原文：In order to be anything, it has to take the risk of becoming other thing itself, of bouncing into its other. So, the self is empty in itself.?

if it doesn't take the risk of adopting the otherness, of bouncing into the otherness. So this is "Sichanderswerden", this goes for any entity we would say.?

Any entity is empty in itself and the origin is empty in itself unless it takes the risk of Sichanderswerden, unless it produces something that called "beyond that origin", something that negates that origin.

In order to be anything at all, it has to adopt the otherness. This is extremely basic Hegel's stance. And one other way to present the idea is the idea of "the fall". Slavoj Zizek has written quite a bit about the question about "the fall".

You can take "the fall" in the biblical sense: There was a paradise and then there is a "fall" from paradise--is the narrative which is usually given. But Hegel's idea of "the fall" is that we start with the fall and paradise, which existed before, when an entity is closed in itself, is a retroactive construction.

So, things have to be "fall" in order to be themselves. I mean they are not themselves in the supposed paradise of their self-identity. It's only after the fall, that we can construct what they were supposed to be in themselves. 'Cause before the fall they were empty.

We only retroactively have the idea of the fullness of origin. Origin for Hegel is always empty. It is an empty thing. It's not full wealth from which things should have evolved. It's an empty thing and the only one before, from this alleged paradise of self-identity let's say. Only then can we retroactively see what supposedly precedes it.

But in our imagination we can't help doing the narrative -- imagining is a narrative-- of some fullness of being which then fell.

譯文：為了是任何東西，自我就必須冒險(xiǎn)變成其他東西，與自我的他者正面遭遇。所以，自我如果不冒險(xiǎn)將他者性容納在內(nèi)，從而遇見(jiàn)他者，自我就自身而言就是空的。所以這就是“自我他者化”，我們講的實(shí)體都適用這個(gè)道理。

任何實(shí)體就自身而言都是空的，且如果不進(jìn)行自我他者化并創(chuàng)造出超越本原的東西、一種揚(yáng)棄了本原的東西，本原就自身而言也會(huì)是空的。

為了是任何東西，就必須要接納他者性。這是黑格爾的基本立場(chǎng)。另一種可以用來(lái)說(shuō)明這個(gè)觀念的是“墮落”這一概念。齊澤克已經(jīng)寫(xiě)了一些關(guān)于“墮落”的東西。

你可以在經(jīng)典（圣經(jīng)）意義上把握“墮落”這個(gè)概念：曾有天堂，而后有從天堂中“墮落”下來(lái)——這是一般的敘事。但是黑格爾意義上的“墮落”則是：墮落是我們的起點(diǎn)，而之前存在的那個(gè)天堂，即實(shí)體與自我同一的那個(gè)時(shí)刻，是一種回溯性建構(gòu)。

所以，物為了是物自身必須要先“墮落”。我的意思是它們?cè)诩僭O(shè)中的那個(gè)自我同一的天堂中還不是自身。而只有在墮落之后，我們才能夠建構(gòu)起它們自身所應(yīng)當(dāng)是的那個(gè)樣子。因?yàn)閴櫬渲?，它們是空的?/p>

我們只有在回溯性的建構(gòu)中才產(chǎn)生“本原的完滿性”這一概念。黑格爾意義上的本原是空的。是空的東西。事物不是從完滿的豐富性中演化出來(lái)的。本原是空的、唯一的，是來(lái)自于假設(shè)中自我同一的天堂的先在。然后，我們才能回溯性地看到先于它的那個(gè)東西。

但是在想象中我們?nèi)滩蛔∪ソ?gòu)這種敘事（想象是一種敘事），這種敘事認(rèn)為先有存在者的某種完滿，然后這種完滿的存在墮落了。

（以上為2018年4月12日講座切片）