Inside the Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank

硅谷銀行風(fēng)暴背后的雄心和失誤

By Maureen Farrell

March 15, 2023

作者：莫琳·法瑞爾

2023年3月15日

在倒閉前夕，信用評級機構(gòu)穆迪發(fā)出的警告，令硅谷銀行慌忙采取對策。

JASON HENRY FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES Gregory Becker, CEO of Silicon Valley Bank, leaned back in his chair at a technology conference last week in San Francisco’s luxurious Palace Hotel, and delivered a bullish message. 上周，在舊金山皇宮精選酒店舉行的一次技術(shù)會議上，硅谷銀行首席執(zhí)行官格雷戈里·貝克爾靠在椅子上，發(fā)表了十分樂觀的看法。 In the confident, almost bombastic, style that was his signature, Becker told the audience of investors, Wall Street analysts and technology executives that Tuesday afternoon that the future of the tech industry was sparkling — and so was Silicon Valley Bank’s place within it. 周二下午，貝克爾以他標(biāo)志性的自信、幾近浮夸的風(fēng)格告訴投資者、華爾街分析師和技術(shù)企業(yè)高管，科技行業(yè)擁有閃耀的未來——硅谷銀行在其中的地位也是如此。 What he didn’t say was that, roughly a week earlier, rating agency Moody’s had called to tell Becker that his bank’s financial health was in jeopardy, and its bonds were in danger of being downgraded to junk. Realizing the bank needed to raise cash, Becker had been scrambling since then to fix things. 但他沒有說的是，大約一周前，評級機構(gòu)穆迪打電話告訴貝克爾，他的銀行的財務(wù)狀況處于危險之中，其債券有被降級為垃圾級的危險。貝克爾意識到銀行需要籌集現(xiàn)金，從那時起就一直在忙于解決問題。 That phone call set off a frantic scramble inside Silicon Valley Bank. Just one day after Becker projected confidence at the conference, the bank announced a $1.8 billion loss and a hastily put together plan to raise $2.25 billion in fresh capital. The news spooked the bank’s depositors and investors so much that on Thursday, its stock plummeted roughly 60% and clients pulled out roughly $40 billion of their money. 那通電話促使硅谷銀行內(nèi)部在慌亂中緊急采取行動。就在貝克爾在會議上展示信心一天后，該銀行宣布虧損18億美元，并倉促制定了一項籌集22.5億美元新資本的計劃。這一消息令該銀行的儲戶和投資者大為震驚，周四，其股價暴跌約60%，客戶撤出了約400億美元的資金。 By Friday, Silicon Valley Bank was dead. 到周五，硅谷銀行倒閉了。 The bank’s failure sent the stocks of more than a dozen small and midsize banks reeling on Monday, but they rebounded on Tuesday. But the rebound remains small compared to the scale of the losses inflicted in recent days. 該銀行的倒閉致使十幾家中小型銀行的股票在周一大跌，但在周二反彈。與最近幾天造成的損失規(guī)模相比，反彈幅度仍然很小。 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., which took over the bank, has since been trying to auction off all or parts of it. On Sunday night, the federal government said all customers would be made whole. 接管該銀行的聯(lián)邦存款保險公司此后一直試圖拍賣其全部或部分資產(chǎn)。周日晚上，聯(lián)邦政府表示所有客戶都將獲得存款全額補償。 The tale of Silicon Valley Bank is one of ambition and management mistakes, of a CEO who talked so much about innovation and the future that he and his lieutenants didn’t pay enough attention to the mundane but enormously important work of managing risk and ensuring financial prudence. When the bank was caught flat-footed in a rapidly changing economic environment, it waited till the last minute to try to avert its fate. 硅谷銀行是一個雄心壯志和管理失誤兼有的故事，其CEO過多地談?wù)搫?chuàng)新和未來，以至于他和他的副手們沒有足夠重視管理風(fēng)險和確保財務(wù)審慎的工作，這些工作十分枯燥但極其重要。當(dāng)銀行在瞬息萬變的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境中措手不及時，它直到最后一刻才試圖扭轉(zhuǎn)命運。 “This isn’t greed, necessarily, at the bank level,” said Danny Moses, an investor at Moses Ventures known for his role in predicting the 2008 financial crisis in the book and movie “The Big Short.” “這不一定是銀行層面的貪婪，”摩西風(fēng)險投資公司的投資者丹尼·摩西說。他因在小說和同名電影《大空頭》中對2008年金融危機的預(yù)測而聞名。 “It’s just bad risk management,” Moses added. “It was complete and utter bad risk management on the part of SVB.” “這就是差勁的風(fēng)險管理，”摩西還說?！笆荢VB完全、徹底的爛風(fēng)險管理?！?Becker could not be reached for comment. Former representatives of Silicon Valley Bank directed queries to the FDIC, which declined to comment. 本文無法聯(lián)系到貝克爾置評。前硅谷銀行代表將問題轉(zhuǎn)給聯(lián)邦存款保險公司，后者拒絕置評。 Silicon Valley Bank began in 1983 as a small community bank catering to fledgling tech companies. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, its fortunes and size grew along with the tech sector. 硅谷銀行成立于1983年，是一家小型社區(qū)銀行，專門為新興科技公司提供服務(wù)。在整個1980和90年代，它的財富和規(guī)模隨著科技行業(yè)的發(fā)展而增長。 After an ill-fated foray into real estate lending in the early 1990s, the bank returned to its roots, pitching its services to fast-growing but typically unprofitable companies during the internet boom. The bank also made a side bet on California wineries. 在1990年代初進軍房地產(chǎn)貸款領(lǐng)域遭遇失敗之后，銀行回歸本源，將其服務(wù)推向互聯(lián)網(wǎng)繁榮時期快速增長但通常尚未盈利的公司。銀行還對加州的酒莊下了邊注。

一名銀行分析師表示，自2011年以來擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官的格雷格·貝克爾“他對想要如何塑造硅谷銀行有著明確的愿景”。

PATRICK T. FALLON/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE — GETTY IMAGES Becker, who grew up on a farm in Indiana, joined the firm in 1993 shortly after graduating from Indiana University. He worked one year at another California bank in the early 1990s but otherwise spent his career at Silicon Valley Bank. 貝克爾在印第安納州的一個農(nóng)場長大，于1993年從印第安納大學(xué)畢業(yè)后不久進入公司。除了1990年代初期在加州另一家銀行工作過一年，他的職業(yè)生涯的其余時間都在硅谷銀行度過。 By 2011, when Becker was named CEO, the bank had expanded to dozens of cities in America and worldwide. He saw an opportunity to woo startups and venture capitalists with new offerings. 到2011年貝克爾被任命為首席執(zhí)行官時，銀行已將業(yè)務(wù)擴展到美國和全球的數(shù)十個城市。他看到了用新服務(wù)吸引初創(chuàng)企業(yè)和風(fēng)險資本家的機會。 “When Greg took over as CEO, he had a definitive vision for what he wanted Silicon Valley Bank to be,” said Timothy Coffey, a bank analyst at Janney Montgomery Scott. “He wanted to be the heart and soul of what we ended up calling the innovation economy.” “當(dāng)格雷格接任首席執(zhí)行官時，他對想要如何塑造硅谷銀行有著明確的愿景，”詹尼蒙哥馬利斯科特公司的銀行分析師蒂莫西·科菲說?！八氤蔀槲覀冏罱K稱之為創(chuàng)新經(jīng)濟的核心和靈魂?！?In that, Coffey said, he succeeded: “Nothing happened inside the Valley that didn’t involve Silicon Valley Bank.” 科菲說，在這一點上，他成功了：“硅谷內(nèi)發(fā)生的一切都與硅谷銀行有關(guān)?！?Based in Santa Clara, California, the bank had at least five offices in the Valley area, with an aesthetic that one person described as “part stainless-steel tech vibe, part VC resort vibe.” Wine fridges dotted the offices. Visitors to the office on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, the heart of the Silicon Valley ecosystem, often remarked on the display of wines from the vineyards the bank had financed. 銀行總部位于加利福尼亞州圣克拉拉，在硅谷地區(qū)至少設(shè)有五個辦事處，有人形容其審美就是“有點不銹鋼科技范兒，又有點VC度假地風(fēng)味”。辦公室里散布著酒柜。去過位于硅谷生態(tài)核心地帶的門洛公園沙山路上那家銀行的人經(jīng)常會注意到那里的葡萄酒展示，它們來自銀行投資的葡萄園。 From his earliest days as CEO, Becker kept a tight grip on the firm, said Adam Dean, a former president of SVB Asset Management who left more than a decade ago. “It was the church of Greg.” 十多年前離職的SVB資產(chǎn)管理公司前總裁亞當(dāng)·迪恩說，從擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官的最初幾天起，貝克爾就一直牢牢控制著公司?！霸谀抢锔窭赘裾f一不二?！?Becker positioned himself as a champion of innovation. In official bios, he described himself “an advocate for entrepreneurs, their investors and corporates in the innovation sector internationally.” He cultivated friendships with venture capitalists. 貝克爾將自己定位為創(chuàng)新的擁護者。在官方簡歷中，他稱自己是“國際創(chuàng)新領(lǐng)域創(chuàng)業(yè)者、投資者和企業(yè)的倡導(dǎo)者”。他與風(fēng)險資本家建立了友誼。 “Greg was always looking out five to 10 years,” said Coffey. “He was more of a VC than he was a banker.” “格雷格總是在展望五年到10年后，”科菲說。“與其說是銀行家，不如說他是風(fēng)投家?！?For thousands of founders and their venture capital backers, SVB became the bank of choice. That was reflected in its swelling deposits: By the end of 2021, the bank held $189.2 billion in deposits up from $102 billion in 2020 and $49 billion in 2018. Its stock price roughly tripled from 2018 to 2021. 對于數(shù)以千計的創(chuàng)始人和他們的風(fēng)險資本支持者來說，硅谷銀行成了首選。這反映在其不斷膨脹的存款上：到2021年底，該銀行持有1892億美元的存款，遠高于2020年的1020億美元和2018年的490億美元。從2018年到2021年，其股價大約翻了三倍。 Flush with cash to invest, Becker began to build an investment banking business to advise companies on mergers and initial public offerings, deals that bring in big fees. The bank offered large pay packages to bankers from bigger rivals. It bought a Boston bank for $900 million to manage money for wealthy clients on the East Coast. 貝克爾有了充足的現(xiàn)金可以投資，他開始建立投資銀行業(yè)務(wù)，為企業(yè)并購和首次公開募股提供咨詢，這些交易可以帶來大筆費用。銀行向那些為規(guī)模更大的競爭對手工作的銀行家開出了高薪待遇。以九億美元收購了一家波士頓銀行，為東海岸的富有客戶管理資金。 Despite its growth in deposits, the bank struggled to find ways to make money off them. Banks typically invest customer deposits in a variety of assets that they can earn a return on, including a mix of long-term and short-term bonds issued by the government — a largely safe bet. 盡管存款在增長，但銀行在利用存款獲利這件事上并不順利。銀行通常將客戶存款投資于各種能夠獲得回報的資產(chǎn)，包括政府發(fā)行的長期和短期債券組合——這是一個基本安全的賭注。

硅谷銀行旗下的一家波士頓分行。硅谷銀行的存款在2021年幾乎翻了一番。

BRIAN SNYDER/REUTERS But SVB decided that government debt that came due over 10 to 30 years — and offered higher interest rates at the time — was a better bet than shorter-duration bonds, which paid less interest, according to analysts. So it made an outsize bet on long-dated bonds, a lack of diversity that increased its risk. 但分析師們表示，硅谷銀行認為，10至30年期的政府債券（當(dāng)時利率較高）比期限較短的債券（利率較低）更值得押注。因此，它在長期債券上押下了巨額賭注，缺乏多樣性的做法增加了風(fēng)險。 As of Dec. 31, SVB classified most of its debt portfolio, or roughly $95 billion, as “held to maturity.” Because of a quirk in banking regulation, the bank didn’t have to account for fluctuations in the value of those bonds on its balance sheet. 截至12月31日，硅谷銀行將其大部分債務(wù)投資組合（約950億美元）歸類為“持有至到期”。由于銀行監(jiān)管的某些習(xí)慣，該行不必將這些債券價值的波動計入其資產(chǎn)負債表。 On average, banks with at least $1 billion in assets classified only 6% of their debt in this category at the end 2022. But Silicon Valley Bank put 75% of its debt as held to maturity, according to a research report by Janney Montgomery Scott. 在2022年底，資產(chǎn)在10億美元以上的銀行平均只將6%的債務(wù)歸為這一類別。但詹尼·蒙哥馬利·斯科特的一份研究報告顯示，硅谷銀行將75%的債務(wù)列為持有至到期投資。 By classifying most of its debt this way, SVB was able to mask its brewing troubles longer than it otherwise would have been. But as interest rates rose, investors recalculated where to put their money. Venture capital investing slowed down. Startups began to withdraw more money from their accounts. 通過對其大部分債務(wù)這樣歸類，硅谷銀行得以更長時間地掩蓋醞釀之中的麻煩。但隨著利率上升，投資者重新計算了投資方向。風(fēng)險資本投資放緩。創(chuàng)業(yè)公司開始從他們的賬戶中提取更多資金。 The bank’s conundrum: If it continued to give clients their money, SVB would be stretched for cash. But if it sold those long-term bonds, it would have to do so at a loss. Because newer bonds were paying more interest, buyers would purchase long-term debt at a discount from their value when SVB bought them. 硅谷銀行面臨的難題是：如果繼續(xù)向客戶放款，銀行將面臨現(xiàn)金緊張的局面。但如果出售這些長期債券，就得承擔(dān)損失。因為新債券支付的利息更高，買家會以硅谷銀行購買時的折扣價購買長期債權(quán)。 The problems weren’t immediately visible to analysts because losses on debt portfolios are considered paper losses — until they’re actually sold at a loss. 分析師無法第一時間看到這些問題，因為債務(wù)投資組合的損失被認為是賬面損失——直到它們真的被虧本出售。 In late February, Becker, sat onstage in the dark theater of the Academy Museum of Motion Pictures in Los Angeles, where SVB was co-sponsoring a conference. Asked by a reporter about the bank’s tanking bond portfolio, Becker said it had “zero intention” of selling its underwater securities. 2月底，貝克爾坐在洛杉磯電影學(xué)院博物館黑暗的劇院舞臺上，硅谷銀行正在這里聯(lián)合主辦一場會議。在被記者問及該銀行不斷下滑的債券投資組合時，貝克爾表示銀行“完全無意”出售其虧本的證券。 That plan would soon change. 這個計劃很快就變了。 Shortly after Moody’s warned Becker of a potentially steep downgrade early in the week of Feb. 27, the bank reached out to Goldman Sachs, frantic that there could be a run on the bank if it didn’t shore up its finances, a person with knowledge of the deal said. It needed to sell some of its debt and raise new money from stock market investors. 據(jù)知情人士透露，在2月27日這周早些時候，穆迪警告貝克爾，該行可能會被大幅下調(diào)評級，之后不久，銀行聯(lián)系高盛，心急火燎地表示，如果高盛不能出資支撐其財務(wù)運轉(zhuǎn)，可能會發(fā)生擠兌。它需要出售部分債務(wù)，并從股市投資者那里籌集新的資金。

去年年初，貝克爾曾表示對市場十分看好，但到了夏天，人們對經(jīng)濟形勢的看法開始轉(zhuǎn)向悲觀。

PETER DASILVA FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES Days after the Moody’s call, the bank said in a March 3 filing that it would be able to “sustain overall healthy client fund levels, despite balance sheet pressures from declining deposits, elevated client cash burn and overall market environment challenges.” 在穆迪致電幾天后，該行在3月3日的一份文件中表示，盡管“存款下降、客戶現(xiàn)金消耗增加和整體市場環(huán)境挑戰(zhàn)給資產(chǎn)負債表帶來壓力”，但銀行仍能“維持客戶資金水平的整體健康”。 Last Wednesday, the bank issued a news release after the market closed, saying it had sold $21 billion of its debt at a loss of $1.8 billion and was looking to raise $2.25 billion in new equity. The investment firm General Atlantic said it would buy $500 million of the bank’s stock. 上周三，硅谷銀行在股市收盤后發(fā)布了一份新聞稿，稱該行以虧損18億美元的價格出售了210億美元的債券，并計劃通過增發(fā)新股籌集22.5億美元。投資公司泛大西洋表示將購買該銀行五億美元的股票。 That afternoon, and on Thursday, Goldman bankers started pitching investors on buying SVB shares. The announcement had spooked investors, who worried that the bank was in deeper trouble than it was letting on. When the markets opened on Thursday, the bank’s shares fell steeply. 當(dāng)天下午以及周四，高盛的銀行家們開始勸說投資者購買硅谷銀行的股票。公告讓投資者產(chǎn)生了警覺，他們擔(dān)心該銀行的麻煩比它所表現(xiàn)出來的要嚴重。周四股市開盤時，銀行的股價大幅下跌。 Silicon Valley woke up to a blizzard of text messages, phone calls and Twitter posts about the bank’s mounting woes. Clients of the bank rushed to pull deposits. On Thursday alone, they withdrew $42 billion. 一覺醒來，大量關(guān)于該銀行問題不斷惡化的短信、電話和推文在硅谷傳開。銀行的客戶紛紛提取存款。僅周四一天，他們就提取了420億美元。 Late morning Pacific time, Becker got on a webinar with hundreds of investors and lawyers. The bank had plenty of liquidity, he said, but he ended the call with one caveat: If people began telling one another that SVB was in trouble, it would pose a challenge, according to people briefed on the call. 太平洋時間接近中午的時候，貝克爾與數(shù)百名投資者和律師舉行了網(wǎng)絡(luò)研討會。他說銀行有充足的流動性，但據(jù)了解情況者說，他在電話會議結(jié)束時提出了一個警告：如果人們開始奔走相告，說硅谷銀行遇到了麻煩，那就會構(gòu)成一個挑戰(zhàn)。 But by Thursday afternoon, banking regulators including the FDIC were warning SVB that the bank might not survive, two people briefed on the negotiations said. The bank’s financial advisers raced to find a potential buyer, but none came forward. 但兩名了解談判情況的人士表示，到周四下午，包括聯(lián)邦存款保險公司在內(nèi)的銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管機構(gòu)都在警告硅谷銀行，它可能無法生存下去。銀行的財務(wù)顧問們忙著尋找潛在買家，但沒人出手。 On Friday morning, trading in its stock was halted. By that afternoon, the regulator had seized the bank. Becker’s nearly 30-year tenure at Silicon Valley Bank was over. 周五上午，銀行的股票停牌。當(dāng)天下午，監(jiān)管機構(gòu)接管了這家銀行。貝克爾在硅谷銀行近30年的任期結(jié)束了。

Erin Griffith對本文有報道貢獻。

Maureen Farrell是一名商業(yè)記者，報道私募基金、對沖基金和億萬富翁等話題。歡迎在Twitter上關(guān)注她：@maureenmfarrell。

翻譯：晉其角、明齋

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