中文目錄 （機(jī)翻）
1.公司戰(zhàn)略與CSR績(jī)效（RAS2023）
2.反腐倡廉、政府補(bǔ)貼和企業(yè)創(chuàng)新（MS2023）
3.公司披露與分析師行為（RFS2023）
4.公司現(xiàn)金持有是否過(guò)量（RFS2023）
5.客戶管理層期望與供應(yīng)商成本管理決策（POM2023）
6.外部董事：從供應(yīng)商而來(lái)（POM2023）

1.When doing good for society is good for shareholders: importance of alignment between strategy and CSR performance

We investigate the association between firms’ strategy and their corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and whether the alignment between strategy and CSR activities affects firms’ financial performance. We describe firms’ strategies as innovation differentiation, marketing differentiation, and cost leadership Miller, (1986). We expect a higher benefit from CSR for firms that rely more on innovation differentiation and a lower benefit for firms that rely more on marketing differentiation and cost leadership. We measure firms’ strategy through a textual analysis of 10-K filings and collect CSR data from KLD Ratings. We find that innovation differentiation strategy is positively associated with CSR performance, while cost leadership (marketing differentiation) is negatively (insignificantly) associated with CSR performance. Moreover, we find that innovating differentiators with higher CSR performance achieve higher financial performance. Finally, we provide additional evidence that information asymmetry and financial constraints moderate the alignment between firms’ strategy and CSR performance.

2.Anticorruption, Government Subsidies, and Innovation: Evidence from China

We leverage an exogenous shock—the crackdown on corrupt Chinese officials beginning in 2012—and examine how the allocation of research subsidies and innovative outcomes were affected. We argue that the staggered removal of provincial heads on corruption charges during China’s anticorruption campaign and the unanticipated departures of local government officials responsible for innovation programs led to plausibly exogenous reductions in corruption. After both events, the allocation of subsidies became more sensitive to firm merit than to corruption and subsidies became more strongly associated with future innovation. Anticorruption efforts and officials’ career incentives improved the efficacy of subsidy programs.

3.Do Corporate Disclosures Constrain Strategic Analyst Behavior?

We show that analyst behavior changes in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce coverage and issue less optimistic, more accurate, less bold, and less informative forecasts. Our evidence indicates that analysts reduce a strategic component of their behavior: the changes are stronger among analysts with more strategic incentives like affiliated or retail-focused analysts. We conclude that mandatory disclosure can substitute for analyst information production, which is constrained by investors’ ability to verify forecasts using corporate filings.

4.Do Corporations Retain Too Much Cash? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Corporations have accumulated record amounts of cash. We study whether firms’ cash retention has been excessive by examining a Korean reform that introduced a new tax on earnings retained as cash. Difference-in-differences tests show that treated firms reduce cash retention and instead increase payouts and investments. Market participants react favorably to the reform, consistent with excessive cash retention. The valuation effects and the alternative uses of the cash are associated with behavioral and agency frictions. Firms that are more subject to behavioral biases increase payouts and experience higher valuations, while poorly governed firms allocate more to investment and experience relatively lower valuations.

5.Customers’ managerial expectations and suppliers’ asymmetric cost management

This paper investigates how managers in the upstream firm (i.e., supplier) adjust their allocations of cost resources in response to managerial expectations of the downstream firms (i.e., customers) on the future demand and prospects. We conduct an empirical analysis to examine the impact of the tone of customers’ forward-looking disclosures (FLDs) contained in the Management Discussion and Analysis section of 10-K filings on suppliers’ asymmetric cost behaviors, characterizing costs decreasing less for sales fall than increasing for equivalent sales rise (i.e., “cost stickiness”). We show that the degree of suppliers’ asymmetric cost management is positively associated with their customers’ tone of FLDs. Moreover, such an association is stronger when the suppliers produce more unique products for their major customers. Our inferences remain robust after controlling for the strategic disclosure behavior of the customer firms, ruling out an alternative mechanism of suppliers’ own managerial expectations and managerial empire-building incentives. Lastly, using a decision made by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2005 as a quasi-natural experiment setting, we show that the effect of customers’ tone of FLDs on suppliers’ cost stickiness becomes stronger when FLDs are more informative. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to introduce cost stickiness in the operations management context to capture management's operational decision intervention regarding resource allocation. We also contribute to information sharing literature by highlighting the importance of channels other than the traditional explicit information sharing channel in obtaining demand-relevant information in supply chains.

6.Should a firm bring a supplier into the boardroom?

Endowed with significant firm-specific knowledge, inside directors can contribute to the decision-making processes of the boardroom. However, regulatory changes, focusing primarily on the monitoring function of the boards, have driven inside directors out of the boardroom. This article argues that suppliers with firm- and industry-specific knowledge are uniquely positioned to fill a critical void in boardrooms. It also suggests that the value of having a supplier on the board (SOTB) is influenced by environmental contingencies faced by a firm: operational efficiency, diversification, and demand uncertainty. Using an objective measure of supplier presence in the boardroom, the authors find that a supplier's presence enhances firm performance. They also find that the value of an SOTB in enhancing performance is greater in firms with lower operational efficiency and higher demand uncertainty and, is lower in firms with higher diversification. These results are robust to potential endogeneity issues, alternative estimation methods, and measures of moderator and outcome variables.