作者：John Haldon約翰·哈爾頓

出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

自翻：神尾智代

接上（12）

Officers

長(zhǎng)官

????????? There was no 'officer corps' in the Byzantine army, although it is clear that the majority of men who commanded units beyond the level of a squad or troop came from the wealthier elements in society, whether in the provinces or in Constantinople, and that service at court in one of the palace units functioned as a sort of training school. The sources tell us quite a lot about the middle and upper levels of officers, and until the 12th century it is clear that there was always a substantial meritocratic element in advancement. Social background and education played a role, but it was perfectly possible for an able and competent soldier or lower-ranking officer to rise to high position. In all aspects of Byzantine society social connections and kinship always played an important role too, and training and ability were generally mediated through personal ties; for example, an officer might advance his career through service initially in the retinue of an important officer, from where he might receive a junior appointment in a local regiment, rising through the various grades, or being transferred to a senior position elsewhere. Some careers developed within families serving in the same unit — there are several examples of officers' sons entering their father's unit as simple troopers or soldiers before being promoted to junior and then more senior officer grade; in other cases, we hear of privileged young provincial men sent to Constantinople where, with the help of an influential relative or patron, they were appointed to a junior post in the guards before further promotion. In one case, which was probably not untypical, a young man was appointed first to a small corps of elite guards in the palace, before receiving a junior command at the capital, then a middling provincial post, before being promoted to a senior position, all in the course of some 10 years or so.

（拜占庭軍隊(duì)中沒(méi)有“軍官團(tuán)”，盡管很明顯，指揮超出小隊(duì)或部隊(duì)級(jí)別的部隊(duì)的大多數(shù)人來(lái)自社會(huì)中較富裕的人，無(wú)論是在行省還是在君士坦丁堡，而且 在一個(gè)宮殿單位的宮廷服務(wù)就像一種培訓(xùn)學(xué)校。消息來(lái)源告訴我們很多關(guān)于中上層軍官的信息，直到 12 世紀(jì)，很明顯，晉升中總是存在大量的精英因素。社會(huì)背景和教育發(fā)揮了作用，但一個(gè)有能力的士兵或下級(jí)軍官升到高位是完全可能的。 在拜占庭社會(huì)的各個(gè)方面，社會(huì)關(guān)系和親屬關(guān)系也一直扮演著重要的角色，訓(xùn)練和能力通常通過(guò)人際關(guān)系來(lái)調(diào)節(jié)；例如，一名軍官最初可能會(huì)通過(guò)在重要軍官的隨從服務(wù)中提升他的職業(yè)生涯，在那里他可能會(huì)在當(dāng)?shù)剀妶F(tuán)獲得初級(jí)職位，升入各個(gè)級(jí)別，或者被調(diào)到其他地方擔(dān)任高級(jí)職位。一些職業(yè)是在同一部隊(duì)的家庭中發(fā)展起來(lái)的——有幾個(gè)例子，軍官的兒子進(jìn)入他們父親的部隊(duì)，成為普通的士兵或士兵，然后被提升為初級(jí)和高級(jí)軍官級(jí)別；在其他情況下，我們聽(tīng)說(shuō)有特權(quán)的年輕外省人被派往君士坦丁堡，在有影響力的親戚或贊助人的幫助下，他們?cè)谶M(jìn)一步晉升之前被任命為衛(wèi)隊(duì)的初級(jí)職位。有一個(gè)例子，這可能并不罕見(jiàn)，一個(gè)年輕人在大約十年的時(shí)間里，先被任命到宮中的一小支精銳衛(wèi)隊(duì)，然后在京城接受初級(jí)指揮，然后是中級(jí)的省級(jí)職位，然后被提升為高級(jí)職位。）

????????? By the middle of the 11th century the growth of a powerful provincial aristocracy had brought some changes to this structure. The provincial elite itself provided a major source of recruits to the middle and senior officers' posts in the empire, and during the later 9th and 10th centuries came to monopolise most key provincial military commands. The increasing use of mercenaries reduced at the same time the importance and status of the provincial, thematic soldiery, who blended back into the mass of the peasantry from which they were drawn, thereby losing their distinctive social position.

（到 11 世紀(jì)中葉，強(qiáng)大的省級(jí)貴族的成長(zhǎng)使這種結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)生了一些變化。省級(jí)精英本身為帝國(guó)中高級(jí)軍官職位提供了主要的新兵來(lái)源，并且在 9 世紀(jì)后期和 10 世紀(jì)期間開(kāi)始?jí)艛啻蠖鄶?shù)關(guān)鍵的省級(jí)軍事指揮部。雇傭軍的使用越來(lái)越多，同時(shí)降低了省級(jí)、專題士兵的重要性和地位，他們重新融入了他們所來(lái)自的農(nóng)民群眾中，從而失去了獨(dú)特的社會(huì)地位。）

Discipline and training

紀(jì)律和訓(xùn)練

????????? The Byzantine army, at least as represented in the narrative histories and in the military treatises, prided itself on its order and discipline. Life in the army involved a very different sort of daily routine from life in civilian contexts or from that in less disciplined and organised neighbouring armies. A 6th-century military handbook makes this abundantly clear: 'Nature produces but few brave men, whereas care and training make efficient soldiers,' notes the author. Levels of discipline varied and were a major cause of concern to commanders and to the authors of all the military treatises. There are plenty of cases of mutiny and unrest among the provincial armies and the examples of troops panicking when the commander was thought to have been killed or injured is evidence of the variable psychological condition of the troops. The extent to which proper discipline was actually enforced is not very clear in the limited sources. Usually it was the most able commanders who were most likely to apply military discipline effectively, partly a reflection of their personal character and ability to inspire confidence among the soldiers - a point also recognised in the military treatises. Financial generosity, either on the part of individual commanders or officers, or the government, was a crucial ingredient in encouraging soldiers to follow orders and accept the discipline necessary for effective fighting.

（拜占庭的軍隊(duì)，至少在敘事歷史和軍事論文中，以其秩序和紀(jì)律而自豪。 軍隊(duì)中的生活與平民生活或缺乏紀(jì)律和組織的鄰近軍隊(duì)的生活有著截然不同的日常生活。一本 6 世紀(jì)的軍事手冊(cè)非常清楚地說(shuō)明了這一點(diǎn)：“大自然造就的勇士寥寥無(wú)幾，而關(guān)懷和訓(xùn)練則造就了高效的士兵，”作者指出。 紀(jì)律水平各不相同，是指揮官和所有軍事論文作者關(guān)注的一個(gè)主要原因。省軍發(fā)生叛變、動(dòng)亂的事例屢見(jiàn)不鮮，當(dāng)指揮官被認(rèn)為已被打死或受傷時(shí)，部隊(duì)驚慌失措的例子就是部隊(duì)心理狀態(tài)多變的證據(jù)。在有限的資料來(lái)源中，實(shí)際執(zhí)行適當(dāng)紀(jì)律的程度并不十分清楚。通常是最有能力的指揮官最有可能有效地運(yùn)用軍事紀(jì)律，部分反映了他們的個(gè)人性格和激發(fā)士兵信心的能力——這一點(diǎn)在軍事論文中也得到了承認(rèn)。無(wú)論是個(gè)別指揮官或軍官，還是政府，財(cái)政慷慨都是鼓勵(lì)士兵服從命令并接受有效戰(zhàn)斗所需紀(jì)律的關(guān)鍵因素。）

????????? Discipline also varied according to the categories of troops. A strict code certainly prevailed in elite units such as the imperial tagmata and in units which had a particular loyalty to their commanding officer. One story recounts the tale of an officer who was upbraided by the emperor himself for his unkempt appearance while at his post in the palace. Discipline was probably least effective in the militia-like thematic forces, but under competent officers it seems to have been effectively maintained. There existed an official code of military discipline which is frequently included in the military handbooks, and effective leaders seem on the whole to have applied it. Nikephoros 11 is reported to have awarded punishment to a soldier for dropping his shield because he was too tired to continue carrying it. When his officer ignored the order, he too was punished severely, on the grounds that the first had endangered his comrades as well as himself, while the latter had compounded the crime and further endangered the well-being of the whole force. Constantine V in the 8th century, Nikephoros II, John I Tzimiskes, Basil II in the late 10th century and Romanos IV in the later 1060s were all regarded with approval as strict disciplinarians, as was Alexios I in the late 11th century. Yet discipline often broke down.

（紀(jì)律也根據(jù)部隊(duì)的類別而有所不同。嚴(yán)格的守則肯定在精英部隊(duì)中盛行，例如帝國(guó)塔格瑪塔和對(duì)指揮官特別忠誠(chéng)的部隊(duì)。一個(gè)故事講述了一個(gè)官員的故事，因?yàn)樗趯m中任職期間的蓬頭垢面被皇帝親自斥責(zé)。 在類似民兵的主題部隊(duì)中，紀(jì)律可能最不有效，但在有能力的軍官之下，紀(jì)律似乎得到了有效維持。有一個(gè)正式的軍事紀(jì)律守則，經(jīng)常被列入軍事手冊(cè)，而有效的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者總體上似乎已經(jīng)應(yīng)用了它。 據(jù)報(bào)道，尼基弗魯斯 11 曾因一名士兵因太累而無(wú)法繼續(xù)攜帶盾牌而丟掉盾牌而受到懲罰。 當(dāng)他的軍官無(wú)視命令時(shí)，他也受到了嚴(yán)厲的懲罰，理由是前者危及他的戰(zhàn)友和他自己，而后者則加重了罪行并進(jìn)一步危及整個(gè)部隊(duì)的福祉。 8 世紀(jì)的君士坦丁五世、尼基弗羅斯二世、約翰一世·齊米斯克斯、10 世紀(jì)后期的巴西爾二世和 1060 年代后期的羅曼諾斯四世都被認(rèn)為是嚴(yán)格的紀(jì)律家，就像 11 世紀(jì)后期的阿萊克修斯一世一樣。然而紀(jì)律經(jīng)常崩潰。）

????????? There are some hints in the sources about the exercises carried out by the soldiers, descriptions corroborated by accounts of similar exercises in the tactical manuals and handbooks. Nikephoros Phokas put on a series of military games and mock battles in the hippodrome at Constantinople in the 960s - they were so realistic and frightening that a panic occurred which claimed many lives. But whatever the textbooks said about the value of such exercises, sensible commanders appear generally to have been aware of the limitations of the different sorts of troops under their command. The treatises on warfare often include quite simple, easily managed tactical manoeuvres for the great bulk of the thematic infantry, who were on the whole not well equipped and potentially unreliable. In contrast the well-trained and well-equipped heavy cavalry and elite units were expected to implement quite complex manoeuvres, frequently under enemy attack, on the battlefield. Skills and training, discipline and morale went hand in hand.

（資料中有一些關(guān)于士兵進(jìn)行的演習(xí)的暗示，戰(zhàn)術(shù)手冊(cè)和手冊(cè)中對(duì)類似演習(xí)的描述也證實(shí)了這一點(diǎn)。960 年代，Nikephoros佛卡斯在君士坦丁堡的競(jìng)技場(chǎng)上進(jìn)行了一系列軍事游戲和模擬戰(zhàn)斗——它們是如此逼真和可怕，以至于發(fā)生了一場(chǎng)奪去許多生命的恐慌。 但無(wú)論教科書如何評(píng)價(jià)此類演習(xí)的價(jià)值，明智的指揮官似乎普遍意識(shí)到他們所指揮的不同類型部隊(duì)的局限性。關(guān)于戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的論文通常包括非常簡(jiǎn)單、易于管理的戰(zhàn)術(shù)演習(xí)，適用于大部分主題步兵，他們總體上裝備不足，可能不可靠。相比之下，訓(xùn)練有素、裝備精良的重騎兵和精銳部隊(duì)被期望在戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上執(zhí)行相當(dāng)復(fù)雜的機(jī)動(dòng)，經(jīng)常在敵人的攻擊下。 技能和培訓(xùn)、紀(jì)律和士氣齊頭并進(jìn)。）

????????? The sort of exercise in particular skills which cavalry troopers had to carry out is illustrated in a late 6th-century manual:

????????? [The trooper] should shoot rapidly, mounted on his horse and at a canter, to the front, to the rear, to right and to left; he should practise leaping onto his horse. When mounted and at a canter he should shoot one or two arrows rapidly and put the strung bow in its case ... and then take the lance which he carries on his back.

With the strung bow in its case he should hold the lance in his hand, then quickly replace it on his back and take the bow.

（6世紀(jì)后期的一本手冊(cè)說(shuō)明了騎兵必須執(zhí)行的特定技能練習(xí)：

【騎兵】應(yīng)速射，騎馬慢跑，向前、向后、向右、向左； 他應(yīng)該練習(xí)跳上他的馬。在騎馬和慢跑時(shí)，他應(yīng)該快速射出一兩支箭，然后將已上弦的弓放在弓盒中……然后拿起他背在背上的長(zhǎng)矛。將已上弦的弓裝在盒中，他應(yīng)將長(zhǎng)矛握在手中，然后迅速將其放回背上并拿起弓。）

????????? As well as these individual skills with bow, lance or sword, the troops were drilled in formation, so that, in larger or smaller bodies, they could be wheeled, moved from column into line and back again, form a square against heavy cavalry attack, form into a wedge to break through an enemy formation, and so forth. Success on the battlefield often depended on the effectiveness with which such manoeuvres might be carried out, although it was also admitted that things should be kept as simple as possible to avoid confusion or being caught unprepared mid-way through a manoeuvre - there are examples of battles in which one of the reasons for the collapse of the imperial forces appears to be due to such errors.

（除了弓、槍、劍這些個(gè)人技能外，部隊(duì)還被編隊(duì)訓(xùn)練，這樣他們就可以在或大或小的身體上進(jìn)行輪式，從縱隊(duì)到隊(duì)列再回來(lái)，形成一個(gè)方陣，對(duì)抗重騎兵的進(jìn)攻。形成楔形以突破敵人的陣型，等等。戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上的成功通常取決于執(zhí)行此類機(jī)動(dòng)的有效性，盡管人們也承認(rèn)事情應(yīng)該盡可能簡(jiǎn)單，以避免在機(jī)動(dòng)中途出現(xiàn)混亂或措手不及——有一些例子 帝國(guó)軍隊(duì)崩潰的原因之一似乎是由于這些錯(cuò)誤的戰(zhàn)斗。）

未完待續(xù)