What Does “Stakeholder Capitalism” Mean to You?

過去幾年涌現的大量文章和聲明預示著一種新的、更具包容性的資本主義形式的到來，通常被人稱為“利益相關者資本主義”（stakeholder capitalism）。它可望對公司給予支持，為客戶改善結果，為長期股東帶來更好的回報，并最終從整體上加強經濟和社會。按照新的意識觀念，公司董事會和商界領袖受到敦促，要采取多利益相關者的治理方式，而不是已指導他們工作數十年的以股東為中心的治理方式。

The past few years have?seen an?outpouring of articles and statements heralding the arrival of a new and more inclusive form of capitalism, often called “stakeholder capitalism.” It promises to bolster companies, improve outcomes for their constituencies, produce better returns for long-term shareholders, and ultimately strengthen the economy and society as a whole. In line with the new ideology, corporate boards and business leaders have been urged to adopt a multistakeholder approach to governance in place of the shareholder-centered one that has guided their work for several decades.

這些年來，我經過與數百名公司董事、高管、投資者、治理專業(yè)人士和學者的交談，發(fā)現人們對利益相關者資本主義的理解存在著巨大差異。公司內部和公眾辯論中存在許多混亂和分歧，其根源在于未能認識到這些差異。最近關于環(huán)境、社會和治理的爭議就是一個典型的例子。在本文中，我會描述四種利益相關者資本主義——工具型、經典型、福利型和結構型——它們反映出對利益相關者的利益承諾存在顯著差異，這些差異基于截然不同的理論依據。（參見圖表“利益相關者資本主義的四大類型”）

In speaking with hundreds of corporate directors, executives, investors, governance professionals, and academics over the years, I’ve found wide differences in how stakeholder capitalism is understood. The failure to recognize those differences has been a source of much confusion and disagreement inside companies and in the public debate. The recent controversy over environmental, social, and governance investing is a case in point. In this article I describe four kinds of stakeholder capitalism—

instrumental,?classic,?beneficial,

?and?

structural

—which reflect significantly different levels of commitment to the interests of stakeholders and are based on very different rationales.

隨著越來越多的企業(yè)接受利益相關者資本主義，重要的是，企業(yè)領導們對他們確切接受的利益相關者資本主義要有共識。如果不清楚對所有利益相關者的承諾到底是什么，人們就對其予以支持，那么當需要在利益相關者的利益之間做出艱難權衡——這種權衡在所難免——的決策時，這會讓董事和高管相互發(fā)生沖突。它還會在利益相關者中產生期望，而這些期望如果無法實現，就會助長憤世嫉俗、疏遠和不信任的情緒——這與大多數利益相關者資本主義支持者的初衷恰恰相反。與此同時，股東們也不知道這種新的意識形態(tài)對他們意味著什么。本文旨在提供指導，幫助企業(yè)領導者明確他們所指的利益相關者資本主義是何含義，從而降低出現此類負面后果的風險。

As more companies embrace stakeholder capitalism, it is important that corporate leaders have a shared understanding of what, exactly, they are embracing. Espousing a commitment to all stakeholders without clarity about what that actually entails puts directors and executives on a collision course with one another when decisions requiring difficult trade-offs among stakeholders’ interests arise—as they inevitably do. It also creates expectations among stakeholders that if unfulfilled will fuel cynicism, alienation, and distrust—the opposite of what most proponents of stakeholder capitalism intend. Meanwhile, shareholders are left wondering what this new ideology means for them. This article is intended as a guide to help corporate leaders define what they mean by stakeholder capitalism and thus reduce the risk of such negative consequences.

[?工具型利益相關者主義 ]

實現股東長期價值的最大化

[?Instrumental Stakeholderism?]

Maximizing Long-Term Shareholder Value

工具型利益相關者資本主義認為，考慮所有利益相關者的利益實際上有助于實現股東回報的最大化，因為一家企業(yè)對待非股東利益相關者的方式會影響到股東價值。對其他利益相關者的投資可能會降低今天的股東價值，但在未來會給股東帶來回報。相反，虧待其他利益相關者可能會暫時讓股東受益，但在更長的時間內卻對股東不利。因此，即使那些以股東價值最大化為唯一目標的公司領導者也應考慮其他利益相關者的利益。

This version of stakeholder capitalism holds that considering the interests of all stakeholders can actually help maximize returns to shareholders, because how a company treats its nonshareholder stakeholders can affect shareholder value. Investing in other stakeholders may reduce shareholder value today but pay off for shareholders in the future. Conversely, shortchanging other stakeholders may benefit shareholders for a time but be detrimental to them over a longer period. Thus even corporate leaders whose only objective is maximizing value for shareholders should consider the interests of other stakeholders.

這似乎是當今投資界很大一部分人對利益相關者資本主義的主流理解。當然，美國“三大”資產管理公司——貝萊德（BlackRock）、先鋒集團（Vanguard）和道富環(huán)球投資管理公司（State Street Global Advisors）——的負責人最近發(fā)表的聲明似乎也反映了這一觀點。貝萊德董事會主席兼首席執(zhí)行官拉里·芬克（Larry Fink）2021 年在致CEO們的信中表示：“你的公司越能展示其為客戶、員工和社區(qū)提供價值的宗旨，你就越具備能力去競爭，并為股東帶來長期、持久的利潤?！?/p>

That appears to be the dominant understanding of stakeholder capitalism in much of the investment community today. Certainly recent statements by heads of the “big three” asset managers in the United States—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors—seem to reflect this view. In his 2021 letter to CEOs, BlackRock Chairman and CEO Larry Fink stated: “The more your company can show its purpose in delivering value to its customers, its employees, and its communities, the better able you will be to compete and deliver long-term, durable profits for shareholders.”

這種觀點認為，今天采取的行動會對明天產生影響，不同利益相關者的利益通常是相互依存的。讓我們看看投資員工發(fā)展這一簡單的例子。為你的銷售人員提供脫產的時間去學習新技能，這可能會減少當季的銷售額，令部分股東失望，并有可能殃及股價?？墒牵@很有可能有助于未來的銷售并促進增長，從而增加股東價值。根據同樣的邏輯，放棄這種投資可能會提高今天的盈虧底線并讓股東受益，但如果你的銷售團隊技能過時，會導致銷售額下降、運營效率低下，最終導致股東價值損失，而這些損失甚至會超過之前的收益。

This view recognizes that actions taken today have consequences for tomorrow and that the interests of different stakeholders are often interdependent. Consider the simple example of investing in employees’ development. Giving your salespeople time away from their jobs to learn new skills may dampen that quarter’s sales, disappointing some shareholders and possibly hurting the stock price. But it will most likely help sales and fuel growth in the future, increasing shareholder value. By the same logic, forgoing such investment may improve the bottom line and benefit shareholders today but lead to declining sales, operational inefficiencies, and ultimately losses in shareholder value that exceed the earlier gains if your sales team’s skills become outdated.

對利益相關者的工具性態(tài)度絕不是對股東至上主義的挑戰(zhàn)，它完全符合股東至上主義的四條基本原則：將股東價值最大化作為公司目標；優(yōu)先對股東負責而非對其他利益相關者負責；其他利益相關者的偏好服從于股東的偏好；賦予股東對董事和其他治理事項的專屬投票權。這在兩個方面有別于傳統(tǒng)的股東資本主義：明確考慮其他利益相關者的利益，以及在更長的時間跨度內對股東價值進行評估。

An instrumental approach to stakeholders in no way challenges shareholder primacy and is fully consistent with its four main tenets: treating shareholder-value maximization as the corporate objective; prioritizing accountability to shareholders over accountability to other stakeholders; subordinating the preferences of other stakeholders to those of shareholders; and giving shareholders the exclusive right to vote on directors and other governance matters. It differs from traditional shareholder capitalism in just two main ways: by giving explicit consideration to other stakeholders’ interests, and by assessing shareholder value over a longer period.

一些評論人士表示，這些差異無關緊要。然而，明確關注其他相關者的利益可以揭示決策者在狹隘關注股東價值時通常意識不到的風險。事實上，無視這些利益已致使許多企業(yè)的股東價值遭到嚴重破壞。我僅舉兩個例子——富國銀行的虛假賬戶事件和大眾汽車的“柴油門”事件。假如這些公司的領導者能更多關注非股東的利益，他們可能會采取的是不同的做法或戰(zhàn)略，并最終為股東做得更好。

Some commentators say those differences are inconsequential. But paying explicit attention to other stakeholders’ interests can reveal risks that decision-makers often don’t recognize when they’re focused narrowly on shareholder value. Indeed, disregard for those interests has led to substantial destruction of shareholder value at numerous companies. Consider the fake-accounts debacle at Wells Fargo and Dieselgate at Volkswagen—to name just two. Had leaders of those companies paid more attention to the interests of constituents who were not shareholders, they might have pursued different practices or strategies and ultimately done a better job for their shareholders.

關注利益相關者的利益、以更長遠的目光看問題，這還可以展現戰(zhàn)略機遇。建設新工廠時，狹隘關注近期股東回報的企業(yè)領導者不太可能選擇陷入困境的本土地區(qū)，而會選擇成本更低的海外地區(qū)。然而，當康明斯2010年決定在印第安納州的西摩生產新的高速、低排發(fā)動機系列時，它就做到了目光長遠。其決定意味著該公司必須對這一社區(qū)及其學校進行大量投資，但同時也為提高該地區(qū)的教育程度和收入水平提供了機會，并創(chuàng)建一個先進制造業(yè)的全球中心，最終讓公司受益。2015年，康明斯開始在西摩工廠生產新的系列發(fā)動機。在一定程度上由于康明斯與其他公司以及該地區(qū)市政和教育領導的合作，當地居民的受教育程度、收入和工資標準都得到了提升。

Paying attention to stakeholder interests and taking a longer view can also reveal strategic opportunities. Corporate leaders narrowly focused on near-term shareholder returns would be unlikely to choose to build a new plant in their distressed home region rather than in a lower-cost location overseas. But Cummins did just that in 2010 when it decided to manufacture its new line of high-speed, low-emissions engines in Seymour, Indiana. Its decision meant that the company would have to make significant investments in the community and its schools—but it also presented an opportunity to raise educational attainment and income levels in the region and create a global hub for advanced manufacturing that would ultimately benefit the company. In 2015 Cummins began producing its new line of engines at the Seymour plant. And thanks in part to its collaboration with other companies and the region’s civic and educational leaders, local residents’ educational attainment, incomes, and wage rates improved as well.

工具型利益相關者主義面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。

Challenges for instrumental stakeholderism.?

這種態(tài)度可望為利益相關者和社會帶來真正的好處，但這些好處只限于此。盡管它要求企業(yè)領導考慮利益相關者的利益，但它并不要求他們尊重這些利益，除非這樣做在經濟上對股東有利。從這個角度來看，對公司利益相關者進行投資與任何其他投資一樣，只有在這種投資會增加凈現值的情況下才應該著手進行，并且應該避免對那些降低長期股東價值的利益相關者進行投資。雖然工具型利益相關者主義的支持者通常會關注康明斯這樣的雙贏案例，但企業(yè)領導經常會面臨壓力和機會，其產生股東價值的方式不會讓所有利益相關者受益，甚至可能對部分利益相關者造成傷害。

This approach promises real benefits for stakeholders and society, but those benefits go only so far. Although it requires corporate leaders to take stakeholders’ interests into account, it does not require them to?

respect

?those interests unless doing so would be financially beneficial for shareholders. From this perspective, an investment in the company’s stakeholders, like any other investment, should be pursued only if it increases net present value, and investments in stakeholders that reduce long-term shareholder value should be avoided. While proponents of instrumental stakeholderism tend to focus on win-win examples like the Cummins case, corporate leaders frequently face pressure and opportunities to generate shareholder value in ways that do not benefit all stakeholders and may even do harm to some of them. 比如，經濟學家羅伊·沙皮拉（Roy Shapira）和路易吉·津加萊斯（Luigi Zingales）已經證明，污染環(huán)境，即使是在違反法律和有害公眾健康的情況下，有時可以最大化股東的長期價值。他們利用在眾多訴訟中披露的信息，對杜邦公司高管1984年在全氟辛酸（PFOA）問題上做出的決定進行了調查。全氟辛酸是一種用于制造特氟龍的有毒化學物質，當時正滲入生產所在社區(qū)的飲用水中。文件顯示，高管們知道全氟辛酸對人類的毒性和在環(huán)境中的持久性。正如幾位作者在其論文“污染是否會實現價值最大化？”中所報告的那樣，得到考慮的有三種選擇：終止全氟辛酸的生產，繼續(xù)生產并采取措施減少有害排放，以及在不采取減排措施的情況下繼續(xù)生產。沙皮拉和津加萊斯從股東價值最大化領導者的角度出發(fā)，利用與每種選擇相關的公司長期成本與收益的現值，對決策進行了建模。他們的分析發(fā)現，即使在考慮到法律責任、監(jiān)管制裁、聲譽影響以及公司在后續(xù)30年中的其他成本之后，高管們的決定——繼續(xù)生產全氟辛酸而不減排——也實現了股東價值的最大化。換言之，從工具型利益相關者主義的角度來看，這一決定完全正確，因為尊重其他利益相關者利益的選擇不會實現長期股東價值的最大化。

The economists Roy Shapira and Luigi Zingales have shown, for example, that polluting the environment, even when it is against the law and harmful to public health, can sometimes maximize long-term value for shareholders. Using information disclosed in numerous lawsuits, they examined the decision DuPont executives made in 1984 regarding perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), a toxic chemical used in making Teflon that was seeping into the drinking water of the community where it was manufactured. Documents showed that executives knew about PFOA’s toxicity to humans and persistence in the environment. As the authors reported in their paper “Is Pollution Value-Maximizing?,” three options were considered: ending production of PFOA, continuing production with measures to abate the harmful emissions, and continuing production without abatement measures. Shapira and Zingales modeled the decision from the perspective of a shareholder-value-maximizing manager using the present value of the long-term costs and benefits to the company associated with each option. Their analysis found that the executives’ decision—to continue producing PFOA without abatement—maximized shareholder value, even after taking into account legal liabilities, regulatory sanctions, reputational effects, and other costs to the company over the ensuing 30 years. In other words, the decision was perfectly correct from the perspective of instrumental stakeholderism, because an option that respected other stakeholders’ interests would not have maximized long-term shareholder value.

工具型利益相關者主義的支持者有時會將決策規(guī)則的清晰性作為其主要優(yōu)點之一。可是，預測哪種行動方案最有可能實現長期股東價值的最大化充滿了困難，尤其是當它需要對健康、清潔空氣和司法等沒有市場價格的結果賦予貨幣價值，或預測法律、政策或公眾情緒會如何長期演變時。時間范圍越長，行動的投機性就越強。實現長期股東價值最大化的規(guī)則表面上可能清晰明了，但它消除不了困難的權衡，有時還會對其他利益相關者和整個社會造成嚴重傷害。

Proponents of instrumental stakeholderism sometimes cite the clarity of its decision rule as one of its principal virtues. But predicting which course of action will most likely maximize long-term shareholder value is fraught with difficulty, especially when it requires putting a monetary value on outcomes such as health, clean air, and justice, which have no market price, or predicting how laws, policies, or public sentiment will evolve over the long term. The longer the time frame, the more speculative the exercise. The rule to maximize long-term shareholder value may be clear on its face, but it does not eliminate difficult trade-offs, and it can sometimes result in serious harm to other stakeholders and society at large.

[?經典型利益相關者主義?]

尊重利益相關者的合法訴求

[?Classic Stakeholderism?]

Respecting Stakeholders’ Legitimate Claims

經典型利益相關者資本主義認為，至少部分利益相關者的利益必須得到尊重和考慮。它會區(qū)分利益，優(yōu)先考慮那些受道德或法律規(guī)范保護的利益，而不是基于愿望或欲望的利益。其核心思想是，前者更基本的利益會產生訴求，而訴求有效性不取決于對股東價值的貢獻，并構成對利益相關者義務的基礎，而這些義務與財務和戰(zhàn)略需求同等重要。這種利益相關者主義認識到，為利益相關者利益服務通常有助于股東價值，但即使它不會促成股東價值的時候，部分利益相關者的利益也應該得到解決。（我之所以稱其為“經典”，是因為它與利益相關者理論的早期表達相似。）

This version of stakeholder capitalism holds that at least some stakeholders’ interests must be respected as well as considered. It differentiates among interests, prioritizing those protected by ethical or legal norms over those based on wishes or desires. The core idea is that the former, more fundamental, interests give rise to claims whose validity is not contingent on their contribution to shareholder value and underpin obligations to stakeholders that sit alongside financial and strategic imperatives. This type of stakeholderism recognizes that serving stakeholder interests often contributes to shareholder value, but that some stakeholder interests should be addressed even when it doesn’t. (I call it “classic” because of its similarity to early expressions of stakeholder theory.)

企業(yè)領導被允許（更不用說被要求）以不一定實現股東價值最大化的方式行事，這種想法聽起來可能像異端。但事實遠非如此。即使是股東至上主義最著名的支持者米爾頓·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）也承認，追求股東價值應該在法律和“道德習俗”所體現的社會規(guī)則范圍內進行。他在1970年《紐約時報》的一篇著名文章中對道德習俗進行了相當狹隘的定義，只要求企業(yè)競爭的時候“不欺騙或欺詐”，不過，他原本可能會譴責欺騙任何利益相關者——客戶、員工、供應商、股東或社區(qū)——即使這可以證明為股東創(chuàng)造了長期價值。

The idea that corporate leaders are permitted, let alone required, to act in ways that don’t necessarily maximize shareholder value may sound like heresy. But that is far from the case. Even the best-known proponent of shareholder primacy, Milton Friedman, acknowledged that shareholder value should be pursued within the rules of society as embodied in law and “ethical custom.” In his well-known?New York Times?article of 1970 he defined ethical custom quite narrowly, as requiring only that companies compete “without deception or fraud,” but presumably he would have condemned deceiving?

any

?stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers, shareholders, or communities—even if it could be shown to create long-term value for shareholders.

這種觀點的一個更強有力形式可以在1981年商業(yè)圓桌會議（Business Roundtable）的企業(yè)責任聲明中找到。該聲明宣稱：“股東必須獲得良好的回報，但其他涉眾的合法擔憂也必須得到適當的關注。”美國法律學會1992年的《公司治理原則：分析與建議》（Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations）明確承認，公司決策者在與利益相關者打交道時可能會關注道德考慮，“即使公司利潤和股東收益沒有因此而提高”。

A more robust form of this view is found in the Business Roundtable’s 1981 statement on corporate responsibility, which declared that “the shareholder must receive a good return but the legitimate concerns of other constituencies also must have the appropriate attention.” And the American Law Institute’s 1992?Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations?explicitly acknowledges that corporate decision-makers may pay heed to ethical considerations in their dealings with the company’s stakeholders “even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced.”

特拉華州最近的法庭案例更進一步，表明在特定情況下，尊重部分利益相關者的利益甚至可能是一個誠信義務問題。2021年起訴波音公司董事會的案件說明了這一點。在737 MAX窄體客機發(fā)生兩起致命墜機事故后，股東代表該公司提起訴訟，指控董事會忽視了職責，未能監(jiān)督和監(jiān)控飛機安全。在允許案件在辯護階段之后繼續(xù)審理時，法院指出，盡管某些董事會和領導層的溝通“名義上”提到了安全，但它們并非“以安全為中心”。也就是說，它們關注的是安全對財務、運營、公共關系或法律的影響，而不是安全本身。

Recent court cases in Delaware go further, suggesting that in certain situations respect for some stakeholder interests may even be a matter of fiduciary duty. The 2021 case against Boeing’s board of directors speaks to this point. After two fatal crashes of the 737 MAX narrow-body airliner, shareholders filed suit on behalf of the company, alleging that the board had neglected its duty by failing to oversee and monitor airplane safety. In allowing the case to proceed beyond the pleading phase, the court noted that although certain board and management communications mentioned safety “in name,” they were not “safety-centric.” That is, they focused on the financial, operational, public relations, or legal implications of safety rather than on safety itself.

可以肯定的是，確定董事會對監(jiān)督不力的責任極其困難，這個案子最終結案了。然而，對于董事和官員來說，這一案例表明，適當重視利益相關者的根本利益——而不僅僅是他們對股東價值的影響——正日益被視為他們角色不可或缺的一部分。

To be sure, establishing a board’s liability for a failure of oversight is extremely difficult, and the case was ultimately settled. For directors and officers, however, the case suggests that due regard for stakeholders’ fundamental interests—not just their impact on shareholder value—is increasingly seen as integral to their roles.

經典型利益相關者主義面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。

Challenges for classic stakeholderism.?

與工具型利益相關者主義相比，經典型利益相關者主義為利益相關者和社會利益提供了更強的保護。然而，正如利益相關者主義的批評人士所指出的，確定哪些利益必須得到尊重并不總是那么容易。

Compared with instrumental stakeholderism, classic stakeholderism provides much stronger protection for stakeholder and societal interests. As critics of stakeholderism have noted, however, determining which interests must be respected is not always easy. 一個有用的出發(fā)點是全世界廣泛接受的公司行為準則。這些準則包括遵守法律、尊重人權、真相和誠實、信守承諾、保護健康和安全等。然而，企業(yè)領導在哪些利益必須得到保護的問題上可能會面臨艱難的判斷。讓我們看看一家涉及大規(guī)模裁員的企業(yè)的重組。通過取消向離職員工提供提前通知和遣散費的慣例（但在法律上是可選的），該公司可以節(jié)省數百萬美元的資金。讓我們再進一步假設取消這些措施將有助于領導層達到之前向股東宣布的指導利潤率。一些領導人員會認為這種方法完全有效，認為在這種情況下，員工沒有權利提出合法訴求，要求提前通知或遣散費，而另一些領導人員則會認為這對員工極不公平，因此不符合經典型利益相關者主義的要求。

A useful starting point is the norms of corporate conduct that are widely accepted around the world. They include obeying the law, respecting human rights, truth and honesty, honoring promises, protecting health and safety, and so on. Nevertheless, corporate leaders may face difficult judgments about which interests must be protected. Consider a corporate restructuring that involves mass layoffs. The company could save millions of dollars by eliminating its customary (but legally optional) practice of giving advance notice and severance packages to departing employees. Assume further that eliminating those measures would help management meet the guidance on margins previously announced to shareholders. Some managers would see the approach as perfectly valid, arguing that employees have no legitimate claim to advance notice or severance payments in this situation, while others would find it profoundly unfair to employees and thus inconsistent with the requirements of classic stakeholderism.

經典型利益相關者主義面臨的一個同樣令人煩惱（如果說不更加令人煩惱的話）的挑戰(zhàn)是解決利益相關者相互矛盾的訴求之間的沖突。即使訴求范圍僅限于基于法律和道德原則的那些要求，企業(yè)領導還是可能面臨艱難的權衡。比如，在疫情初期，食品行業(yè)的一些公司就面臨左右為難的局面，一方面要確保在暴發(fā)了新冠疫情的工廠里工作的員工安然無恙，另一方面要履行向經銷商和消費者提供食品的責任。工具型利益相關者主義將“股東價值最大化”作為解決此類困境的通用決策規(guī)則，而與此不同的是，經典型利益相關者主義認為，只有通過一個深思熟慮的過程，將相互矛盾的利益進行權衡和比較，并尋求傷害最小化和人類福祉最大化，這些困境才能夠得到解決。

An equally if not more vexing challenge for classic stakeholderism is resolving conflicts among competing stakeholder claims. Even if the universe of claims is limited to those based on legal and ethical principles, corporate leaders can face difficult trade-offs. During the early days of the pandemic, for instance, some companies in the food sector were torn between ensuring the safety of employees working in plants plagued by Covid outbreaks and meeting their responsibilities to get food to distributors and consumers. Unlike instrumental stakeholderism, which offers “maximize shareholder value” as an all-purpose decision rule for resolving such dilemmas, classic stakeholderism holds that they can be resolved only through a process of deliberation that weighs and compares competing interests and seeks to minimize harm and maximize human well-being.

利益相關者理論的批評人士通常指出，缺乏一個解決權衡問題的決策規(guī)則是一大缺點。然而，支持者認為，對這一規(guī)則的要求是基于過于狹隘的理性觀，脫離了企業(yè)領導層的混亂現實。他們言之有理。從本質上講，企業(yè)領導的工作需要承擔多重義務。他們不可能事先說出應該如何解決沖突，或者應該優(yōu)先考慮誰的利益。兩者都取決于局面的事實和情境以及所涉特定利益的性質。

Critics of stakeholder theory often point to the lack of a single decision rule for resolving trade-offs as a major shortcoming. Proponents, however, see the demand for such a rule as based on an overly narrow conception of rationality, divorced from the messy realities of corporate leadership. They have a point. By its very nature, the job of corporate leaders entails multiple obligations. It is not possible to say in advance how conflicts should be resolved or whose interests should take priority. Both depend on the facts and circumstances of the situation and the nature of the particular interests at stake.

[?福利型利益相關者主義?]

為利益相關者改善結果

[?Beneficial Stakeholderism?]

Improving Outcomes for Stakeholders

福利型的利益相關者資本主義不僅尋求滿足利益相關者的基本訴求，而且還尋求顯著改善他們的福祉。這在一定程度上源于一種信念，認為在過去四十年中，優(yōu)化股東回報導致許多企業(yè)在其他領域投資不足，并導致不成比例的收益分配給了資本所有者。它還受到一種想法的推動，即為改善所有利益相關者的生活而經營企業(yè)有助于解決當今社會面臨的一些大規(guī)模問題和不平等現象，從而有助于保護經濟的長期健康，平抑對資本主義日益增長的不滿。

This version of stakeholder capitalism seeks not just to meet stakeholders’ basic claims but also to measurably improve their well-being. It comes in part from a belief that optimizing returns for shareholders over the past four decades has led many companies to underinvest in their other constituencies and has caused a disproportionate share of gains to go to the owners of capital. It is also driven by the idea that running companies to improve the lives of all stakeholders will help address some of the large-scale problems and inequities facing society today, thereby helping to protect the long-term health of the economy and quell growing discontent with capitalism.

我稱這一類型為“福利型利益相關者主義”，因為它與福利企業(yè)運動相似，該運動包括努力將傳統(tǒng)公司認證為所謂的B型企業(yè)，以及在美國許多州和其他國家通過立法，允許企業(yè)將自己變身為“福利公司”或“公益公司”。雖然認證標準和規(guī)章各不相同，但它們都有一個共同的要求，即公司董事在制定政策和決策時要“平衡”或“考慮”不同利益相關者的利益，而且公司要定期報告其在促進利益相關者福祉方面取得的進展。

I call this version “beneficial stakeholderism” because of its similarity to the benefit corporation movement, which includes efforts to certify traditional corporations as so-called B Corps and the adoption of legislation in numerous states and countries permitting businesses to organize themselves as “benefit corporations” or “public benefit corporations.” Although the certification standards and statutes vary, they have in common a requirement that the company’s directors “balance” or “consider” the interests of its various stakeholders when setting policies and making decisions, and that the company periodically report on its progress in advancing stakeholders’ well-being.

福利型利益相關者主義與福利企業(yè)對待利益相關者的態(tài)度有一定相似性，但一家企業(yè)不需要成為福利公司或得到認證的B型企業(yè)就可以采用其基本原則。保羅·波爾曼（Paul Polman）領導下的聯(lián)合利華行動就是一個例子。在波爾曼2009年至2019年的任期內，該公司推行的議程是為許多利益相關者帶來收益。正如聯(lián)合利華對其可持續(xù)生活計劃發(fā)表的10年進展報告中所詳述的那樣，該公司提高了員工的健康和幸福感，使其薪酬體系更加公平，向所有員工支付了生活工資，并改善了80多萬小農戶的生計。它促進了供應鏈中的人權，提高了產品的營養(yǎng)價值，改善了10多億人的健康和衛(wèi)生，并朝著到2030年將環(huán)境影響減半的目標取得了進展。大約在同一時期，聯(lián)合利華還實現了290%的股東總回報率——遠高于同行業(yè)18家消費品企業(yè)165%的中位數。

Beneficial stakeholderism has certain affinities with the benefit corporation approach to stakeholders, but an organization need not be a benefit corporation or a certified B Corp to adopt its basic tenets. Unilever’s actions under the leadership of Paul Polman are an example. During Polman’s tenure, from 2009 to 2019, the company pursued an agenda that delivered gains for many of its stakeholders. As detailed in Unilever’s 10-year progress report on its Sustainable Living Plan, the company enhanced employees’ health and well-being, made its pay system more equitable, paid all employees a living wage, and augmented the livelihoods of more than 800,000 smallholder farmers. It advanced human rights in its supply chain, raised the nutritional value of its products, improved the health and hygiene of more than a billion people, and made progress toward cutting its environmental impact in half by 2030. During roughly the same period, Unilever also delivered a total shareholder return of 290%—well above the median of 165% for 18 consumer goods companies in its peer group.

在將內在（而不僅僅是工具性）價值歸因于非股東利益相關者的某些利益方面，福利型利益相關者主義與經典型利益相關者主義類似。然而，福利型利益相關者主義要求更廣泛地致力于利益相關者的福祉。比如，經典型利益相關者主義關注的是員工安全、機會均等、同工同酬以及受基本法律和道德規(guī)范保護的其他利益。福利型利益相關者主義會在此基礎上增加尊嚴、包容性、有意義的工作和廣義的經濟公平——員工是否能獲得體面的生計，是否公平地分享到了他們幫助創(chuàng)造的價值，以及是否有足夠的晉升機會。

Beneficial stakeholderism is similar to classic stakeholderism in attributing intrinsic (not just instrumental) value to certain interests of nonshareholder stakeholders. However, it calls for a more expansive commitment to the well-being of stakeholders. For example, classic stakeholderism is concerned with employee safety, equal opportunity, equal pay for equal work, and other interests that are protected by basic legal and ethical norms. Beneficial stakeholderism would add to that list dignity, inclusion, meaningful work, and economic equity in the broad sense—whether employees earn a decent livelihood, receive a fair share of the value they are helping create, and have sufficient opportunities for advancement.

福利型利益相關者主義在其他方面的要求也比經典型利益相關者主義高。它設想的是不斷改進向利益相關者提供的成果，因而意味著對每個利益相關者群體都制定有明確的目標，以及跟蹤、衡量和報告這些成果的方法，同時還有適當的薪酬和激勵制度。它需要一種富有想象力的戰(zhàn)略方法，而利益相關者的利益是這一戰(zhàn)略中不可或缺的組成部分，而非次要的制約因素。它還需要一個全面的決策和資源分配手段。企業(yè)領導切勿孤立地看待每一個決定，而是將其視為選擇組合的一部分，而這些選擇旨在為所有利益相關者實現理想的結果。

Beneficial stakeholderism is more demanding than classic stakeholderism in other ways as well. It envisions ongoing improvement in the outcomes delivered to stakeholders, thus implying defined goals for each stakeholder group and methods for tracking, measuring, and reporting on those outcomes, along with appropriate compensation and incentive systems. It requires an imaginative approach to strategy in which stakeholder interests are essential building blocks rather than side constraints. And it requires a holistic approach to decision-making and resource allocation. Corporate leaders must view each decision not in isolation but as part of a portfolio of choices aimed at achieving the desired outcomes for all stakeholders.

與工具型利益相關者主義一樣，福利型利益相關者主義反對傳統(tǒng)的股東價值最大化這一短期思維。然而，這兩個類型在投資決策方法上相異。福利型利益相關者主義不是僅僅根據可能的股東回報來分配資源，而是優(yōu)先考慮有可能改善諸多利益相關者結果的項目。據我所知，盡管支持者還沒有明確說明應該如何做出這些決定，但這個過程想必會包括分析對每個受影響的利益相關者群體造成的預期影響，并選擇總體效益最大的項目，或者通過某種方法可以優(yōu)化各群體結果的項目。

Like instrumental stakeholderism, beneficial stakeholderism rejects the short-termism of traditional shareholder-value maximization. The two versions diverge, however, in their approach to investment decisions. Instead of allocating resources solely on the basis of likely returns to shareholders, beneficial stakeholderism prioritizes projects with the potential to improve outcomes for multiple stakeholders. Although proponents have not, to my knowledge, spelled out precisely how such decisions should be made, the process presumably involves analyzing the expected impact on each affected stakeholder group and choosing either the project with the greatest benefit in aggregate or the one that by some methodology optimizes results across the groups.

福利型利益相關者主義面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。

Challenges for beneficial stakeholderism.?

盡管這個類型的利益相關者資本主義為所有利益相關者提供了不斷改善結果的前景，但其批評人士發(fā)出的不要期望過高的警告是正確的。與經典型利益相關者主義一樣，福利型利益相關者主義有時需要在不同的利益之間進行權衡。不過，它對更廣泛利益的擔憂可能會令這些權衡變得更具挑戰(zhàn)性。

Although this version of stakeholder capitalism holds out the prospect of ever-improving outcomes for all stakeholders, its critics are right to caution against expecting too much. Like classic stakeholderism, beneficial stakeholderism sometimes entails trade-offs among differing interests. But its concern for a broader set of interests can make those trade-offs even more challenging. 此外，還存在一個真正的問題，即，在不失去股東支持或違背其信托義務的情況下，企業(yè)領導者可以向非股東利益相關者進行多少投資。比如，如果特拉華州一家傳統(tǒng)公司的董事決定出售該公司，他們在法律上有義務優(yōu)先考慮股東的短期財務利益?？墒?，即使公司不會出售，法律、經濟、競爭和資本市場因素通常也會限制領導者考慮其他相關者利益的能力。

Moreover, there is a real question about how much corporate leaders can invest in their nonshareholder stakeholders without losing shareholder support or running afoul of their fiduciary duties. If, for example, the directors of a traditional Delaware corporation decide to sell the company, they are legally obliged to prioritize shareholders’ short-term financial interests. But even when the company is not for sale, legal, economic, competitive, and capital-markets factors often constrain leaders’ ability to promote the interests of other stakeholders.

特拉華州法律被視為美國公司法的黃金標準。根據該州法律，對其他利益相關者的投資必須與促進公司利益保持合理關系。評論人士通常對這一限制不以為然，指出法院不愿意對董事會的商業(yè)決定進行事后品評。然而，對于有良知的企業(yè)領導者而言，與企業(yè)利益的合理關系是一個重要的基準。擬議中對非股東的投資如果不能促進公司利益，那就必須在其他基礎上證明其合理性。如前所指出的，出于法律或道德原因，它可能是被要求或得到允許的，也可能作為慈善捐款而得到允許。如果不能以這些方式之一來證明其正當性，那么（從法律上講）這是對公司資產的浪費，也是對公司董事采取法律行動的理由。

Under Delaware law, considered the gold standard for corporate law in the United States, investments in other stakeholders must have a rational relationship to advancing the interests of the corporation. Commentators often brush off this limitation, noting that courts are reluctant to second-guess a board’s business decisions. For conscientious corporate leaders, however, a rational relationship to the corporation’s interests is an important benchmark. A proposed investment in nonshareholders that does not advance the interests of the corporation must be justified on some other basis. As noted, it might be required or allowed for legal or ethical reasons, or it could be permitted as a charitable contribution. If it cannot be justified in one of those ways, it is (legally speaking) a waste of corporate assets and grounds for legal action against the company’s directors.

對大多數企業(yè)領導來說，一個更緊迫的問題不是法律允許什么，而是考慮到公司的經濟和競爭形勢，什么是現實的。即使是與業(yè)務直接相關的利益相關者的利益也只能在某種程度上得到解決。比如，客戶幾乎總是想要更好的質量、更佳的服務和更低的價格，但一家公司滿足這些愿望的能力并非是無限的。加大對客戶的投資通常意味著減少對其他方面的投資。無論是傳統(tǒng)公司還是福利公司，如果它對客戶（或任何其他利益相關者）的慷慨導致太多虧損交易，該公司都可能破壞其自身的生存能力。許多因素——公司的戰(zhàn)略、其他利益相關者的預期、可用的資源、競爭對手在做的事情、行業(yè)發(fā)生變化的方式——都會影響企業(yè)領導對任何一個利益相關者群體的投資程度。即使對于景氣行業(yè)中的快速增長企業(yè)來說，實施多方利益相關者戰(zhàn)略可能也很困難。對于陷入困境的公司和那些處于低增長或衰退行業(yè)的企業(yè)而言，情況更是如此。

A more pressing issue for most corporate leaders is not what the law allows but what is realistic given the company’s economic and competitive situation. Even stakeholder interests that are directly related to the business can be addressed only up to a point. Customers, for instance, almost always want better quality, better service, and lower prices, but a company’s ability to satisfy those desires is not infinite. Investing more in customers typically means investing less in something else. And whether it is a traditional corporation or a benefit corporation, a company can undermine its own viability if its generosity to customers (or any other stakeholders) results in too many loss-making transactions. Many factors—the company’s strategy, the expectations of other stakeholders, what resources are available, what competitors are doing, how the industry is changing—affect how much corporate leaders can invest in any one stakeholder group. Even for fast-growing companies in thriving industries, delivering on a multistakeholder strategy can be difficult. For distressed companies and those in low-growth or declining industries, it is even more so.

企業(yè)領導對其他利益相關者投資的能力最終取決于股東支持這些投資的意愿。不同意資源分配方式的股東可能會出售其股份。如果有足夠多的股東這樣做，公司的股價就會下跌。如果下跌嚴重或曠日持久，該公司可能會成為代理人爭斗或收購要約的目標。無論法律制度賦予了企業(yè)領導何種決策自由裁量權，他們的實際選擇都受到股東偏好的約束，而正如前所指出的，股東通過買賣股票、選舉董事、在重大交易上進行投票以及在法庭上挑戰(zhàn)董事的權力，對公司的方向擁有最終權力。

Corporate leaders’ ability to invest in other stakeholders ultimately depends on shareholders’ willingness to support those investments. Shareholders who disagree with how resources are being allocated may sell their shares. If enough of them do so, the company’s stock price will fall. If the drop is severe or prolonged, the company may become the target of a proxy fight or a takeover bid. Whatever decision-making discretion the legal system gives corporate leaders, their actual choices are constrained by the preferences of shareholders who, as noted, have ultimate power over the company’s direction through their rights to buy and sell shares, elect directors, vote on major transactions, and challenge directors in court.

總之，福利型利益相關者主義充滿希望，但接受它的企業(yè)領導面臨著一條充滿挑戰(zhàn)的道路。與工具型和經典型利益相關者主義相比，福利型利益相關者主義設想的是在企業(yè)如何部署資源和分配其創(chuàng)造的價值方面，大大改變傳統(tǒng)的股東價值最大化的觀念，讓非股東利益相關者在這兩方面都獲得更大的份額?？墒牵缜八懻摰哪菢?，他們促進其他利益相關者利益的能力確實受到了限制。在對普華永道最近一項調查的回應中，僅有13%的董事強烈同意，即使氣候目標會影響短期財務業(yè)績，它們也應該成為優(yōu)先事項。也許這是因為上市公司的投資者似乎很少愿意為了一個更綠色的地球或一個更公平的社會而放棄有意義的回報。

In summary, beneficial stakeholderism holds promise, but corporate leaders who embrace it face a challenging path. In comparison with instrumental and classic stakeholderism, beneficial stakeholderism envisions a more significant shift away from traditional shareholder-value maximization in how companies deploy resources and distribute the value they create, with a greater share of both going to nonshareholder stakeholders. But, as discussed, limits on their ability to advance other stakeholders’ interests are real. Only 13% of directors responding to a recent survey by PwC agreed strongly that climate goals should be a priority even if they affect short-term financial performance. Perhaps that’s because few investors in public companies appear willing to forgo meaningful returns for a greener planet or a more equitable society.

[?結構型利益相關者主義?]

增加利益相關者的權力

[?Structural Stakeholderism?]

Increasing Stakeholder Power

截至目前，所討論的三個利益相關者主義類型全都關注的是股東至上主義的第一個核心支柱：股東價值最大化是（或者說應該是）一家企業(yè)的主要目標。它們都要求對這一目標或其實施方式進行完善或改變。它們的相似之處在于，在很大程度上保留了傳統(tǒng)的治理結構和流程，而這些決定了股東和其他利益相關者之間的權力平衡。也就是說，它們都接受股東至上主義的另一個支柱：股東是（或者說應該是）在企業(yè)治理中唯一有正式發(fā)言權的涉眾群體。第四個類型——我稱之為“結構型利益相關者主義”——呼吁在治理過程中賦予非股東利益相關者投票權或其他權力。這個類型的支持者試圖將其他相關者的利益硬連接到這個過程中，而不是依靠公司董事和企業(yè)領導來考慮他們，通常是在選擇董事或董事會的正式代表時賦予這些利益相關者明確的角色。

The three versions of stakeholderism discussed so far all focus on the first pillar of shareholder primacy: Maximizing value for shareholders is (or should be) a corporation’s principal objective. They all call for refinements or changes to that objective or how it is implemented, and they are similar in leaving the traditional governance structures and processes that define the balance of power between shareholders and other stakeholders largely intact. That is to say, they all accept another pillar of shareholder primacy: Shareholders are (or should be) the only constituency with a formal voice in corporate governance. A fourth version—which I term “structural stakeholderism”—calls for giving nonshareholder stakeholders voting or other powers in the governance process. Advocates of this version seek to hard wire the interests of other stakeholders into the process, rather than relying on corporate directors and business leaders to take them into account, typically by giving those stakeholders a defined role in selecting directors or formal representation on corporate boards.

在這一理念得到廣泛實施的地方，尤其是在歐洲，員工是最常被賦予董事會代表權的利益相關者群體（股東除外）。德國的雙層董事會制度就是一個例子。按照法律和傳統(tǒng)，德國企業(yè)的監(jiān)事會中三分之一至二分之一的董事由員工選舉，其余的由股東選舉。其他歐洲國家采取了其他的員工參與方式。盡管董事會中的員工代表在美國十分罕見，但也并非聞所未聞。1919年馬薩諸塞州的一項法律（仍然有效）允許制造業(yè)公司采用的規(guī)章授權員工選舉一名或多名董事，而一些工會已經在董事會中獲得了一個席位。比如，達美航空公司董事會包括一名由其飛行員協(xié)會管理機構提名的飛行員。在過去幾年里，十多項關于在董事會中增加非領導層員工的股東提案已經在美國的大型企業(yè)中進行了投票表決（得到的支持不足），而美國參議院的幾項法案也會賦予大型企業(yè)的員工選舉一定比例的董事會成員的權利。

Where this idea has been widely implemented, notably in Europe, employees are the stakeholder group (other than shareholders) that is most often given board representation. Germany’s two-tiered board system is an example. By law and tradition one-third to one-half of the directors on the supervisory boards of German companies are elected by employees and the rest by shareholders. Other European countries take other approaches to employee participation. Although rare in the United States, employee representation on boards is not unheard of. A 1919 Massachusetts law (still in effect) permitted manufacturing companies to adopt bylaws empowering employees to elect one or more directors, and some unions have secured a seat on company boards. The board of Delta Air Lines, for example, includes a pilot nominated by the governing body of its pilot association. In the past few years more than a dozen shareholder proposals about adding nonmanagement employees to boards have been voted on (and gotten scant support) at large U.S. companies, and several bills in the U.S. Senate would give employees of large companies the right to elect a certain percentage of the board.

有人還不時建議任命可以代表公眾利益的董事。20世紀70年代，在一系列企業(yè)倒閉和丑聞之后，這種想法在美國法律和商業(yè)學術界人士中獲得認可。事實上，在2008年全球金融風暴期間接受政府救助的愛爾蘭各銀行的董事會曾嘗試過這種做法。其他評論人士提出，客戶、社區(qū)、納稅人或其他利益相關者應在董事會中具有代表性。對一些人來說，“利益相關者資本主義”一詞本身就意味著公司董事會應該由各種利益相關者群體的代表構成。

The appointment of directors who represent the public interest has also been proposed from time to time. The idea gained currency among law and business academics in the United States in the 1970s, following a spate of corporate failures and scandals. It was actually tried on the boards of Irish banks that received government bailouts during the global financial crisis of 2008. Other commentators have proposed that customers, communities, and taxpayers or other stakeholders have board representation. For some, the term “stakeholder capitalism” itself implies that corporate boards should comprise representatives of various stakeholder groups.

大多數主張在董事會中增加利益相關者代表或將投票權擴大到股東以外的人聲稱，其他涉眾的更有力參與會因提高生產力、提高員工敬業(yè)度或激發(fā)創(chuàng)新而加強企業(yè)創(chuàng)造長期價值的能力。但對大多數人來說，這些都是次要后果。主要目標是保護非股東利益相關者的利益，并在公司決策中增加賦予他們的權重。

Most advocates for adding stakeholder representatives to boards or extending voting rights beyond shareholders claim that more-robust involvement of other constituencies would strengthen companies’ ability to create long-term value by boosting productivity, enhancing employee engagement, or sparking innovation. But for most, those are secondary consequences. The principal goal is to protect the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders and increase the weight given to them in corporate decision-making.

結構型利益相關者主義面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。

Challenges for structural stakeholderism.

在董事會中增加員工或其他利益相關者代表的呼聲提出了對董事會性質和董事職責——以及對董事治理權力基礎——的根本性質疑。盡管董事有時被稱為股東的“代表”——而且如前所指出的，董事是由股東選舉產生的——但在法律上，他們更像是機構的受托人，而不是代表特定涉眾群體的代表。這就是為何當一家維權對沖基金在為自己的提名人爭取董事會席位，或者因實現其目標而向該董事提供額外薪酬時，其他股東可能會抗議的原因。作為受托人，董事對整個公司負有關愛和忠誠的義務，有義務代表公司進行獨立判斷——而不是聽命于一小部分股東。

The call to add representatives of employees or other stakeholders to corporate boards raises fundamental questions about the nature of boards and the duties of directors—and about the basis of directors’ authority to govern. Although directors are sometimes referred to as shareholders’ “representatives”—and, as noted, are elected by shareholders—they are legally more akin to trustees for the institution than to delegates representing a particular constituency. That is why other shareholders may protest when an activist hedge fund negotiates a seat on the board for its own nominee or offers additional compensation to that director for achieving its goals. As fiduciaries, directors owe care and loyalty to the corporation as a whole and are obliged to exercise independent judgment on its behalf—not to do the bidding of a subset of shareholders.

因此，在傳統(tǒng)的法律模式下，公司董事會更接近信托董事會，而不是涉眾董事會。這兩種取向導致了截然不同的心態(tài)和對董事效能截然不同的要求。該機構的受托人必須了解多個涉眾群體的利益，以及它們與整個企業(yè)的關系。為了保持客觀性，他們需要與尋求施加影響的利益相關方保持一定距離。相比之下，某一涉眾群體的代表應該與其成員密切接觸，實現他們的愿望，維護他們的利益。因此，受托董事和涉眾群體董事會對擺在董事會面前的問題保持截然不同的立場。

Under the traditional legal model, a corporate board is thus closer to a fiduciary board than to a constituency board. Those two orientations lead to very different mindsets and very different requirements for director effectiveness. Fiduciaries for the institution must understand the interests of multiple constituencies and how they relate to the business as a whole. To maintain their objectivity, they need to keep some distance from interested parties seeking to exert influence. By comparison, representatives of a constituency are expected to engage closely with its members, carry out their wishes, and advocate for their interests. Fiduciary directors and constituency directors can thus take very different stances on issues that come before the board.

在公司董事會中增加員工或其他利益相關者的提議很少明確提出這一問題，但其中許多人似乎將這些董事會設想為由各種利益相關者群體代表組成的涉眾群體董事會。盡管涉眾群體董事會適合一些組織，但這種模式對商業(yè)企業(yè)會產生令人不安的影響。也許最令人擔憂的是對決策速度和連貫性的潛在影響。如果董事的主要職責是為他們所代表群體的利益服務，而不是為公司的利益服務的話，那么很快就會出現漫無止境的談判和爭論不休的僵局。涉及戰(zhàn)略、投資、領導力、收購、撤資、重組等方面的決策通常必須迅速做出。在快速變化的商業(yè)環(huán)境中，花時間征求各利益相關者群體的意見并商討解決他們之間分歧的方案可能行不通。此外，如果沒有對公司的共同責任來支持和聚焦談判，那么極有可能會出現欠佳的結果。

Few if any proposals to add employees or other stakeholders to corporate boards raise this issue explicitly, but many of them seem to envision those boards as constituency boards comprising representatives of various stakeholder groups. Although constituency boards are appropriate for some organizations, the model has troubling implications for business corporations. Perhaps the most worrisome is the potential effect on the speed and coherence of decision-making. If the principal duty of directors is to serve the interests of the groups they represent rather than the interests of the company, the prospect of lengthy negotiations and contentious standoffs quickly arises. Decisions about strategy, investments, leadership, acquisitions, divestments, restructuring, and the like must often be made quickly. In a rapidly changing business environment, taking time to solicit the views of various stakeholder groups and to negotiate a resolution of the differences among them may not be feasible. Moreover, without a shared duty to the company to anchor and focus the negotiations, the odds of a suboptimal result are high.

利益相關者董事會的概念與董事獨立性的理想背道而馳，而董事獨立性是當今良好治理的核心。對于利益相關者董事會的倡導者而言，作為員工、客戶、供應商或其他涉眾在企業(yè)中擁有利益是一種服務資格?？墒牵赡軗p害董事的判斷力，削弱董事會做出整體價值創(chuàng)造決策的能力。利益相關者董事會的支持者將其視為朝著單一目標努力的合作團體，而懷疑人士則將它們視為相互矛盾的復雜主張，會滋生不信任，并損害決策。在接受利益相關者董事會之前，明智的做法是明確其成員的職責，并考慮他們在實踐中如何行使職責。

The concept of stakeholder boards runs counter to the ideals of director independence that are at the core of good governance today. For advocates of stakeholder boards, having an interest in the business as an employee, a customer, a supplier, or another constituent is a qualification for service. But it can also compromise a director’s judgment and undermine boards’ ability to make overall value-creating decisions. Proponents of stakeholder boards envision them as collaborative bodies working toward a single purpose, whereas skeptics envision them as thickets of competing claims that breed distrust and impair decision-making. Before embracing stakeholder boards, it would be wise to clarify the duties of their members and consider how they are likely to function in practice.

股東資本主義可能或多或少會超出人們的想象，也或多或少會對股東至上主義構成挑戰(zhàn)，這取決于正在考慮的是哪一個類型。每一個類型都涉及一系列獨特的承諾和挑戰(zhàn)，而且每一個類型對公司及其董事會的運作都有非常不同的實際意義。企業(yè)領導需要清楚地了解這些意義是什么。他們還需要誠實坦言，他們的類型實際上可以為利益相關者帶來什么，可以為社會帶來什么，以及對股東意味著什么。我們已經過了這樣一個時間點：對沖突的擔憂可以通過簡單呼吁股東、利益相關者和社會之間共享長期利益來消除。現在是澄清我們所謂的“利益相關者資本主義”是何意義的時候了。

Stakeholder capitalism can be more or less than meets the eye—and more or less of a challenge to shareholder primacy—depending on which version is being considered. Each one involves a distinctive set of commitments and challenges, and each has very different practical implications for how companies and their boards function. Corporate leaders need a clear understanding of what those implications are. They also need to be honest about what their version can actually deliver for stakeholders, what it can deliver for society, and what it means for shareholders. We have passed the point at which concern about conflicts can be brushed off with easy appeals to a presumed long-term harmony of interests among shareholders, stakeholders, and society. The time has come to clarify what we mean by “stakeholder capitalism.”

林恩·佩因是哈佛商學院貝克基金會教授及約翰·麥克萊恩工商管理教席教授。

林恩·佩因（Lynn S. Paine）| 文

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