[番外篇]精讀節(jié)選 5.沃邦學說的影響
研究戰(zhàn)壕、營和突擊的戰(zhàn)術細節(jié)的意義遠遠超出了對早期現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭性質(zhì)的更好理解。堡壘戰(zhàn)和城市作戰(zhàn)的獨特性質(zhì)和頻率對早期現(xiàn)代社會產(chǎn)生了廣泛的影響[1]。?討論這一時期的“有限”戰(zhàn)爭時，必須忽略平民陷入交火的無數(shù)次情況。戰(zhàn)斗是在平原上進行的（字面意思是“野戰(zhàn)”），但為了控制人口稠密的城市地區(qū)而發(fā)動圍攻——圍攻將戰(zhàn)爭帶入了居民的爐膛和家園。市民最直接感興趣的是， 一個城鎮(zhèn)被占領的容易程度影響了參與者（戰(zhàn)斗員和非戰(zhàn)斗員）的戰(zhàn)爭經(jīng)歷。強大的城墻可能會保護里面的人免受掠奪團伙的隨意掠奪，但這也使他們成為軍事行動的目標。在防守占主導地位的時代，
被圍困的堡壘的力量可能會將雙方推向極端。駐軍將被鼓勵堅持到底，而圍攻者則對緩慢的圍攻感到沮喪，要么安頓下來封鎖以餓死城鎮(zhèn)，要么通過放火燒毀城鎮(zhèn)來發(fā)泄他們的憤怒 ?。另一方面，防御工事薄弱的城鎮(zhèn)可能會鼓勵攻擊者放棄正式的圍攻，轉(zhuǎn)而通突襲占領這個地方。如果他們的進攻成功，駐軍和鎮(zhèn)民的命運將取決于敵方指揮官能否成功地控制他的部隊的嗜血。因此，他們的生死直接陷入了國王的最后爭論中。
攻防平衡在很大程度上決定了軍事行動的吸引力以及這些行動將花費多少資金。由于整個早期現(xiàn)代國家的財政機構都致力于資助這一時期笨拙的軍事統(tǒng)治者，這些軍事因素決定了早期現(xiàn)代社會將承擔的負擔。正如蒙克早先的引述所承認的那樣，圍攻是一種特別昂貴的發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭的方式[2]。?過去幾十年中，對早期現(xiàn)代軍隊的后勤和行政研究的爆發(fā)突顯了其軍事工具所消耗的沉重費用以及這些政府籌集、裝備和維持這些武器的困難[3]。對于法國人來說，建造現(xiàn)代堡壘和翻新舊堡壘花費路易超過1.05億里弗爾，占皇家總支出的2.5%[4]。?事實上，法國社會的防御工事成本遠高于此，因為這個數(shù)字只占他一半期間產(chǎn)生的成本。統(tǒng)治，不包括地方直接支付的許多費用，包括現(xiàn)金和人工。占領和保衛(wèi)這些防御工事也需要花錢，以生命損失、消耗火藥和子彈以及爆裂大炮來衡量。與最長的圍攻相比，短暫圍攻的成本相形見絀，而且兩者都使軍隊年復一年地陷入困境，從而進一步夸大了戰(zhàn)時費用——隨著軍隊在特定城鎮(zhèn)周圍長時間的固定時間，成本飆升。除了幾個被征服的地方之外，一場戰(zhàn)役幾乎沒有什么可展示的，和平談判很容易破裂（或永遠不會開始），明年需要更多的軍事行動，這需要在整個冬季和春季重建部隊力量，并為另一場戰(zhàn)役的費用支付資金。在這種代價高昂的停滯中，人們產(chǎn)生了這樣的希望：一場決定性的戰(zhàn)斗雖然是血腥的，但從長遠來看，可以通過縮短一場無決定性的戰(zhàn)爭的持續(xù)時間來挽救生命和金錢[5]。這個理論對路易十四或他的對手都不起作用，特別是在 ?1688-1697年和1701-1714年的兩次最后的馬拉松比賽中。龐大的軍隊（在路易統(tǒng)治期間規(guī)模不斷擴大[6]）以及他們執(zhí)行的艱巨任務迫使戰(zhàn)爭開支失控，從法國國王統(tǒng)治初期的一半開支到他最后一次戰(zhàn)爭中王室“預算”的 90%[7]。在一個幾乎無休止的武裝沖突時代，找到資金來支付如此龐大的戰(zhàn)爭事業(yè)，對每一個早期現(xiàn)代國家都提出了嚴峻的挑戰(zhàn)，無論它擁有多么豐富的自然資源，它可以征召多少農(nóng)民，它可以雇傭多少雇傭軍，或者它可以從自己的稅基和金融家那里籌集多少錢。 信貸和現(xiàn)金是早期現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭的支柱，已被確定為傳統(tǒng)軍事歷史與復合君主制的更廣泛歷史之間的關鍵聯(lián)系，這些君主制試圖鞏固自己的權威，同時相互斗爭以爭奪主導地位[8]。在一個幾乎持續(xù)不斷的戰(zhàn)爭時期，這種貪得無厭的要求實際上可以奴役政治領導人，迫使“財政軍事”政權經(jīng)常無方向地發(fā)展[9]。發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭的巨大財政需求促使君主主義者和共和主義者都想方設法為他們的軍隊提供資金，這些軍隊往往參與攻擊敵人的據(jù)點[10]。對于早期的現(xiàn)代法國來說，學者們已經(jīng)說明了戰(zhàn)爭如何成為中央集權君主的敵人。對即時現(xiàn)金的無休止需求使對創(chuàng)造性短期融資的追求高于財政和政治改革，因為財政和政治改革將改善王室的長期穩(wěn)定。像讓·巴蒂斯特·勒·大科爾伯特（Jean-Baptiste le Grand ?Colbert）這樣具有改革思想的財政部長看到他們的計劃隨著宣戰(zhàn)而崩潰：王室被迫出售更多的貪婪辦公室并雇用更多自主的稅吏，而不是通過回購這些行政職位來重新獲得王室控制權。支持這場戰(zhàn)爭努力十年或更長時間進一步耗盡了路易的資源十四的狀態(tài)到了極限[11]。因此，闡述進攻和防御戰(zhàn)術之間的平衡對于我們理解戰(zhàn)爭在早期現(xiàn)代國家發(fā)展中所起的作用至關重要。
Duffy, Siege Warfare,chapter ten, The Fortress and Humankind. See also the wide-ranging collection of Ivy Corfis and Michael Wolfe (eds.), The Medieval City under Siege, (Woodbridge, 1995).
Lynn mentions the matter in passing in Wars of Louis XIV, p. 78 and in more detail in Giant, pp. 573–574. See also John Childs, Warfare in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 105–107.
Among others (to limit ourselves to monographs): Parker, The Army of Flanders and The Military Revolution, chapter 2; John Lynn’s relevant chapters (3–6) in Giant; the works in his edited Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, (Boulder, CO, 1993); James Wood, The King’s Army, chapter 11; David Parrott’s Richelieu’s Army, chapter 4; and Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest 1661–1701, (Cambridge, 2002). This is also one of the main themes of the recent volume edited by Philippe Contamine, War and Competition between States, (Oxford, 2000).
Jean-Pierre Rorive, La guerre de siège sous Louis XIV en Europe et à Huy, (Brussels,1997), pp. 39–40. Localities bore an even greater share of the burden. For an example from the French Wars of Religion, see Michael Wolfe, “Walled towns during the French wars of religion (1560–1630),” in J. Tracy, et al., City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 328–337.
Russell Weigley presents a caricature of this battle-seeking philosophy in The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Victory from Breitenfeld to Waterloo, (Bloomington,1991).
See John Lynn, “Recalculating French Army Growth during the Grand Siècle, 1610–1715,” French Historical Studies 18(4) Autumn 1994, reprinted in Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate, pp. 117–148.
Rorive, La guerre de siège sous Louis XIV, pp. 39–40. On early modern military financing generally, see P.G.M. Dickson and John Sperling, “War Finance, 1689–1714,” in J.S. Bromley (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688–1715/25 (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 284–315. The most recent surveys of French finances during the period can be found in Richard Bonney, Jean Roland Malet: premier historien des finances de la monarchie fran?aise. (Paris, 1993); as well as his “The Eighteenth Century II: The Struggle for Great Power Status and the End of the Old Fiscal Regime,” in R. Bonney (ed.), The rise of the fiscal state in Europe, c. 1200–1815, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 315–392. These figures (e.g. 71% of the royal “budget” being expended on the war department in the early years of the war) are based on the financial histories of two 18th century historians, Jean-Roland Malet, an aide to the French controller-general Nicolas Desmaretz, and Véron de Fourbonnais. For the English, see D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, (Oxford, 1988); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783, (New York, 1989), and most recently James Scott Wheeler, The making of a world power: war and revolution in seventeenth-century England, (Stroud,1999).
Both Michael Roberts’ initial Military Revolution and Geoffrey Parker’s more recent permutation stressed the increasing army sizes, which in turn necessitated new methods of generating revenue to support the troops. David Parrott and Guy Rowlands argue, to different degrees, for a French royal army supported predominantly by the service ethos of its noble officer corps. Although historians might disagree over how many men were paid, how they were paid, when the most important military changes occurred, and whether military expenses drove administrative and fiscal innovations or the reverse, they all agree that states (and their sources of revenues) usually teetered on the brink of insolvency as a result.
For a recent overview of this literature, see Gwynne Lewis’s “‘Fiscal States’: Taxes, War, Privilege and the Emergence of the European ‘Nation State’, c. 1200–1800,” French Historical Studies, 15(1) 2001, pp. 51–63, especially p. 54.
Parrott argues this point in Richelieu’s Army, p. 550.
For examples of such French financial gymnastics, see Gary McCollim, The formation of fiscal policy in the reign of Louis XIV: the example of Nicolas Desmaretz, controller general of finances (1708–1715), Ph.D. dissertation (Columbus, OH, 1979); and Rowlands, The Dynastic State.
