前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體并非想象中那么可怕，對于尋找新增長點(diǎn)的企業(yè)來說，與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)俱來的是高收益。本文將進(jìn)入前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體的企業(yè)分為4大類：苦力型、集群創(chuàng)造者、經(jīng)紀(jì)人和食利者，并分別給出了它們的戰(zhàn)略設(shè)計(jì)建議。? ? ?

對于尋求兩位數(shù)增長的跨國公司，機(jī)會(huì)越來越少。他們越來越關(guān)注低收入、高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的國家——既是進(jìn)口新市場，也是出口平臺(tái)。

Global players in search of?double-digit growth?are running out of opportunities.?They?are paying more attention to low-income, high-risk countries both as new markets for selling goods and services and as platforms from which to export them elsewhere.

這些被我們稱之為“前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體（frontier economies）”的國家，可能看起來并非前路光明的伊甸園——被政府干預(yù)的市場，脆弱的法制體系，人均收入低或GDP增長艱難。但在未來5年里預(yù)計(jì)增長最快的25個(gè)國家中，19個(gè)是前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體，其中包括緬甸、莫桑比克、越南和盧旺達(dá)。很多前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體都蘊(yùn)藏著世界上最豐富的未開采礦藏和金屬資源；盡管目前商品價(jià)格疲軟，開發(fā)這些資源的全球投資仍將繼續(xù)拉動(dòng)收入和增長。這一點(diǎn)的重要性在于，前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體增長很少受全球經(jīng)濟(jì)趨勢左右，即使有時(shí)國家風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素的指向并不樂觀，搶占先機(jī)者依舊能收獲更多的外商投資回報(bào)。

These “frontier economies,” as we call them, may not seem like promising terrain; they are characterized by politically manipulated markets, weak legal systems, and either low per capita income or faltering GDP. Yet of the 25 countries forecast to grow the fastest over the next five years, 19 are frontier economies. Among them are Myanmar, Mozambique, Vietnam, and Rwanda. Many are home to the world’s largest untapped sources of minerals and metals, and despite the current soft commodity prices, global investment in developing these resources will continue to boost income and growth. That’s important because it means that growth in frontier economies depends relatively little on overall global economic trends, and first movers can reap better returns on foreign investments than the sometimes alarming country risk factors might suggest.

另外，聰明的公司發(fā)現(xiàn)，其中一些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)被過分夸大了。前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中受政治左右的市場大多限于有巨額資本投入的領(lǐng)域，比如自然資源開采或基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。相比之下，像創(chuàng)造資源附加值一類投入相對較少的領(lǐng)域，不易受政治干擾；而且價(jià)值創(chuàng)造和迅速發(fā)展未開發(fā)領(lǐng)域的空間也比較大。比如蒂芙尼（Tiffany & Company）除了在比利時(shí)，也成功在柬埔寨、博茨瓦納、毛里求斯和越南開展鉆石拋光業(yè)務(wù)。

Some of those risks, moreover, turn out to be overblown, as smart companies are discovering. Politically engineered market distortions in frontier economies are often limited to sectors characterized by very large capital investments, such as natural resource extraction or infrastructure. By contrast, sectors where relatively smaller sums of money are involved (such as value-added work on resources) tend to attract less political interest, and there is scope for competing on value and rapidly growing under-developed sectors. For example, Tiffany & Company has successful diamond-polishing operations in Cambodia, Botswana, Mauritius, and Vietnam, along with operations in Belgium.

即使是在競爭嚴(yán)重受到政府制約的行業(yè)中，選對了細(xì)分領(lǐng)域和戰(zhàn)略的外國企業(yè)也能成功。實(shí)際上，與金磚國家或東南亞小龍相比，前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中公司面臨的競爭要小得多，因此能在更長時(shí)間內(nèi)享受更高的利潤空間。

Even in industries where competition is skewed by government manipulation, foreign players that target the right sectors with the right strategies can prosper. In fact, companies operating in frontier economies often encounter significantly less competition than they’d face in a BRIC or tiger economy and are therefore likely to enjoy higher profit margins for longer periods.

我們在下文中提供框架，幫助你分析清楚是否應(yīng)該選擇前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體，選擇哪些，以及如何在你所選的市場競爭中勝出。

In the following pages we offer a framework to help you figure out whether and where to play and how to win in the spaces you choose to compete in.

Mapping the Opportunities

謀劃機(jī)遇

尋找前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中機(jī)遇的第一步，是沿兩個(gè)維度評估所在行業(yè)的競爭環(huán)境。（1）盈利能力取決于相互競爭的公司，而非政府政策和行為（2）無論主要聚焦國內(nèi)銷售還是對外出口，任何行業(yè)均包含在以下4大門類中。

The first step in identifying opportunities in a frontier economy is to assess the competitive environment of its industries along two dimensions: (1) the degree to which profitability is determined by competition between firms and not by government policies and actions and (2) whether the industry is focused primarily on domestic sales or on exports. Industries will fall into one of four categories.

苦力型

Workhorses

這一領(lǐng)域中，企業(yè)相對規(guī)模小，面向國內(nèi)顧客銷售產(chǎn)品，企業(yè)間采取常規(guī)商業(yè)戰(zhàn)略相互競爭，通過產(chǎn)品差異化、運(yùn)營效率、營銷和人力資源發(fā)展獲得競爭優(yōu)勢。典型的苦力型公司包括當(dāng)?shù)刂圃焐蹋揖邚S、瓶裝水廠等等），服務(wù)供應(yīng)商（小建筑公司，出租車行），零售商（雜貨店、藥店），以及面向國內(nèi)或當(dāng)?shù)厥袌龅男∞r(nóng)場。在多數(shù)前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中，苦力型公司雇用了大多數(shù)勞動(dòng)力。例如，聯(lián)合利華就在海外進(jìn)行苦力型業(yè)務(wù)，向非洲國家當(dāng)?shù)叵M(fèi)者出售清潔劑。

In this category, relatively small companies sell to domestic customers and compete with one another using normal business strategies, seeking competitive advantage through product differentiation, operational efficiency, marketing, and human resource development. Typical examples of workhorse firms include local manufacturers (furniture makers and water bottlers, for example), service providers (small construction firms, taxi drivers), retailers (grocery stores, pharmacies), and small farms serving the domestic or local market. In most frontier economies, workhorse businesses employ the majority of the labor force. An example of a foreign company operating in this category is Unilever making and selling detergent to local consumers in African countries.

集群創(chuàng)造者

Cluster builders

該領(lǐng)域的公司針對出口互相競爭，它們往往是服務(wù)于發(fā)達(dá)國家大型外企的供應(yīng)鏈伙伴。這類企業(yè)通常身處產(chǎn)業(yè)“集群”，以便利用低廉的制造成本，熟練或廉價(jià)的勞動(dòng)力及其他資源，并從多種經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的供應(yīng)商，或來自當(dāng)?shù)厥袌龅男枨笾蝎@益。因?yàn)槌隹诩浩髽I(yè)圍繞價(jià)格和品質(zhì)競爭，清晰、鼓勵(lì)商業(yè)的法律法規(guī)對它們大有裨益，而且它們需要健全的機(jī)制來履行合同。典型的集群創(chuàng)造者包括電子和服裝制造商，航運(yùn)公司或呼叫中心等國際服務(wù)供應(yīng)商。Gap在緬甸的服裝制造業(yè)務(wù)屬于此類。

Companies in this category compete with one another in export businesses, often as supply chain partners to large foreign corporations serving developed markets. Such firms typically locate in industry “clusters” to take advantage of low production costs, availability of skilled or cheap labor and other inputs, the presence of multiple and sophisticated suppliers, or demand from the local market. Because export cluster firms compete on price and quality, they benefit from clear and business-friendly laws and regulations, and they require well-developed institutions around contract enforcement. Typical players include electronics and garment manufacturers and international service providers such as shipping lines or call centers. Gap’s clothing manufacturing in Myanmar falls into this category.

經(jīng)紀(jì)人

Powerbrokers

和苦力型一樣，此類公司服務(wù)國內(nèi)市場，但它們在深受政治影響的行業(yè)開展業(yè)務(wù)。典型例子包括大型電信公司、公共事業(yè)、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施供應(yīng)商、水泥制造商和汽油經(jīng)銷商?？偛课挥谌A盛頓特區(qū)的Symbion Power就是該領(lǐng)域的外來公司，該能源企業(yè)在坦桑尼亞、肯尼亞、馬達(dá)加斯加等前沿市場開發(fā)運(yùn)營發(fā)電站。發(fā)達(dá)國家中此類業(yè)務(wù)通常受到法規(guī)限制，目的是促進(jìn)競爭或保護(hù)消費(fèi)者。而在前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中，法規(guī)主要讓政府或特權(quán)階層獲利。

Companies in this category serve the domestic market, as workhorses do, but they operate in industries where political influence has a big role. Typical players include large telecommunications companies, utilities, infrastructure providers, cement manufacturers, and gasoline distributors. An example of a foreign entrant in this space is Washington, D.C.–based Symbion Power, an energy company that develops and operates power plants in Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, and other frontier markets. In developed countries, businesses of this kind are usually regulated to promote competition or protect customers. In frontier economies, however, regulation primarily directs profits to the government or privileged interests.

Rentiers

食利者

此類公司為出口導(dǎo)向型，但包括賦稅、權(quán)利費(fèi)用以及其他義務(wù)等條款都以政府合同形式規(guī)定清楚。食利者往往是大型企業(yè)，以特許權(quán)形式（即基于政府許可）經(jīng)營，包括油氣、礦產(chǎn)和其他資源開采。該領(lǐng)域的執(zhí)法和合約往往不強(qiáng)，常引起安全和環(huán)境問題。利潤由賬面盈虧決定——公司能把經(jīng)營成本降到多低——但收入嚴(yán)重受政府從總收入中抽成的影響。礦業(yè)巨頭Rio Tinto在蒙古的大型銅礦和金礦業(yè)務(wù)就屬于食利者模式。

Companies in this category are export oriented, but the terms of their operation, including taxes, royalties, and other obligations, are spelled out in contracts with the government. Often large, they operate in the “concession” space—that is, on the basis of government licenses—and include oil, gas, mineral, and other resource extractors. Enforcement of regulations and agreements in this category is typically weak, often resulting in safety and environmental problems. Profits are a function of the bottom line—how cheaply firms can conduct their operations—but revenues are greatly affected by how much the government takes off the top. Mining giant Rio Tinto’s massive copper and gold mine in Mongolia operates in the rentier space.

重要的一點(diǎn)是，在不同國家，行業(yè)可能屬于不同分類，消費(fèi)電子就是一例。三星在越南是出口業(yè)務(wù)，但在哈薩克斯坦大部分產(chǎn)品都在國內(nèi)銷售。另外重要的一點(diǎn)是，不要將行業(yè)劃分得過于寬泛。例如，很多領(lǐng)域可能有賴于政府政策和行為，但依然包括很多苦力型企業(yè)。在石油業(yè)，開采公司與政府商討特許權(quán)，并估算征用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而石油服務(wù)公司通過常規(guī)渠道與石油巨頭爭奪業(yè)務(wù)。

It’s important to note that industries may fall into different categories in different countries. Take consumer electronics. Samsung is an export business in Vietnam, but in Kazakhstan its sales are largely domestic. It’s also important not to define industries too broadly. Many sectors may hinge on government policies and actions, for example, but contain significant workhorse pockets. In the oil industry, extractors negotiate concession terms with governments and assume expropriation risk, while oil service firms compete for business from the oil majors through the usual channels.

一旦你清楚了行業(yè)分類，就可以開始相應(yīng)地劃分前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體的GDP。如此你就能看到國家經(jīng)濟(jì)的組成部分，占主導(dǎo)地位的當(dāng)?shù)乩妫屇懔私獾阶约涸谀抢镉袔壮蓹C(jī)遇。（圖表《布局前沿》顯示了兩個(gè)前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體截然不同的分類組成。）

Once you’ve completed the industry categorization, you can segment the GDP of the frontier economy accordingly. This enables you to see how the country’s economy breaks down, exposing the dominant local interests, and gives you a sense of the scale of your opportunity there. (The exhibit “Mapping Frontiers” shows how two very different frontier economies stack up.)

每個(gè)門類都與具體主導(dǎo)戰(zhàn)略相關(guān)，而且所面臨的種種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也截然不同。因此，按4大類別劃分行業(yè)的過程不僅能揭示你在哪里有最好的機(jī)會(huì)，也能幫你發(fā)現(xiàn)把握機(jī)會(huì)的最佳戰(zhàn)略。讓我們從苦力型行業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)開始分析。

The exercise of mapping industries to the four categories not only reveals where your best opportunities lie but also helps identify your best strategy for pursuing them. That’s because each category is associated with a particular dominant strategy and is exposed to a distinct menu of risks. Let’s begin by looking at strategies and risks for workhorse industries.

苦力型戰(zhàn)略

Strategies for Workhorses

成功的苦力型公司看起來和其他地方的優(yōu)秀企業(yè)沒什么兩樣：它們實(shí)施并利用現(xiàn)有能力，調(diào)整營銷和分銷戰(zhàn)略以應(yīng)對當(dāng)?shù)乜谖逗拖拗?。大型跨國公司可能希望超越本土競爭對手，但現(xiàn)實(shí)情況遠(yuǎn)非如此。本土企業(yè)深知當(dāng)?shù)厥袌銮闆r，并與成功關(guān)鍵的利益相關(guān)方建立了聯(lián)系。（有關(guān)強(qiáng)大本土競爭對手的例子，詳見邊欄《競爭可能比你想象的激烈》。）

Successful workhorse firms look like successful firms anywhere: They adapt and leverage existing capabilities and adjust their marketing and distribution strategies to reflect local tastes and constraints. Big multinationals might expect to outperform local competitors, but this is far from universally the case. Domestic companies know the market conditions intimately and have developed the relationships with stakeholders necessary to succeed. (For an example of a strong homegrown competitor, see?“Competition May Be Tougher Than You Think.”)

對于外來者，與強(qiáng)大的本土企業(yè)競爭通常需要一些能挑戰(zhàn)目標(biāo)國現(xiàn)有商業(yè)模式的顛覆式創(chuàng)新，也可能需要重新定義進(jìn)入者的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)。以聯(lián)合利華為例，其典型供應(yīng)鏈當(dāng)中的關(guān)鍵元素——超市和現(xiàn)代零售店，只占非洲前沿市場的一小部分。非洲的消費(fèi)者每天收入低于2美元，因此每天只在社區(qū)簡陋的小店里購買小包裝的清潔劑、牙膏或食用油。店主在附近的市鎮(zhèn)或分銷商那里購買大包裝產(chǎn)品，然后自己分裝成沒有商標(biāo)的小包裝出售，售價(jià)折合成每盎司或克重后十分昂貴。

For foreign entrants, competing with strong local businesses often requires some disruptive innovation that challenges the dominant business model in the target country and may well require redefining the entrant’s product or service as well. Take the case of Unilever. Supermarkets and modern retail stores—key players in its typical supply chain—serve only a small fraction of the trade in frontier markets in Africa. Consumers there make less than $2 a day, so they buy small sachets of detergent, toothpaste, or cooking fat on a daily basis in informal shops in their communities. Store owners buy big packs of these products in nearby towns or from distributors and then prepare unbranded packets themselves, which they sell at extremely high prices per ounce or gram.

聯(lián)合利華吸取了其子公司印度斯坦利華的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，意識(shí)到在非洲的機(jī)遇：跳過中間商，直接以更低價(jià)生產(chǎn)分銷自己的小包裝產(chǎn)品。效仿在印度的做法，聯(lián)合利華搭建了農(nóng)村地區(qū)的銷售網(wǎng)絡(luò)，建立多層級(jí)分銷系統(tǒng)，聘用地區(qū)經(jīng)銷商負(fù)責(zé)將產(chǎn)品配送到當(dāng)?shù)胤咒N商手中，由當(dāng)?shù)胤咒N商向一線銷售人員提供培訓(xùn)和產(chǎn)品。盡管由于包裝和分銷成本降低了單位利潤率，但薄利多銷。在非洲其他市場，聯(lián)合利華不僅改變了包裝，還改變了產(chǎn)品本身特點(diǎn)：例如開發(fā)出了不需要冷藏的人造黃油。

Drawing on the experience of its subsidiary Hindustan Lever, in India, Unilever realized that there was an opportunity in Africa to serve customers by cutting out the middleman and producing and directly distributing its own small-format packages at a lower price. As it had done in India, Unilever developed a network of salespeople in rural areas, employing a multitiered distribution system with regional distributors in charge of taking the product to local distributors, who provided training and supplies to the salespeople on the ground. Although the margins per unit were low because of packaging and distribution costs, there was potential for huge volume. In other African markets, Unilever has changed not just packaging but characteristics of the products themselves; for instance, it has developed margarine that does not require refrigeration.

在食利者或經(jīng)紀(jì)人領(lǐng)域的苦力型企業(yè)往往是外來者的理想目標(biāo)，可以作為未來增長的平臺(tái)，比如尼日利亞的海卡集團(tuán)（Sea Trucks Group）。荷蘭創(chuàng)業(yè)家雅克·魯曼（Jacques Roomans）在1977年成立了?？瘓F(tuán)，其最初是尼日爾三角洲的油氣公司的保險(xiǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)。如今該公司供應(yīng)一系列具有復(fù)雜技術(shù)含量的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)，包括SURF（水下連緊管、立管和出油管線），水下基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，和剛性輸油管道鋪設(shè)。?？瘓F(tuán)在規(guī)劃、設(shè)計(jì)、實(shí)施以及交付尼日利亞客戶的項(xiàng)目過程中，盡最大可能讓尼日利亞當(dāng)?shù)厝藚⑴c。CEO兼總裁魯曼（Roomans）和高管團(tuán)隊(duì)繼續(xù)在尼日利亞舊都拉各斯工作，即使該公司已經(jīng)發(fā)展到其他新興和前沿國家，在馬來西亞、安哥拉、加納、巴西、俄羅斯和墨西哥都贏得了合同。

Workhorse pockets in rentier or powerbroker sectors are often good target markets for foreign entrants and can serve as a platform for future growth. Take the case of Nigeria-based Sea Trucks Group. Founded in 1977 by Dutch entrepreneur Jacques Roomans, Sea Trucks started as an insurance broker to oil and gas companies in the Niger Delta. Today, the company provides a range of technologically sophisticated products and services, including SURF (subsea umbilicals, raisers, and flowlines), subsea infrastructure, and rigid-pipeline laying. Sea Trucks maximizes local Nigerian participation in planning, engineering, implementation, and delivery of proj-ects for Nigeria-based clients. Roomans, the CEO and president of the group, and the senior team have continued to work out of Lagos even as the company has globalized to other emerging and frontier countries, winning contracts in Malaysia, Angola, Ghana, Brazil, Russia, and Mexico.

出口集群戰(zhàn)略??

Strategies for Export Clusters

很多公司從前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體供應(yīng)商采購制成品，或在前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體建立自己的制造廠房，主要是因?yàn)槭艿搅畠r(jià)勞動(dòng)力的吸引。在一些前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中，虐待現(xiàn)象普遍存在，但當(dāng)?shù)卣率コ隹跈C(jī)會(huì)，不總是采取措施應(yīng)對。然而發(fā)達(dá)國家的消費(fèi)者越來越關(guān)注前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中的勞工處境、對環(huán)境的破壞和來自政府的壓迫；他們的行為能大幅改變經(jīng)濟(jì)圖景。

Many companies source manufactured goods from suppliers in frontier economies or set up their own manufacturing facilities there, the attraction generally being the availability of cheap labor. In some frontier economies, however, abuses are widespread, and local governments don’t always take action to correct them for fear of losing export opportunities. Consumers in the developed world, however, are increasingly sensitive to labor conditions, environmental damage, and government oppression in frontier economies; their behavior can change the economic picture dramatically.

2001年，緬甸價(jià)值8.5億美元的出口服裝中，超過一半的目的地是美國。但作為對“草根運(yùn)動(dòng)”和緬甸獨(dú)裁政府的抵制，在2003年美國禁止來自緬甸的商品進(jìn)口，美國服裝公司撤出了緬甸，使緬甸的出口一落千丈。當(dāng)然局勢也可能扭轉(zhuǎn)。隨著2010年昂山素季被釋放，包括美國服裝巨頭Gap在內(nèi)的跨國公司以及發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)紛紛開始回歸緬甸。

In 2001 more than half of Myanmar’s $850 million in garment exports went to the United States. But in response to grassroots activism and boycotts protesting Myanmar’s authoritarian regime, followed by a 2003 U.S. embargo on imports from the country, U.S. clothing companies exited Myanmar, and its exports plunged. The pendulum can swing back, of course—with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, in 2010, investors, multinationals (including U.S. clothing giant Gap), and development agencies started queuing up again in Myanmar.

如果公司想保持在前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體的制造業(yè)地位，僅采取獲得廉價(jià)勞動(dòng)力的戰(zhàn)略還不夠；它們必須作為集群制造者行動(dòng)。明智的企業(yè)越來越意識(shí)到，很多來自相同出口行業(yè)的公司在前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體聚在一處，能在勞動(dòng)技能、供應(yīng)商密度和法規(guī)支持上產(chǎn)生長期協(xié)同效應(yīng)。集群還有助于消除它們目標(biāo)市場（發(fā)達(dá)國家）的法律限制，并且引來援助和發(fā)展投資。

If companies are to maintain an enduring manufacturing presence in frontier economies, their strategies must be about more than just access to cheap labor; they must act as cluster builders. Smart companies increasingly recognize the long-term synergies—in terms of labor skills, density of suppliers, and regulatory support—that can result when many firms of the same export industry colocate in a frontier economy. Clusters also help to unblock legal restrictions in the developed markets they serve and act as a magnet for aid and development investment.

Fruit Company（ITFC）是加納貧困北部地區(qū)一家核心-承包型公司（在核心大面積農(nóng)田周邊建立小農(nóng)戶種植園——譯者注），直接向歐洲市場出口有機(jī)芒果。ITFC擁有400英畝專業(yè)運(yùn)營的商業(yè)農(nóng)場（核心），同時(shí)，該組織也與周邊地區(qū)1200多家小農(nóng)場主（承包）合作。作為零利息、實(shí)物貸款和廣泛培訓(xùn)的交換，小農(nóng)場主同意拿出一兩英畝地專門用有機(jī)方式種植芒果，并通過ITFC的營銷渠道銷售，收入用來償還貸款。通過培育農(nóng)場主集群，該公司無須在公社和酋長土地制地區(qū)進(jìn)行冗繁、不穩(wěn)定的土地集約運(yùn)作，就能維持較大規(guī)模運(yùn)營。

Consider the Integrated Tamale Fruit Company (ITFC), a nucleus-and-outgrower organization in Ghana’s poor northern region that exports organic mangoes directly to the European market. ITFC has its own 400-acre, professionally run commercial farm, but it also works with more than 1,200 smallholder farmers in the surrounding area (the “outgrowers”). In exchange for an interest-free, in-kind loan and extensive training, the smallholders agree to grow mangoes on an acre or two of their land using organic techniques and to sell them through ITFC’s marketing channels. The proceeds are used to repay the loans. By nurturing this cluster of farmers, the company can operate at greater scale without the tedious and uncertain process of assembling acreage in an area with communal and chieftaincy-organized land use.

ITFC的努力為當(dāng)?shù)剞r(nóng)民的收入帶來了翻天覆地增長，并引起了非洲開發(fā)銀行和美國政府的“千年挑戰(zhàn)公司”等發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)及加納政府的關(guān)注。這些組織和機(jī)構(gòu)均已加入支持和擴(kuò)展集群的規(guī)劃中，并斥資改善鄉(xiāng)村道路建設(shè)。

ITFC’s efforts, which have led to transformational income growth for local farmers, have attracted the attention of development agencies such as the African Development Bank and the U.S. government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation, as well as the Ghanaian government. These organizations have stepped in to bolster and expand the cluster scheme and to finance improvements in rural roads.

前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中的集群創(chuàng)建也出現(xiàn)在高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)中。總部在美國的風(fēng)投公司Socialatom Ventures投資那些面向全球提供服務(wù)，并且聘用拉美人才的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)。在哥倫比亞的麥德林，它與負(fù)責(zé)在該城市推動(dòng)創(chuàng)新的國企Ruta N合作，開發(fā)當(dāng)?shù)爻鮿?chuàng)企業(yè)集群并培養(yǎng)程序員。Socialatom還與當(dāng)?shù)卮髮W(xué)合作，提升它們的工程學(xué)課程。通過非營利機(jī)構(gòu)Coderise，該公司還在欠發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)組織設(shè)計(jì)思維和編程技術(shù)的兒童訓(xùn)練營。

Cluster building in frontier economies is happening in high-tech industries as well. Socialatom Ventures, a U.S.-based venture capital firm, invests in start-ups that sell services globally using Latin American talent. In Medellin, Colombia, it has partnered with Ruta N, a public corporation charged with promoting innovation in the city, to develop a local cluster of start-ups and programmers. Socialatom has also teamed up with local universities to improve their engineering curricula. And through its nonprofit foundation Coderise, it runs boot camps in design thinking and coding skills for children from disadvantaged areas.

經(jīng)紀(jì)人和食利者戰(zhàn)略

Strategies for Powerbrokers and Rentiers

在食利者或經(jīng)紀(jì)人領(lǐng)域擁有一席之地并維護(hù)利益，往往比苦力型或出口集群型領(lǐng)域要難。很多情況下，食利者或經(jīng)紀(jì)人項(xiàng)目具有政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)極高的公眾身份。

Staking out and protecting interests in rentier or powerbroker sectors is usually harder than operating in a workhorse sector or an export cluster. In many cases, rentier or powerbroker proj-ects take on very public identities that carry significant political risks.

玻利維亞的“水戰(zhàn)爭”（Water War）就是很好的例子。1999年，玻利維亞政府私有化了位于科恰班巴的國有水務(wù)公司SEMAPA。柏科特（Bechtel）、Edison和西班牙能源公司Abengoa創(chuàng)建的合資公司Aguas del Tunari贏得了改造這座中型城市供水的合同。（該城市約40%人口往往沒有飲用水。與更富有、用水量多的市民相比，相對貧窮的市民用水量少，因此每立方米的水費(fèi)更高。最貧窮的市民沒有進(jìn)入供水系統(tǒng)，不得不以天價(jià)從水罐車上買水。）Aguas del Tunari迅速讓超過30%的缺水人口用上了水。為了資助該公司已取得的進(jìn)展和未來發(fā)展， 2000年1月，政府允許水價(jià)提高35%。NGO和當(dāng)?shù)厣鐣?huì)團(tuán)體立刻譴責(zé)這種做法屬于漫天要價(jià)，幾千人走上科恰班巴街頭，要求政府終止該特許權(quán)。4月，政府向民眾讓步，恢復(fù)原價(jià)，并最終廢除了合同。

The so-called Water War in Bolivia is a case in point. In 1999, the government of Bolivia privatized SEMAPA, the state-owned water company in Cochabamba. Aguas del Tunari, a joint venture between Bechtel, Edison, and the Spanish energy company Abengoa, was awarded the contract to revamp water provision in the midsize city. (Some 40% of the population often did not have potable water. Low-volume users, who were relatively poor, paid more per cubic meter than wealthier high-volume users. The very poorest, who had no connection to the system at all, had to buy water from tanker trucks at exorbitant prices.) Aguas del Tunari rapidly expanded the supply of water to 30% more of the population. To help the company pay for this and future improvements, the government allowed an increase in water tariffs of 35% in January 2000. NGOs and local social groups immediately condemned the price hike as abusive, and thousands of people took to the streets of Cochabamba to demand that the government terminate the concession. In April the government caved, rolling back the price hikes and eventually revoking the contract.

為了成功，海外企業(yè)可以通過增加和多樣化利益相關(guān)方減小類似風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。做法之一是，通過CSR項(xiàng)目為苦力型企業(yè)創(chuàng)造機(jī)會(huì)。例如礦業(yè)巨頭必和必拓（BHPB）在莫桑比克就煉鋁項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行了大量投資。2001年，與莫桑比克政府和國際金融公司（IFC）合作，BHPB成立了“賦權(quán)與聯(lián)動(dòng)中小企業(yè)項(xiàng)目”（Small and Medium Enterprise Empowerment and Linkage Program）。該項(xiàng)目向當(dāng)?shù)爻邪烫峁┖虰HPB競爭合同以及培訓(xùn)工人的技術(shù)。此舉激發(fā)了當(dāng)?shù)毓こ坦镜陌l(fā)展，并傳播了采購、物料處理以及工程服務(wù)方面的最佳實(shí)踐。BHPB開始與當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè)共享其很大部分價(jià)值鏈，讓當(dāng)?shù)厣鐓^(qū)獲益良多。

Foreign firms can reduce this type of risk by increasing and diversifying stakeholders in their success. One way to do that is to create workhorse pockets through CSR programs. Take the case of mining giant BHP Billiton (BHPB), which made a massive investment in Mozambique with its aluminum smelter proj-ect. In 2001, working with the Mozambican government and the International Finance Corporation, BHPB set up the Small and Medium Enterprise Empowerment and Linkages Program. The program gave local contractors the skills necessary to compete for contracts with BHPB and trained their workers. This stimulated the development of local engineering firms and disseminated best practices in procurement, materials handling, and engineering services. BHPB began to offer local businesses large shares in its value chain, bringing many positive benefits to the community.

海外公司意識(shí)到讓利益相關(guān)方參與，非常重要，加拿大資源公司Sherritt就明白這點(diǎn)，其在馬達(dá)加斯加的Ambatovy項(xiàng)目在施工階段需要約1.1萬名當(dāng)?shù)毓と?，這使得Sherritt成了該國最大的雇主。如果政府取消合同，公司的總體勞動(dòng)力構(gòu)成的選民實(shí)力足以形成聲討。但必然地，隨著建設(shè)進(jìn)入尾聲，員工們因?yàn)榧磳⒃獾角采?，也不?huì)滿意。為了延續(xù)這一為期30年工程帶來的福利，Sherritt決定在建筑工期結(jié)束后繼續(xù)資助建筑工人。時(shí)任Sherritt CEO的伊安·德蘭尼（Ian Delaney）解釋說：“我們開發(fā)的系統(tǒng)能養(yǎng)活項(xiàng)目雇傭的當(dāng)?shù)厝恕Ｄ呐滤麄儾辉贋槲覀児ぷ?，至少每天公司可以為他們提供一頓飯。我們也避免了讓他們和國家的收入出現(xiàn)波動(dòng)，以后每月支付他們5到15美元?！?/p>

It’s important for foreign firms to realize that when they engage stakeholders, the commitment must be long term. The Canadian resource company Sherritt understands this. Its Ambatovy proj-ect, in Madagascar, required the labor of approximately 11,000 locals for the construction phase, which made Sherritt the largest employer in the country. The company’s workforce was a powerful constituency that would complain if the government were to cancel Sherritt’s contract. But employees would also be unhappy about the layoffs that were inevitable as construction wound down. In order to sustain goodwill for the 30-year proj-ect, therefore, Sherritt decided to continue to support the construction workers after the construction phase. Sherritt’s CEO at the time, Ian Delaney, explained: “We developed a system to feed the locals we had hired for the proj-ect [and who were no longer employed with us] at least a meal a day. We also avoided a major income shock to them and their country by paying them $5 to $15 a month going forward.”

除讓多個(gè)利益相關(guān)方參與，即使沒有核心業(yè)務(wù)，公司還有多種方式讓自己成為當(dāng)?shù)夭豢苫蛉钡暮献骰锇椤herritt在古巴就是如此。該公司在阿爾伯塔的精煉廠需要一種特殊的礦石，因此1994年選擇在古巴開礦。為了讓Sherritt在當(dāng)?shù)啬苡幸幌兀琒herritt與古巴政府創(chuàng)建了合資公司，共享古巴礦產(chǎn)和加拿大精煉廠的所有權(quán)。此外，Sherritt還承擔(dān)了工人培訓(xùn)，并幫助古巴政府起草海外投資法規(guī)。

As an alternative to engaging with multiple stakeholders, firms can make themselves indispensable to powerful local players in multiple ways, even some that are removed from the core business. Sherritt took this approach in Cuba. The company required a specific kind of ore for its refinery in Alberta, and in 1994 it chose to develop a mine in Cuba. In order to protect its position, Sherritt set up a joint venture with the Cuban government, sharing ownership of both the Cuban mine and the Canadian refinery. In addition, Sherritt undertook to train workers and helped the Cuban government draft a foreign investment law.

在礦產(chǎn)運(yùn)營了若干年后，古巴政府擁有大量現(xiàn)金，但沒有國際市場渠道，于是向Sherritt求助，尋找融資機(jī)會(huì)開發(fā)古巴一些廢棄的油田。Sherritt在多倫多發(fā)行了債券，與古巴政府一起投資了一家新的合資企業(yè)。此后，雙方又陸續(xù)開辦了多家合資公司。這些公司為度假城市Varadero提供能源，還經(jīng)營酒店、移動(dòng)電話公司以及大豆加工廠。Sheritt與政府的和諧關(guān)系，及其為政府提供急需硬通貨的能力，使得其從1994年起，一直是古巴市場上強(qiáng)勁穩(wěn)定的一員。

A few years after the mine’s operations started, the government, cash-strapped and without access to international markets, asked Sherritt to help it find financing to develop some abandoned oil fields in Cuba. Sherritt issued a bond in Toronto and invested in a new joint venture with the Cuban government. Together they created other joint ventures to produce energy for the resort town of Varadero and to operate a hotel, a mobile phone company, and a soy-processing plant. Sherritt’s good relationship with the government, not to mention its ability to provide the government with much-needed hard currency, has made it a stable and profitable player in Cuba since 1994.

很多分析師認(rèn)為，鑒于目前利率升高，商品價(jià)格偏低的大環(huán)境，最好不要選擇前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體。如果聽從了這樣的建議，很多跨國企業(yè)都會(huì)吃1998年亞洲金融危機(jī)之后撤離新興市場的后悔藥——錯(cuò)過了長達(dá)15年的豐厚回報(bào)。因?yàn)楣善笔袌霾蛔阋宰尪鄶?shù)投資者了解前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體。了解它們，往往須進(jìn)行實(shí)地考察和直接投資。對長期增長耐心、審慎的分析，以及選擇恰當(dāng)?shù)膽?zhàn)略，能讓在如今前沿經(jīng)濟(jì)體中立足的企業(yè)獲得豐厚回報(bào)。

Many analysts see the current environment of rising interest rates and lower commodity prices as a reason to stay away from frontier economies. But following that advice might lead to the same regrets felt by the many multinationals that pulled out of emerging markets after the Asian financial crisis of 1998: They missed a decade and a half of bumper returns. Since equity markets are not deep enough for most investors to get exposure to frontier economies, investments in these places will necessarily be direct and boots-on-the-ground, and may require a decade or more to realize the investment thesis. Patience, careful analysis of long-run growth potential, and an appropriate choice of strategy will reward those companies that stake out a position in today’s frontier economies.

阿爾多·穆薩基奧是位于馬薩諸塞州沃爾瑟姆布蘭迪斯國際商學(xué)院的教授；

埃里克·沃克是位于加拿大不列顛哥倫比亞省溫哥華西蒙弗雷澤大學(xué)比迪商學(xué)院的教授。

原文刊登于《哈佛商業(yè)評論》中文版2016年12期 。