When, in today's ethico-political debates, one mentions the name 'Immanuel Kant', the first association, of course, is the post-Communist liberal advocacy of the 'return to Kant' in all its?different versions - from Hannah Arendt to Jurgen Habermas; from neoliberals like Luc Ferry and John Rawls to theorists of?the 'second modernity' like Ulrich Beck. However, the fundamental wager of Lacan 's 'Kant with Sade' is that there is another, much more uncanny Kant, the Kant apropos of whom Lacan claimed that, in the history of ideas, his ethical revolution was the starting point which led to the Freudian discovery of the unconscious: Kant was the first to delineate the dimension 'beyond the pleasure principle'. ? 在今天的倫理政治辯論中，當人們提到“伊曼紐爾·康德”這個名字時，第一個聯(lián)想當然是后共產主義自由主義倡導的“回歸康德”的各種不同版本——從漢娜·阿倫特到尤爾根 哈貝馬斯； 從呂克·費里（Luc Ferry）和約翰·羅爾斯（John Rawls）等新自由主義者到烏爾里?！へ惪耍║lrich Beck）等“第二現(xiàn)代性”理論家。 然而，拉康的“康德同薩德”的基本賭注是，還有另一個更加不可思議的康德，拉康聲稱，在思想史上，康德的倫理革命是導致了弗洛伊德對無意識的發(fā)現(xiàn)的起點：康德是第一個描繪“超越快樂原則”的維度的人。 The first association of someone vaguely acquainted with Lacan is probably 'Oh, yes, the guy who asserted the subject's decentrement against the Cartesian and Kantian tradition of transcendental cogito' . . .. Here, already, the picture becomes flawed. Lacan's thesis is that the Freudian 'decentred' subject of the unconscious is none other than the Cartesian cogito, further radicalized in the Kantian transcendental subject - how can this be? What is this notorious Freudian 'decentrement'? A seemingly eccentric definition from Hegel's philosophy of nature (that of a plant as an animal with its intestines outside its body) offers, perhaps, the most succinct determination of what the subject's 'decentrement' is about. Let us approach this via Wagner's Walkure, in which Wotan, the supreme god, is split between his respect for the sacred link of marriage (advocated by his wife Fricka) and his admiration for the power of free love (advocated by his beloved rebellious daughter Brunnhilde). When the brave Siegmund, after escaping with the beautiful Sieglinde, wife of the cruel Hunding, has to confront Hunding in a duel, Brunnhilde violates Wotan's explicit order (to let Siegmund be killed in the battle) . In defence of her disobedience, Briinnhilde claims that, by trying to help Siegmund, she effectively realized Wotan's own disavowed true will - in a way, she is nothing but this ' repressed' part of Wotan, a part he had to renounce on deciding to give way to Fricka's pressure . . . . A Jungian reading would claim here that Fricka and Brunnhilde (as well as other lower gods who surround Wotan) merely eXLernalize different libidinal components of Wotan 's personality: Fricka, as the defender of orderly family life, stands for his superego, while Brunnhilde, with her passionate advocacy of free love, stands for Wotan 's unconstrained love passion .... For Lacan, however, it is already too much to say that Fricka and Brunnhilde 'externalize' different components of Wotan 's psyche: the subject's 'decentrement' is original and constitutive; T am from the very outset ' outside myself' , a bricolage of external components. Wotan does not merely ' project' his superego in Fricka, Fricka is his superego, in the same way as Hegel claims that a plant is an animal that has its intestines outside its body, in the guise of the roots embedded in the earth. 稍微熟悉拉康的人的第一個聯(lián)想可能是“哦，是的，這個人主張主體的去中心化，反對笛卡爾和康德的先驗我思傳統(tǒng)”.... 在這里，這個想的有些錯了。拉康的論點是，弗洛伊德的無意識“去中心”主體正是笛卡爾的我思，（我思）比康德的先驗主體中進更一步激進化——這怎么可能呢？這個臭名昭著的弗洛伊德“去中心化”是什么？ 黑格爾自然哲學（即植物作為動物，其腸子在體外）的一個看似古怪的定義，也許為主體的“去中心化”提供了最簡潔的確定。讓我們通過瓦格納的《女武神》來探討這個問題，其中至高無上的神沃坦在他對婚姻神圣聯(lián)系的尊重（由他的妻子弗里卡倡導）和他對自由戀愛的力量的欽佩（由他心愛的叛逆女兒布倫希爾德倡導）之間分裂。 當勇敢的齊格蒙德帶著殘忍的洪丁的妻子美麗的齊格琳德逃跑后，必須與洪丁決斗時，布倫希爾德違反了沃坦的明確命令（讓齊格蒙德在戰(zhàn)斗中被殺）。 在為自己的不服從辯護時，布林希爾德聲稱，通過試圖幫助齊格蒙德，她有效地實現(xiàn)了沃坦自己否認的真實意愿——在某種程度上，她只不過是沃坦“被壓抑”的一部分，他由于決定屈服于弗里卡的壓力而必須放棄的一部分…. 榮格派的解讀會認為弗里卡和布倫·尼爾德（以及沃坦周圍的其他低等神）只是將沃坦人格中不同的力比多成分外化：弗里卡作為有序家庭生活的捍衛(wèi)者，代表著他的超我，而布倫希爾德則以她對自由愛情的熱情倡導，代表了沃坦不受約束的愛情激情……然而，對于拉康來說，說弗里卡和布倫希爾德“外化”了沃坦心理的不同組成部分，已經有些過了：主體的“去中心化”是原初的、構成性的；我從一開始就“在我自己之外”，是外部組件的拼湊。 沃坦不是僅僅將他的超我“投射”在弗里卡身上，弗里卡就是他的超我，就像黑格爾聲稱植物（它的腸子在體外）以根部嵌入大地的形式而是一種動物。 This Hegelian formulation holds also - and especially - for the symbolic order, a kind of spiritual intestines of the human animal outside its Self: the spiritual Substance of my being, the roots from which I draw my spiritual food, are outside myself, embodied in the decentred symbolic order. One is thus tempted to say that, spiritually, man remains an animal, rooted in anexternal substance - one of the impossible New Age dreams is precisely to turn man into a spiritual animal, floating freely in spiritual space, without any need for substantial roots outside himself. When Woody Allen made a series of public appearances before the press in the wake of his scandalous separation from Mia Farrow, he acted in ' real life' exactly like neurotic and insecure male characters from his movies. So should we conclude that 'he put himself in his movies', that his movies' main male characters are half-concealed self-portraits? No; the conclusion to be drawn is exactly the opposite one: in his real life, Woody Allen identified with and copied a certain model that he elaborated in his movies - that is to say, it is 'real life' that imitates symbolic patterns expressed at their purest in art. This, then, is what Lacan means by the subject's decentrement, and it is not difficult to perceive the link between this decentred subject and the Kantian transcendental subject: the key feature that unites the two is that they are both empty, deprived of any substantial content. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant summarizes this paradox of cogito at its purest: 'In the pure thought of myself, I am the being itself rich bin das Wesenselbst], yet no part of this being is given to me thereby for my thought. ' So, in the unique point of cogito as the intersection between being and thought, I lose thought as well as being: thought, because all and every content is lost; being, because all determinate objective being evaporates in the pure thought - and, for Lacan, this void is the Freudian subject of desire. ? 黑格爾的這種表述也尤其是對于符號秩序來說，是人類動物在其自我之外的一種精神腸子：我存在的精神實體，我從中汲取精神食糧的根源，在我自己之外，被體現(xiàn)在去中心化的符號秩序中。 因此，一個人容易得出結論說：在精神上，人仍然是一種動物，植根于外部物質——新時代不可能實現(xiàn)的夢想之一就是將人變成一種精神動物，在精神空間中自由漂浮，不需要任何外于他自己的物質根基。當伍迪·艾倫與米婭·法羅分手后，他在媒體面前進行了一系列公開露面，他在“現(xiàn)實生活”中的表現(xiàn)就像他電影中神經質和缺乏安全感的男性角色一樣。 那么我們是否應該得出“他把自己放進電影里”，他的電影中的男主角都是半掩的自畫像呢？ 不; 得出的結論恰恰相反：在伍迪·艾倫的現(xiàn)實生活中，他認同并復制了他在電影中闡述的某種模式——也就是說，模仿所表達的象征模式的是“現(xiàn)實生活” 最純粹的藝術。 那么，這就是拉康所說的主體的去中心化，并且不難看出這種去中心化的主體與康德的先驗主體之間的聯(lián)系：將兩者統(tǒng)一起來的關鍵特征是它們都是空的，被剝奪了任何實質性的內容?？档略谒摹都兇饫硇耘小分锌偨Y了這一最純粹的我思悖論：“在我自己的純粹思想中，我是存在自身[

ich bin das Wesen selbst

]，然而，這個存在的任何部分都沒有被給予我供我思考。” 因此，在我思作為存在與思想交叉點的獨特點上，我失去了思想以及存在：（失去）思想，因為所有內容都丟失了；（失去）存在，因為所有確定的客觀存在都在純粹思想中蒸發(fā)了——對于拉康來說，這種空無就是弗洛伊德式的欲望主體。 ? Alenka Zupancic's book focuses on the unexpected ethical consequences of this assertion of modern subjectivity, which amount to a radical disjunction between ethics proper and the domain of the Good. Here Lacan is on the side of Kant against utilitarian as well as the standard Christian ethics: it is false to try to ground ethics in some calculus of pleasures or gains (in the long term, it pays to behave morally, and, through force of habit, this utilitarian decision turned into our 'second nature ', so that we now behave morally in a spontaneous way, unaware of the calculus of pleasures behind it) , or in expanding this calculus to include our exchange with God Himself (it pays to be moral, since although we may suffer for it in this life, we will be properly rewarded for it after our death). For Lacan, as already for Freud, the human subject is not only less moral than he knows, but also much more moral than he believes himself to be: we accomplish moral acts for the sake of duty, even if we (wrongly) think that we do it on account of some utilitarian calculus, with an eye to some kind of future reward. Starting from the analytical problematic of the theory of rational choice, Jon Elster arrived at the same 'unknown residual fact': ? 阿倫卡·祖潘西奇（Alenka Zupancic）的書重點討論了這種現(xiàn)代主體性主張所帶來的意想不到的倫理后果，這相當于倫理本身與善的領域之間的根本脫節(jié)。在這里，拉康站在康德一邊，反對功利主義以及標準的基督教倫理學：試圖將倫理學建立在某種對快樂或收益的計算上是錯誤的（從長遠來看，道德行為是值得的，并且通過習慣的力量，這種功利主義決定變成了我們的“第二天性”，因此我們現(xiàn)在以一種自發(fā)的方式做出道德行為，而沒有意識到其背后的快樂計算），或者將這種計算擴展到包括我們與上帝本身的交流（道德是值得的，因為盡管我們在今生可能會為此受苦，但死后我們會因此而得到適當?shù)幕貓螅?對于拉康來說，就像弗洛伊德一樣，人類主體不僅沒有他所知道的那么道德，而且卻要比他相信自己是的更道德：我們?yōu)榱肆x務而完成道德行為，即使我們（錯誤地）認為我們這樣做是基于一些功利主義的計算，著眼于某種未來的回報。喬恩·埃爾斯特從理性選擇理論的分析問題出發(fā)，得出了同樣的“未知的剩余事實”： ?

people's motives are determined by self-interest and by the norms to which they subscribe. Norms, in turn, are partly shaped by selfinterest, because people often adhere to tbe norms tbat favour them. But norms are not fully reducible to self-interest, at least not bv this particular mechanism. The unknown residual is a brute fact, at least for the time being.

人們的動機是由自身利益和他們所遵守的規(guī)范決定的。反過來，規(guī)范在一定程度上是由自身利益決定的，因為人們常常遵守對他們有利的規(guī)范。但規(guī)范并不能完全還原為自身利益，至少通過這種特定機制不能。未知的剩余是一個殘酷的事實，至少目前如此。

?

In short, the utilitarian circle - even the most refined one, in which my obedience to ethical norms is grounded not only in an egotistic calculus but in the satisfaction brought about by the awareness that I will contribute to the well-being of the whole of humankind - is never squared; one always has to add an x, the 'unknown remainder', which, of course, is the Lacanian objet petit a, the object-cause of desire. In this precise sense, for Lacan, ethics is ultimately the ethics of desire - that is to say, the Kantian moral law is the imperative of desire. In other words, what Lacan accomplishes, in an inherent radicalization of the Kantian project, is a kind of 'critique of pure desire': in contrast to Kant, for whom our capacity to desire is thoroughly 'pathological' (since, as he repeatedly stresses, there is no a priori link between an empirical object and the pleasure this object generates in the subject) , Lacan claims that there is a 'pure faculty of desire ', since desire does have a non-pathological, a priori object-cause - this object, of course, is what Lacan calls objet petit a. Even the most egotistically calculated exchange of favours has to rely on a first move which cannot be explained in these terms, in some grounding gesture of giving, of the primordial gift (as Derrida would have put it) which cannot be accounted for in the terms of future benefits. ? 簡而言之，功利主義圈子永遠不會真的完成（圓圈真的閉合）——即使是最精致的圈子，在這個圈子里，我對道德規(guī)范的服從不僅僅基于一種自我中心的算計，而且基于我將為整個人類的福祉做出貢獻的意識所帶來的滿足感。人們總是必須加上一個x，即“未知的余數(shù)”，這當然是拉康的客體小a，即欲望的客體原因。 正是在這個意義上，對于拉康來說，倫理學最終是欲望的倫理學——也就是說，康德的道德法則是欲望的必然。 換句話說，拉康在康德計劃的內在激進化中所完成的是一種“對純粹欲望的批判”：與康德相反，對康德來說，我們的欲望能力是徹底“病態(tài)的”（因為， 他反復強調，經驗對象與該對象在主體中產生的快樂之間不存在先驗的聯(lián)系），拉康聲稱存在“純粹的欲望能力”，因為欲望確實具有非病態(tài)的、先驗的客體原因——這個客體當然就是拉康所說的客體小a。即使是最自私地計算的恩惠交換也必須依賴于第一步，而這不能用這些術語來解釋，在一些基本的給予姿態(tài)中，原始禮物（正如德里達會這么說的）不能用關于這些東西的未來利益的術語來解釋。 ? The further consequence of this key breakthrough is that the ethical act proper should be distinguished from the Ego-Ideal (the Law of the public Good) as well as from the superego, its obscene supplement. For Lacan, the superego is not the moral agency, since the guilt it imposes on the subject is precisely the unmistakable sign that the subject has ' compromised his duty' to follow his desire. To take a - perhaps unexpected - example from politics: the splitting into Ego-Ideal and superego can be discerned in the fundamental paradox of ex-Yugoslav self-management Socialism: all the time, the official ideology exhorted people actively to participate in the process of self-management, to master the conditions of their life outside the 'alienated' Party and state structures; the official media deplored people's indifference, escape into privacy, and so on - however, it was precisely such an event, a true self-managed articulation and organization of people 's interests, which the regime feared most. A whole series of unwritten 'markers' thus delivered between the lines the injunction that the official exhortation was not to be taken too literally; that a cynical attitude towards the official ideology was what the regime actually wanted - the greatest catastrophe for the regime would be if its own ideology were to be taken too seriously, and realized by its subjects. And on a different level, does not the same go for the classic imperialistcolonialist exhortation which urged the colonized to become like their 'civilized' oppressors? Was this injunction not undermined from within by a 'wise ' acknowledgement that the colonized people are mysteriously and irreducibly 'other' - that, however hard they try, they will never succeed? This unwritten superego injunction which undermines the official ideological stance makes it clear in what sense, in contrast to the notorious right to difference - to maintain one's specific cultural identity - one should, rather, assert the right to Sameness as the 'fundamental right of the oppressed': like ex-Yugoslav self management, the colonialist oppressor also fears above all the realization of its own official ideological request. ? 這一關鍵突破的進一步結果是，適當?shù)牡赖滦袨閼撆c自我理想（公共利益法則）以及超我（其淫穢的補充）區(qū)分開來。對于拉康來說，超我不是道德機構，因為它強加給主體的罪惡感恰恰是主體為了追隨自己的欲望而“妥協(xié)了他的義務”的明確標志。舉一個也許出人意料的政治例子：自我理想和超我的分裂可以從前南斯拉夫自我管理社會主義的基本悖論中看出：一直以來，官方意識形態(tài)都勸告人們積極參與自我管理的過程，掌握自己在“異化”的黨和國家結構之外的生活條件；官方媒體痛惜人們的冷漠、逃避隱私等等——然而，正是這樣的事件，真正的人民利益的自我管理表達和組織，才是政權最害怕的。因此，一系列不成文的“標記”在字里行間傳達了這樣的禁令：官方的勸告不要過于字面意思。對官方意識形態(tài)采取憤世嫉俗的態(tài)度才是該政權真正想要的——對于該政權來說，最大的災難將是如果它自己的意識形態(tài)被過于認真地對待并被其臣民所實現(xiàn)。在不同的層面上，經典的帝國主義殖民主義勸誡不也是如此嗎？敦促被殖民者變得像他們的“文明”壓迫者一樣？難道這一禁令不是從內部被一種“明智的”承認所削弱的嗎？承認被殖民的人民是神秘的、不可還原的“異類”——無論他們如何努力，他們永遠不會成功？這種不成文的超我禁令破壞了官方的意識形態(tài)立場，它清楚地表明，與臭名昭著的差異權相比，為了維持一個人特定的文化身份，人們應該在何種意義上主張同一性權利作為“有趣的基本權利” 與前南斯拉夫的自我管理一樣，殖民主義壓迫者也首先擔心其官方意識形態(tài)要求的實現(xiàn)。 ? So how are we to break out of this vicious intertwining of the Good and its obscene supplement? Let us recall the final scene of the first big Hollywood production about the Bosnian war, Welcome to Sarajevo, a film that was a failure ( and, incidentally, a film that Alen ka ZupanCic hates intensely! ). In this scene, shot with minimal pathos, the broken-down Bosnian mother renounces her beloved daughter: she signs the paper which gives full custody of her daughter to the English journalist who wants to adopt her. The supreme act of maternal love is here identified as precisely the Brechtian gesture of renouncing the maternal link - of conceding that, in comfortable English surroundings, her daughter will fare much better than in war-torn Bosnia. When she watches the video of her daughter playing with other children in an English garden, she immediately understands that her daughter is happy in England; when, in their last phone conversation, her daughter at first even pretends that she no longer understands Bosnian, the mother, as it were, gets the message . . .. This scene should also be read as a critical comment on the Western humanitarian approach, revealing its ethical ambiguity: it gives a different twist to the simple narrative of a good English journalist who just wants to save a Bosnian child from her war-torn country, fighting Serbian terrorists as well as the Bosnian state bureaucracy for which the evacuation of children is capitulation and betrayal (i.e. doing the job of ethnic cleansing for the Serbs) . With its final twist, the film becomes a reflexive critical comment on what it purports to be up to that point: a humanitarian tale of a journalist doing his ethical duty by saving one person (a child) from the Bosnian war inferno - in a way, the Bosnian official who claims that evacuation is capitulation was right: such humanitarian acts ultimately only add insult to injury by depriving Bosnians of their offspring . ... So, in the final confrontation between the journalist and the mother, it is the mother who accomplishes the ethical gesture against the journalist, whose very humanitarian and caring behaviour is ultimately unethical. ? 那么，我們如何才能擺脫善與淫穢補充的這種惡性交織呢？ 讓我們回想一下好萊塢第一部關于波斯尼亞戰(zhàn)爭的大制作《歡迎來到薩拉熱窩》的最后一幕，這是一部失敗的電影（順便說一句，這部電影是阿倫·卡·祖潘西奇非常討厭的！）。在這個以最小的悲傷拍攝的場景中，這位崩潰的波斯尼亞母親放棄了她心愛的女兒：她簽署了一份文件，將女兒的完全監(jiān)護權交給了想要收養(yǎng)她的英國記者。母愛的至高無上的行為在這里被確定為布萊希特式的放棄母性聯(lián)系的姿態(tài)——承認，在舒適的英國環(huán)境中，她的女兒會比在飽受戰(zhàn)爭蹂躪的波斯尼亞過得更好。當她看到女兒和其他孩子在英國花園里玩耍的視頻時，她立即明白女兒在英國很快樂； 在他們最后一次電話交談中，她的女兒一開始甚至假裝她不再聽懂波斯尼亞語，而母親似乎明白了這一點 .... 這個場景也應該被解讀為對西方人道主義方法的批判評論，揭示了其道德上的模糊性：它給一位優(yōu)秀的英國記者的簡單敘述帶來了不同的扭曲，這位記者只想將一名波斯尼亞兒童從她那飽受戰(zhàn)爭蹂躪的國家中拯救出來，打擊塞爾維亞恐怖分子以及波斯尼亞國家官僚機構，對他們來說，撤離兒童是投降和背叛（即對塞爾維亞人進行種族清洗）。 隨著最后的轉折，這部電影成為對其迄今為止所聲稱的內容的反思性批評：一個人道主義故事，講述了一名記者履行其道德義務，從波斯尼亞戰(zhàn)爭地獄中拯救一個人（一個孩子）的故事——在某種程度上 這位聲稱撤離就是投降的波斯尼亞官員是對的：這種人道主義行為最終只會雪上加霜，剝奪了波斯尼亞人的后代……所以，在記者和母親之間的最后對峙中，是母親完成了針對記者的道德姿態(tài)，而記者的人道主義和關懷行為最終是不道德的。