將這些乘客送往倫敦辦理手續(xù)?！?/p>

? ? ?It might at this point be helpful to give a brief account of the general?relationship between SIS and CIA at that time.

【在這一點上，簡要敘述一下當時SIS和CIA之間的一般關系可能會有所幫助?！?/p>

? ? ?On the whole, co-operation between SIS and CIA was extremely?close, though for reasons inherent in the character of these organisations?there was always bound to be a certain amount of reserve on both?sides. It is true that SIS, with its historic reputation and long?experience, had been called in to act as midwife at the birth of CIA in?the years immediately after the war when the USA had felt the need?for a permanent intelligence service. In the person of Kim Philby, it?had then had a guiding hand in the organisation of the new service and?in the light of subsequent events it may possibly not have been the?only guiding hand. But soon the young stripling had outgrown its?mentor and, with far greater resources in money and manpower, had?become the senior partner. Though its methods of operating were on?the whole not to the liking of most SIS officers who, both by tradition?and necessity, practised a more subtle approach and favoured more?discreet ways of getting hold of intelligence, CIA, by sheer force of?numbers and money, was able to produce far more information than?SIS, with all its experience and know-how, could ever hope to lay?hands on.

【總體來說，SIS和CIA之間的合作是非常密切的，盡管由于這些組織固有的原因，雙方總是有一定的保留。誠然，在二戰(zhàn)結束后不久，美國覺得有必要建立一個永久性的情報機構時，SIS憑借其歷史聲譽和長期經(jīng)驗，在CIA誕生之初就被召來充當助產(chǎn)士。在金·菲爾比(Kim Philby)的領導下，它在新服務的組織中起到了指導作用，鑒于隨后發(fā)生的事件，它可能不是唯一的指導作用。但很快，這個年輕的小伙子就長大了，超過了他的導師，在財力和人力上都有了更大的資源，成為了資深合伙人?？偟膩碚f，它的運作方式并不符合SIS局大多數(shù)官員的喜好，無論是傳統(tǒng)的還是必要的，他們都采用了更微妙的方法和更謹慎的獲取情報的方法，而CIA僅僅依靠數(shù)量和金錢就能提供比SIS多得多的情報，它所有的經(jīng)驗和技術，都能指望得到?！?/p>

? ? ?Contacts between SIS and CIA covered a wide field of activity.?Some large-scale intelligence operations were jointly run. For?instance, the British and Americans together financed and controlled for?intelligence purposes the anti-Soviet emigre organisation, NTS.?This operation, run under the code name 'Shrapnel', cost a lot of money, but produced poor results. Having come to the conclusion?that NTS operations in the Soviet Union had come almost completely?under Soviet control, SIS decided in 1955 to pull out and leave the?tiresome job of dealing with Russian emigres to its American partner.

【SIS和CIA之間的聯(lián)系涉及廣泛的活動領域。一些大規(guī)模的情報行動是聯(lián)合進行的。例如，英國和美國為了情報目的共同資助和控制反蘇移民組織NTS。這次代號為“彈片”的行動耗資巨大，但效果不佳。在得出NTS在蘇聯(lián)的運作幾乎完全在蘇聯(lián)控制之下的結論后，SIS在1955年決定撤出，把處理俄羅斯移民的煩人工作交給它的美國伙伴?！?/p>

? ? ?This liaison between the British and American intelligence services?was chiefly conducted through the SIS Washington station and CIA's?station in London. The latter office had a large staff dealing with a number?of Government departments (MI5, the Joint Intelligence?Committee, the Joint Intelligence Bureau, the Foreign Office and?others) but their main link was with SIS, which was broadly speaking?responsible for their activities in the United Kingdom.

【英美情報機構之間的聯(lián)絡主要是通過SIS華盛頓站和CIA倫敦站進行的。后一個辦事處有大量工作人員與若干政府部門(軍情五處、聯(lián)合情報委員會、聯(lián)合情報局、外交部和其他部門)打交道，但它們的主要聯(lián)系是與情報系統(tǒng)聯(lián)系，一般來說，情報系統(tǒng)負責它們在聯(lián)合王國的活動?！?/p>

? ? ?CIA often discussed plans and operations with SIS before informing?the State Department of them. Care had to be taken therefore that no reference?was made in Foreign Office telegrams to joint SIS-CIA?operations or plans. Failure to observe this precaution had in the past?resulted in the State Department becoming aware of CIA plans before?they had been submitted to it for clearance, thus causing embarrassment to CIA and SIS relations.

【中央情報局經(jīng)常在向國務院通報計劃和行動之前與SIS進行討論。因此，需要注意的是，外交部的電報中沒有提到SIS-CIA的聯(lián)合行動或計劃。在過去，由于未能遵守這一預防措施，美國國務院在CIA的計劃提交給它審批之前就知道了，從而給CIA和SIS的關系造成了損害。】

? ? ?There was an understanding that CIA would not recruit British?citizens without SIS approval and SIS would not recruit American?citizens without CIA approval. Equally CIA would not carry out?intelligence operations in the United Kingdom without submitting?details to SIS and obtaining its approval.

【有一項共識是，CIA不會在沒有得到SIS批準的情況下招募英國公民，SIS也不會在沒有得到CIA批準的情況下招募美國公民。同樣，如果沒有向SIS提交細節(jié)并獲得其批準，CIA也不會在英國開展情報活動?！?/p>

? ? ?Not every one in SIS welcomed these close ties with the Americans.?George Young, when he was Vice-Chief, said in one of his talks to?senior SIS officers about Anglo-American relations in general, and?SIS-CIA relations in particular: 'If we were in the position of?England at the time of the first Elizabeth with the same unscrupulous?adventurism of the first Elizabethans, the situation would not be?difficult to play for our Government . . . But Britain would have to?keep a free hand, as free as Elizabeth always left herself in her dealings?with Spain, France, the Netherlands and the Muscovites. For better or?for worse, we have thrown in our lot with the Americans.?Interdependence has meant that we are embroiled more and more?with CIA in any major project. It is the Prime Minister's policy "to?carry the Americans with us", as the saying goes. The snag of course is?that in a number of spheres of SIS-CIA co-operation the Americans?might drag us back or even down with them and it is a delicate and difficult?matter to handle.'

【并不是所有SIS成員都歡迎與美國的這種密切關系。喬治·楊在擔任副局長時，曾在一次與SIS高級官員的談話中談到英美關系，特別是SIS與CIA的關系:“如果我們處在伊麗莎白一世時期的英國的地位，有著伊麗莎白一世時期的那種冒險主義，那么我們政府的處境就不難了……但英國必須自由行事，就像伊麗莎白在處理西班牙，法國，荷蘭和莫斯科人時所做的那樣不管是好是壞，我們都和美國人在一起。相互依賴意味著我們在任何重大項目中都越來越多地與中情局糾纏在一起。正如俗話所說，首相的政策是“讓美國人與我們同在”。當然，問題是，在SIS-CIA的多個領域的合作中，美國人可能會把我們拖回去，甚至拖下去，這是一個微妙而困難的問題。”】

? ? ?No doubt this was an expression of his personal views, but, I think,?it is true to say that it reflected fairly accurately those tacitly held by?the great majority of SIS officers.

【毫無疑問，這是他個人觀點的表達，但我認為，可以說，這相當準確地反映了絕大多數(shù)SIS官員所默認的觀點?！?/p>

? ? ?I want to make it quite clear here that, apart from my involvement?in the initial stages of operation 'Stop-watch Gold', the codename?allotted by the SIS Registry Office to the Berlin tunnel operation, I?have myself never at any stage in my career in SIS had any official?contact with the CIA or been engaged in joint operations with that?organisation.

【我想在這里明確說明，除了我參與了"黃金秒表"行動的初始階段，這是SIS登記處分配給柏林隧道行動的代號，我本人在SIS的職業(yè)生涯中從未與CIA有過任何官方聯(lián)系或參與過與該組織的聯(lián)合行動?！?/p>

? ? ?When the Americans left they took with them to Washington?detailed plans of every aspect of the operation. It so happened that two?days later I had my regular meeting with my Soviet contact. I handed?to him film of the minutes taken at the meetings together with the?accompanying sketches and plans which I had been able to photograph?in my office during lunchtime the previous day. I told him in broad?outline about the Berlin project and pointed out to him the great?secrecy with which the operation was surrounded and the necessity for?taking particular care that any counter-measures the Soviet authorities?might take should look natural and not create the suspicion that they?were aware of what was afoot. My Soviet opposite number was much?impressed with the audacity of the scheme and its magnitude and?asked me to meet him again soon so that we could discuss it in more?detail and I could keep him informed of any fresh developments.

【當美國人離開時，他們帶著行動各個方面的詳細計劃來到華盛頓。碰巧的是，兩天后，我和我的蘇聯(lián)聯(lián)絡人進行了常規(guī)會面。我把會議記錄的膠片，以及附帶的草圖和計劃交給了他，這些都是我前一天午餐時間在辦公室里拍攝的。我把柏林計劃的大致內(nèi)容告訴了他，并向他指出，這次行動的秘密程度非常高，而且必須特別小心，蘇聯(lián)當局采取的任何應對措施看上去都應該很自然，而不能讓人懷疑他們知道正在進行的行動。我的蘇聯(lián)聯(lián)絡人對這一計劃的大膽和規(guī)模印象深刻，他請我不久再與他見面，以便我們可以更詳細地討論這個問題，如果有任何新進展，我可以隨時通知他?！?/p>

? ? ?When we met again a week later he told me that in view of the?importance of the information and its secrecy he had taken the?photographed documents to Moscow himself. There they were now?being studied in order to work out appropriate protective measures.?As far as he could see at this stage these would probably be limited to?diverting the most important and secret traffic to other routes. He?had, however, been especially instructed to assure me that no steps?would be taken which could be interpreted as evidence that the?Soviets knew or even suspected that their cables were no longer?secure. The safeguarding of my position was considered of paramount?importance. The operation would therefore be allowed to take its?normal course. Indeed, it might be possible to make use of it to Soviet?advantage.

【一個星期后我們再次見面時，他告訴我，考慮到情報的重要性和機密性，他已親自把那些照片文件帶到莫斯科去了。目前正在那里對它們進行研究，以便制定適當?shù)谋Ｗo措施。就他目前所知，這可能僅限于將最重要和最秘密的情報轉(zhuǎn)移到其他路線。然而，他被特別指示向我保證，不會采取任何可能被解讀為證據(jù)的措施，表明蘇聯(lián)知道甚至懷疑他們的電報不再安全。保衛(wèi)我的地位被認為是最重要的。因此，將允許這項行動按照其正常進程進行。事實上，蘇聯(lián)有可能利用它來為自己謀利?！?/p>

? ? ?How had it come about that I, who had been so proud on that?morning in August 1944 when Colonel Cordeaux RM, Chief of the?Northern Area (CNA), had told me in his office on the eighth floor of?54 Broadway Buildings that I was now a member of the legendary?British Secret Service, so proud that I could hardly believe my luck,?was now freely and willingly divulging information on the most?sensitive and secret operations of that service to a representative of?the Soviet Union? To explain this, I will have to start with the story of?my life and above all relate how it shaped and changed, in the course?of time, my religious and ideological convictions and brought me to?the situation in which I now found myself.

【1944年8月的那個早晨，北區(qū)的首長科多·雷上校，他在他的辦公室里告訴我，我現(xiàn)在是傳奇般的英國特勤局的一員。而為什么現(xiàn)在是在自由和自愿地向蘇聯(lián)代表泄露有關該機構最敏感和秘密行動的情報?為了解釋這一點，我將不得不從我的生活故事開始，最重要的是講述它是如何在時間的過程中塑造和改變我的宗教和意識形態(tài)信念，并將我?guī)У轿椰F(xiàn)在所處的境地?！?/p>