? ? ? ? 本篇文章由我翻譯，全文共63頁，本篇為節(jié)選的第四部分約8.5頁內(nèi)容，原文為英文并附于末尾，全文已翻譯完畢。紅色標(biāo)注為原文附帶的注釋，藍(lán)色標(biāo)注為我添加的補(bǔ)充和注釋。文章中引用部分若已有漢譯本，則一概使用漢譯本的翻譯，并補(bǔ)充標(biāo)注漢譯本的引用文獻(xiàn)。由于專欄編輯器中不能設(shè)置斜體，我用加粗來代替斜體。 為了方便，我會(huì)在正文中加入頁碼，表示方法如【288】。

上一章

????????五、逃離與新的開始

????????馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》里對(duì)資本進(jìn)行了注定失敗的“辯證推導(dǎo)”的嘗試之后最終領(lǐng)悟到，只有克服采取類似研究方法的吸引力，并在信念開始動(dòng)搖時(shí)從危險(xiǎn)的懸崖邊退卻，才能在研究中取得真正的進(jìn)步。這場戲劇中許多不尋常的情節(jié)。例如，馬克思在一段文本中使用了一個(gè)典型的黑格爾主義習(xí)語，他說，資本—價(jià)值在生產(chǎn)過程中的各種存在形式，首先是作為生產(chǎn)的條件，最后則是作為產(chǎn)品，是“純粹的假象”(reiner Schein)，價(jià)值本身在這一過程中維持其“始終不變的本質(zhì)”。根據(jù)這一觀察，馬克思得出結(jié)論，“被看作價(jià)值的產(chǎn)品并不是產(chǎn)品，而是始終如一的、不變的價(jià)值”。(Marx, 1993, 312-3/MEW, Vol. 42, 233)(24)這反過來迫使他（在這里，對(duì)價(jià)值質(zhì)與量的混淆再一次產(chǎn)生了關(guān)鍵性的倒錯(cuò)結(jié)果）事實(shí)上地排除了生產(chǎn)剩余價(jià)值的可能性！馬克思一直堅(jiān)持著這一觀點(diǎn)，甚至花費(fèi)了幾頁來提供數(shù)值例作為支撐，然后才意識(shí)到，如果這一觀點(diǎn)是正確的話，那么從負(fù)責(zé)進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)性投資行為——實(shí)際上是資本主義生產(chǎn)過程本身——的資本家或企業(yè)的角度來看，這一行為將是“無目的的”[16]?！昂冒伞?，他沉思道。

????????幸好，馬克思明智地決定放下這團(tuán)亂麻。在接下來的幾頁里，在一系列關(guān)于各種主題的括號(hào)之后，馬克思重新開始分析，從一般的經(jīng)濟(jì)事實(shí)——剩余價(jià)值的實(shí)現(xiàn)出發(fā)，而這一點(diǎn)在馬克思的黑格爾主義論證中遭到了忽視：

????????資本在生產(chǎn)過程結(jié)束時(shí)具有的剩余價(jià)值，——這種剩余價(jià)值作為產(chǎn)品的更高的價(jià)格，只有在流通中才得到實(shí)現(xiàn)，但是，它同一切價(jià)格一樣，它們在流通中得到實(shí)現(xiàn)，是由于它們在進(jìn)入流通以前，已經(jīng)在觀念上成為流通的前提……——按照交換價(jià)值的一般概念來說，表示對(duì)象化在產(chǎn)品中的勞動(dòng)時(shí)間或者說勞動(dòng)量……大于資本原有各組成部分所包含的勞動(dòng)量。而這種情況只有當(dāng)對(duì)象化在勞動(dòng)價(jià)格中的勞動(dòng)小于用這種對(duì)象化勞動(dòng)所購買的活勞動(dòng)時(shí)間時(shí)才是可能的。(Marx, 1973, 321/MEW, Vol, 42, 240)(25)

????????馬克思不再試圖從貨幣“概念”和/或更遙遠(yuǎn)的價(jià)值本身的“概念”中“推導(dǎo)出”資本流通中的剩余價(jià)值。相反，他將利潤，即投資的正收益，視為一種特定的經(jīng)濟(jì)形式，并接著提問，它的可能性條件是什么。他認(rèn)識(shí)到，如果“勞動(dòng)”的報(bào)酬，即雇傭勞動(dòng)者的報(bào)酬，等于勞動(dòng)在生產(chǎn)過程中“創(chuàng)造”的價(jià)值量的話，那么作為典型的資本主義收入形式的利潤實(shí)際上就不可能存在；因?yàn)樵谶@種情況下，工人會(huì)擁有生產(chǎn)過程中創(chuàng)造的全部“新”價(jià)值（即產(chǎn)品價(jià)值超過生產(chǎn)過程中所使用的生產(chǎn)資料的價(jià)值的部分）的貨幣等價(jià)物，就像他們在簡單商品生產(chǎn)的條件下那樣。因此，實(shí)際上就不會(huì)有任何“剩余價(jià)值”留給投資者。在認(rèn)識(shí)到這一點(diǎn)之后——在馬克思的完成作中，他用“勞動(dòng)力價(jià)值”與勞動(dòng)力在使用中所創(chuàng)造出來的價(jià)值之間的差額這一更準(zhǔn)確的術(shù)語來表述這一點(diǎn)——馬克思取得了通往經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué)的關(guān)鍵，他不在執(zhí)著于早期對(duì)資本家收入的神秘化“推導(dǎo)”，而是轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)@一收入形式進(jìn)行科學(xué)解釋。

????????這一解釋的細(xì)節(jié)及其遵循的邏輯規(guī)范將是另一篇論文的主題。然而，學(xué)過哲學(xué)史的學(xué)生們可能已經(jīng)注意到了，我在前面使用“可能性條件”這一表述時(shí)間接指向了康德。最后，我將提供一些必然只是示意性的觀察，以表明在這一背景下提及康德是合適的。

?????????

????????六、先驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)：康德的建議

????????《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》可以被解讀為一部馬克思努力打破他對(duì)黑格爾主義論證依賴的戲劇，同時(shí)馬克思具有理論獨(dú)立性的成熟產(chǎn)物則是《資本論》。盡管在《資本論》中，尤其是如列寧著名的格言所表明的，在它的第一章中，存在著大量典型的黑格爾主義公式，甚至可以稱為某種典型的黑格爾主義語法。如馬克思他自己所說，他“賣弄起”黑格爾“特有的表達(dá)方式”的合理理由已在前文中闡明。但是，與《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》截然不同的是，在《資本論》中馬克思不再“賣弄”那些黑格爾主義論證風(fēng)格。確實(shí)有證據(jù)表明馬克思有時(shí)會(huì)倒退回黑格爾主義：當(dāng)馬克思難以提供合理解釋時(shí)，通常是在馬克思研究主要問題時(shí)所附帶的一些問題時(shí)，他才會(huì)運(yùn)用黑格爾主義方法以快速且暫時(shí)性地繞開它。但《資本論》中顯然不存在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中特有的黑格爾主義方法的“概念辯證法”的系統(tǒng)性實(shí)驗(yàn)。

????????事實(shí)上，如果說《資本論》中的分析方法類似于哲學(xué)史上的某部著作的話，與其說類似于黑格爾的《邏輯學(xué)》，不如說是更像黑格爾的《邏輯學(xué)》所回應(yīng)的另一部著作：即康德的《純粹理性批判》。我建議，馬克思應(yīng)當(dāng)被看作經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué)領(lǐng)域的康德：《資本論》，或至少《資本論》的第一卷，對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的意義就像康德的第一“批判”對(duì)于物理學(xué)的意義一樣。盡管一代又一代的馬克思主義者已經(jīng)習(xí)慣于否定這樣的建議并對(duì)其抱有敵意，但我依然認(rèn)為這是一種高度贊揚(yáng)。在這里，我只能簡要地嘗試將這一建議合理化。順便說一句，我并沒有認(rèn)為馬克思曾經(jīng)以某種途徑受到過第一“批判”的影響。實(shí)際上，幾乎可以肯定的是，馬克思從未讀過后者。

????????我指的是，馬克思的論證最好理解為康德意義上的“先驗(yàn)”論證。因此，正如康德的第一“批判”中所謂“先驗(yàn)分析”的邏輯起點(diǎn)是感性經(jīng)驗(yàn)的給定性一樣[17]，《資本論》中馬克思對(duì)價(jià)值分析的起點(diǎn)既不是對(duì)人的行為的隨意規(guī)定（就像新古典經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)所做的那樣），也不是“概念”或范疇“規(guī)定”（就像黑格爾主義的“哲學(xué)科學(xué)”那樣），而是經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)象的純粹給定性，或更準(zhǔn)確地講，就是商品流通領(lǐng)域中所特有的那些經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)象。很明顯，馬克思拒絕將他的方法歸為一種黑格爾主義方法，他自己在1879-80年的《評(píng)阿?瓦格納的〈政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教科書〉》中所強(qiáng)調(diào)的這一點(diǎn)可能就是他在《資本論》中最重要的方法論反思：“……我不是從‘概念’出發(fā)，因而也不是從‘價(jià)值概念’出發(fā)，所以沒有任何必要把它‘分割開來’。我的出發(fā)點(diǎn)是勞動(dòng)產(chǎn)品在現(xiàn)代社會(huì)所表現(xiàn)的最簡單的社會(huì)形式，這就是‘商品’?！?(Marx, 1975, 198/MEW, Vol. 19, 368-9)(26)。在《資本論》中，馬克思在引入他對(duì)所謂“價(jià)值形式”的分析并在對(duì)價(jià)值的所謂“實(shí)體”進(jìn)行了簡潔明了的論證后寫道：“我們實(shí)際上也是從商品的交換價(jià)值或交換關(guān)系出發(fā)，才探索到隱藏在其中的商品價(jià)值?，F(xiàn)在我們必須回到價(jià)值的這種表現(xiàn)形式?！?(Marx, 1976, 139/MEW, Vol. 23, 62)(27)現(xiàn)在，擺在眼前的商品流通的最基本現(xiàn)象，即與作為“使用價(jià)值”的商品的特殊物質(zhì)存在形式相對(duì)的作為“交換價(jià)值”的商品的一般經(jīng)濟(jì)“表現(xiàn)形式”，就是價(jià)格。

????????必須指出的一點(diǎn)是，馬克思通過優(yōu)先考慮（在論證價(jià)值的“實(shí)體”和審視它的“形式”時(shí)）所謂的“基本”價(jià)值關(guān)系，即兩種特殊種類商品的交換比例，掩蓋了價(jià)值代表其所分析的現(xiàn)象領(lǐng)域這一事實(shí)。在這樣一種商品交換體系中，交換比例通常是不可觀察到的（因?yàn)闊o論如何，商品之間不直接發(fā)生交換是這樣一種體系的典型特征），但總是可以從商品的價(jià)格中推斷出來，后者實(shí)際上就是經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的“原始資料”。盡管如此，隨著馬克思分析的發(fā)展，任何特定種類商品的價(jià)值形式無非就是其價(jià)格這一點(diǎn)表現(xiàn)得越來越明顯，即商品的價(jià)值體現(xiàn)在一定量的貨幣中[18]。就這一現(xiàn)象領(lǐng)域，我想指出，馬克思在《資本論》第一章中研究的實(shí)際上同樣也是“可能性條件”：我們可以繼康德之后將之稱為“一般經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的可能性條件”。然而，這里需要強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，這些經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的可能性條件同時(shí)也是那些產(chǎn)生經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)中特定對(duì)象的社會(huì)實(shí)踐的可能性條件。這一實(shí)踐就是商品交換自身。

????????經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的第一個(gè)可能性條件是，有一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的中介，使商品的相對(duì)價(jià)值可以在其中得到表達(dá)并實(shí)際上存在于其中。商品的價(jià)值與其作為“使用價(jià)值”的特定物理化身之間的現(xiàn)實(shí)可分離性是其可交換性的必要條件；只要商品的可交換性這一現(xiàn)實(shí)條件得到滿足，那么商品價(jià)格表達(dá)的認(rèn)識(shí)論條件也就同樣得到滿足。履行這兩種職能的實(shí)在的“價(jià)值形式”，即商品作為交換價(jià)值所實(shí)有的“普遍性”，正如我們看到的那樣，就是貨幣。若沒有貨幣，那么價(jià)格既不能確定也不能被支付，所有更具體的價(jià)值現(xiàn)象（工資、利潤、利息、租金等等）也同樣缺乏其存在的唯一中介。因此，用馬克思的話來說，貨幣就是一般經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)中“可感覺而又超感覺”的“物”，馬克思所謂的“價(jià)值理論”的首要任務(wù)就是論證其必要性（即對(duì)交換體系運(yùn)作的必要性和對(duì)市場現(xiàn)象的“感覺”的必要性）并闡明其性質(zhì)。單就“經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)”而言，這一任務(wù)可以被粗糙地看作與康德的所謂“超驗(yàn)感性論”所實(shí)現(xiàn)的任務(wù)相類似的東西，即就感性經(jīng)驗(yàn)來將空間和時(shí)間解讀為直覺的先驗(yàn)形式——盡管這種類比確實(shí)很粗糙，并且在我們能夠正確認(rèn)識(shí)其理論意義之前，還需要進(jìn)行更多的分析。此外，如果沒有“價(jià)值形式”，那么即使是對(duì)價(jià)值現(xiàn)象的孤立的和/或雜亂的感覺也是不可能存在的，因此，在對(duì)所謂價(jià)值“實(shí)體”進(jìn)行任何討論之前，對(duì)“價(jià)值形式”的闡述都應(yīng)當(dāng)以嚴(yán)格先驗(yàn)的方式用康德的方法按照論證的順序呈現(xiàn)。我懷疑，正是由于馬克思對(duì)其價(jià)值分析的敘述并非如此，才導(dǎo)致了對(duì)其價(jià)值分析的傳統(tǒng)誤解，即其僅僅只是一個(gè)價(jià)格決定理論，一個(gè)以解釋價(jià)格量為目的的理論。

????????馬克思的理論不僅僅是一個(gè)價(jià)格決定理論。但作為一個(gè)關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)客觀性的理論，價(jià)格決定理論也是必要的。正如感性產(chǎn)生了直覺這一點(diǎn)不足以得到感性經(jīng)驗(yàn)，相反，這些直覺還必須通過規(guī)律結(jié)合在一起，成為一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的整體，因此同樣的，貨幣提供了價(jià)值現(xiàn)象存在的中介這一點(diǎn)也不足以得到經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，而這些現(xiàn)象——最基本的就是價(jià)格——必須表現(xiàn)出某種系統(tǒng)性的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系與規(guī)律性。事實(shí)上，既然價(jià)格屬于某種商品而且只屬于特殊商品，因?yàn)樗鼈兪沁@些種類的樣本，因此嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)卣f，對(duì)商品價(jià)格的孤立“感覺”也是以它們的規(guī)律性為前提。從這個(gè)意義上來說，對(duì)“價(jià)值形式”的考察必然會(huì)引出一種馬克思在某種程度上將之不恰當(dāng)?shù)胤Q為價(jià)值“實(shí)體”的思考：或者用不那么形而上學(xué)的術(shù)語來說，對(duì)商品的相對(duì)價(jià)值是如何具有可公度性（Franz Petry將這一問題稱為價(jià)值“質(zhì)”問題）的研究，必然會(huì)引出是什么調(diào)節(jié)了相對(duì)價(jià)值的問題（Petry將這一問題稱為價(jià)值“量”問題）(Petry, 1916)或者再換一種說法：對(duì)“外在”的價(jià)值尺度即貨幣的闡述，要求我們尋找一個(gè)在前者中得到表達(dá)的“內(nèi)在”的價(jià)值尺度，即價(jià)格量的調(diào)節(jié)原理。（參見Rosenthal, 1998, ch.14, sec. 14.2）

????????價(jià)格體系的一致性及其變化的規(guī)律性不僅是經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)可能性的認(rèn)識(shí)論條件，也同時(shí)是交換體系穩(wěn)定性的現(xiàn)實(shí)條件。因果律將感性材料結(jié)合為一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的整體，所謂的“價(jià)值規(guī)律”則在價(jià)格方面執(zhí)行相同的職能。簡而言之，這一“價(jià)值規(guī)律”指的是商品應(yīng)當(dāng)按照與為生產(chǎn)其所需的“社會(huì)勞動(dòng)”相等的比例交換：或正如其實(shí)際上所表達(dá)的那樣，通常情況下作為商品可交換性指標(biāo)的價(jià)格，從長期來看，應(yīng)當(dāng)由生產(chǎn)這一商品所需的社會(huì)必要?jiǎng)趧?dòng)時(shí)間來調(diào)節(jié)。[19]我在這里提出的是，這條規(guī)律可以以類似于康德對(duì)因果律進(jìn)行先驗(yàn)論證的方式進(jìn)行先驗(yàn)論證，因?yàn)槿绻贿\(yùn)用這種先驗(yàn)論證，價(jià)格體系就會(huì)變得不連貫，交換體系就會(huì)崩潰。我不打算在這里重復(fù)這樣的論證。但馬克思主義“價(jià)值理論”——即在當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)辯論中這一術(shù)語所通常具有的含義——的堅(jiān)定支持者們應(yīng)當(dāng)認(rèn)真對(duì)待對(duì)其進(jìn)行先驗(yàn)論證的可能性。正如康德所指出的，只有那些能夠被證明是先驗(yàn)成立的主張，才能夠被無一例外地認(rèn)為是必然成立的。試圖在經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上捍衛(wèi)馬克思的理論，無論其所提供的證據(jù)多么令人信服，都不可避免地將“價(jià)值規(guī)律”的地位貶低為一個(gè)具有或多或少合理性的預(yù)設(shè)?，F(xiàn)在，與前文一樣，當(dāng)馬克思在《資本論》第一卷中面對(duì)資本時(shí)，他再一次的從一開始就將其視為一種給定的經(jīng)濟(jì)形式，即商品流通領(lǐng)域中的另一種現(xiàn)象。換句話說，馬克思從資本在流通領(lǐng)域中的“表現(xiàn)形式”開始了他的分析，也可以說，從它的直觀可感覺方面開始。資本的這一直觀可感覺方面就是投資后的正貨幣收益，若資本主義的生產(chǎn)條件實(shí)際上已經(jīng)存在，且沒有受到任何異常的干擾的話，那它就在那里。它不必須是“推導(dǎo)”而來的，就像黑格爾主義闡述中的資本“概念”那樣。因此，與馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中闡述的從貨幣到資本的曲折“辯證過渡”形成鮮明對(duì)比的是，他現(xiàn)在僅僅用一個(gè)簡單的觀察來引入對(duì)資本的討論，“商品流通的直接形式，”他寫道，

????????“是W—G—W，商品轉(zhuǎn)化為貨幣，貨幣再轉(zhuǎn)化為商品，為買而賣。但除這一形式外，我們還看到具有不同特點(diǎn)的另一形式G—W—G，貨幣轉(zhuǎn)化為商品，商品再轉(zhuǎn)化為貨幣，為賣而買。在運(yùn)動(dòng)中通過這后一種流通的貨幣轉(zhuǎn)化為資本，成為資本，而且按它的使命來說，已經(jīng)是資本。” (Marx, 1976, 247-8/MEW, Vol. 23, 162,) (28)

????????馬克思進(jìn)一步指出，為了使第二種流通形式具有合理的內(nèi)容，并使與之相關(guān)的社會(huì)活動(dòng)具有合理的意義，其終點(diǎn)所代表的貨幣數(shù)量必須大于其起點(diǎn)所代表的貨幣數(shù)量。否則，由于貨幣本質(zhì)上是同質(zhì)的，作為資本的貨幣的流通將是“毫無意義的”。因此，這一流通必須更準(zhǔn)確地用G-W-G’來表示[20]。簡而言之，資本的現(xiàn)象形式就是利潤，與前文引用過的馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中的試探性說明相反，利潤并不是一個(gè)價(jià)格，而是兩組價(jià)格之和的差額：首先是由給定的經(jīng)濟(jì)主體，無論是個(gè)人還是合伙公司所花費(fèi)的“成本價(jià)格”，接著是由其收取的“銷售價(jià)格”。

????????值得一提的是，在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中，馬克思曾試圖從價(jià)值“概念”或更準(zhǔn)確地說是利潤以貨幣形式實(shí)現(xiàn)的“普遍性”與任何給定數(shù)額的貨幣所具有的“有限特殊性”之間所謂的矛盾推導(dǎo)出利潤的“必然性”。資本，作為一種充滿“動(dòng)力”以克服其數(shù)量限制的價(jià)值，被誤認(rèn)為是對(duì)這一矛盾的“揚(yáng)棄”。馬克思并沒有在《資本論》嘗試進(jìn)行任何類似的“推導(dǎo)”，而是注意到了“價(jià)值規(guī)律”與利潤之間表面上的不一致——利潤不是“必然的”，它僅僅只是在經(jīng)驗(yàn)上可被觀察的——正是這一點(diǎn)引起了馬克思對(duì)這一不一致的具體的可能性條件的研究。這正是馬克思在所謂“資本總公式的矛盾”中討論的關(guān)鍵所在，只有“辯證法”水平非常高超的學(xué)者才會(huì)沒能察覺到這一點(diǎn)。

????????如果商品應(yīng)當(dāng)以與相等價(jià)值相對(duì)應(yīng)的特定比例進(jìn)行交換，且這就是支配其流通的“直接形式”(W-G-W)的“規(guī)律”，那么在一定量的貨幣而非商品構(gòu)成其兩極的相反形式的流通(G-W-G)中，如何系統(tǒng)性地出現(xiàn)“剩余價(jià)值”？如前所述，既然“價(jià)值規(guī)律”是交換體系本身穩(wěn)定性的必要條件，那么在使所有價(jià)值現(xiàn)象不至于消失的情況下，就這一規(guī)律就必須發(fā)揮作用。馬克思將分析的重點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到了資本主義生產(chǎn)過程上，更準(zhǔn)確地說，轉(zhuǎn)移到了由資本/雇傭勞動(dòng)的合同所確定的特定的法律條件上，而資本主義生產(chǎn)過程就發(fā)生在這些條件下。馬克思的成就正是在“價(jià)值規(guī)律”持續(xù)發(fā)揮作用的基礎(chǔ)上揭示了那些使盈利成為可能的條件。

?

哲學(xué)系

科羅拉多大學(xué)

14 East Cache La Poudre Street

Colorado Springs, Co 80903

jrosenthal@cc.colorado.edu

注釋：

????????[16] Marx, 1973, 316/MEW, Vol. 42, 236.（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第276頁） 在這之后，馬克思也意識(shí)到，由于資本家必須用通過銷售商品所取得的收益來滿足他們自己的消費(fèi)需求，因此僅僅是以后者的形式進(jìn)行的生產(chǎn)要素價(jià)值的再生產(chǎn)就會(huì)導(dǎo)致總投資的不斷減少——直到初始資本的價(jià)值完全消失。

????????[17] 這確實(shí)是康德分析的起點(diǎn)，并在一定程度上被康德在純粹理性范疇的“先驗(yàn)”推導(dǎo)之前插入的所謂“形而上學(xué)”推導(dǎo)所掩蓋，見Rosenthal, 1993.

????????[18] 這一點(diǎn)在初版《資本論》(1867)第一卷第一章中得到了更明確的闡述。馬克思寫道：“價(jià)格已經(jīng)確定的商品具有雙重形式……它的現(xiàn)實(shí)形態(tài)是一種使用物品的形態(tài)……它的作為一定量同種人類勞動(dòng)的化身的表現(xiàn)形式，就是它的價(jià)格，就是一定量的金?！?(MEGA, Zweite Abteilung, Band 5, 60)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第78頁）（馬克思在這里假定黃金就是貨幣商品）

????????[19] 在馬克思1858年4月2日寫給恩格斯的一封信中，他簡要介紹了目前為止的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究。有趣的是，他在這里將價(jià)值規(guī)律與價(jià)值形式的思考直接聯(lián)系在了一起，正如我們所看到的那樣，這種聯(lián)系在《資本論》中的敘述略有模糊。因此，馬克思寫道：“轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樨泿诺纳唐穬r(jià)值，就是商品的價(jià)格，這種價(jià)格暫時(shí)只是在同價(jià)值這種純粹形式上的區(qū)別中表現(xiàn)出來。根據(jù)一般的價(jià)值規(guī)律，一定數(shù)量的貨幣只表現(xiàn)一定數(shù)量的對(duì)象化勞動(dòng)?！?(見MEW, Vol 29, 31) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第50卷第363頁）

????????[20] 實(shí)際上，馬克思在這方面的論述仍不準(zhǔn)確。G-W-G這一流通僅僅表明凈收入得到了保證，而資本主義利潤只是凈收入的一種特定形式。見上文注釋[15]。然而，對(duì)于我們的目的來說，更重要的是，馬克思是從利潤現(xiàn)象開始——即使他未能充分描述這一現(xiàn)象——以便研究它的可能性條件。

譯者注：

????????(24) 《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第272頁。

????????(25) 《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第281頁。

????????(26) 《馬克思恩格斯全集》第一版第19卷第412頁。

????????(27) 《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第61頁。

????????(28) 《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第172頁。

參考文獻(xiàn)

????????Arthur, Christopher J. 1991. Review Article. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britaim 23/24, 79-90.

????????--------. 1993. "Hegel’s Logic and Marx’s Capital." In Fred Moseley, ed., Marx’s Method in Capital: A Re-examination. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press.

????????Backhaus, Hans-Georg. 1997. Dialektik der Wertform. Freiburg: ?a ira Verlag.

????????Banaji, Jairus. 1979. "From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel's Dialectic in Marx's Capital. "In Diane Elson, ed., Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism. London: CSE Books.

????????Brentel, Helmut. 1989. Soziale Form und ?konomisches Objekt: Studien zum Gegenstandsund Methodenverst?ndnis der Kritik der politischen ?konomie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

????????Eldred, M. and M. Hanion. 1981. "Reconstructing Value-Form Analysis." Capital and Class, 13 (Spring), 24-60.

????????Hegel, G. W. F. 1969. The Science of Logic. Trans. A. V. Miller. London: Allen & Unwin.

????????--------. 1970. Enzyklop?die der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Erster Teil. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

????????Marx, Karl. 1970. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. New York: International.

????????--------. 1973. Grundrisse. Middlesex: Penguin.

????????--------. 1975. Texts on Method, ed. Terrel Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

????????--------. 1976. Capital, Vol. I. Middlesex: Penguin.

????????Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe. 1972-. Berlin: Die tz Verlag.

????????Marx-Engels Werke. 1956-. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

????????Petry, Franz. 1916. Der soziale Gehalt derMarxschen Werttheorie. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.

????????Rosenthal, John. 1991. "Freedom's Devices: The Place of the Individual in Hegel's Philosophy of Right." Radical Philosophy, 59, 27-32.

????????--------. 1993. "A Transcendental Deduction of the Categories without the Categories." International Philosophical Quarterly, XXXIII: 4, 449-64.

????????--------. 1998. The Myth of Dialectics: Re-interpreting the Marx-Hegel Relation. New York: St. Martins.

?????????Schweickart, David. 1988. "Reflections on Anti-Marxism: Elster on Marx's Functionalism and Labor Theory of Value." Praxis International, 8:1, 109-22.

????????Shamsavari, Ali. 1991 . Dialectics and Sodai Theory: The Logic o/Capital. London: Merlin.

????????Smith, Tony. 1990. The Logic of Marx's Capital. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

????????Escape and New Beginning

????????It is indeed precisely this last insight that Marx struggles to acquire in the pages of the Grundrisse following his ill-fated attempt at a "dialectical derivation" of capital, and he is only able to prevail in this struggle precisely by resisting the temptation to embark on similar adventures and pulling back from the brink on those occasions when his resolve temporarily falters. This drama includes many curious episodes. For example, there is the passage in which Marx comments in a distinctly Hegelian idiom that the diverse forms in which capital-value exists through the production process, first as conditions of production and finally as product, are "pure semblance" (reiner Schein) and that it is value itself that remains throughout this process the "self-identical essence." From this observation, Marx is then led to conclude that "the product, considered as value, is in this respect not product, but rather value which has remained identical and unchanged" (Marx, 1993, 312-3/MEW, Vol. 42, 233). This compels him in turn (and here again the confusion of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of value plays a crucial paralogical role) actually to exclude the possibility of surplus-value being generated! Marx insists upon the point, even offering numerical examples in its support, for several pages of text, before realizing that if it were correct the act of productive investment and indeed the capitalist production process itself, considered from the point of view of the capitalist or firm as the juridical subject which undertakes it, would be "purposeless". [16] "Well," he muses.

????????Thankfully, Marx shows the wisdom simply to abandon this tangled thread. Some few pages further on, following a series of parentheses on various topics, he begins his analysis anew, setting out from just that mundane economic datum, the realization of surplus-value, of which he had temporarily lost sight during his bout of Hegeloid high-flying:

????????The surplus value which capital has at the end of the production process - a surplus value which, as a higher price of the product, is realized only in circulation, but like all prices, is realized in it by already being ideally presupposed to it ... - signifies, expressed in accord with the general concept of exchange value, that the labour time objectified in the product ... is greater than that which was present in the original components of capital. This in turn is possible only if the labour objectified in the price of labour is smaller than the living labour time purchased with it. (Marx, 1973, 321/MEW, Vol, 42, 240).

????????Marx does not attempt any more to "derive" the appearance of surplus-value in the circuit of capital from the "concept" of money and/or, more remotely, from the "concept" of value itself. Rather he takes profit, viz. a positive return upon investment, as a given economic form and then asks after its conditions of possibility. He recognizes that if the remuneration of "labor," viz. of wage-laborers, were deter mined by the amount of value which labor "creates" in the production process, then profit as a distinctly capitalist form of revenue would not in fact be possible at all; since under this condition, workers would lay claim to a monetary equivalent for the entirety of the "new" value created in the production process (i.e., the excess of the value of the product over the value of the means of production employed in producing it) , exactly as they would under conditions of simple-commodity production. Hence there would not in fact be any "surplus-value" left over for the investor. With this recognition - which in his finished presentation gets formulated more precisely in terms of the difference between the "value of labor-power" and the value which labor-power creates in use - Marx has acquired the key to what will become, in contrast to his earlier mystical "derivation" of capitalist revenue, his scientific explanation of the same.

????????The details of this explanation and the logical norms it obeys, is the subject for another paper. Students of the history of philosophy will, however, have noticed an allusion to in my use of the expression "conditions of possibility" in the previous paragraph. In closing, I would like to offer just a few, necessarily schematic, observations suggesting the aptness of the allusion to Kant in this context.

?????????

????????A Priori Economics: A Kantian Proposal

????????Whereas the Grundrisse can be read as the drama of Marx's struggle to break his dependency on Hegelian argumentation, the mature product of his theoretical autonomy is Capital This is so notwithstanding the abundant presence in Capital, and especially indeed, as Lenin's famous aphorism suggests, in its first chapter, of characteristically Hegelian formulae and even what might be called a certain characteristically Hegelian syntax. The rational grounds for this, as Marx himself put it, "coquetting" with Hegel's "peculiar mode of expression" have been clarified above. But, in marked contrast to the Grundrisse, Marx does not anymore in Capital "coquet" with Hegelian styles of argumentation. There is evidence of the occasional Hegeloid relapse: a grabbing for the quick Hegelian fix when rational explanation fails and typically as regards matters that are incidental to the main lines of Marx's inquiry. But the methodical experimentation in "conceptual dialectics" on the Hegelian pattern, which is so characteristic of the Grundrisse, is notably absent from Capital.

????????In fact, if the analytical procedure displayed in Capital resembles that of any text in the history of philosophy, it is not so much Hegel's Logic as the text to which Hegel's Logic is essentially a rejoinder: viz. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. I would suggest that Marx should be regarded as the Kant of economic science: that Capital, or at least Volume 1 of Capital, is to economics what Kant's first Critique is to physics. Though generations of Marxists will have been conditioned to respond with horror to such a suggestion, I regard it as a very great compliment. Here I can do no more than to try briefly to make this suggestion plausible. I do not, by the way, mean to be implying that Marx was in any way influenced by the first Critique. Indeed, he almost certainly never read the latter.

????????I do mean to be implying, however, that Marx's arguments are best understood as "transcendental" arguments in the Kantian sense. Thus, just as the logical starting point of Kant's so-called "transcendental analytic" in the first Critique is the givenness of sensible experience, [17]so the starting point for Marx's value analysis in Capital is neither arbitrary stipulates concerning human behavior (per the conventions of neoclassical economics), nor "concepts" or conceptual "determinations" (per those of Hegelian "philosophical science"), but rather the sheer givenness of economic phenomena or, more exactly, such economic phenomena as are proper to the sphere of commodity circulation. Clearly rejecting the attribution to him of a Hegelian procedure, Marx himself emphasizes this point in what is likely his most important ex post methodological reflection upon Capital, his 1879-80 "Marginal Notes on Adolph Wagner." "... I do not start out from 'concepts,'" Marx writes, "hence I do not start out from 'the concept of value,' and I do not have 'to divide' these in anyway. What I start out from is the simplest social form in which the labour-product is presented in contemporary society, and this is the commodity" (Marx, 1975, 198/MEW, Vol. 19, 368-9). In Capital itself, introducing his analysis of the so-called "value-form" and after having already provided a notably laconic demonstration of the so-called "substance" of value, Marx writes: "We in fact started out from exchange-value or the exchange-relation of commodities, in order then to arrive at the value hidden in it. We have now to return to this form of appearance of value (Marx, 1976, 139/MEW, Vol. 23, 62). Now, the most fundamental phenomena of commodity circulation, the general economic "form of appearance" of commodities as "exchange-values" in contrast to their particular material forms of existence as "use-values," are prices.

????????It must be said that Marx's presentation, by giving priority (both in the demonstration of the "substance" of value and the examination of its "form") to the so-called "elementary" value-relation, viz. the exchange-ratio obtaining between two particular sorts of commodity, obscures the fact that prices represent the phenomenal domain of his analysis. Exchange-ratios are not typically observable as such in a system of commodity exchange (since it is in any case a defining feature of such a system that goods do not exchange directly), but are always deducible from commodity-prices, which latter are, in effect, the "raw data" of economic experience. Nonetheless, as Marx's analysis progresses it becomes increasingly evident that the "value-form" of any particular sort of commodity is nothing other than its price, viz. its value as embodied in so many units of money. [18] With regard to this phenomenal domain, I want to suggest that what Marx investigates in chapter 1 of Capital is, in effect, the "conditions of possibility" of the same: what we could call, following Kant, the "conditions of possibility of economic experience in general." It needs to be stressed, however, that these conditions of possibility of economic experience are at once conditions of possibility of the social practice which gives rise to the specific object of economic experience. This practice is, namely, commodity-exchange itself.

????????A first such condition of possibility of economic experience is that there be a uniform medium in which the relative values of commodities can gain expression and indeed existence. The real separability of the value of commodities from their particular physical incarnations as "use-values" is a necessary condition for their exchangeability; inasmuch as this practical condition for the exchangeability of commodities is fulfilled, so too is the epistemological condition for the expression of commodity-prices likewise fulfilled. The real "form of value" which discharges both functions, the existent "universality" of commodities as exchange-values, is, namely and as we have seen, money. Apart from money, prices could be neither determined nor paid and all more specific value-phenomena (wages, profit, interest, rent, etc.) would likewise lack the very medium of their existence. Money is, then, to paraphrase Marx, the "sensate-suprasensate" "matter" of economic experience in general and it is the primary task of Marx's so-called "value theory" to demonstrate its necessity (viz. both for the functioning of an exchange system and for the "perception" of market phenomena) and to clarify its nature. This task could be regarded as roughly analogous as concerns "economic experience" to that fulfilled by Kant's so-called "transcendental aesthetic," viz. the interpretation of space and time as a priori forms of intuition, with regard to sensible experience - though the analogy is indeed rough and much more would have to be said before we could properly assess its theoretical significance. Since, furthermore, even isolated and/or disorderly perceptions of value phenomena would be impossible were there not a "value-form," the clarification of this "value-form" ought in a strictly transcendental presentation on the Kantian pattern to precede any discussion of the so-called "substance" of value in the order of demonstration. That this is not the case in Marx's presentation of his value analysis, has, I suspect, contributed to the conventional misinterpretation of the latter as merely a theory of price determination: i.e., a theory which has as its objective the explanation of price quantities.

????????Marx's theory is not merely that. But as a theory of economic objectivity, it is of necessity also that. For just as it is not sufficient that sensibility yield intuitions in order for sensate experience to obtain, but rather these punctual intuitions must in addition be bound together by rules into a cohesive whole, so too in order for economic experience to obtain it is not sufficient that money provide the medium of existence of value-phenomena, but rather such phenomena - most fundamentally, prices - must exhibit a certain systematic interconnection and regularity. Indeed, since prices pertain to sorts of commodity and only to particular commodities inasmuch as they are specimens of such sorts, even the isolated "perception" of commodity prices strictly speaking presupposes the assumption of their regularity. In this sense, the examination of the "value-form" leads immanently to a consideration of what Marx somewhat infelicitously describes as the "substance" of value: or, in less metaphysical terms, examination of the issue of how the relative values of commodities are made commensurable (what Franz Petry called the "qualitative" value problem) leads immanently to a consideration of the issue of what regulates their relative values (what Petry called the "quantitative" value problem) (Petry, 1916). Or again: the clarification of the "extrinsic" measure of value, viz. money, requires us to seek an "intrinsic" measure of value which gains expression in the former, to seek, namely, the regulating principle of price quantities (cf. Rosenthal, 1998, ch.14, sec. 14.2).

????????The coherence of the price-system and the rule-governedness of changes in it are not only epistemological conditions of the possibility of economic experience, but simultaneously practical conditions for the stability of the system of exchange. Whereas it is the principle of causality that binds together sense-data into a cohesive whole, it is the so-called "law of value" that discharges the same function with regard to prices. This "law of value" is, in short, that commodities should tend to exchange in such proportions as require equal allocations of "social labor" to produce: or expressed, as indeed it ought to be, in relation to prices as indices of the exchangeability of commodities in general, that these should in the long run be regulated by the labor-time socially necessary for the production of the commodities to which they pertain. [19] What I am proposing here is that this law can be demonstrated transcendentally, in a manner analogous to Kant's transcendental demonstration of the principle of causality, inasmuch as were it not to apply the system of prices would become incoherent and the system of exchange would collapse. I will not attempt to rehearse this demonstration here. But partisans of the Marxian "theory of value" - viz. in the sense which this expression is typically given in contemporary economic debates - should take seriously the possibility of a transcendental proof of it. As Kant pointed out, only such claims as can be shown to hold a priori can be taken to hold necessarily and without exception. Attempts to defend Marx's theory on an empirical basis, however compelling the evidence offered, inevitably degrade the status of the "law of value" to that of a merely more or less plausible hypothesis Now, in conformity with the foregoing, when Marx comes in Capital I to treat the subject of capital, he again does so initially as just a given economic form, i.e., as just another phenomenon of the circulation sphere of commodities. In other words, Marx starts his analysis from the "form of appearance" of capital in the circulation sphere, from its, so to say, immediately perceptible aspect. This immediately perceptible aspect of capital is, namely, a positive monetary return upon investment and, supposing capitalist conditions of production in fact obtain and are not subject to any extraordinary disturbances, it is just there. It does not have to be "derived," as would, for instance, the "concept" of capital in a Hegelian exposition. Thus, in stark contrast to the tortuous "dialectical transition" from money to capital which Marx presents in the Grundrisse, he now introduces his discussion of capital with a simple observation. "The direct form of the circulation of commodities," he writes,

????????is C - M - C, the transformation of commodities into money and the reconversion of money into commodities: selling in order to buy. But alongside this form we find a second specifically different form: M - C - M, the transformation of money into commodities and the re-conversion of commodities back into money: buying in order to sell. (Marx, 1976, 247-8/MEW, Vol. 23, 162,)

????????Marx notes further that in order for this second form of circulation to have a rational content and for the social activity associated with it to have a comprehensible sense, the quantity of money representing its endpoint must typically be greater than that representing its point of departure. Otherwise, the circuit of money as capital, since money is by definition qualitatively homogenous, would be "pointless." So, this circuit must, more precisely, be represented as M - C – M’. [20] The phenomenal form of capital is, in short, profit, which, contrary to Marx's tentative remarks from the Grundrisse cited above, is not a price, but rather appears as the difference between the respective sums of two sets of prices: first those "cost-prices" incurred by a given economic agent, whether individual or corporate, and then those "sales-prices" charged by the same.

????????It will be recalled that in the Grundrisse, Marx attempted to derive the "necessity" of profit from a supposed contradiction between the "concept" of value or rather the "generality" of the latter as realized in the form of money and the "restricted particularity" of any given sum of money. Capital, as value imbued with the "drive" to overcome its quantitative limitation, was supposed, in effect, to represent the "sublation" of this contradiction. Far from attempting any similar "derivation" in Capital, it is precisely the prima facie inconsistency between the "law of value" and the datum of profit - profit is not "necessary," it is just empirically observable - to which Marx draws attention in order to motivate the investigation into the specific conditions of possibility of the latter. This is the very point of Marx's discussion of the so-called "Contradictions in the General Formula of Capital" and it requires an excess of "dialectical" sophistication to be able to miss this point.

????????If commodities should tend to exchange in such proportions as they represent equal values (the proportion in which different sorts of commodity represent equal values being indicated by their respective prices) and this is the "law" which governs the "direct form" of their circulation (C - M - C) , then how can it systematically be the case that a "surplus-value" appears in the inverse circulation (M - C - M) in which monetary quantities rather than goods constitute the extremes? Since, as noted, the "law of value" is a necessary condition for the stability of the exchange system as such, it cannot be suspended without entailing the disappearance of all value phenomena whatsoever. In shifting the focus of his analysis to the capitalist production process and, more precisely, the specific juridical conditions under which it occurs as determined by the capital/wage-labor contract, Marx's achievement is to expose those conditions which enable profit-making on the very basis of the consistent application of the "law of value."

?

Department of Philosophy

Colorado College

14 East Cache La Poudre Street

Colorado Springs, Co 80903

jrosenthal@cc.colorado.edu