中文目錄
1.管理者是否通過直接互動向機構(gòu)投資者學(xué)習(xí)
2.信息中介：商業(yè)銀行家如何促進戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟
3.行業(yè)競爭與分析師覆蓋范圍決策和職業(yè)生涯
4.距離對銀行貸款的因果影響
5.主動基金管理人對 ESG 的承諾
6.重新審視管理“風(fēng)格”

1.Do Managers learn from institutional investors through direct interactions?（JAE2023）

I examine whether corporate managers learn from institutional investors through direct interactions at investor conferences. I find that managers seek more direct interactions with institutional investors at conferences when they have a greater need for information about their firm's product markets and supply chains. This relation is stronger when managers expect investors to be knowledgeable. I also show that the information acquired from conference interactions is reflected in subsequent manager decisions. First, direct interactions help managers to extract information embedded in stock prices and later use it to make investments. Second, within the same firm and month, managers' personal stock trades immediately after attending a conference earn higher abnormal returns, consistent with direct interactions expanding their private information set. Overall, these findings suggest that managers can acquire decision-relevant information from direct interactions with institutional investors of their firm.

2.Information Intermediaries: How Commercial Bankers Facilitate Strategic Alliances(JFQA2023)

We investigate how bankers use information from lending relationships to help borrowers find partners for strategic alliances. Firms that have borrowed from the same banker or share an indirect connection through a network of bankers are significantly more likely to enter an alliance. Consistent with bankers overcoming informational frictions, their ability to facilitate alliances decreases with banker-network distance, and is stronger for opaque borrowers. Firms connected to more potential partners via banker networks enter more alliances. These alliances are associated with positive announcement returns, and brokering banks are more likely to receive future underwriting mandates.

3.Does Industry Competition Influence Analyst Coverage Decisions and Career Outcomes?(JFQA2023)

We analyze whether industry competition influences analyst coverage decisions and whether analysts benefit from covering product market competitors. We find that analysts are more likely to cover a firm when this firm competes with more firms already covered by the analyst. We also find that the intensity of competition among these competitors is additionally important to the coverage decision. Moreover, we find that analysts who cover product market competitors are more likely to obtain analyst star status. These results are consistent with the importance to analysts of industry competition and product market knowledge accumulated through covering product market competitors.

4.The Causal Impact of Distance on Bank Lending(MS2023)

We investigate the role of physical distance in corporate lending by exploiting infrastructure improvements as shocks to travel time. Lower travel time increases the likelihood of initiating a new banking relationship, consistent with an economic surplus from lower transaction costs. In existing lending relationships, banks capture part of this surplus by increasing interest rates, in particular, if banks have higher bargaining power. Reductions in travel time to competing banks have the opposite effects. Banks benefit from improved infrastructure through an increase in clients, and lenders that rely more on technology do not exhibit sensitivity to changes in distance.

5.Analyzing Active Fund Managers’ Commitment to ESG: Evidence from the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment(MS2023)

The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) is the largest global environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiative in the asset-management industry to date. We analyze what happens after active U.S. mutual funds sign the PRI to assess whether they exhibit ESG implementation. We find that PRI signatories attract a large fund inflow, but we do not observe improvements in fund-level ESG scores or fund returns. We consider a battery of ways to proxy for funds’ ESG incorporation (e.g., entry/exit, screening, engagement, voting for pro-ESG proposals), but fail to observe evidence of meaningful on average follow-through. Next, we explore cross-sectional fund characteristics and find that only quant funds exhibit small improvements in ESG performance versus other funds, mainly through buying high-ESG-performing stocks. Furthermore, we note that signatories are not superior performers in ESG issues prior to joining the PRI relative to non-PRI funds, but PRI affiliation tends to be widely advertised on company websites, marketing materials, and fund documents. Overall, a reasonable reader may perceive our findings as consistent with PRI funds’ greenwashing. We note, however, that what we uncover is based only on outcome-based measures and may miss some actual efforts of signatories.

6.Revisiting managerial “style”: The replicability and falsifiability of manager fixed effects for firm policies（SMJ2023）

We attempt to replicate Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who used manager fixed effects to provide evidence for managerial “style” as measured by metrics such as leverage, R&D spending, and Tobin's Q. We find that the statistical and economic significance of manager fixed effects is generally lower in our results than in theirs. This discrepancy motivated us to conduct placebo tests in which we randomize managers' spells at their firms. The results with the randomized data are generally as strong as those with the real data, suggesting (a) that the apparent explanatory power of manager fixed effects may be largely a statistical artifact and (b) that managerial “style” may manifest itself in more complex ways than can be ascertained from examining financial statement metrics.