本文選自衛(wèi)報(bào)，和學(xué)長(zhǎng)一起來(lái)再看氣候問(wèn)題。

學(xué)長(zhǎng)建議

1. 在語(yǔ)境中學(xué)習(xí)表達(dá)用法；

2. 著重把握學(xué)長(zhǎng)標(biāo)注的內(nèi)容；

3. 帶著問(wèn)題去閱讀文章。

Reading Comprehension

1. According to the article, why do the vast majority of people consider climate change to be a global emergency?

2. How can we end the vicious cycle of climate change?

3. Why are the poorest people not responsible for any of the decisions on emissions?

4. What responsibility should the rich have in terms of emissions?

5. What is the purpose of the example of France in the text?

6. Why does any deviation from an egalitarian strategy justify redistribution?

The richest 10% produce about half of greenhouse gas emissions.

This is not simply a rich versus poor countries divide: there are huge emitters in poor countries, and low emitters in rich countries

這不是簡(jiǎn)單的富國(guó)與窮國(guó)之分：窮國(guó)有巨大的排放者，而富國(guó)有低排放者。

let’s face it: our chances of staying under a 2C increase in global temperature are not looking good. If we continue business as usual, the world is on track to heat up by 3C at least by the end of this century. At current global emissions rates, the carbon budget that we have left if we are to stay under 1.5C will be depleted in six years. The paradox is that, globally, popular support for climate action has never been so strong. According to a recent United Nations poll, the vast majority of people around the world sees climate change as a global emergency. So, what have we got wrong so far?

讓我們面對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)吧：我們將全球溫度保持在 2°以下的機(jī)會(huì)并不樂(lè)觀(guān)。如果我們繼續(xù)照常工作，到本世紀(jì)末，世界將至少升溫 3°。按照目前的全球排放率，如果我們要保持在 1.5℃以下，我們剩下的碳預(yù)算將在六年內(nèi)耗盡。矛盾的是，在全球范圍內(nèi)，民眾對(duì)氣候行動(dòng)的支持從未如此強(qiáng)烈。根據(jù)聯(lián)合國(guó)最近的一項(xiàng)民意調(diào)查，世界上絕大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為氣候變化是一個(gè)全球性的緊急情況。那么，到目前為止，我們有什么錯(cuò)呢？

There is a fundamental problem in contemporary discussion of climate policy: it rarely acknowledges inequality. Poorer households, which are low CO2 emitters, rightly anticipate that climate policies will limit their purchasing power. In return, policymakers fear a political backlash should they demand faster climate action. The problem with this vicious circle is that it has lost us a lot of time. The good news is that we can end it.

當(dāng)代關(guān)于氣候政策的討論有一個(gè)根本問(wèn)題：它很少承認(rèn)不平等。貧窮的家庭是低二氧化碳排放者，他們正確地預(yù)期氣候政策將限制他們的購(gòu)買(mǎi)力。作為回報(bào)，政策制定者擔(dān)心，如果他們要求加快氣候行動(dòng)，會(huì)引起政治反彈。這種惡性循環(huán)的問(wèn)題是，它使我們失去了很多時(shí)間。好消息是，我們可以結(jié)束它

Let’s first look at the facts: 10% of the world’s population are responsible for about half of all greenhouse gas emissions, while the bottom half of the world contributes just 12% of all emissions. This is not simply a rich versus poor countries divide: there are huge emitters in poor countries, and low emitters in rich countries.

讓我們先看一下事實(shí)。世界上 10%的人口要對(duì)所有溫室氣體排放的一半負(fù)責(zé)，而世界上最底層的一半人口只占所有排放的 12%。這不是簡(jiǎn)單的富國(guó)與窮國(guó)之分：窮國(guó)有巨大的排放者，而富國(guó)則有低排放者。

Consider the US, for instance. Every year, the poorest 50% of the US population emit about 10 tonnes of CO2 per person, while the richest 10% emit 75 tonnes per person. That is a gap of more than seven to one. Similarly, in Europe, the poorest half emits about five tonnes per person, while the richest 10% emit about 30 tonnes – a gap of six to one. You can now view this data on the World Inequality Database

例如，考慮到美國(guó)。每年，美國(guó)最貧窮的 50%的人口每人排放約 10 噸二氧化碳，而最富有的 10%的人口每人排放 75 噸。這是一個(gè)超過(guò)七比一的差距。同樣，在歐洲，最貧窮的一半人口每人排放約 5 噸，而最富裕的 10%人口排放約 30 噸：差距為 6 比 1。你現(xiàn)在可以在世界不平等數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)中查看這些數(shù)據(jù)。

Where do these large inequalities come from? The rich emit more carbon through the goods and services they buy, as well as from the investments they make. Low-income groups emit carbon when they use their cars or heat their homes, but their indirect emissions – that is, the emissions from the stuff they buy and the investments they make – are significantly lower than those of the rich. The poorest half of the population barely owns any wealth, meaning that it has little or no responsibility for emissions associated with investment decisions.

這些巨大的不平等從何而來(lái)？富人通過(guò)他們購(gòu)買(mǎi)的商品和服務(wù)，以及他們的投資排放更多的碳。低收入群體在使用汽車(chē)或取暖時(shí)排放碳，但他們的間接排放——即他們購(gòu)買(mǎi)的東西和進(jìn)行的投資的排放——明顯低于富人的排放。最貧窮的一半人口幾乎不擁有任何財(cái)富，這意味著他們對(duì)與投資決策相關(guān)的排放幾乎沒(méi)有任何責(zé)任。

Why do these inequalities matter? After all, shouldn’t we all reduce our emissions? Yes, we should, but obviously some groups will have to make a greater effort than others. Intuitively, we might think here of the big emitters, the rich, right? True, and also poorer people have less capacity to decarbonize their consumption. It follows that the rich should contribute the most to curbing emissions, and the poor be given the capacity to cope with the transition to 1.5C or 2C. Unfortunately, this is not what is happening – if anything, what is happening is closer to the opposite.

為什么這些不平等現(xiàn)象很重要？畢竟，我們不應(yīng)該都減少我們的排放嗎？是的，我們應(yīng)該，但顯然有些群體必須比其他人做出更大的努力。直觀(guān)地說(shuō)，我們?cè)谶@里可能會(huì)想到大的排放者，即富人，對(duì)嗎？沒(méi)錯(cuò)，而且窮人的消費(fèi)去碳化的能力也較弱。因此，富人應(yīng)該為遏制排放做出最大的貢獻(xiàn)，而窮人應(yīng)該有能力應(yīng)對(duì)向 1.5° 或 2° 的過(guò)渡。不幸的是，這不是正在發(fā)生的事情 ——如果有的話(huà)，正在發(fā)生的事情更接近于相反。

It was evident in France in 2018, when the government raised carbon taxes in a way that hit rural, low-income households particularly hard, without much affecting the consumption habits and investment portfolios of the well-off. Many families had no way to reduce their energy consumption. They had no option but to drive their cars to go to work and to pay the higher carbon tax. At the same time, the aviation fuel used by the rich to fly from Paris to the French Riviera was exempted from the tax change. Reactions to this unequal treatment eventually led to the reform being abandoned. These politics of climate action, which demand no significant effort from the rich yet hurt the poor, are not specific to any one country. Fears of job losses in certain industries are regularly used by business groups as an argument to slow climate policies.

這在2018年的法國(guó)很明顯，當(dāng)時(shí)政府提高了碳稅，對(duì)農(nóng)村、低收入家庭的打擊特別大，而對(duì)小康之家的消費(fèi)習(xí)慣和投資組合沒(méi)有多大影響。許多家庭沒(méi)有辦法減少他們的能源消耗。他們別無(wú)選擇，只能開(kāi)著汽車(chē)去上班，支付更高的碳稅。同時(shí)，富人用來(lái)從巴黎飛往法國(guó)里維埃拉的航空燃料被豁免于稅收變化。對(duì)這種不平等待遇的反應(yīng)最終導(dǎo)致改革被放棄。這些氣候行動(dòng)的政治，沒(méi)有要求富人做出重大努力，卻傷害了窮人，并不是任何一個(gè)國(guó)家所特有的。對(duì)某些行業(yè)失業(yè)的擔(dān)憂(yōu)經(jīng)常被商業(yè)團(tuán)體用來(lái)作為減緩氣候政策的理由。

Countries have announced plans to cut their emissions significantly by 2030 and most have established plans to reach net-zero somewhere around 2050. Let’s focus on the first milestone, the 2030 emission reduction target: according to my recent study as expressed in per capita terms, the poorest half of the population in the US and most European countries have already reached or almost reached the target. This is not the case at all for the middle classes and the wealthy, who are well above – that is to say, behind – the target.

各國(guó)已經(jīng)宣布了到 2030 年大幅減少排放的計(jì)劃，大多數(shù)國(guó)家已經(jīng)制定了在 2050 年左右達(dá)到凈零排放的計(jì)劃。讓我們專(zhuān)注于第一個(gè)里程碑，2030 年的減排目標(biāo)：根據(jù)我最近的研究，以人均計(jì)算，美國(guó)和大多數(shù)歐洲國(guó)家最貧窮的一半人口已經(jīng)達(dá)到或幾乎達(dá)到目標(biāo)。而中產(chǎn)階級(jí)和富人的情況則完全不是這樣，他們遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于——也就是說(shuō)——落后于目標(biāo)。

One way to reduce carbon inequalities is to establish individual carbon rights, similar to the schemes that some countries use to manage scarce environmental resources such as water. Such an approach would inevitably raise technical and information issues, but it is a strategy that deserves attention. There are many ways to reduce the overall emissions of a country, but the bottom line is that anything but a strictly egalitarian strategy inevitably means demanding greater climate mitigation effort from those who are already at the target level, and less from those who are well above it; this is basic arithmetic.

減少碳不平等的一個(gè)方法是建立個(gè)人碳權(quán)，類(lèi)似于一些國(guó)家用來(lái)管理水等稀缺環(huán)境資源的計(jì)劃。這種方法將不可避免地引起技術(shù)和信息問(wèn)題，但這是一個(gè)值得關(guān)注的戰(zhàn)略。有許多方法可以減少一個(gè)國(guó)家的總體排放量，但底線(xiàn)是，除了嚴(yán)格的平均主義戰(zhàn)略之外，任何其他方法都不可避免地意味著要求那些已經(jīng)達(dá)到目標(biāo)水平的人做出更大的氣候減緩努力，而那些遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)目標(biāo)水平的人則要減少努力；這是基本的算術(shù)。

Arguably, any deviation from an egalitarian strategy would justify serious redistribution from the wealthy to the worse off to compensate the latter. Many countries will continue to impose carbon and energy taxes on consumption in the years to come. In these contexts, it is important that we learn from previous experiences. The French example shows what not to do. In contrast, British Columbia’s implementation of a carbon tax in 2008 was a success – even though the Canadian province relies heavily on oil and gas – because a large share of the resulting tax revenues goes to compensate low- and middle-income consumers via direct cash payments. In Indonesia, the ending of fossil fuel subsidies a few years ago meant extra resources for government but also higher energy prices for low-income families. Initially highly contested, the reform was accepted when the government decided to use the revenue to fund a universal health insurance and support to the poorest.

可以說(shuō)，任何偏離平均主義戰(zhàn)略的行為都將證明從富人到窮人的嚴(yán)重再分配是合理的，以補(bǔ)償后者。許多國(guó)家在未來(lái)幾年將繼續(xù)對(duì)消費(fèi)征收碳和能源稅。在這些情況下，重要的是我們要從以前的經(jīng)驗(yàn)中學(xué)習(xí)。法國(guó)的例子說(shuō)明了什么是不應(yīng)該做的。相比之下，不列顛哥倫比亞省在 2008 年實(shí)施的碳稅是成功的——盡管該省嚴(yán)重依賴(lài)石油和天然氣——因?yàn)橛纱水a(chǎn)生的稅收收入的很大一部分通過(guò)直接現(xiàn)金支付來(lái)補(bǔ)償中低收入的消費(fèi)者。在印度尼西亞，幾年前結(jié)束化石燃料補(bǔ)貼意味著政府的額外資源，但也意味著低收入家庭的能源價(jià)格上漲。起初，這項(xiàng)改革備受爭(zhēng)議，但當(dāng)政府決定將收入用于資助全民健康保險(xiǎn)和支持最貧窮的人時(shí)，這項(xiàng)改革被接受了。

To accelerate the energy transition, we must also think outside the box. Consider, for example, a progressive tax on wealth, with a pollution top-up. This would accelerate the shift out of fossil fuels by making access to capital more expensive for the fossil fuel industries. It would also generate potentially large revenues for governments that they could invest in green industries and innovation. Such taxes would be politically easier to pass than a standard carbon tax, since they target a fraction of the population, not the majority. At the world level, a modest wealth tax on multimillionaires with a pollution top-up could generate 1.7% of global income. This could fund the bulk of extra investments required every year to meet climate mitigation efforts.

為了加速能源轉(zhuǎn)型，我們還必須突破局限。例如，考慮對(duì)財(cái)富征收累進(jìn)稅，并對(duì)污染進(jìn)行加價(jià)。這將通過(guò)使化石燃料行業(yè)獲得的資本更加昂貴來(lái)加速化石燃料的轉(zhuǎn)變。它還將為政府帶來(lái)潛在的大量收入，使其可以投資于綠色產(chǎn)業(yè)和創(chuàng)新。這種稅在政治上比標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的碳稅更容易通過(guò)，因?yàn)樗鼈冡槍?duì)的是人口的一部分，而不是大多數(shù)。在世界范圍內(nèi)，對(duì)百萬(wàn)富翁征收適度的財(cái)富稅，再加上污染補(bǔ)貼，可以產(chǎn)生全球收入的 1.7%。這可以資助每年所需的大部分額外投資，以滿(mǎn)足氣候減緩的努力。

Whatever the path chosen by societies to accelerate the transition – and there are many potential paths – it’s time for us to acknowledge there can be no deep decarbonization without profound redistribution of income and wealth.

無(wú)論社會(huì)選擇什么樣的道路來(lái)加速轉(zhuǎn)型——有許多潛在的道路——現(xiàn)在是時(shí)候讓我們承認(rèn)，沒(méi)有收入和財(cái)富的深刻再分配，就不可能有深入的脫碳過(guò)程。