Why Germany Attacked the Soviet Union

為何德國攻擊了蘇聯(lián)

前言：希特勒對蘇聯(lián)宣戰(zhàn)——兩份歷史性文件
（譯者注：因時間和能力所限，歷史文檔的翻譯可能會有不通順的地方，請諒解）

As dawn was breaking on Sunday morning, June22, 1941, military forces of Germany, Finland and Romania suddenly struckagainst the Soviet Union along a broad front stretching hundreds of miles fromthe Arctic Circle in the far north to the Black Sea in the south. Italy,Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia quickly joined the campaign – the largestmilitary offensive in history. Soldiers from those nations were soon joined byvolunteers from other European countries, including France, Netherlands,Denmark, Norway, Spain, and Belgium.

1941年6月22日，星期天，黎明時分，德國、芬蘭和羅馬尼亞的軍隊突然向蘇聯(lián)發(fā)起進攻，戰(zhàn)線從遙遠的北方的北極圈延伸到南方的黑海，綿延數(shù)百英里。意大利、匈牙利、斯洛伐克和克羅地亞很快加入了這場戰(zhàn)役，這是歷史上規(guī)模最大的軍事進攻。其他歐洲國家的志愿者也很快加入了來自這些國家的士兵之中，包括法國、荷蘭、丹麥、挪威、西班牙和比利時。

Thestunning news of this attack was announced to the world by German radio at 5:30that Sunday morning, when Reich Minister Joseph Goebbels broadcast the text ofa proclamation by Adolf Hitler to the German people that laid out his reasonsfor the historic offensive.

這個令人震驚的消息是德國廣播電臺在那個星期天的早上5:30向全世界宣布的，當時德意志帝國部長約瑟夫·戈培爾向德國人民播放了阿道夫·希特勒的一份宣言，其中列出了他發(fā)動這場歷史性進攻的原因。

Followingthat was the broadcast of Germany’s declaration of war against the SovietUnion. This was in the form of a diplomatic note to the Soviet government, readby Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to a packed and hastily organizednews conference of journalists representing the German press, as well asnewspapers across Europe and overseas.

之后是德國對蘇聯(lián)宣戰(zhàn)的廣播。這是一份給蘇聯(lián)政府的外交照會，由外交部長里賓特洛甫在一場擁擠而匆忙組織的記者招待會上宣讀。記者中有代表德國新聞界的記者，也有代表歐洲和海外的報紙的記者。

ThisForeign Office statement explains in some detail the German government’sreasons for the momentous decision to attack the USSR. About two hours earlier,Ribbentrop had given the text to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, while at thesame time the German ambassador in Moscow was delivering a shorter version ofit to the Soviet Foreign Minister.

外交部的這份聲明在一定程度上詳細解釋了德國政府做出攻擊蘇聯(lián)這一重大決定的原因。大約兩小時前，里賓特洛甫把這段文字交給了蘇聯(lián)駐柏林大使，與此同時，德國駐莫斯科大使正在把這段文字的簡本交給蘇聯(lián)外交部長。

Germanleaders did not know that the Soviets were already producing the T-34, KV-1 andKV-2 tanks, the heaviest and most deadly in the world, and more formidable thanany German model. Nor they did they know that the Soviet military had more than4,000 amphibious tanks – which were meant only for offensive operations – whilethe Germans had none.

德國領導人不知道蘇聯(lián)已經在生產T-34、KV-1和KV-2坦克，這是世界上最重、最致命的坦克，比任何德國型號的坦克都更強大。他們也不知道蘇聯(lián)軍隊有4000多輛兩棲坦克，而德國沒有。

TheGermans were also unaware of how the Soviets had been preparing their militarycommanders for war. For example, at a secret speech to military academygraduates in May 1941, just weeks earlier, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin said:“In conducting the defense of our country, we are compelled to act in anaggressive manner. From defense we have to shift to a military policy ofoffense. It is indispensable that we reform our training, our propaganda, ourpress to a mindset of offense. The Red Army is a modern army, and the modernarmy is an army of offense.”

德國人也不知道蘇聯(lián)是如何讓他們的軍事指揮官為戰(zhàn)爭做準備的。例如，1941年5月，就在幾周前，蘇聯(lián)領導人約瑟夫·斯大林在一次對軍校畢業(yè)生的秘密演講中說:“在保衛(wèi)我們的國家時，我們不得不采取一種咄咄逼人的行動。我們必須從防御轉向進攻的軍事政策。我們必須改革我們的訓練、我們的宣傳、我們的新聞，使之具有進攻的心態(tài)。紅軍是一支現(xiàn)代化的軍隊，現(xiàn)代化的軍隊是一支進攻的軍隊。”

Hitlerhimself acknowledged, both in public and in private, that he had misjudged theextent and scale of the Soviet threat. “Certainly, though, we were mistakenabout one thing,” the German leader told a large audience in Berlin on Oct. 3,1941. “We had no idea how gigantic the preparations of this enemy were againstGermany and Europe and how immeasurably great was the danger; how we just barelyescaped annihilation, not only of Germany but also of Europe.”

希特勒本人在公開場合和私下里都承認，他對蘇聯(lián)的威脅程度和規(guī)模判斷失誤。1941年10月3日，這位德國領導人在柏林對大批聽眾說:“當然，我們在一件事上犯了錯誤。”“我們不知道這個敵人對德國和歐洲的準備有多么充分，也不知道危險有多大;我們是如何逃過了滅頂之災的，不僅是德國，還有整個歐洲?！?br/>
TheUS government responded to the news of the German-led offensive with anofficial statement, issued by Deputy Secretary of State Sumner Welles.Completely ignoring the points made by the leaders in Berlin, it claimed thatGermany’s “treacherous” attack was part of a plan by Hitler “for the cruel andbrutal enslavement of all peoples and for the ultimate destruction of theremaining free democracies.”

美國副國務卿薩姆納·威爾斯發(fā)表了一份官方聲明，回應了德國領導的進攻的消息。聲明完全無視柏林領導人的觀點，聲稱德國“背信棄義”的襲擊是希特勒“對所有民族進行殘酷和野蠻奴役，最終摧毀剩余自由民主國家”計劃的一部分。

Actually, it was the Soviet Union – the world’smost oppressive regime at the time – that was dedicated to the eradication of“free democracies” and to the ultimate triumph of “proletarian dictatorship” inall countries. Stalin had made clear his elemental hostility to “freedemocracy” when the Red Army tried impose a Bolshevik regime on Finland in the“Winter War” of 1939-1940. In fact, soldiers of Finland – a parliamentarydemocracy – were now fighting as allies of Hitler’s Germany against theSoviets.

事實上，正是蘇聯(lián)——當時世界上最具壓迫性的政權——致力于鏟除“自由民主”，并最終在所有國家取得“無產階級專政”的勝利。當蘇聯(lián)紅軍在1939年至1940年的“冬季戰(zhàn)爭”中試圖將布爾什維克政權強加給芬蘭時，斯大林已經明確表示了他對“自由民主”的基本敵意。事實上，芬蘭士兵——一個議會民主制國家——現(xiàn)在作為希特勒德國的盟友與蘇聯(lián)作戰(zhàn)。

Inrecent years, however, a growing number of historians have assembledconsiderable evidence that validates key points made by Hitler and the Germangovernment, and which shows that the Soviets were preparing a massive assault.The most influential of these historians has probably been a former Soviet GRUmilitary intelligence officer, Vladimir Rezun. In a series of books writtenunder the pen name of Viktor Suvorov, he has presented impressive evidence toshow that the Soviet regime was preparing a massive offensive against Germanyand Europe, and that the German-led attack forestalled an imminent Sovietstrike. It is Stalin, not Hitler – he says – who should be considered the“chief culprit” of World War II.

然而，近年來，越來越多的歷史學家收集了大量的證據(jù)，證明希特勒和德國政府的觀點是正確的，這表明蘇聯(lián)正準備發(fā)動大規(guī)模進攻。這些歷史學家中最有影響力的可能是前蘇聯(lián)GRU（格勒烏，蘇軍總參謀部情報總局）軍事情報官員弗拉基米爾·麗茲。在維克多?蘇沃洛夫(Viktor Suvorov)筆名所著的一系列著作中，他提供了令人印象深刻的證據(jù)，表明蘇聯(lián)政權正準備對德國和歐洲發(fā)動大規(guī)模進攻，而德國領導的進攻阻止了蘇聯(lián)即將發(fā)動的攻擊。他說，應該被認為是二戰(zhàn)“罪魁禍首”的是斯大林，而不是希特勒。

Numerousdocuments and other historical evidence have come to light in recent decadesthat validate key points made in the German statements of June 22, 1941. Thisevidence also thoroughly discredits the simplistic portrayal of theGerman-Soviet clash, and indeed of the Second World War itself, that USofficials and prominent historians presented to the American public during thewar, and for years afterwards.

近幾十年來，大量的文件和其他歷史證據(jù)已經浮出水面，證實了1941年6月22日德國聲明中的要點。這一證據(jù)也徹底否定了美國官員和著名歷史學家在二戰(zhàn)期間以及戰(zhàn)后多年向美國公眾展示的對德蘇沖突乃至二戰(zhàn)本身的簡單化描述。

Even ifthe leaders in Germany, Finland, and other European countries were mistaken inbelieving that a Soviet assault was imminent, they certainly had ample reasonto regard the Stalin regime as a dangerous threat, and to conclude that theSoviets were deploying vast military forces in preparation for attack at somepoint in the future. The reasons given by Hitler and his government to justifythe German-led attack were not lies or pretexts.

即使德國、芬蘭和其他歐洲國家的領導人錯誤地認為蘇聯(lián)即將發(fā)動進攻, 他們當然有充足的理由將斯大林政權視為一個危險的威脅，并得出結論，蘇聯(lián)正在部署龐大的軍事力量，準備在未來某個時候發(fā)動攻擊。希特勒及其政府為德國領導的襲擊辯解的理由不是謊言或借口。

Indeed,the German, Finnish, and Romanian leaders had more valid and substantive causeto strike against the USSR in June 1941 than American leaders have had forlaunching a number of wars – including against Mexico in 1845, against Spain in1898, and against Iraq in 2003. In none of those cases did the country attackedby US military forces present a clear and present danger to the US, or a threatto vital American national interests.

事實上，德國、芬蘭和羅馬尼亞領導人在1941年6月對蘇聯(lián)發(fā)動襲擊的理由，比美國領導人發(fā)動一系列戰(zhàn)爭的理由更充分、更有實質意義——包括1845年對墨西哥、1898年對西班牙和2003年對伊拉克發(fā)動的戰(zhàn)爭。在這些案例中，美國軍隊襲擊的國家都沒有對美國造成明顯的、當前的威脅，也沒有對美國的重要國家利益構成威脅。

BecauseHitler’s proclamation of June 22, 1941, and the German Foreign Officedeclaration of the same day, explain at some length the reasons and motives forthe fateful decision to strike against the USSR, these are documents ofhistoric importance. The texts of specially prepared translations of these twostatements are given below in full.

由于希特勒于1941年6月22日發(fā)表的《宣言》和德國外交部同日發(fā)表的《宣言》，在一定程度上解釋了決定對蘇聯(lián)發(fā)動攻擊的原因和動機，這些文件具有重要的歷史意義。以下是這兩項聲明的特別編寫的譯文全文。

While theprophecies of a French statesman [Georges Clemenceau] that there were twentymillion Germans too many – in other words, that this number would have to beeliminated by hunger, disease or emigration – were apparently being fulfilledto the letter, the National Socialist movement began its work of unifying theGerman people, and thereby initiating the resurgence of the Reich. This rise ofour people from distress, misery and shameful disregard was in the form of apurely internal renaissance. In no way did that affect, much less threaten,Britain.

期間，法國政治家預言(喬治?克列孟梭),二千萬名德國人太多了——換句話說,這個數(shù)字會被饑餓、疾病或移民所清除——民族社會主義運動顯然是在履行諾言，開始了統(tǒng)一德國人民的工作，從而開始了德意志帝國的復興。我國人民從苦難、苦難和可恥的漠視中崛起，以純粹的內部復興的形式。這絲毫沒有影響英國，更談不上威脅英國。

Nevertheless,a new, hate-filled policy of encirclement against Germany began immediately.Internally and externally there came into being that plot, familiar to all ofus, between Jews and democrats, Bolsheviks and reactionaries, with the sole aimof inhibiting the establishment of the new German people’s state, and ofplunging the Reich anew into impotence and misery.

然而，一項充滿仇恨的包圍德國的新政策立即開始了。從內部到外部，在猶太人和民主黨人之間，在布爾什維克和反動派之間，產生了我們大家都熟悉的那種陰謀，其唯一目的就是要阻止建立新的德國人民國家，使帝國重新陷入無能為力和痛苦之中。

Apart fromus, the hatred of this international world conspiracy was directed againstthose nations that, like ourselves, were neglected by fortune and were obligedto earn their daily bread in the hardest struggle for existence.

除了我們之外，對這一世界陰謀的仇恨是針對那些象我們一樣被財富忽視的國家，這些國家必須在最艱苦的生存斗爭中謀生。

Above all,the right of Italy and Japan, just as much as that of Germany, to share in thegoods of this world was contested and in fact was formally denied. The allianceof these [three] nations was, therefore, purely an act of self-protection inthe face of the egoistic global combination of wealth and power that threatenedthem. As early as 1936 [Winston] Churchill, according to statements by theAmerican General Wood before a committee of the American House ofRepresentatives, declared that Germany was once again becoming too powerful andmust therefore be destroyed.

最重要的是，意大利和日本同德國一樣，享有分享這個世界的商品的權利受到了質疑，事實上，這種權利被正式拒絕了。因此，面對威脅它們的全球財富和權力的利己主義結合，這(三個)國家的聯(lián)盟純粹是一種自我保護的行為。早在1936年丘吉爾，根據(jù)美國伍德將軍在美國眾議院委員會上的發(fā)言，他就宣布德國再次變得過于強大，因此必須被摧毀。

In theSummer of 1939 the time seemed to have come for Britain to begin to realize itsintended annihilation by repetition of a comprehensive policy of encirclementof Germany. The plan of the campaign of lies staged for this purpose consistedin declaring that other people were threatened, in tricking them with Britishpromises of guarantees and assistance, and of getting them to go againstGermany, just as had happened prior to the [First] World War.

1939年夏天，似乎到了英國開始實現(xiàn)其毀滅的時候了——它要重復對德國的全面包圍政策。為達到這一目的而進行的謊言運動的計劃是宣布其他人受到威脅，用英國的保證和援助承諾來欺騙他們，并讓他們去反對德國，就像第一次世界大戰(zhàn)之前發(fā)生的那樣。

I, on theother hand, have been striving for two decades, with a minimum of interventionand without destroying our production, to arrive at a new socialist order inGermany, one that not only eliminates unemployment but also permits theproductive worker to receive an ever greater share of the fruits of his labor.The achievements of this policy of national economic and social reconstruction– which strove for a true national community by overcoming rank and classdivisions – are unique in today’s world.

另一方面,我一直為之奮斗二十年,用最少的干預和不破壞我們的生產,以實現(xiàn)德國的社會主義新秩序,一個不僅可以消除失業(yè),也允許生產工人獲得他的勞動果實中越來越大的份額。這一國家經濟和社會重建政策——它通過克服階級和階級分歧以建立一個真正的國家共同體而努力——所取得的成就在今天的世界上是獨特的。

It wastherefore only with extreme difficulty that I brought myself in August 1939 tosend my [Foreign] Minister [von Ribbentrop] to Moscow in an endeavor there tocounter the British encirclement policy against Germany. I did this only out ofa sense of responsibility toward the German people, but above all in the hopeof finally, in spite of everything, achieving lasting easing of tensions and ofbeing able to reduce sacrifices that otherwise might have been demanded of us.

因此，在1939年8月，我費了很大的勁才把我的[外交]部長[馮·里賓特洛甫]派到莫斯科，在那里努力反對英國對德國的包圍政策。我這樣做只是出于對德國人民的一種責任感，但最重要的是，我希望無論如何最終實現(xiàn)持久地緩和緊張局勢，并能夠減少我們本來可能需要作出的犧牲。

WhileGermany solemnly affirmed in Moscow that the designated territories andcountries – with the exception of Lithuania – lay outside any German political interests,a special [supplementary] agreement was concluded in case Britain were tosucceed in inciting Poland into actually going to war against Germany. In thiscase, as well, German claims were subject to limitations entirely out ofproportion to the achievements of the German forces.

盡管德國在莫斯科鄭重聲明，指定的領土和國家(立陶宛除外)不屬于德國的任何政治利益范圍，但為了防止英國成功煽動波蘭對德國發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭，兩國達成了一項特別(補充)協(xié)議。在這種情況下，德國的要求也受到限制，與德國部隊的成就完全不成比例。

However,already during our advance in Poland, Soviet rulers suddenly, and contrary tothe treaty, also claimed Lithuania. The German Reich never had any intention ofoccupying Lithuania, and not only failed to present any such demand to theLithuanian government, but on the contrary refused the request of the thenLithuanian government to send German troops to Lithuania in that spirit forthat purpose as inconsistent with the aims of German policy.

然而，在我們向波蘭推進的過程中，蘇聯(lián)統(tǒng)治者突然違反條約，也聲稱對立陶宛擁有主權。但德國帝國從未打算占領立陶宛,不僅沒有向立陶宛政府提出聲索,相反，隨后還拒絕了立陶宛政府的派出德國軍隊前往立陶宛的請求，因為這種精神與德國政策的目標不一致。

Despiteall this I complied also with this fresh Russian demand. However, this was onlythe beginning of continually renewed extortions, which have been repeated eversince.

盡管如此，我還是答應了俄羅斯的這個新要求。然而，這只是不斷發(fā)生敲詐勒索的開始，從那以后這種敲詐勒索一再發(fā)生。

Thevictory in Poland, which was won exclusively by German troops, prompted me toaddress yet another peace offer to the Western powers [Britain and France]. Itwas rejected, due to the efforts of the international and Jewish warmongers.Already at that time the reason for this rejection lay in the fact that Britainstill had hopes of being able to mobilize a European coalition against Germany,which was to include the Balkans and Soviet Russia. It was therefore decided inLondon to send Mr. Cripps as ambassador to Moscow. He received clearinstructions under all circumstances to resume relations between Britain andSoviet Russia, and develop them in a pro-British direction. The British pressreported on the progress of this mission, except insofar as tactical reasonsdid not impose silence.

德國軍隊在波蘭取得的勝利，促使我再次向西方大國(英國和法國)提出和平建議。由于國際和猶太戰(zhàn)爭販子的努力，它被拒絕了。當時，英國拒絕的原因在于，英國仍然希望能夠動員一個歐洲聯(lián)盟來反對德國，其中包括巴爾干半島和蘇聯(lián)俄羅斯。
因此，倫敦決定派克里普斯擔任駐莫斯科大使。他在任何情況下都接受了恢復英蘇關系的明確指示，并朝著親英的方向發(fā)展。英國新聞界報道了這項任務的進展情況，但出于戰(zhàn)術原因沒有保持沉默。

While oursoldiers from May 10, 1940, onward were breaking Franco-British power in thewest, Russian military deployment on our eastern frontier was continuing to anever more menacing extent. From August 1940 onward I therefore considered it tobe in the interest of the Reich to no longer permit our eastern provinces,which moreover had been laid waste so often before, to remain unprotected inthe face of this tremendous deployment of Bolshevik divisions.

當我們的士兵從1940年5月10日開始，在西方打破英法兩國的力量時，俄羅斯在我們東部邊境的軍事部署卻越來越具有威脅性。因此，從1940年8月起，我認為，為了德意志帝國的利益，不再允許我們東部各省在布爾什維克師的大規(guī)模部署下繼續(xù)不受保護。

Thus, andjust as intended by this British-Soviet Russian cooperation, there came aboutthe tying up of such strong [German] forces in the east that a radicalconclusion of the war in the west, particularly as regards aircraft, could nolonger be vouched for by the German leadership. This, however, was in line withthe goals not only of British but also of Soviet Russian policy, for bothBritain and Soviet Russia intended to let this war go on for as long aspossible in order to weaken all Europe and render it ever more impotent.

因此，正如英蘇俄合作的意圖一樣，德國在東方集結了如此強大的(德國)軍隊，以至于西方戰(zhàn)爭徹底結束了，尤其是在飛機方面，再也無法得到德國領導層的擔保。然而，這不僅符合英國的目標，也符合蘇聯(lián)對俄政策的目標，因為英國和蘇聯(lián)都打算讓這場戰(zhàn)爭盡可能長時間地繼續(xù)下去，以便削弱整個歐洲，使它變得更加無能。

Russia’sthreatened attack on Romania was in the last analysis equally intended to gainpossession of or, if possible, to destroy, an important base of the economiclife of not only Germany, but of all of Europe. Since 1933 the German Reichsought with boundless patience to win over states in southeastern Europe astrading partners. We therefore also had the greatest interest in their internalconsolidation and order. Russia’s advance into Romania and Greece’s alliancewith Britain threatened to quickly turn these regions as well into a generaltheater of war.

俄羅斯威脅對羅馬尼亞發(fā)動的攻擊，歸根結底同樣是為了獲得或(如果可能的話)摧毀——不僅是德國，而且是整個歐洲經濟生活的一個重要基礎。自1933年以來，德意志帝國一直以極大的耐心尋求贏得歐洲東南部國家作為貿易伙伴的支持。因此，我們對他們內部的鞏固和秩序也最感興趣。俄羅斯入侵羅馬尼亞，以及希臘與英國結盟，都有可能很快將這些地區(qū)變成戰(zhàn)爭的戰(zhàn)場。

Contraryto our principles and customs, and at the urgent request of the then Romaniangovernment, which was itself responsible for this development, I advised thatit acquiesce to the Soviet Russian demands for the sake of peace, and to cede[the province of] Bessarabia. The Romanian government believed, however, thatit could answer for this before its own people only if Germany and Italy incompensation would at least guarantee the integrity of what still remained ofRomania. I did so with heavy heart, above all because when the German Reichgives a guarantee, that means it also abides by it. We are neither Englishmennor Jews.

我違反我們的原則和習慣，并應當時羅馬尼亞政府的緊急要求，即羅馬尼亞政府本身對這一事態(tài)發(fā)展負有責任，我建議它為了和平而默認蘇聯(lián)的要求，并割讓(貝沙比拉省)。然而，羅馬尼亞政府認為，它只有在德國和意大利至少需要提供補償——保證羅馬尼亞仍然留有完整性的情況下，才能在其人民面前做出這個答案。我是懷著沉重的心情這么做的，最重要的是，當?shù)乱庵镜蹏龀霰ＷC時，這意味著它也會遵守它。因為我們既不是英國人也不是猶太人。

I stillbelieve at this late hour to have served the cause of peace in that region,albeit by assuming a serious obligation of our own. In order, however, finallyto solve these problems and achieve clarity concerning the Russian attitudetoward Germany, as well as under pressure of continually increasingmobilization on our eastern frontier, I invited Mr. Molotov to come to Berlin.

我依然相信這是為了這片地區(qū)的和平事業(yè)，盡管我們會背上嚴重的負擔。然而，為了最終解決這些問題，澄清俄羅斯對德國的態(tài)度，以及在我國東部邊境不斷增加動員的壓力下，我邀請莫洛托夫先生來到柏林。

My answer:As ever, Germany has absolutely no political interests in Finland. A new war byRussia against the small Finnish nation could not, however, be regarded anylonger by the German government as tolerable, all the more so because we couldnever believe that Finland could threaten Russia. Under no circumstances did wewant another theater of war to arise in the Baltic.

我的回答是:和以往一樣，德國在芬蘭絕對沒有任何政治利益。然而，德國政府再也不能容忍俄羅斯對這個芬蘭小國發(fā)動一場新的戰(zhàn)爭，因為我們永遠不能相信芬蘭能威脅到俄羅斯。在任何情況下，我們都不希望波羅的海再次發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭。

Molotov’sthird question: Is Germany prepared to agree that Soviet Russia give aguarantee to Bulgaria and, in this regard, send Soviet troops to Bulgaria, inconnection with which he – Molotov – was prepared to state that the Soviets didnot intend on that account, for example, to depose the King?

莫洛托夫的第三個問題:德國準備同意蘇聯(lián)給保加利亞提供防衛(wèi)，具體而言，向保加利亞派遣蘇聯(lián)軍隊，與之相關的還有，他——莫洛托夫——準備說，例如，蘇聯(lián)不打算因此而廢黜國王?