Most start-ups don’t succeed: More?than two-thirds?of them never deliver a positive return to investors. But?why?do so many end disappointingly? That question hit me with full force several years ago when I realized I couldn’t answer it.

多數(shù)初創(chuàng)企業(yè)以失敗收場：超過三分之二的初創(chuàng)公司從未有過正向的投資者回報。為什么這么多公司結(jié)局慘淡，令人失望？本文作者采訪調(diào)研了數(shù)百位創(chuàng)始人和投資人，撰寫了關(guān)于失敗創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的20多個案例研究。研究成果匯集成書并出版，書名為《創(chuàng)業(yè)公司緣何失敗》，書中描寫了造成大量初創(chuàng)公司慘淡收場，不斷反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的模式。本文介紹了其中兩種初創(chuàng)公司最容易避免的失敗模式。

Good Idea, Bad Bedfellows

想法優(yōu)秀，伙伴失敗

As I’ve noted, VCs look for founders with the right stuff: resilience, passion, experience leading start-up teams, and so forth. But even when such rare talent captains a new venture, there are other parties whose contributions are crucial to it. A broad set of stakeholders, including employees, strategic partners, and investors, all can play a role in a venture’s downfall.

風(fēng)投會審查創(chuàng)始人是否具備諸如韌性、激情和經(jīng)驗(yàn)等領(lǐng)導(dǎo)創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)的品質(zhì)。但即便選出了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)新公司的人才，其他合作方的貢獻(xiàn)也至關(guān)重要。包括雇員、戰(zhàn)略伙伴和投資人在內(nèi)的利益相關(guān)方都可能影響企業(yè)成敗。

Indeed, a great jockey isn’t even necessary for start-up success. Other members of the senior management team can compensate for a founder’s shortcomings, and seasoned investors and advisers can likewise provide guidance and useful connections. A new venture pursuing an amazing opportunity will typically attract such contributors—even if its founder doesn’t walk on water. But if its idea is merely good, a start-up may not become a talent magnet.

偉大的創(chuàng)始人并不能確保創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的成功。高管團(tuán)隊(duì)的其他成員可以補(bǔ)足創(chuàng)始人的缺點(diǎn)，資深投資人和顧問也能提供指導(dǎo)和有用的社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)。即便創(chuàng)始人不是萬里挑一，創(chuàng)業(yè)想法絕佳的新企業(yè)一般也會吸引到這樣的參與者，但如果創(chuàng)業(yè)想法只是湊合，一般就不會吸引這么多人才。

Consider the case of Quincy Apparel. In May 2011 two former students of mine, Alexandra Nelson and Christina Wallace, came to me for feedback on their start-up concept. I admired both of them and was impressed with their idea, which identified an unmet customer need: Young professional women had a hard time finding affordable and stylish work apparel that fit them well. Nelson and Wallace, who were close friends, devised a novel solution: a sizing scheme that allowed customers to specify four separate garment measurements (such as waist-to-hip ratio and bra size)—akin to the approach used for tailoring men’s suits.

以Quincy Apparel為例。2011年5月，我之前的兩位學(xué)生亞歷山德拉·尼爾森（Alexandra Nelson）和克里斯提娜·華萊士（Christina Wallace）希望我可以給她們的創(chuàng)業(yè)想法提點(diǎn)意見。我很欽佩兩位，也欣賞她們的創(chuàng)業(yè)想法——滿足了一個未被滿足的客戶需求：年輕職業(yè)女性很難找到合身且價格公道的職場穿搭。這兩位好朋友想出了一種新穎的量體裁衣的方法：顧客可以定制四片布料的尺寸（例如腰臀比和胸圍），和男士定制西裝方法類似。

Following the lean start-up method, Nelson and Wallace then validated customer demand using a textbook-perfect minimum viable product, or MVP—that is, the simplest possible offering that yields reliable customer feedback. They held six trunk shows at which women could try on sample outfits and place orders. Of the 200 women who attended, 25% made purchases. Buoyed by these results, the cofounders quit their consulting jobs, raised $950,000 in venture capital, recruited a team, and launched Quincy Apparel. They employed a direct-to-consumer business model, selling online rather than through brick-and-mortar stores.?

在這種精益創(chuàng)業(yè)方式之后，尼爾森和華萊士使用教科書般的最簡化可實(shí)行產(chǎn)品（MVP）來驗(yàn)證客戶需求，即帶來可信賴客戶反饋的最簡單服務(wù)。她們舉辦了六場非公開新時裝展示會，女性顧客可試穿樣衣并下單。200名來參加的女性中有25%下了單。兩位創(chuàng)始人大受鼓舞，辭去咨詢公司的工作，募集了95萬美元風(fēng)投資本，招兵買馬成立了Quincy Apparel。她們采用了直面消費(fèi)者的商業(yè)模式，通過電商而不是實(shí)體店出售。

At this point I became an early angel investor in the company. Initial orders were strong, as were reorders: An impressive 39% of customers who bought items from Quincy’s first seasonal collection made repeat purchases. However, robust demand required heavy investment in inventory. Meanwhile, production problems caused garments to fit poorly on some customers, resulting in higher-than-expected returns. Processing returns and correcting production problems put pressure on margins, rapidly depleting Quincy’s cash reserves. After Quincy tried and failed to raise more capital, the team trimmed the product line, aiming to simplify operations and realize efficiencies. However, the business lacked enough funding to prove out the pivot, and Quincy was forced to shut down less than a year after its launch.

彼時我也是公司初期的天使投資人之一。最初的訂單和回購數(shù)量很大：購買首季系列服裝的客戶中有39%的復(fù)購率。但強(qiáng)勁需求需要大量庫存。同時生產(chǎn)出現(xiàn)問題，導(dǎo)致部分客戶衣服不合身，退貨超出預(yù)期。處理退貨并解決生產(chǎn)問題影響了利潤，很快耗盡了Quincy的現(xiàn)金儲備。公司嘗試再次募資但失敗了，團(tuán)隊(duì)決定減少產(chǎn)品線，簡化運(yùn)營提高效力，但缺乏足夠資金完成轉(zhuǎn)型，成立不到一年后被迫關(guān)門。

So why did Quincy fail?

Quincy為何失敗？

Quincy’s founders had a good idea. Were Wallace and Nelson simply poor jockeys? Temperamentally, their fit with the founder role was good. They were sharp and resourceful and had complementary strengths. However, the founder team wobbled in two important ways. First, unwilling to strain their close friendship, Wallace and Nelson shared decision-making authority equally with respect to strategy, product design, and other key choices. This slowed their responses when action was required. Second, neither founder had experience with clothing design and manufacturing.

Quincy的創(chuàng)始人有絕佳的創(chuàng)業(yè)想法。那是因?yàn)槿A萊士和尼爾森是很差的創(chuàng)始人嗎？兩人的性情很適合創(chuàng)始人的角色。聰明且見多識廣，優(yōu)勢互補(bǔ)。但是創(chuàng)始人團(tuán)隊(duì)在兩個方面有不足之處。首先，兩人不愿意破壞她們的友誼。華萊士和尼爾森在戰(zhàn)略、產(chǎn)品設(shè)計等其他關(guān)鍵角色上有平等決策權(quán)。在需要決策時這種設(shè)計拖延了響應(yīng)速度。第二，兩人都沒有成衣設(shè)計和制造經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

Apparel production entails many specialized tasks, such as fabric sourcing, pattern making, and quality control. To compensate for their lack of industry know-how, the founders hired a few apparel company veterans, assuming that they’d fill multiple functions—as jack-of-all-trades team members do in most early-stage start-ups. However, accustomed to the high levels of specialization in mature apparel companies, Quincy’s employees weren’t flexible about tackling tasks outside their areas of expertise.

成衣生產(chǎn)制造涉及許多專業(yè)化任務(wù)，如面料采購、圖樣設(shè)計和質(zhì)量控制。兩人為彌補(bǔ)自身行業(yè)知識的欠缺，聘請了成衣公司的一些資深員工，以為可以一人多用，就像很多初創(chuàng)企業(yè)早期的萬事通成員。但這些員工習(xí)慣了成熟成衣公司的高度專業(yè)化，在解決專業(yè)以外的任務(wù)時不夠靈活。

Investors also played a role in Quincy’s demise. The founders had aimed to raise $1.5 million but managed to secure only $950,000. That was enough to fund operations for two seasonal collections. Before launching, the founders had correctly assumed that at least three seasons would be needed to fine-tune operations. Quincy had some traction after two seasons but not enough to lure new backers, and the venture capital firms that had provided most of its money were too small to commit more funds. Furthermore, the founders were disappointed with the guidance they got from those VCs, who pressured them to grow at full tilt—like the technology start-ups the investors were more familiar with. Doing so forced Quincy to build inventory, burning through cash before it had resolved its production problems.

投資人也要負(fù)上責(zé)任。創(chuàng)始人本來計劃募集150萬美元，但最終只拿到了95萬。這些錢只夠推出兩季服裝系列。創(chuàng)始人準(zhǔn)確預(yù)計至少要三季才能調(diào)試好運(yùn)營問題。兩季之后Quincy贏得了一些聲譽(yù)但不足以吸引新投資者。主要的投資公司規(guī)模太小無法繼續(xù)投入更多錢。創(chuàng)始人對風(fēng)投資本的指導(dǎo)也很失望，后者要求她們像技術(shù)類初創(chuàng)企業(yè)那樣全速增長，結(jié)果導(dǎo)致Quincy在解決生產(chǎn)問題前就耗盡現(xiàn)金建立了庫存。

In summary, Quincy had a good idea but?bad bedfellows:?Besides the founders, a range of resource providers were culpable in the venture’s collapse, including team members, manufacturing partners, and investors.

總之Quincy的創(chuàng)業(yè)想法很不錯，但合作方不好：除了創(chuàng)始人，很多資源提供者對公司的失利都有責(zé)任，包括團(tuán)隊(duì)成員、制造工廠和投資人。

Could this outcome have been avoided? Perhaps. The founders’ lack of fashion industry experience was at the root of many problems. It took time for Wallace and Nelson to master the complexities of apparel design and production. Without industry connections, they couldn’t leverage their professional networks to recruit team members or count on past relationships with factory managers to ensure prompt delivery. And without an industry track record, they had difficulty finding investors willing to bet on first-time founders.

這一結(jié)果有可能避免嗎？也許。創(chuàng)始人缺乏時裝從業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)是很多問題的根源。華萊士和尼爾森花了很長時間才掌握了成衣設(shè)計和制造的復(fù)雜門道。兩人缺乏業(yè)內(nèi)關(guān)系網(wǎng)，無法利用職業(yè)關(guān)系招聘團(tuán)隊(duì)成員，也不能依賴過去和工廠管理者的關(guān)系確保即刻交付。由于沒有行業(yè)成功經(jīng)驗(yàn)，她們也很難找到愿意為初次創(chuàng)業(yè)者投資的投資人。

False Starts

錯誤的開始

I have long been an apostle of the lean start-up approach. But as I dug deeper into case studies of failure, I concluded that its practices were falling short of their promise. Many entrepreneurs who claim to embrace the lean start-up canon actually adopt only part of it. Specifically, they launch MVPs and iterate on them after getting feedback. By putting an MVP out there and testing how customers respond, founders are supposed to avoid squandering time and money building and marketing a product that no one wants.

我一直都是精益創(chuàng)業(yè)方法的信徒，但隨著我愈加深入地研究關(guān)于失敗的案例，我發(fā)現(xiàn)精益創(chuàng)業(yè)的實(shí)踐知易行難。很多聲稱使用精益創(chuàng)業(yè)方法的創(chuàng)業(yè)者實(shí)際只應(yīng)用了其中一部分。具體來說，創(chuàng)業(yè)者會推出最簡化可實(shí)行產(chǎn)品（MVP），獲得反饋后再迭代。通過這種方式測試顧客反應(yīng)，目的是避免浪費(fèi)時間和金錢打造宣傳沒有人需要的產(chǎn)品。

Yet by neglecting to research customer needs?before?commencing their engineering efforts, entrepreneurs end up wasting valuable time and capital on MVPs that are likely to miss their mark. These are?false starts.?The entrepreneurs are like sprinters who jump the gun: They’re too eager to get a product out there. The rhetoric of the lean start-up movement—for example, “l(fā)aunch early and often” and “fail fast”—actually encourages this “ready, fire, aim” behavior.

但在開始設(shè)計之前如果忽略了對客戶需求的研究，創(chuàng)始人最終很可能會在失敗的MVP上浪費(fèi)寶貴的時間和金錢。這就是錯誤的開始。創(chuàng)業(yè)者像發(fā)令槍還沒響就搶跑的人：太著急把產(chǎn)品投放市場了。例如，精益創(chuàng)業(yè)所宣揚(yáng)的“多次、盡早推出產(chǎn)品”，“快速失敗”實(shí)際上在鼓勵“先開槍后瞄準(zhǔn)”的行為。

The online dating start-up Triangulate experienced this syndrome in 2010. A clue about the cause of Triangulate’s failure lies in its three big pivots in less than two years. On one hand, pivots are foundational for lean start-ups. With each iteration, Nagaraj’s team had heeded the “fail fast” mantra. The team also followed the principle of launching early and often—putting a real product into the hands of real customers as fast as possible.

在線交友網(wǎng)站Triangulate在2010年就經(jīng)歷了這樣的現(xiàn)象。關(guān)于它的失敗，細(xì)節(jié)藏在不到兩年的三次重大轉(zhuǎn)型中。一方面，精益創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的基石就是轉(zhuǎn)型。每次迭代創(chuàng)始人納加拉杰的團(tuán)隊(duì)都注意到“快速失敗”的咒語。團(tuán)隊(duì)遵循盡早且頻繁地推出產(chǎn)品的原則，盡快將真正的產(chǎn)品放到真實(shí)消費(fèi)者手中。

But there’s more to the lean start-up approach than those practices. Before entrepreneurs begin to build a product, lean start-up guru Steve Blank insists, they must complete a phase called “customer discovery”—a round of interviews with prospective customers. Those interviews probe for strong, unmet customer needs—problems worth pursuing. In Nagaraj’s postmortem analysis of Triangulate’s failure, he acknowledged skipping this crucial step. He and his team failed to conduct up-front research to validate the demand for a matching engine or the appeal of the wingman concept. Nor did they conduct MVP tests akin to Quincy’s trunk shows. Instead they rushed to launch Wings as a fully functional product.

但精益創(chuàng)業(yè)的內(nèi)容不止這些。精益創(chuàng)業(yè)大師史蒂夫·布朗克（Steve Blank）認(rèn)為在創(chuàng)業(yè)者打造產(chǎn)品之前，必須做好“顧客探索”，即對潛在顧客的全面訪談和了解。這些訪談可以幫助企業(yè)了解客戶未被滿足的強(qiáng)烈需求以及值得繼續(xù)追尋的問題。在納加拉杰對公司失敗的事后分析中，他承認(rèn)自己跳過了這一關(guān)鍵步驟。他和團(tuán)隊(duì)未能進(jìn)行事先研究，證實(shí)產(chǎn)品概念存在需求。他們也沒有進(jìn)行Quincy的非公開新時裝展示會那樣的MVP測試，而是倉促推出并認(rèn)定它能被市場接受。

By giving short shrift to customer discovery and MVPs, Triangulate’s team fell victim to a false start—and turned the “fail fast” mantra into a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the team members had spoken to customers at the outset or tested a true MVP, they could have designed their first product in ways that conformed more closely to market needs. By failing with their first product, they wasted a feedback cycle, and time is an early-stage entrepreneur’s most precious resource. With the clock ticking, one wasted cycle means one less opportunity to pivot before money runs out.

Triangulate的團(tuán)隊(duì)由于沒有做顧客探索和MVP，剛開始就犯了錯誤，將“快速失敗”魔咒變成一個自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的預(yù)言。如果團(tuán)隊(duì)在剛開始就和顧客交流過或測試過真正的MVP， 他們的最初產(chǎn)品設(shè)計可能會更接近市場需求。首個產(chǎn)品的失敗導(dǎo)致他們浪費(fèi)了反饋循環(huán)，而對早期創(chuàng)業(yè)公司來說，最寶貴的資源就是時間。隨著時間越來越緊迫，浪費(fèi)一個循環(huán)意味著在現(xiàn)金用盡前少了一個轉(zhuǎn)型機(jī)會。

Maintaining Balance

保持平衡

It’s important for an entrepreneur to maintain balance. Guidance based on conventional wisdom is good—most of the time—but it shouldn’t be followed blindly. Consider the following advice given to many first-time founders and how it can backfire:

創(chuàng)業(yè)者要學(xué)會保持平衡。傳統(tǒng)智慧的指導(dǎo)多數(shù)情況下是好的，但不要盲目追隨。我們來看看以下這些針對初次創(chuàng)業(yè)者的建議，如何造成適得其反的效果：

Just do it!

想做就做！

Great entrepreneurs make things happen and move fast to capture opportunity. But a bias for action can tempt an entrepreneur to truncate exploration and leap too soon into building and selling a product, as I’ve explained. When that happens, founders may find themselves locked prematurely into a flawed solution.

優(yōu)秀創(chuàng)業(yè)者都是實(shí)干家，能迅速行動抓住機(jī)會。但對行動的偏執(zhí)可能會誘使創(chuàng)業(yè)者跳過探索階段，過早開始打造產(chǎn)品并出售，這點(diǎn)前文我已做過解釋。出現(xiàn)這種情況時，創(chuàng)始人可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)自己過早下結(jié)論，解決方案其實(shí)還存在許多問題。

Be persistent!

堅持不懈！

Entrepreneurs encounter setbacks over and over. True entrepreneurs dust themselves off and go back at it; they must be determined and resilient. However, if persistence turns into stubbornness, founders may have difficulty recognizing a false start for what it is. They likewise may be reluctant to pivot when it should be clear that their solution isn’t working. Delaying a pivot eats up scarce capital, shortening a venture’s runway.

創(chuàng)業(yè)者總是會不斷遇到挫折。真正的創(chuàng)業(yè)者會拍拍灰塵，立刻重返戰(zhàn)場。他們必須有決心和韌性。但如果毅力變成固執(zhí)，創(chuàng)業(yè)者也許會無法分辨錯誤的開始，在他們的解決方案并不奏效時堅持不轉(zhuǎn)型。延遲轉(zhuǎn)型會消耗稀缺的資金，縮短企業(yè)的跑道。

Bring passion!

懷抱激情！

A burning desire to have a world-changing impact can power entrepreneurs through the most daunting challenges. It can also attract employees, investors, and partners who’ll help make their dreams a reality. But in the extreme, passion can translate into overconfidence—and a penchant to skip critical up-front research. Likewise, passion can blind entrepreneurs to the fact that their product isn’t meeting customer needs.

創(chuàng)業(yè)者希望改變世界的強(qiáng)烈欲望能幫助他們度過最令人生畏的挑戰(zhàn)，也能吸引幫助他們實(shí)現(xiàn)夢想的雇員、投資人和合伙人。但在極端情況下，激情可以演變?yōu)檫^度自信，并因此跳過前期研究。同樣地，激情也能蒙蔽創(chuàng)業(yè)者的雙眼，讓他們看不到自身產(chǎn)品無法滿足顧客需求。??

Bootstrap!

省錢！

Because resources are limited, entrepreneurs must conserve them by being frugal and figuring out clever ways to make do with less. True enough, but if a start-up cannot consistently deliver on its value proposition because its team lacks crucial skills, its founders must decide whether to hire employees with those skills. If those candidates demand high compensation, a scrappy, frugal founder might say, “We’ll just have to do without them”—and risk being stuck with bad bedfellows.

由于資源有限，創(chuàng)業(yè)者必須節(jié)儉，動腦筋用更少的錢辦更多的事。但如果創(chuàng)業(yè)公司由于缺乏具備關(guān)鍵技能的員工，無法持續(xù)提供價值定位，創(chuàng)始人必須決定是否要雇用具有這些技能的員工。如果這些人要求高工資，好斗且節(jié)儉的創(chuàng)始人也許會說“我們只能在沒有這些人的情況下湊合了”，這樣就有可能遭遇前文提到的伙伴糟糕的問題。

Grow!

增長！

Rapid growth attracts investors and talent and gives a team a great morale boost. This may tempt founders to curtail customer research and prematurely launch their product. Also, fast growth can put heavy demands on team members and partners. If a team has bad bedfellows, growth may exacerbate quality problems and depress profit margins.

快速增長能夠吸引投資人和人才，也能提振團(tuán)隊(duì)士氣。這也許會誘使創(chuàng)始人縮減顧客研究，過早推出產(chǎn)品。快速增長會面臨巨大需求，會給團(tuán)隊(duì)成員和合伙人壓力。如果團(tuán)隊(duì)有糟糕的伙伴，增長也許會加劇質(zhì)量問題，降低利潤空間。

It’s fashionable in start-up circles to speak glibly about failure as a badge of honor or a rite of passage—just another phase of an entrepreneur’s journey. Failure also takes a toll on the economy and society. A doomed venture ties up resources that could be put to better use. And it acts as a deterrent to would-be entrepreneurs who are more risk-averse, have financial obligations that make it hard to forgo a paycheck, or face barriers when raising capital—which is to say, many women and minorities.

創(chuàng)業(yè)圈很流行對失敗侃侃而談，就像失敗是一種榮譽(yù)勛章或通關(guān)儀式，是創(chuàng)業(yè)之路的另一個階段。失敗也會給經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會帶來損失。失敗的企業(yè)浪費(fèi)了本可用于其他地方的資源。失敗也對很多潛在的創(chuàng)業(yè)者起到了震懾作用，包括更加厭惡風(fēng)險的潛在創(chuàng)業(yè)者，有財務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)無法放棄工作的創(chuàng)業(yè)者，以及女性和少數(shù)族裔等募集資本障礙重重的創(chuàng)業(yè)者。

To be sure, failure will (and should) always be a reality for many entrepreneurs. Doing something new with limited resources is inherently risky. But by recognizing that many failures are avoidable and follow the same trajectory, we can reduce their number and frequency. The payoff will be a more productive, more diverse, and less bruising entrepreneurial economy.

失敗的確將會（也應(yīng)該）一直是很多創(chuàng)業(yè)者的現(xiàn)實(shí)。利用有限資源做一些創(chuàng)新的事本身就存在風(fēng)險。但是，如果我們承認(rèn)很多失敗有同樣的模式且可以避免，就可以減少失敗的數(shù)量和頻率，并獲得更富生產(chǎn)力、更多樣化和更少痛苦的創(chuàng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)。

湯姆·艾森曼(Tom Eisenmann) | 文

湯姆·艾森曼是哈佛商學(xué)院工商管理系Howard H.Stevenson教席教授，哈佛創(chuàng)新實(shí)驗(yàn)室Peter O. Cris主席，著有《創(chuàng)業(yè)公司緣何失?。簞?chuàng)業(yè)成功的新路線圖》（Why Startups Fail: A New Roadmap for Entrepreneurial Success）（2021年Currency出版社出版），文章改編自本書。

牛文靜 | 譯???時青靖 | 校??? 李源 | 編輯

本文有刪節(jié)，原文參見《哈佛商業(yè)評論》中文版2021年5月刊。