ECONOMETRICA 2023年第2期

MAR, 2023,?VOLUME 91,?ISSUE 2

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——更多動態(tài)，請持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨

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Dynamic Spatial General Equilibrium

動態(tài)空間一般均衡

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20273

Benny Kleinman, Ernest Liu, Stephen J. Redding

We incorporate forward‐looking capital accumulation into a dynamic discrete choice model of migration. We characterize the steady‐state equilibrium; generalize existing dynamic exact‐hat algebra techniques to incorporate investment; and linearize the model to provide an analytical characterization of the economy's transition path using spectral analysis. We show that capital and labor dynamics interact to shape the economy's speed of adjustment toward steady state. We implement our quantitative analysis using data on capital stocks, populations, and bilateral trade and migration flows for U.S. states from 1965–2015. We show that this interaction between capital and labor dynamics plays a central role in explaining the observed decline in the rate of income convergence across U.S. states and the persistent and heterogeneous impact of local shocks.

我們將前瞻性資本積累納入遷移的動態(tài)離散選擇模型。我們對穩(wěn)態(tài)均衡進行了表征;推廣現(xiàn)有的動態(tài)精確代數(shù)技術(shù)，以納入投資;并將模型線性化，以使用光譜分析提供經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)型路徑的分析表征。我們表明，資本和勞動力動態(tài)相互作用，塑造了經(jīng)濟向穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)的調(diào)整速度。我們利用1965—2015年美國各州的資本存量、人口、雙邊貿(mào)易和移民流動數(shù)據(jù)進行定量分析。我們的研究表明，資本和勞動力動態(tài)之間的這種相互作用在解釋美國各州收入趨同率的下降以及地方?jīng)_擊的持續(xù)和異質(zhì)性影響方面發(fā)揮了核心作用。

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Optimal Regulation of Noncompete Contracts

競業(yè)禁止合同的最優(yōu)規(guī)制

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18128

Liyan Shi

I study regulation of noncompete employment contracts, assessing the trade‐off between restricting worker mobility and encouraging firm investment. I develop an on‐the‐job search model in which firms and workers sign dynamic wage contracts with noncompete clauses and firms invest in their workers' general human capital. Employers use noncompete clauses to enforce buyout payments when their workers depart, ultimately extracting rent from future employers. This rent extraction is socially excessive, and restrictions on these clauses can improve efficiency. The optimal regulation policy is characterized. In an application to the managerial labor market using a novel contract data set, I find the optimal policy to be quantitatively close to a ban.

我研究了競業(yè)禁止雇傭合同的規(guī)定，評估了限制工人流動和鼓勵企業(yè)投資之間的權(quán)衡。我開發(fā)了一種求職模型，在這個模型中，公司和員工簽訂帶有競業(yè)禁止條款的動態(tài)工資合同，公司投資于員工的一般人力資本。雇主利用競業(yè)禁止條款在員工離職時強制執(zhí)行買斷金，最終從未來雇主那里收取租金。這種租金提取在社會上是過度的，對這些條款加以限制可以提高效率。對最優(yōu)調(diào)控策略進行了表征。在一個利用新型合同數(shù)據(jù)集的管理勞動力市場應(yīng)用中，我發(fā)現(xiàn)最優(yōu)政策在定量上接近禁令。

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Synthetic Control As Online Linear Regression

綜合控制與在線線性回歸

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20720

Jiafeng Chen

This paper notes a simple connection between synthetic control and online learning. Specifically, we recognize synthetic control as an instance of?Follow‐The‐Leader?(FTL). Standard results in online convex optimization then imply that, even when outcomes are chosen by an adversary, synthetic control predictions of counterfactual outcomes for the treated unit perform almost as well as an oracle weighted average of control units' outcomes. Synthetic control on differenced data performs almost as well as oracle weighted difference‐in‐differences, potentially making it an attractive choice in practice. We argue that this observation further supports the use of synthetic control estimators in comparative case studies.

本文指出了綜合控制與在線學(xué)習(xí)之間的簡單聯(lián)系。具體地說，我們認為合成控制是跟隨-領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者(FTL)的一個實例。在線凸優(yōu)化的標準結(jié)果意味著，即使結(jié)果是由對手選擇的，對處理單元的反事實結(jié)果的綜合控制預(yù)測幾乎與對控制單元結(jié)果的甲骨文加權(quán)平均一樣好。對不同數(shù)據(jù)的綜合控制幾乎與oracle加權(quán)差中差一樣好，這可能使其成為實踐中有吸引力的選擇。我們認為，這一觀察結(jié)果進一步支持在比較案例研究中使用合成控制估計量。

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Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Competitors

在普通價值拍賣中與數(shù)量未知的競爭對手競價

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17793

Stephan Lauermann, Andre Speit

This paper studies a first‐price common‐value auction in which bidders do not know the number of their competitors. In contrast to the case of common‐value auctions with a known number of rival bidders, the inference from winning is not monotone, and a “winner's blessing” emerges at low bids. As a result, bidding strategies may not be strictly increasing, but instead may contain atoms. Moreover, an equilibrium fails to exist when the expected number of competitors is large and the bid space is continuous. Therefore, we consider auctions on a grid. On a fine grid, high‐signal bidders follow an essentially strictly increasing strategy, whereas low‐signal bidders pool on two adjacent bids on the grid. The solutions of a “communication extension” based on Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame (2002) capture the equilibrium bidding behavior in the limit, as the grid becomes arbitrarily fine.

本文研究了一種第一價格的普通價值拍賣，在這種拍賣中，競標者不知道其競爭對手的數(shù)量。與已知競標者數(shù)量的普通價值拍賣不同，中標的推論并不單調(diào)，“贏家的祝?！背霈F(xiàn)在出價較低的地方。因此，投標策略可能不會嚴格增加，而是可能包含原子。此外，當競爭對手的預(yù)期數(shù)量較大且投標空間連續(xù)時，均衡不存在。因此，我們考慮網(wǎng)格上的拍賣。在細電網(wǎng)中，高信號競標者遵循本質(zhì)上嚴格增加的策略，而低信號競標者則在電網(wǎng)上兩個相鄰的投標中集中投標?；贘ackson、Simon、Swinkels和Zame(2002)的“通信擴展”解決方案捕捉了極限下的均衡競價行為，因為網(wǎng)格變得任意精細。

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Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics

與權(quán)力的聯(lián)系:政治聯(lián)系、創(chuàng)新和公司動態(tài)

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18338

Ufuk Akcigit, Salomé Baslandze, Francesca Lotti

How do political connections affect firm dynamics, innovation, and creative destruction? We extend a Schumpeterian growth model with political connections that help firms ease bureaucratic and regulatory burden. The model highlights how political connections influence an economy's business dynamism and innovation, and generates a number of implications guiding our empirical analysis. We construct a new large‐scale data set for the period 1993–2014, on the universe of firms, workers, and politicians, complemented with corporate financial statements, patent data, and election data, so as to define connected firms as those employing local politicians. We identify a leadership paradox: market leaders are much more likely to be politically connected, but much less likely to innovate. Political connections relate to a higher rate of survival, as well as growth in employment and revenues, but not in productivity—a result that we also confirm using the regression discontinuity design. At the aggregate level, gains from political connections do not offset losses stemming from lower reallocation and growth.

政治關(guān)聯(lián)如何影響企業(yè)動態(tài)、創(chuàng)新和創(chuàng)造性破壞?本文擴展了一個熊彼特增長模型，引入政治關(guān)聯(lián)，幫助企業(yè)減輕官僚主義和監(jiān)管負擔(dān)。該模型強調(diào)了政治聯(lián)系如何影響一個經(jīng)濟體的商業(yè)活力和創(chuàng)新，并產(chǎn)生了一些指導(dǎo)我們實證分析的含義。我們構(gòu)建了一個新的1993—2014年的大規(guī)模數(shù)據(jù)集，包括公司、工人和政治家，并補充了公司財務(wù)報表、專利數(shù)據(jù)和選舉數(shù)據(jù)，以便將關(guān)聯(lián)公司定義為雇傭當?shù)卣渭业墓尽Ｎ覀儼l(fā)現(xiàn)了一個領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力悖論:市場領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者更有可能擁有政治人脈，但創(chuàng)新的可能性要小得多。政治關(guān)系與更高的生存率、就業(yè)和收入增長有關(guān)，但與生產(chǎn)率無關(guān)——我們也使用斷點回歸設(shè)計證實了這一結(jié)果。總體而言，政治關(guān)系帶來的收益并不能抵消較低的再分配和增長帶來的損失。

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Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party

非民主國家的派系:來自中國共產(chǎn)黨的理論和證據(jù)

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19274

Patrick Francois,?Francesco Trebbi,?Kairong Xiao

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates factional arrangements within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the governing political party of the People's Republic of China. Using detailed biographical information of political elites in the Central Committee and provincial governments, we present a set of new empirical regularities within the CCP, including systematic patterns of cross‐factional balancing at different levels of the political hierarchy and substantial faction premia in promotions. We propose and estimate an organizational economic model to characterize factional politics within single‐party nondemocratic regimes and its economic implications.

本文對中國共產(chǎn)黨內(nèi)部的派系安排進行了理論和實證研究。利用中央委員會和省級政府政治精英的詳細履歷信息，我們提出了一套新的中共內(nèi)部經(jīng)驗規(guī)律，包括政治等級不同層次的跨派系平衡的系統(tǒng)模式和晉升中大量的派系優(yōu)勢。我們提出并估計了一個組織經(jīng)濟模型，以描述單黨非民主政權(quán)中的派系政治及其經(jīng)濟影響。

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Optimal Product Design: Implications for Competition and Growth under Declining Search Frictions

最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品設(shè)計:搜索摩擦下降對競爭和增長的影響

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19653

Guido Menzio

As search frictions in the market for a consumer product decline, buyers are able to locate and access more and more sellers. In response, sellers choose to design varieties of the product that are more and more specialized in order to take advantage of the heterogeneity in buyers' preferences. I find conditions on the fundamentals of the market under which the increase in specialization exactly offsets the decline in search frictions. Under these conditions, the extent of competition and the extent of price dispersion remain constant over time even though search frictions are vanishing. Buyer's surplus and seller's profit, however, grow over time at a constant endogenous rate, as the increase in specialization allows sellers to cater better and better to the preferences of individual buyers.

隨著消費品市場的搜索摩擦減少，買家能夠找到和訪問越來越多的賣家。作為回應(yīng)，賣方選擇設(shè)計越來越專業(yè)化的產(chǎn)品品種，以利用買方偏好的異質(zhì)性。我發(fā)現(xiàn)，在市場基本面的條件下，專業(yè)化程度的提高恰好抵消了搜索摩擦的下降。在這些條件下，盡管搜索摩擦正在消失，但競爭的程度和價格差異的程度隨著時間的推移保持不變。然而，隨著時間的推移，買方的盈余和賣方的利潤以恒定的內(nèi)生速度增長，因為專業(yè)化程度的提高使賣方能夠更好地迎合個別買方的偏好。

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Network Cluster-Robust Inference

網(wǎng)絡(luò)聚類標準誤推斷

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19816
p. 641-667

Michael P. Leung

Since network data commonly consists of observations from a single large network, researchers often partition the network into clusters in order to apply cluster‐robust inference methods. Existing such methods require clusters to be asymptotically independent. Under mild conditions, we prove that, for this requirement to hold for network‐dependent data, it is necessary and sufficient that clusters have low conductance, the ratio of edge boundary size to volume. This yields a simple measure of cluster quality. We find in simulations that when clusters have low conductance, cluster‐robust methods control size better than HAC estimators. However, for important classes of networks lacking low‐conductance clusters, the former can exhibit substantial size distortion. To determine the number of low‐conductance clusters and construct them, we draw on results in spectral graph theory that connect conductance to the spectrum of the graph Laplacian. Based on these results, we propose to use the spectrum to determine the number of low‐conductance clusters and spectral clustering to construct them.

由于網(wǎng)絡(luò)數(shù)據(jù)通常由來自單個大型網(wǎng)絡(luò)的觀測數(shù)據(jù)組成，研究人員經(jīng)常將網(wǎng)絡(luò)劃分為集群，以便應(yīng)用集群魯棒推理方法。現(xiàn)有的這類方法要求聚類是漸近獨立的。在溫和的條件下，我們證明，對于網(wǎng)絡(luò)相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)的這一要求，簇具有低電導(dǎo)是必要和充分的，即邊緣邊界大小與體積的比率。這產(chǎn)生了一個簡單的集群質(zhì)量度量。我們在模擬中發(fā)現(xiàn)，當集群具有低電導(dǎo)時，集群魯棒方法比HAC估計器更好地控制規(guī)模。然而，對于缺乏低電導(dǎo)簇的重要類別的網(wǎng)絡(luò)，前者可能表現(xiàn)出巨大的尺寸失真。為了確定低電導(dǎo)簇的數(shù)量并構(gòu)建它們，我們借鑒了頻譜圖理論中的結(jié)果，將電導(dǎo)與拉普拉斯圖的頻譜聯(lián)系起來?；谶@些結(jié)果，我們建議使用頻譜來確定低電導(dǎo)簇的數(shù)量和頻譜聚類來構(gòu)建它們。

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Is Attention Produced Optimally? Theory and Evidence from Experiments with Bandwidth Enhancements

注意力的產(chǎn)生是最佳的嗎?帶寬增強的理論和實驗證據(jù)

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20400

Erin T. Bronchetti, Judd B. Kessler, Ellen B. Magenheim, Dmitry Taubinsky, Eric Zwick

This paper develops and deploys a methodology for testing whether people correctly value tools that reduce attention costs. We call these tools bandwidth enhancements (BEs) and characterize how demand for BEs varies with the pecuniary incentives to be attentive, under the null hypothesis of correct perceptions and optimal choice. We examine if the theoretical optimality conditions are satisfied in three experiments. The first is a field experiment (n?=?1373) with an online education platform, in which we randomize incentives to complete course modules and incentives to utilize a plan‐making tool to complete the modules. In the second experiment (n?=?2306), participants must complete a survey in the future. We randomize survey‐completion incentives and how long participants must wait to complete the survey, and we elicit willingness to pay for reminders. The third experiment (n?=?1465) involves a psychometric task in which participants must identify whether there are more correct or incorrect mathematical equations in an image. We vary incentives for accuracy, elicit willingness to pay to reduce task difficulty, and examine the impact of learning and feedback. In all experiments, demand for reducing attention costs increases as incentives for accurate task completion increase. However, in all experiments—and across all conditions—our tests imply that this increase in demand is too small relative to the null of correct perceptions. These results suggest that people may be uncertain or systematically biased about their attention cost functions, and that experience and feedback do not necessarily eliminate bias.

本文開發(fā)并部署了一種方法來測試人們是否正確地重視降低注意力成本的工具。我們將這些工具稱為帶寬增強(BEs)，并描述了在正確感知和最佳選擇的零假設(shè)下，對BEs的需求如何隨著關(guān)注的金錢激勵而變化。我們在三個實驗中檢驗了理論最優(yōu)性條件是否滿足。第一個是在線教育平臺的現(xiàn)場實驗(n = 1373)，在這個實驗中，我們隨機分配完成課程模塊的激勵措施，以及使用計劃制定工具完成模塊的激勵措施。在第二個實驗中(n = 2306)，被試必須在未來完成問卷調(diào)查。我們對完成調(diào)查的激勵措施和參與者必須等待多長時間才能完成調(diào)查進行隨機化，并引出他們?yōu)樘嵝讯顿M的意愿。第三個實驗(n = 1465)涉及一項心理測量任務(wù)，參與者必須識別圖像中的數(shù)學(xué)方程是正確的還是錯誤的。我們改變對準確性的激勵，促使人們愿意為降低任務(wù)難度而付費，并檢查學(xué)習(xí)和反饋的影響。在所有實驗中，降低注意成本的需求隨著準確完成任務(wù)的激勵增加而增加。然而，在所有的實驗中，以及在所有的條件下，我們的測試都表明，相對于正確認知的無效，這種需求的增長太小了。這些結(jié)果表明，人們可能對自己的注意力成本函數(shù)存在不確定性或系統(tǒng)性偏見，而經(jīng)驗和反饋不一定能消除偏見。

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Constrained Conditional Moment Restriction Models

約束條件矩約束模型

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13830

Victor Chernozhukov, Whitney K. Newey, Andres Santos

Shape restrictions have played a central role in economics as both testable implications of theory and sufficient conditions for obtaining informative counterfactual predictions. In this paper, we provide a general procedure for inference under shape restrictions in identified and partially identified models defined by conditional moment restrictions. Our test statistics and proposed inference methods are based on the minimum of the generalized method of moments (GMM) objective function with and without shape restrictions. Uniformly valid critical values are obtained through a bootstrap procedure that approximates a subset of the true local parameter space. In an empirical analysis of the effect of childbearing on female labor supply, we show that employing shape restrictions in linear instrumental variables (IV) models can lead to shorter confidence regions for both local and average treatment effects. Other applications we discuss include inference for the variability of quantile IV treatment effects and for bounds on average equivalent variation in a demand model with general heterogeneity.

形狀限制在經(jīng)濟學(xué)中扮演著核心角色，既是理論的可測試含義，也是獲得信息性反事實預(yù)測的充分條件。在這篇論文中，我們提供了在形狀限制下，由條件矩限制定義的識別和部分識別模型的推理的一般程序。我們的檢驗統(tǒng)計量和提出的推理方法是基于有和沒有形狀限制的廣義矩量法(GMM)目標函數(shù)的最小值。一致有效的臨界值是通過一個bootstrap過程獲得的，該過程近似于真實局部參數(shù)空間的子集。在對生育對女性勞動力供給影響的實證分析中，我們表明，在線性工具變量(IV)模型中采用形狀限制可以導(dǎo)致局部和平均處理效果的置信區(qū)域更短。我們討論的其他應(yīng)用包括對分位數(shù)IV治療效果可變性的推斷，以及對具有一般異質(zhì)性的需求模型中平均等效變異的界限的推斷。

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When Is Parallel Trends Sensitive to Functional Form?

平行趨勢何時對函數(shù)形式敏感?

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19402

Jonathan Roth, Pedro H. C. Sant'Anna

This paper assesses when the validity of difference‐in‐differences depends on functional form. We provide a novel characterization: the parallel trends assumption holds under all strictly monotonic transformations of the outcome if and only if a stronger “parallel trends”‐type condition holds for the cumulative distribution function of untreated potential outcomes. This condition for parallel trends to be insensitive to functional form is satisfied if and essentially only if the population can be partitioned into a subgroup for which treatment is effectively randomly assigned and a remaining subgroup for which the distribution of untreated potential outcomes is stable over time. These conditions have testable implications, and we introduce falsification tests for the null that parallel trends is insensitive to functional form.

本文評估了雙重差分的有效性何時取決于函數(shù)形式。我們提供了一個新穎的表征:當且僅當未經(jīng)處理的潛在結(jié)果的累積分布函數(shù)具有更強的“平行趨勢”類型條件時，平行趨勢假設(shè)在結(jié)果的所有嚴格單調(diào)變換下成立。這種平行趨勢對功能形式不敏感的條件是滿足的，當且基本上只有當人群可以劃分為一個有效隨機分配治療的亞組和一個剩余的亞組，其未治療的潛在結(jié)果的分布隨著時間的推移是穩(wěn)定的。這些條件具有可測試的含義，并且我們對并行趨勢對函數(shù)形式不敏感的空值引入了證偽測試。