中文目錄
1.管理斷層線和管理預(yù)測
2.數(shù)字的力量：報告收入中的十進(jìn)制閾值效應(yīng)
3.審計團(tuán)隊與審計生產(chǎn)和質(zhì)量
4.金融市場信息及其真實(shí)效應(yīng)
5.數(shù)據(jù)與抵押
6.企業(yè)與地方政府

1.Management Faultlines and Management Forecasts (CAR2022)

We examine whether management faultlines (i.e., dissimilar groupings among executives) are related to management forecast processes and outcomes. Management faultlines are formed based on the simultaneous alignment of senior executives' demographic characteristics (e.g., an MBA background, elite school education, gender, board experience, age, or tenure). We argue that management faultlines impede information sharing, create conflicts, and divert managerial attention away from common-goal tasks. We hypothesize and find that management faultlines are associated with lower management forecast quality. Furthermore, the faultline effect is more pronounced when forecasting difficulty is high. In contrast, the faultline effect is mitigated when a firm nurtures a supportive and diverse workplace. In addition, we find that management forecast propensity and frequency are negatively associated with management faultlines. Overall, our findings suggest that management faultlines compromise management forecast processes and outcomes. In particular, since faultlines can arise as a company diversifies, boards should be aware of these unintended consequences and how they can be mitigated.

2.The Power of Numbers: Base-Ten Threshold Effects in Reported Revenue (CAR2022)

We show that managers have a propensity to disproportionately report total revenues just above base-ten thresholds (e.g., 10 million, 30 million, 1 billion) and examine motives for and consequences of this behavior. Focusing on base-ten thresholds in revenues is important because, despite being unusually prevalent in revenue targets set in executive compensation contracts, analyst forecasts, and management forecasts, they have not been previously explored. We also show that pressure to beat these targets provides one explanation for the base-ten bias in reported revenues. However, these incentive effects do not offer a complete explanation because base-ten threshold-beating is observed even in the absence of these explicit targets. We further find that when firms beat a base-ten threshold for the first time, they experience increases in news coverage, institutional ownership, liquidity, and analyst following, even after controlling for whether they have beaten other common benchmarks. These results suggest that managers also beat base-ten thresholds in order to increase their firms' overall visibility. Overall, we show that a preference for base-ten numbers, which have no inherent economic meaning, has a measurable effect on the actions of market participants. These results open the door to a new range of managerial targets previously unexplored.

3.Do Audit Teams Affect Audit Production and Quality? Evidence from Audit Teams' Industry Knowledge (CAR2022)

We examine how the extent and distribution of industry knowledge within an audit team affect audit outcomes. While prior research examining the role of auditors' industry knowledge focuses mainly on audit firms, audit offices, and audit partners, audits are conducted by audit teams. Using an audit framework and proprietary data from a Big 4 firm that includes audit hours for each team member, we find that Big 4 audit teams with higher average industry knowledge are associated with more audit effort. In contrast, we find mixed evidence on the relation between the average hourly internal cost rate and team knowledge. Furthermore, we find that balanced teams, which have at least one team member who qualifies as an industry specialist at both the senior rank and junior rank, produce higher-quality audits than teams that have no specialists. In contrast, the audit quality of unbalanced teams, which have a specialist at the senior rank but not the junior rank or vice versa, is not statistically different than teams with no specialists. Overall, our evidence suggests that both the extent and distribution of industry knowledge within a team matter for audit production and that industry knowledge is utilized more effectively when it is spread throughout the team. The findings have useful implications for audit firms and regulators regarding how team composition and industry knowledge affect audit outcomes.

4.Information in Financial Markets and Its Real Effects (RF2023)

Financial markets have a central role in allocating resources in modern economies. One of the main functions of financial markets is the discovery of information. This information in turn helps guide decisions in the real side of the economy. The literature on the “feedback effect” of financial markets explores this channel. Empirical work tries to identify the informational feedback from markets to corporate decisions. Theoretical work explores implications that this feedback effect has for the equilibrium in financial markets and for economic efficiency. Current trends in information technology under the FinTech revolution change the nature of information processing in financial markets and so may change the nature of the feedback effect. In this article, I review the main themes of this developing literature and connect them to the current information revolution. I also discuss directions for future research.

5.Data versus Collateral (RF2023)

Using a unique dataset of more than 2 million Chinese firms that received credit from both an important big tech firm (Ant Group) and traditional commercial banks, this paper investigates how different forms of credit correlate with local economic activity, house prices, and firm characteristics. We find that big tech credit does not correlate with local business conditions and house prices when controlling for demand factors, but reacts strongly to changes in firm characteristics, such as transaction volumes and network scores used to calculate firm credit ratings. By contrast, both secured and unsecured bank credit react significantly to local house prices, which incorporate useful information on the environment in which clients operate and on their creditworthiness. This evidence implies that the wider use of big tech credit could reduce the importance of the collateral channel but, at the same time, make lending more reactive to changes in firms’ business activity.

6.Firms and Local Governments: Relationship Building during Political Turnovers (RF2023)

We study how firms build relations with local governments in emerging markets without established rules of political lobbying. We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially privately owned enterprises, POEs hereafter) headquartered in that city significantly increase their “perk spending,” for example, expenses for travel and entertainment among others. Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. In addition, we find that local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of the Chairmen or the CEOs of state-owned enterprises that are controlled by the local government. We also discuss and rule out several alternative explanations for the above findings.