經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)頂刊The Quarterly Journal of Economics (季刊)2023年第1期
The Quarterly Journal of Economics (季刊)2023年第1期
Volume 138, Issue 2, 2023
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——更多動態(tài),請持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh:理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)
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Does Directed Innovation Mitigate Climate Damage? Evidence from U.S. Agriculture?
定向創(chuàng)新能減輕氣候損害嗎?來自美國農(nóng)業(yè)的證據(jù)
Jacob Moscona?and?Karthik A Sastry
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 637–701,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac039
This article studies how innovation reacts to climate change and shapes its economic impacts, focusing on U.S. agriculture. We show in a model that directed innovation can either mitigate or exacerbate climate change’s potential economic damage depending on the substitutability between new technology and favorable climatic conditions. To empirically investigate the technological response to climate change, we measure crop-specific exposure to damaging extreme temperatures and crop-specific innovation embodied in new variety releases and patents. We find that innovation has redirected since the mid-twentieth century toward crops with increasing exposure to extreme temperatures. Moreover, this effect is driven by types of agricultural technology most related to environmental adaptation. We next show that U.S. counties’ exposure to induced innovation significantly dampens the local economic damage from extreme temperatures. Combining these estimates with the model, we find that directed innovation has offset 20% of potential losses in U.S. agricultural land value due to damaging climate trends since 1960 and that innovation could offset 13% of projected damage by 2100. These findings highlight the vital importance, but incomplete effectiveness, of endogenous technological change as a source of adaptation to climate change.
本文以美國農(nóng)業(yè)為研究對象,研究創(chuàng)新如何對氣候變化作出反應(yīng),并塑造其經(jīng)濟(jì)影響。我們在一個模型中表明,定向創(chuàng)新可以減輕或加劇氣候變化的潛在經(jīng)濟(jì)損失,這取決于新技術(shù)和有利氣候條件之間的可替代性。為了實(shí)證研究技術(shù)對氣候變化的響應(yīng),我們測量了特定作物對破壞性極端溫度的暴露,以及體現(xiàn)在新品種發(fā)布和專利中的特定作物創(chuàng)新。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),自20世紀(jì)中葉以來,創(chuàng)新已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)向了越來越多地暴露在極端溫度下的作物。此外,這種效應(yīng)是由與環(huán)境適應(yīng)最相關(guān)的農(nóng)業(yè)技術(shù)類型驅(qū)動的。我們接下來表明,美國郡縣受到誘導(dǎo)創(chuàng)新的影響顯著地抑制了極端溫度造成的當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì)損失。將這些估計與模型相結(jié)合,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),自1960年以來,由于破壞性的氣候趨勢,定向創(chuàng)新已經(jīng)抵消了美國農(nóng)業(yè)用地價值20%的潛在損失,到2100年,創(chuàng)新可以抵消13%的預(yù)計損失。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)強(qiáng)調(diào)了內(nèi)源性技術(shù)變革作為適應(yīng)氣候變化的來源的重要性,但其有效性并不完全。
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How do Campaigns Shape Vote Choice? Multicountry Evidence from 62 Elections and 56 TV Debates?
競選活動如何影響投票選擇?62次選舉和56次電視辯論的多國證據(jù)
Caroline Le Pennec?and?Vincent Pons
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 703–767,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjad002
We use two-round survey data from 62 elections in 10 countries since 1952 to study the formation of vote choice, beliefs, and policy preferences and assess how televised debates contribute to this process. Our data include 253,000 observations. We compare the consistency between vote intention and vote choice of respondents surveyed at different points before, and then again after, the election, and show that 17% to 29% of voters make up their mind during the final two months of campaigns. Changes in vote choice are concomitant to shifts in issues voters find most important and in beliefs about candidates, and they generate sizable swings in vote shares. In contrast, policy preferences remain remarkably stable throughout the campaign. Finally, we use an event study to estimate the impact of TV debates, in which candidates themselves communicate with voters, and of shocks such as natural and technological disasters which, by contrast, occur independently from the campaign. We do not find any effect of either type of event on vote choice formation, suggesting that information received throughout the campaign from other sources such as the media, political activists, and other citizens is more impactful.
我們使用了自1952年以來10個國家62次選舉的兩輪調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)來研究投票選擇、信仰和政策偏好的形成,并評估電視辯論如何促進(jìn)這一過程。我們的數(shù)據(jù)包括253,000個觀測值。我們比較了在選舉前后不同時間點(diǎn)接受調(diào)查的受訪者的投票意向和投票選擇之間的一致性,結(jié)果表明,17%至29%的選民在競選的最后兩個月做出了決定。投票選擇的變化伴隨著選民認(rèn)為最重要的問題和對候選人的看法的變化,它們會導(dǎo)致選票份額的大幅波動。相比之下,在整個競選過程中,政策偏好保持了相當(dāng)穩(wěn)定。最后,我們使用事件研究來估計電視辯論的影響,在電視辯論中,候選人自己與選民溝通,以及自然和技術(shù)災(zāi)害等沖擊,相比之下,獨(dú)立于競選活動發(fā)生。我們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)這兩種類型的事件對投票選擇形成有任何影響,這表明在整個競選過程中,從其他來源(如媒體、政治活動家和其他公民)獲得的信息更有影響力。
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Welfare and Output With Income Effects and Taste Shocks
收入效應(yīng)與需求沖擊下的福利與產(chǎn)出
David R Baqaee?and?Ariel Burstein
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 769–834,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac042
We present a unified treatment of how welfare responds to changes in budget sets or technologies with taste shocks and nonhomothetic preferences. We propose a welfare metric that ranks production possibility frontiers that differs from one that ranks budget sets and characterize it using a general equilibrium generalization of Hicksian demand. This extends Hulten’s theorem, the basis for constructing aggregate quantity indices, to environments with nonhomothetic and unstable preferences. We illustrate our results using both long- and short-run applications. In the long run, we show that if structural transformation is caused by income effects or changes in tastes, rather than substitution effects, then Baumol’s cost disease is twice as important for our preferred measure of welfare. In the short run, we show that standard chain-weighted deflators understate welfare-relevant inflation for current tastes. Finally, using the COVID-19 recession, we illustrate that chain-weighted real consumption and real GDP are unreliable metrics for measuring welfare or production when there are taste shocks.
我們提出了一個統(tǒng)一的處理福利如何響應(yīng)變化的預(yù)算集或技術(shù)與口味沖擊和非同質(zhì)偏好。我們提出了一個福利指標(biāo),它對生產(chǎn)可能性邊界進(jìn)行排序,不同于對預(yù)算集進(jìn)行排序,并使用??怂剐枨蟮囊话憔夥夯瘉砻枋鏊?。這將構(gòu)建總量指標(biāo)的基礎(chǔ)Hulten定理推廣到具有非同質(zhì)和不穩(wěn)定偏好的環(huán)境中。我們使用長期和短期應(yīng)用程序來說明我們的結(jié)果。從長期來看,我們表明,如果結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型是由收入效應(yīng)或品味變化引起的,而不是替代效應(yīng),那么鮑莫爾成本病對我們首選的福利衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的重要性是其兩倍。在短期內(nèi),我們表明,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)鏈加權(quán)平減指數(shù)低估了當(dāng)前口味的福利相關(guān)通脹。最后,我們利用COVID-19衰退說明,當(dāng)存在味覺沖擊時,鏈條加權(quán)實(shí)際消費(fèi)和實(shí)際GDP是衡量福利或生產(chǎn)的不可靠指標(biāo)。
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Use It or Lose It: Efficiency and Redistributional Effects of Wealth Taxation
使用它或失去它:財富稅的效率和再分配效應(yīng)
Fatih Guvenen?and others
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 835–894,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac047
How does wealth taxation differ from capital income taxation? When the return on investment is equal across individuals, a well-known result is that the two tax systems are equivalent. Motivated by recent empirical evidence documenting persistent return heterogeneity, we revisit this question. With heterogeneity, the two tax systems typically have opposite implications for efficiency and inequality. Under capital income taxation, entrepreneurs who are more productive and therefore generate more income pay higher taxes. Under wealth taxation, entrepreneurs who have similar wealth levels pay similar taxes regardless of their productivity, which expands the tax base, shifts the tax burden toward unproductive entrepreneurs, and raises the savings rate of productive ones. This reallocation increases aggregate productivity and output. In the simulated model parameterized to match the U.S. data, replacing the capital income tax with a wealth tax in a revenue-neutral way delivers a significantly higher average welfare. Turning to optimal taxation, the optimal wealth tax (OWT) is positive and yields large welfare gains by raising efficiency and lowering inequality. In contrast, the optimal capital income tax (OKIT) is negative—a subsidy—and delivers lower welfare gains than OWT, owing to the welfare losses from higher inequality. Furthermore, when the transition path is considered, the gains from OKIT turn into significant welfare losses for existing cohorts, whereas OWT continues to deliver robust welfare gains. These results suggest that moderate wealth taxation may be a more appealing alternative than capital income taxation, which can be significantly more distorting under return heterogeneity than under the equal-returns assumption.
財富稅與資本所得稅有何不同?當(dāng)個人的投資回報相等時,一個眾所周知的結(jié)果是兩種稅收制度是相等的。由于最近的實(shí)證證據(jù)證明了持續(xù)的回報異質(zhì)性,我們重新審視了這個問題。由于存在異質(zhì)性,這兩種稅收制度通常會對效率和不平等產(chǎn)生相反的影響。在資本所得稅制度下,生產(chǎn)力更高、因此收入更多的企業(yè)家要繳納更高的稅。在財富稅制度下,擁有相似財富水平的企業(yè)家無論他們的生產(chǎn)率如何,都要繳納相似的稅,這擴(kuò)大了稅基,將稅收負(fù)擔(dān)轉(zhuǎn)移到非生產(chǎn)性企業(yè)家身上,并提高了生產(chǎn)性企業(yè)家的儲蓄率。這種再分配提高了總生產(chǎn)率和產(chǎn)出。在與美國數(shù)據(jù)相匹配的參數(shù)化模擬模型中,以收入中性的方式用財富稅取代資本所得稅可以顯著提高平均福利。轉(zhuǎn)向最優(yōu)稅收,最優(yōu)財富稅(OWT)是正的,通過提高效率和降低不平等產(chǎn)生巨大的福利收益。相比之下,最優(yōu)資本所得稅(OKIT)是負(fù)的——一種補(bǔ)貼——由于不平等加劇導(dǎo)致的福利損失,它帶來的福利收益低于OWT。此外,當(dāng)考慮到過渡路徑時,OKIT的收益變成了現(xiàn)有隊(duì)列的重大福利損失,而OWT繼續(xù)提供強(qiáng)勁的福利收益。這些結(jié)果表明,適度的財富稅可能是比資本所得稅更有吸引力的選擇,資本所得稅在回報異質(zhì)性下比在等回報假設(shè)下更容易扭曲。
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Cutting the Innovation Engine: How Federal Funding Shocks Affect University Patenting, Entrepreneurship, and Publications
切斷創(chuàng)新引擎:聯(lián)邦資金沖擊如何影響大學(xué)專利、創(chuàng)業(yè)和出版
Tania Babina?and others
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 895–954,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac046
This article studies how federal funding affects the innovation outputs of university researchers. We link person-level research grants from 22 universities to patents, publications, and career outcomes from the U.S. Census Bureau. We focus on the effects of large, idiosyncratic, and temporary cuts to federal funding in a researcher’s preexisting narrow field of study. Using an event study design, we document that these negative federal funding shocks reduce high-tech entrepreneurship and publications but increase patenting. The lost publications tend to be higher quality and more basic, whereas the additional patents tend to be lower quality, less general, and more often privately assigned. These federal funding cuts lead to an increase in private funding, which partially compensates for the decline in federal funding. Together with evidence from industry-university contracts, the results suggest that federal funding cuts shift university research funding from federal to private sources and lead to innovation outputs that are less openly accessible and more often appropriated by corporate funders.
本文研究了聯(lián)邦資助對大學(xué)科研人員創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)出的影響。我們將22所大學(xué)的個人研究資助與美國人口普查局的專利、出版物和職業(yè)成果聯(lián)系起來。我們關(guān)注的是,在研究人員先前存在的狹窄研究領(lǐng)域中,大規(guī)模、特殊和臨時削減聯(lián)邦資助的影響。使用事件研究設(shè)計,我們證明這些負(fù)面的聯(lián)邦資金沖擊減少了高科技創(chuàng)業(yè)和出版物,但增加了專利申請。失去的出版物往往質(zhì)量更高,更基本,而額外的專利往往質(zhì)量較低,不那么普遍,更多的是私人轉(zhuǎn)讓。這些聯(lián)邦資金的削減導(dǎo)致私人資金的增加,這部分彌補(bǔ)了聯(lián)邦資金的減少。結(jié)合產(chǎn)學(xué)研合同的證據(jù),研究結(jié)果表明,聯(lián)邦資金削減將大學(xué)研究資金從聯(lián)邦資金轉(zhuǎn)移到私人資金來源,導(dǎo)致創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)出不太容易公開獲取,而且更經(jīng)常被企業(yè)資助者挪用。
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Learning from Shared News: When Abundant Information Leads to Belief Polarization
從分享的新聞中學(xué)習(xí):當(dāng)豐富的信息導(dǎo)致信仰兩極分化
T Renee Bowen?and others
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 955–1000,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac045
We study learning via shared news. Each period agents receive the same quantity and quality of firsthand information and can share it with friends. Some friends (possibly few) share selectively, generating heterogeneous news diets across agents. Agents are aware of selective sharing and update beliefs by Bayes’s rule. Contrary to standard learning results, we show that beliefs can diverge in this environment, leading to polarization. This requires that (i) agents hold misperceptions (even minor) about friends’ sharing and (ii) information quality is sufficiently low. Polarization can worsen when agents’ friend networks expand. When the quantity of firsthand information becomes large, agents can hold opposite extreme beliefs, resulting in severe polarization. We find that news aggregators can curb polarization caused by news sharing. Our results hold without media bias or fake news, so eliminating these is not sufficient to reduce polarization. When fake news is included, it can lead to polarization but?only?through misperceived selective sharing. We apply our theory to shed light on the polarization of public opinion about climate change in the United States.
我們通過分享新聞來學(xué)習(xí)。每個時期的代理收到相同數(shù)量和質(zhì)量的第一手信息,并可以與朋友分享。一些朋友(可能很少)有選擇地分享,在代理之間產(chǎn)生異質(zhì)的新聞飲食。根據(jù)貝葉斯規(guī)則,智能體意識到選擇性共享和更新信念。與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的學(xué)習(xí)結(jié)果相反,我們表明信念在這種環(huán)境中會發(fā)生分歧,導(dǎo)致兩極分化。這需要(i)代理人對朋友的分享有誤解(即使是輕微的誤解),(ii)信息質(zhì)量足夠低。當(dāng)代理人的朋友網(wǎng)絡(luò)擴(kuò)大時,兩極分化會加劇。當(dāng)?shù)谝皇中畔⒌臄?shù)量變大時,代理人可能持有相反的極端信念,導(dǎo)致嚴(yán)重的兩極分化。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)新聞聚合器可以抑制由新聞分享引起的兩極分化。我們的結(jié)果在沒有媒體偏見或假新聞的情況下成立,因此消除這些并不足以減少兩極分化。當(dāng)包含假新聞時,它可能導(dǎo)致兩極分化,但只有通過錯誤的選擇性分享。我們運(yùn)用我們的理論來闡明美國關(guān)于氣候變化的公眾輿論的兩極分化。
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Why do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?
為什么借款人拖欠抵押貸款?
Peter Ganong?and?Pascal Noel
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 1001–1065,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac040
There are three prevailing theories of mortgage default: strategic default (driven by negative equity), cash flow default (driven by negative life events), and double-trigger default (where both negative triggers are necessary). It has been difficult to compare these theories in part because negative life events are measured with error. We address this measurement error using a comparison group of borrowers with no strategic-default motive. Our central finding is that only 6% of underwater defaults are caused exclusively by negative equity, an order of magnitude lower than previously thought. We then analyze the remaining defaults. We find that 70% are driven?solely?by negative life events (i.e., cash flow defaults), while 24% are driven by the?interaction?between negative life events and negative equity (i.e., double-trigger defaults). Together, the results provide a full decomposition of the theories underlying borrower default and suggest that negative life events play a central role.
抵押貸款違約有三種流行的理論:戰(zhàn)略違約(由負(fù)資產(chǎn)驅(qū)動),現(xiàn)金流違約(由負(fù)面生活事件驅(qū)動)和雙重觸發(fā)違約(兩個負(fù)面觸發(fā)都是必要的)。很難對這些理論進(jìn)行比較,部分原因是負(fù)面生活事件的衡量存在誤差。我們使用一組沒有戰(zhàn)略違約動機(jī)的借款人來解決這一測量誤差。我們的主要發(fā)現(xiàn)是,只有6%的水下違約完全是由負(fù)資產(chǎn)引起的,比之前認(rèn)為的要低一個數(shù)量級。然后我們分析剩下的默認(rèn)值。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)70%是由負(fù)面生活事件(即現(xiàn)金流違約)驅(qū)動的,而24%是由負(fù)面生活事件和負(fù)資產(chǎn)之間的相互作用驅(qū)動的(即雙重觸發(fā)違約)??傊?,研究結(jié)果提供了借款人違約理論的全面分解,并表明負(fù)面生活事件起著核心作用。
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Globalization, Trade Imbalances, and Labor Market Adjustment?
全球化、貿(mào)易失衡與勞動力市場調(diào)整
Rafael Dix-Carneiro?and others
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 1109–1171,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac043
We argue that modeling trade imbalances is crucial for understanding transitional dynamics in response to globalization shocks. We build and estimate a general equilibrium, multicountry, multisector model of trade with two key ingredients: (i) endogenous trade imbalances arising from households’ consumption and saving decisions; (ii) labor market frictions across and within sectors. We use our model to perform several empirical exercises. We find that the “China shock” accounted for 28% of the decline in U.S. manufacturing between 2000 and 2014—1.65?times the magnitude predicted from a model imposing balanced trade. A concurrent rise in U.S. service employment led to a negligible aggregate unemployment response. We benchmark our model’s predictions for the gains from trade against the popular ACR sufficient-statistics approach. We find that our predictions for the long-run gains from trade and consumption dynamics significantly diverge.
我們認(rèn)為,建立貿(mào)易失衡模型對于理解應(yīng)對全球化沖擊的轉(zhuǎn)型動態(tài)至關(guān)重要。我們建立并估計了一個具有兩個關(guān)鍵要素的一般均衡、多國、多部門貿(mào)易模型:(i)由家庭消費(fèi)和儲蓄決策引起的內(nèi)生貿(mào)易失衡;(ii)部門之間和部門內(nèi)部的勞動力市場摩擦。我們使用我們的模型來執(zhí)行幾個實(shí)證練習(xí)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),2000年至2014年間,“中國沖擊”占美國制造業(yè)衰退的28%,是貿(mào)易平衡模型預(yù)測的幅度的65倍。與此同時,美國服務(wù)業(yè)就業(yè)的增加導(dǎo)致總體失業(yè)率的反應(yīng)微不足道。我們將模型對貿(mào)易收益的預(yù)測與流行的ACR充分統(tǒng)計方法進(jìn)行對比。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),我們對貿(mào)易和消費(fèi)動態(tài)帶來的長期收益的預(yù)測存在顯著分歧。
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The Fractured-Land Hypothesis
斷裂土地假說
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde?and others
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 1173–1231,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjad003
Patterns of state formation have crucial implications for comparative economic development. Diamond (1997) famously argued that “fractured land” was responsible for China’s tendency toward political unification and Europe’s protracted polycentrism. We build a dynamic model with granular geographical information in terms of topographical features and the location of productive agricultural land to quantitatively gauge the effects of fractured land on state formation in Eurasia. We find that topography alone is sufficient but not necessary to explain polycentrism in Europe and unification in China. Differences in land productivity, in particular the existence of a core region of high land productivity in northern China, deliver the same result. We discuss how our results map into observed historical outcomes, assess how robust our findings are, and analyze the differences between theory and data in Africa and the Americas.?
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Let the Worst One Fail: A Credible Solution to the Too-Big-To-Fail Conundrum
讓最壞的倒閉:一個解決“大而不倒”難題的可靠方案
Thomas Philippon?and?Olivier Wang
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 1233–1271,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac044
We study time-consistent bank resolution mechanisms. The key constraint is that governments cannot avoid bailouts that are ex post efficient. Contrary to common wisdom, we show that the government may still avoid moral hazard and implement the first-best allocation by using the distribution of bailouts across banks to provide incentives. We analyze properties of credible tournament mechanisms that provide support to the best-performing banks and resolve the worst-performing ones. We extend our mechanism and show that it continues to perform well when banks are imperfect substitutes, when they are differentially interconnected as long as bailout funds can be earmarked, and when their risk-taking is driven by overoptimism instead of moral hazard.
我們研究時間一致的銀行清算機(jī)制。關(guān)鍵的制約因素是,政府無法避免事后有效的紓困。與常識相反,我們表明,政府仍然可以通過在銀行間分配救助資金來提供激勵,從而避免道德風(fēng)險,實(shí)現(xiàn)最優(yōu)配置。我們分析了可信競賽機(jī)制的特性,這些機(jī)制為表現(xiàn)最好的銀行提供支持,并解決表現(xiàn)最差的銀行。我們擴(kuò)展了我們的機(jī)制,并表明,當(dāng)銀行是不完美的替代品時,當(dāng)銀行之間存在差異聯(lián)系時,只要救助資金可以指定,當(dāng)他們的冒險行為是由過度樂觀而不是道德風(fēng)險驅(qū)動時,它仍然表現(xiàn)良好。
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The Refugee’s Dilemma: Evidence from Jewish Migration out of Nazi Germany
難民的困境:來自納粹德國猶太移民的證據(jù)
Johannes Buggle?and others
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 1273–1345,?https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjad001
We estimate the push and pull factors involved in the outmigration of Jews facing persecution in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1941. Our empirical investigation makes use of a unique individual-level data set that records the migration history of the Jewish community in Germany over the period. Our analysis highlights new channels, specific to violent contexts, through which social networks affect the decision to flee. We estimate a structural model of migration where individuals base their migration decision on the observation of persecution and migration among their peers. Identification rests on exogenous variations in local push and pull factors across peers who live in different cities of residence. Then we perform various experiments of counterfactual history to quantify how migration restrictions in destination countries affected the fate of Jews. For example, removing work restrictions for refugees in the recipient countries after the Nuremberg Laws (1935) would have led to an increase in Jewish migration out of Germany in the range of 12% to 20% and a reduction in mortality due to prevented deportations in the range of 6% to 10%.
我們估計了1933年至1941年在納粹德國面臨迫害的猶太人的外遷所涉及的推動和拉動因素。我們的實(shí)證調(diào)查利用了一個獨(dú)特的個人層面的數(shù)據(jù)集,記錄了這一時期德國猶太社區(qū)的移民歷史。我們的分析強(qiáng)調(diào)了新的渠道,特別是在暴力環(huán)境下,社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)通過這些渠道影響人們逃離的決定。我們估計了一個遷移的結(jié)構(gòu)模型,在這個模型中,個人的遷移決定是基于對同伴之間迫害和遷移的觀察。識別依賴于居住在不同城市的同齡人之間當(dāng)?shù)赝评蛩氐耐馍兓?。然后,我們進(jìn)行了各種反事實(shí)歷史實(shí)驗(yàn),以量化目的國的移民限制如何影響?yīng)q太人的命運(yùn)。例如,在紐倫堡法案(1935年)之后,在接收國取消對難民的工作限制將導(dǎo)致離開德國的猶太移民增加12%至20%,由于防止驅(qū)逐而導(dǎo)致的死亡率降低6%至10%。