經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人:全球科技政治--新的大談判(part-1)
Global technopolitics--The new grand bargain
Without teaming up, democracies will not be able to establish a robust alternative to China’s autocratic technosphere

teaming up v. 合作;結(jié)成一隊(duì);協(xié)作? ? ? ??Technosphere /'tekn?usfi?/n. 技術(shù)領(lǐng)域
autocratic?/???t??kr?t?k /??獨(dú)裁的
AMERICA HAS long dominated the world in information technology (IT). Its government, universities and enterprising?spirit have provided it with decades of leadership in hardware and software. Its military drones, satellites and “system of systems” give its armed forces a powerful edge over those of any competitor. Silicon Valley is more visited by foreign dignitaries and?finders-of-fact?than any other business locale in the world. One of its tech giants is currently worth over $2trn; three more are worth over $1trn. The contribution technology makes to the?buoyancy?of its markets is without equal.
Enterprising??adj./?ent?pra?z??/ 有事業(yè)心的;有進(jìn)取心的;有創(chuàng)業(yè)精神的
Dignitary ?n. /?d?ɡn?t?ri/ ?顯貴;要人;達(dá)官貴人;高僧
finder-of-fact:一般指事實(shí)真相的調(diào)查人員,一般是法官、陪審團(tuán)等(尤其是法律)
?Buoyancy??/?b???ns?/?1.浮力?? Air can be pumped into the diving suit to increase buoyancy. 可以往潛水衣中打氣增加浮力。2.愉快? a mood of buoyancy and optimiSM. 愉快、樂觀的情緒。3.(經(jīng)濟(jì)上的)繁榮? The likelihood is that the slump will be followed by a period of buoyancy. ?有可能在衰退之后出現(xiàn)一段繁榮時期。
China, too, has digital resources in abundance, not least its huge population of 1.4bn, which means it will eventually boast an even deeper pool of data and experts to develop AI models. The country’s digital giants, from Alibaba to Tencent, have already become AI and cloud-computing powers in their own right. Its people live online to an extent that Americans—many of whom still have cheque books—do not. The country’s Great Firewall keeps undesirable digital content out. Within the wall, tech firms are allowed to fight it out.
And China is on the move. It is investing billions in emerging technologies, from AI?and chip fabrication to quantum computing?and 5G, a new generation of mobile networks. It is hacking other countries’ computer systems and grabbing intellectual property where it can. It is packing the organisations that develop global technical rules, such as the International Telecommunication Union. And it is pulling other countries into its orbit with initiatives such as the “digital Silk Road”, helping them build out their digital infrastructure.
chip fabrication 芯片制造? ? ? ?quantum computing:量子計算
President Donald Trump saw, correctly, that this made China a serious challenger to America’s digital supremacy. His humbling?of Huawei, a Chinese telecoms-equipment maker, has begun a decoupling of Chinese and American IT infrastructures and of the supply chains between China and America that will continue.
Supremacy??n. /su??prem?si/ ?/sju??/~ (over sb/sth) 至高無上;最大權(quán)力;最高權(quán)威;最高地位? the battle for supremacy in the region 爭奪地區(qū)霸權(quán)的較量
humble /?h?mbl/ ?1.貶低;使感到卑微?He was humbled by her generosity. 她的大度使他覺得自己渺小。2.輕松打?。ㄓ戎笍?qiáng)大的對手)??The world champion was humbled last night in three rounds. 這位世界冠軍昨晚三個回合就被輕松擊敗。 3.~ yourself ?低聲下氣;謙遜;虛心
Many device-makers have already moved part of their production out of China and some will end up with two separate supply chains. Apple’s contract manufacturers, for instance, are setting up plants in India. TSMC, a Taiwanese chip firm, announced in May that it will build a facility in Arizona. Feeling its dependence on American semiconductor technology, China is doubling down on efforts to build its own. In software and other areas, too, bifurcation has begun and not just because of bans against?Chinese apps.
bifurcation /?ba?f??ke??n/ n. 分歧(點(diǎn)),分叉;分枝后的一枝
What Mr Trump was unable or unwilling to understand, though, was that China and America are not the only economies that matter in this contest, and that fact provides America with a potentially decisive advantage. India, the European Union, Japan and others all play crucial roles in the world’s IT system as do tech giants such as Alphabet, Apple and Microsoft.
譯文

Global technopolitics--The new grand bargain
Without teaming up, democracies will not be able to establish a robust alternative to China’s autocratic technosphere
沒有合作,西方民主國家將不能建立穩(wěn)健的科技環(huán)境替代中國的科技環(huán)境。
AMERICA HAS long dominated the world in information technology (IT). Its government, universities and enterprising?spirit have provided it with decades of leadership in hardware and software. Its military drones, satellites and “system of systems” give its armed forces a powerful edge over those of any competitor. Silicon Valley is more visited by foreign dignitaries and?finders-of-fact?than any other business locale in the world. One of its tech giants is currently worth over $2trn; three more are worth over $1trn. The contribution technology makes to the?buoyancy?of its markets is without equal.
美國常年統(tǒng)治世界IT行業(yè)。其政府、大學(xué)和進(jìn)取精神幾十年來為IT硬件、軟件行業(yè)帶來了無數(shù)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)階層。其軍用無人機(jī)、衛(wèi)星和“系統(tǒng)的系統(tǒng)”為美國軍事力量帶來了相較其他競爭者強(qiáng)有力的優(yōu)勢。硅谷更是被世界顯要和調(diào)查人員頻頻參觀,一騎絕塵。硅谷其中一家科技巨頭現(xiàn)在估值超過2萬億美元;三家估值超過1萬億。技術(shù)對市場繁榮的貢獻(xiàn)是無與倫比。
China, too, has digital resources in abundance, not least its huge population of 1.4bn, which means it will eventually boast an even deeper pool of data and experts to develop AI models. The country’s digital giants, from Alibaba to Tencent, have already become AI and cloud-computing powers in their own right. Its people live online to an extent that Americans—many of whom still have cheque books—do not. The country’s Great Firewall keeps undesirable digital content out. Within the wall, tech firms are allowed to fight it out.
中國也一樣有豐富的數(shù)字資源,不僅14億的巨量人口最終會帶來更加深刻的數(shù)據(jù)池便于專家開發(fā)AI模型。中國的IT巨頭,從阿里巴巴到騰訊,已經(jīng)憑借自身實(shí)力成為AI及云計算強(qiáng)者。其國民互聯(lián)網(wǎng)生活化程度已經(jīng)超過美國(很多美國人還在使用支票)。其國家的防火墻將不需要的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)內(nèi)容拒之門外。在墻內(nèi),科技公司相互競爭。
And China is on the move. It is investing billions in emerging technologies, from AI?and chip fabrication to quantum computing?and 5G, a new generation of mobile networks. It is hacking other countries’ computer systems and grabbing intellectual property where it can. It is packing the organisations that develop global technical rules, such as the International Telecommunication Union. And it is pulling other countries into its orbit with initiatives such as the “digital Silk Road”, helping them build out their digital infrastructure.
而且中國正在行動。它正在新興技術(shù)上投資數(shù)十億美元,從AI和芯片制造,到量子計算和新一代移動網(wǎng)絡(luò)5G。它正在侵入其他國家的計算機(jī)系統(tǒng),并在可能的地方攫取知識產(chǎn)權(quán)。它積極進(jìn)入全球技術(shù)規(guī)則的組織,比如國際電信聯(lián)盟。中國正通過“數(shù)字絲綢之路”(digital Silk Road)等舉措,將其他國家拉入自己的勢力范圍,幫助它們建設(shè)數(shù)字基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。(UP主表示立場、出發(fā)點(diǎn)不一樣就是結(jié)論不一樣。作為中國人想在國際組織上有話語權(quán),積極參加。在美國有些學(xué)者眼里就是入侵,是別有用心,都是中國威脅論。)
President Donald Trump saw, correctly, that this made China a serious challenger to America’s digital supremacy. His humbling?of Huawei, a Chinese telecoms-equipment maker, has begun a decoupling of Chinese and American IT infrastructures and of the supply chains between China and America that will continue.
特朗普準(zhǔn)確地看到了中國數(shù)字制造正在嚴(yán)重挑戰(zhàn)美國的數(shù)字霸權(quán)。他羞辱中國電信設(shè)備制造商華為,開啟了中美IT行業(yè)在基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施及供應(yīng)的脫鉤,這種脫鉤將會繼續(xù)。
Many device-makers have already moved part of their production out of China and some will end up with two separate supply chains. Apple’s contract manufacturers, for instance, are setting up plants in India. TSMC, a Taiwanese chip firm, announced in May that it will build a facility in Arizona. Feeling its dependence on American semiconductor technology, China is doubling down on efforts to build its own. In software and other areas, too, bifurcation has begun and not just because of bans against?Chinese apps.
許多設(shè)備制造商已經(jīng)將部分生產(chǎn)移出中國,其中一些最終將擁有兩條獨(dú)立的供應(yīng)鏈。例如蘋果的合約制造商計劃在印度設(shè)廠。芯片制造商TSMC(臺積電)在5月宣稱將在美國亞利桑那州建廠。中國感覺到對美國半導(dǎo)體技術(shù)的依賴,正加倍努力打造自己的半導(dǎo)體技術(shù)。在軟件和其他領(lǐng)域,分歧也已經(jīng)開始,不僅僅是因?yàn)橹袊鴳?yīng)用被禁止。
What Mr Trump was unable or unwilling to understand, though, was that China and America are not the only economies that matter in this contest, and that fact provides America with a potentially decisive advantage. India, the European Union, Japan and others all play crucial roles in the world’s IT system as do tech giants such as Alphabet, Apple and Microsoft.
特朗普無法也不愿意理解的是中美兩國并非這場競爭中的唯一決定性經(jīng)濟(jì)體,這也為美國提供了潛在的決定性優(yōu)勢。印度、歐盟、日本以及其他在世界IT系統(tǒng)中扮演關(guān)鍵角色??萍季揞^例如Alphabet(字母表公司)、蘋果及微軟。
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人12月刊