The Strategic Advantage of Incumbency

過(guò)去二十年來(lái)，許多企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者開(kāi)始關(guān)注存亡問(wèn)題。20世紀(jì)的大部分時(shí)期，在某一領(lǐng)域經(jīng)營(yíng)多年、市場(chǎng)占有率強(qiáng)勁、員工眾多的企業(yè)都被視為前景樂(lè)觀。企業(yè)規(guī)模被當(dāng)作資產(chǎn)而非負(fù)累。但在20世紀(jì)90年代初期，IBM和通用汽車等長(zhǎng)期居于主導(dǎo)地位的公司開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)巨額虧損。90年代后期，克萊頓·克里斯坦森（Clayton Christensen）形容成熟公司受累于自身成功的顛覆性創(chuàng)新理論成為企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略中流行的概念。

Over the past two decades many corporate leaders have become focused—perhaps too focused—on that existential question. For most of the 20th century a company that had been in business for many years and had a strong market share and a large employee base was viewed positively. Size was seen as an asset, not a liability. But in the early 1990s long-dominant firms like IBM and General Motors began experiencing significant losses. Later in that decade, Clayton Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation, which describes how established companies fall victim to their own success, became a popular concept in strategy.

普遍的思維模式由此發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變：如今企業(yè)年齡和規(guī)模往往被視為弱點(diǎn)，老式公司常被塑造成巨人歌利亞，最終會(huì)被矮小靈活的大衛(wèi)打倒。這種普遍的看法——大企業(yè)的顛覆和滅亡不可避免——令許多市場(chǎng)主導(dǎo)企業(yè)采取防御的態(tài)度，創(chuàng)新和轉(zhuǎn)型都像是鋌而走險(xiǎn)。? ? ?

That caused a shift in the prevailing mindset: Today age and size are often perceived as vulnerabilities, and “l(fā)egacy” firms are typically cast as Goliaths that will ultimately be taken down by smaller, nimbler Davids. This conventional wisdom—that corporate disruption and death are inevitable—has put many market leaders in a defensive stance. Inside such firms innovation and transformation efforts can take on an air of desperation.

而我們看到了一條不同的道路。與其擺出防御姿勢(shì)，成熟企業(yè)更應(yīng)當(dāng)采取一種我們稱為“戰(zhàn)略性在位”的思維和行動(dòng)方式。我們將戰(zhàn)略性在位定義為，成熟企業(yè)將自身年齡、規(guī)模和傳統(tǒng)轉(zhuǎn)化為市場(chǎng)支配力、信賴關(guān)系和深入洞見(jiàn)等關(guān)鍵優(yōu)勢(shì)的能力。這種轉(zhuǎn)化如果安排得當(dāng)，在位企業(yè)就可以改造自身、戰(zhàn)略及商業(yè)模式，創(chuàng)造新的機(jī)遇并防御新入者。? ? ?

We see a different path forward. Instead of embracing a defensive posture, established companies should adopt a mindset and a set of behaviors we call?strategic incumbency.?We define strategic incumbency as an established firm’s ability to dynamically convert age, size, and tradition into the key advantages of market power, trusted relationships, and deep insights. That conversion, when managed well, allows incumbents to reinvent themselves, their strategies, and their business models and create new opportunities and ward off upstarts.

問(wèn)題在于怎么辦？成功的在位者會(huì)采取哪些措施應(yīng)對(duì)艱難的環(huán)境？如何比其他公司準(zhǔn)備得更充分？

The question is: How? What steps do successful incumbents take to prevail through tough circumstances? How are they better equipped than other firms??

管理復(fù)雜性

Harnessing Complexity? ??

復(fù)雜性雖然有負(fù)面含義，但也有好的和壞的方面。官僚程序拖慢決策、造成內(nèi)部權(quán)力競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、讓組織變得更加“忙碌”，這是壞的復(fù)雜性。增加收入或利潤(rùn)、讓人們齊心協(xié)力、增加活力和專注的則是好的復(fù)雜性。戰(zhàn)略性在位要系統(tǒng)性地消除壞的復(fù)雜性，有效增加好的復(fù)雜性——具體方法通常是以小競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者無(wú)法復(fù)制的方式滿足各種客戶需求。

Although complexity has a negative connotation, it has both good and bad facets. Bureaucratic processes that slow down decision-making, create internal power plays, and add “busyness” to an organization are bad complexity. Anything that boosts the top or bottom line and creates alignment, energy, and focus is good complexity. Strategic incumbents systematically eliminate bad complexity and effectively increase good complexity—often by approaching a wide set of customer needs in ways that smaller competitors can’t replicate.

舉個(gè)通過(guò)復(fù)雜性增加價(jià)值的例子，比如英荷聯(lián)營(yíng)的印度聯(lián)合利華公司（Hindustan Unilever Limited，簡(jiǎn)稱HUL）。2013年桑吉夫·梅赫塔（Sanjiv Mehta）當(dāng)上CEO時(shí)，這家公司已有80年的歷史。梅赫塔質(zhì)疑內(nèi)部認(rèn)為本公司作為印度最大的快速消費(fèi)品生產(chǎn)商已經(jīng)沒(méi)有多少發(fā)展空間的想法。為了反駁這一觀點(diǎn)，他問(wèn)了一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的問(wèn)題：“印度消費(fèi)者的特征是什么？”?

For an example of value-adding complexity, consider Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL), the Indian subsidiary of Unilever, the Anglo-Dutch multinational. When Sanjiv Mehta became the CEO of the then 80-year-old organization, in 2013, he challenged the internal sentiment that there was little room for the largest fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) player in the country to grow. To counter that viewpoint, he asked a simple question: “What is the identity of the Indian consumer?”

? ?

印度人口超過(guò)十億，每隔幾百公里的語(yǔ)言、文化、食物和偏好都不同，這個(gè)問(wèn)題并沒(méi)有唯一的答案。梅赫塔沒(méi)有把印度當(dāng)作一個(gè)單一的組織，而是與團(tuán)隊(duì)一同設(shè)計(jì)了“在許多個(gè)印度取得勝利”戰(zhàn)略。他們首先根據(jù)消費(fèi)模式和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展階段將印度消費(fèi)者分為14個(gè)群體，隨后設(shè)法通過(guò)本土化推動(dòng)增長(zhǎng)——不僅根據(jù)當(dāng)?shù)匦枨笳{(diào)整產(chǎn)品，還在不同區(qū)域采用不同的分銷和供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略。為了提升組織敏捷性，梅赫塔設(shè)立了15個(gè)全國(guó)級(jí)別的分類業(yè)務(wù)團(tuán)隊(duì)，如居家照護(hù)、洗衣、護(hù)發(fā)、護(hù)膚、自然和食物等。每支團(tuán)隊(duì)由小型委員會(huì)獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)，一位總經(jīng)理負(fù)責(zé)達(dá)到盈利要求。

There was no single answer for a country of more than a billion people, where language, culture, taste, and preferences change every few hundred kilometers. Instead of approaching India as a monolith, Mehta and his team devised a strategy called “Winning in Many Indias.” First they divided the country into 14 consumer clusters based on consumption patterns and stage of economic development. Then they identified ways to use localization to drive growth—not only by adapting products for local tastes but also by using different distribution and supply chain strategies in different regions. To improve his organization’s agility, Mehta set up 15 country category business teams, such as home care, laundry, hair care, skin care, naturals, and food. Each team was independently run by a mini board and headed by a general manager with a mandate to deliver on the P&L.

? ? ?

這種去中心化的組織幫助HUL將資源投入到能夠通過(guò)迎合當(dāng)?shù)匦枨蠛涂谖东@得最大回報(bào)的地方。HUL的規(guī)模和資源——即在位的積累——也使其得以同時(shí)采取多種不同的方法。初創(chuàng)企業(yè)根本不可能根據(jù)這么多不同區(qū)域的需求對(duì)這么多產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行調(diào)整。??

This decentralized organization helped HUL invest resources where it would obtain the highest returns by catering to regional needs and tastes. HUL’s size and resources—its incumbency—allowed it to tackle a broad variety of approaches at once. No start-up could hope to localize so many products for so many regions.

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有多少領(lǐng)導(dǎo)團(tuán)隊(duì)敢于在如此成功的企業(yè)進(jìn)行規(guī)模如此之大的結(jié)構(gòu)性改變？對(duì)于梅赫塔而言，讓HUL進(jìn)入下一個(gè)增長(zhǎng)軌道的唯一方式，就是根據(jù)印度各地的不均一性調(diào)整公司運(yùn)營(yíng)結(jié)構(gòu)。他向投資者解釋，“如果（新結(jié)構(gòu)）為業(yè)務(wù)增加了復(fù)雜性，也是像有益膽固醇一樣——這是我們樂(lè)見(jiàn)的復(fù)雜性，在我們的管理之下?！盚UL的轉(zhuǎn)型使得收入從2013年至2019年增加了41%，稅前利潤(rùn)翻了一倍，利潤(rùn)率持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)。投資者獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)了公司：2019年10月，HUL市值達(dá)到600億美元，躋身全世界最有價(jià)值的快速消費(fèi)品企業(yè)之列，超過(guò)高露潔、卡夫亨氏和利潔時(shí)（Reckitt Benckiser）。

How many leadership teams would have dared to undertake a structural change of such magnitude—in a successful company at that? For Mehta, the only way to launch HUL on its next growth trajectory was to align the company’s operating structure with the heterogeneity of the country. He explained to investors, “It [the new structure] added complexity to the business, but it is like good cholesterol—it’s a complexity which we welcome, and it’s a complexity which we manage.” HUL’s efforts led to 41% revenue growth from 2013 to 2019, a doubling of pretax profits, and consistent margin improvements. Investors rewarded the company: In October 2019, HUL’s market capitalization of $60 billion made it one of the most valuable FMCG companies in the world, ahead of Colgate-Palmolive, Kraft Heinz, and Reckitt Benckiser.

關(guān)注長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展

Maintaining a Long-Term Focus

我們的研究里，成功的在位企業(yè)顯示出堅(jiān)持長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)打算的非凡能力。被動(dòng)的在位者會(huì)對(duì)季度表現(xiàn)斤斤計(jì)較，戰(zhàn)略在位者則力求平衡當(dāng)下的成果和對(duì)未來(lái)的準(zhǔn)備。研究中一家公司的CEO解釋，“短期指標(biāo)是外部計(jì)分卡，但還需要更重要的內(nèi)部計(jì)分卡，關(guān)注你對(duì)員工、客戶和社會(huì)的長(zhǎng)期貢獻(xiàn)?！?/p>

In our study successful incumbents showed exceptional ability to stick to a long-term agenda. Whereas passive incumbents get caught up in quarterly performance, strategic incumbents strive to balance delivering in the present with preparing for the future. The CEO of one company we studied explained, “The short-term metrics are the?outer?scorecard, but you also need a more important?inner?scorecard that looks at the contribution you make to employees, customers, and society in the long term.”?

美國(guó)著名的迪瑞公司（Deere and Company），所在的農(nóng)機(jī)設(shè)備行業(yè)周期性很強(qiáng)。幾十年來(lái)這家公司渡過(guò)多次災(zāi)難性的行業(yè)低迷和錘煉，一個(gè)原因是CEO任職時(shí)間長(zhǎng)——在183年的時(shí)間里只有10位CEO。自2009年至2019年擔(dān)任迪瑞CEO的塞繆爾·艾倫（Samuel Allen）整整45年的職業(yè)生涯全都在這家公司度過(guò)。他掌舵期間的迪瑞經(jīng)歷了半個(gè)世紀(jì)以來(lái)最嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)下行周期。2014年至2016年，主要農(nóng)作物價(jià)格下跌，美國(guó)農(nóng)場(chǎng)收入減少，農(nóng)場(chǎng)主推遲購(gòu)買新設(shè)備。農(nóng)機(jī)設(shè)備銷量暴跌，行業(yè)分析師開(kāi)始懷疑迪瑞的發(fā)展前景。但艾倫依然忠于公司的長(zhǎng)期戰(zhàn)略：領(lǐng)導(dǎo)精準(zhǔn)農(nóng)業(yè)——將農(nóng)場(chǎng)設(shè)備與科技結(jié)合起來(lái)，幫助農(nóng)場(chǎng)主以高效環(huán)保的方式提高作物產(chǎn)量和盈利能力——這是前幾任CEO在20世紀(jì)90年代定下的目標(biāo)。艾倫堅(jiān)持嚴(yán)格控制成本，應(yīng)對(duì)緊迫的財(cái)務(wù)壓力，但依然會(huì)將年銷售額的約4%到6%用于收購(gòu)和研發(fā)投資，打造數(shù)字化能力，即使在最艱難的時(shí)期也未中止。? ? ?

Consider the iconic U.S.-based Deere and Company, which operates in the highly cyclical agricultural equipment industry. One reason the company has survived many catastrophic downturns and forged on, decade after decade, is its long-tenured CEOs. It has had just 10 CEOs in its 183-year history. Samuel Allen, Deere’s CEO from 2009 to 2019, was with the company for his entire 45-year career. During his time at the helm, Deere saw the worst down cycle in half a century. From 2014 to 2016, the prices of key agricultural crops fell, U.S. farm income declined, and farmers put off buying new equipment. As sales slumped, industry analysts became skeptical about Deere’s prospects. But Allen remained true to the company’s long-term strategy of being a leader in precision agriculture—the practice of combining farm equipment and technology to help farmers increase yields and profitability in an efficient and environmentally friendly manner—a goal set by his predecessors in the 1990s. He adhered to strict cost discipline to manage the immediate financial pressures but continued to make acquisitions and R&D investments of about 4% to 6% of annual sales to build digital capabilities, even in the most difficult years.

迪瑞公司堅(jiān)持這一戰(zhàn)略的過(guò)程中，在位的積累提供了一系列優(yōu)勢(shì)：廣大的客戶基礎(chǔ)和一百多年的聲譽(yù)。農(nóng)場(chǎng)經(jīng)營(yíng)通常是幾代人的事業(yè)，客戶知道是迪瑞的鋼犁讓中西部成為了農(nóng)業(yè)中心地帶。迪瑞早已有這種創(chuàng)新的傳統(tǒng)，讓價(jià)值主張實(shí)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)代化。通過(guò)為產(chǎn)品配置自動(dòng)化技術(shù)、車載信息服務(wù)、計(jì)算機(jī)視覺(jué)系統(tǒng)、全球衛(wèi)星定位系統(tǒng)和傳感器，迪瑞幫助農(nóng)場(chǎng)主增加產(chǎn)量、降低成本、提高效率，并且極大地促進(jìn)盈利和增長(zhǎng)。21世紀(jì)10年代初期，迪瑞開(kāi)始關(guān)注改變行業(yè)面貌的數(shù)字化技術(shù)，如人工智能和機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)，可以協(xié)助為每一株作物做出實(shí)時(shí)耕種決定。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)，迪瑞前不久收購(gòu)了加利福尼亞的藍(lán)河科技（Blue River Technology），整合計(jì)算機(jī)視覺(jué)和機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)，讓農(nóng)場(chǎng)主可以只在雜草上噴灑殺蟲劑。? ? ?

As Deere pursued this strategy, incumbency provided it with a set of advantages: an immense installed base and a reputation that extended back more than a hundred years. Farming tends to be a multigenerational business, so customers know Deere as the company behind the steel plow that transformed the Midwest into an agricultural heartland. Deere had built on this legacy of innovation to modernize its value proposition. By outfitting its products with automation, telematics, computer vision, GPS, and sensors, it helped farmers produce more, reduce costs, increase efficiencies, and boost their profitability and growth. In the early 2010s, Deere began focusing on game-changing digital technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, which made farming decisions on a plant-by-plant level in real time. For example, Deere’s recent acquisition, the California-based Blue River Technology, integrates computer vision and machine learning to enable farmers to spray pesticide only on weeds.

向農(nóng)場(chǎng)主出售新技術(shù)可不容易：他們保守且節(jié)儉。但迪瑞堅(jiān)持不懈，運(yùn)用對(duì)客戶的深入了解，說(shuō)服較為前沿的農(nóng)場(chǎng)率先采用新技術(shù)，證明技術(shù)的確可以提升運(yùn)營(yíng)效率，然后迅速推廣到其他農(nóng)場(chǎng)。不過(guò)，迪瑞的目標(biāo)不只是為農(nóng)場(chǎng)主優(yōu)化輸入和最大化輸出，更大的動(dòng)力是一個(gè)全球共同面對(duì)的現(xiàn)實(shí)：世界人口預(yù)計(jì)將在2050年達(dá)到97億，屆時(shí)必須以與現(xiàn)在相同的耕地面積產(chǎn)出翻倍的農(nóng)作物，才能提供足夠的食物。精準(zhǔn)農(nóng)業(yè)不只是產(chǎn)品策略，也是維持人類下一代生存發(fā)展的途徑。??

Selling farmers on new technologies isn’t easy: They tend to be conservative and frugal. However, Deere persevered, using its deep knowledge of customers to target leading-edge farms for initial adoption, establishing proof that technology helped them operate more efficiently, and then spiraling out to the rest. But Deere sought to do more than merely optimize input and maximize output for farmers. Its bigger motivation is a global reality: Given that the world’s population is expected to rise to 9.7 billion by 2050, agricultural yields will need to double to produce enough food to meet demand then with the same amount of arable land in use today. Precision agriculture isn’t just a product strategy; it’s a way to sustain the next generation.

利用信賴可靠的客戶關(guān)系

向鄰近領(lǐng)域擴(kuò)展? ? ?

Leveraging Trusted Customer Relationships

to Expand into Adjacencies

我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，重新定義競(jìng)爭(zhēng)場(chǎng)地的一個(gè)強(qiáng)力因素是信賴。戰(zhàn)略在位者在穩(wěn)固的關(guān)系基礎(chǔ)上，與利益相關(guān)者開(kāi)展深入交流，了解對(duì)方需求的演化、將來(lái)要應(yīng)對(duì)的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題，以及利益相關(guān)者和公司共同的利益。? ? ?

One potent enabler for redefining the playing field that we observed is?trust.?Strategic incumbents build on strong relationships to have deep conversations with stakeholders about how their needs are evolving, critical issues that should be addressed in the future, and the interests that they and the company have in common.

丹麥的穆勒-馬士基集團(tuán)（A.P. M?ller–Maersk）就是這樣做的。這家有117年歷史的公司，生產(chǎn)的貨船遍及世界各地。2016年CEO索倫·斯科（S?ren Skou）上任，肩負(fù)著歐洲工業(yè)界規(guī)模最大的轉(zhuǎn)型之一。他放棄了馬士基的石油和能源業(yè)務(wù)，讓公司集中發(fā)展兩大支柱——海上運(yùn)輸和陸上物流。? ? ?

One firm that did this was A.P. M?ller–Maersk. The name of the 117-year-old company adorns cargo ships all over the world. (Maersk’s?Alabama?attracted worldwide attention when it was seized by Somali pirates in 2009, an event that became the subject of a movie starring Tom Hanks.) When S?ren Skou took over as its CEO, in 2016, he was tasked with one of the biggest transformations in European industry. He jettisoned Maersk’s oil and energy businesses in order to focus the company on two pillars—marine shipping and land-based logistics.

馬士基知道必須保持海運(yùn)方面的優(yōu)勢(shì)——這是公司的核心和靈魂。早在20世紀(jì)70年代，馬士基就開(kāi)辟了大型集裝箱貨運(yùn)業(yè)務(wù)，越來(lái)越大的集裝箱運(yùn)貨船不斷創(chuàng)造和打破世界紀(jì)錄。然而，行業(yè)被商品化、波動(dòng)、合并、低利潤(rùn)和六十年里最漫長(zhǎng)的衰退（2008年至2016年）所席卷。在這樣的背景下，斯科的策略是通過(guò)連接和簡(jiǎn)化全球供應(yīng)鏈為客戶創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，而不是單純地把集裝箱從一個(gè)港口運(yùn)到另一個(gè)港口。機(jī)會(huì)是巨大的，因?yàn)轳R士基的海上運(yùn)輸量占全球的1/5，但只向不到20%的海運(yùn)客戶出售了陸上物流產(chǎn)品。? ? ?

The Danish behemoth knew that it had to protect its superiority in shipping—the heart and soul of the company. Maersk had pioneered large-scale container shipping back in the 1970s, repeatedly setting and breaking world records with the launch of ever-bigger container ships. However, the industry had been plagued by commoditization, volatility, consolidation, low margins, and the longest downturn in six decades (2008 to 2016). Against this backdrop, Skou’s strategy was to create value for customers by connecting and simplifying their global supply chains, instead of just moving containers from port to port. The opportunity was immense, since Maersk transported one-fifth of all seaborne freight but sold land-based logistics products to fewer than 20% of its ocean-shipping customers.

不過(guò)，僅憑公司的傳統(tǒng)貨運(yùn)能力，無(wú)法驅(qū)動(dòng)新的價(jià)值主張。因此馬士基聘請(qǐng)了新的人才，調(diào)整物流結(jié)構(gòu)并投資進(jìn)行并購(gòu)以發(fā)展物流能力。公司大幅度轉(zhuǎn)向，從供給驅(qū)動(dòng)（將產(chǎn)品推薦給客戶）轉(zhuǎn)為需求驅(qū)動(dòng)，設(shè)法應(yīng)對(duì)客戶需求和痛點(diǎn)。馬士基航運(yùn)及物流負(fù)責(zé)人文森特·克萊爾（Vincent Clerc）說(shuō)，“我們轉(zhuǎn)為解決方案模式，將客戶需求置于價(jià)值主張的核心。我們消除麻煩，將不同的海運(yùn)和陸運(yùn)產(chǎn)品綜合起來(lái)發(fā)揮作用，并為結(jié)果承擔(dān)責(zé)任?！钡R士基成功的能力從何而來(lái)？部分優(yōu)勢(shì)在于擁有的資產(chǎn)令其有能力控制向客戶承諾的成果，以及通過(guò)貨物出站和入站實(shí)時(shí)信息、貨物追蹤、交通管制、天氣對(duì)路線的影響以及交付時(shí)間等各種數(shù)據(jù)實(shí)現(xiàn)端對(duì)端可見(jiàn)度的能力。? ? ?

However, the company’s traditional capabilities in shipping alone would not drive new value propositions. So Maersk hired new talent, restructured its logistics arm, and invested in M&A to build its logistics capabilities. The company made a big shift from a supply-driven approach (pushing its products to customers) to a demand-driven way of doing business, creating offerings to address customer needs and pain points. Says Vincent Clerc, the head of Ocean and Logistics for Maersk, “We are getting into a solution model where the customer need is at the heart of the proposition. We take away the hassle, combine different ocean and land-side products, make it work, and take accountability for the outcome.” But what gives Maersk the ability to win? Part of its advantage lies in asset ownership, which translates into control over the outcomes it promises to customers, and its ability to orchestrate end-to-end visibility through a wide array of data, such as real-time information on inbound and outbound cargo, shipment tracking, bottlenecks, the impact of weather on shipping routes, and delivery schedules.

技術(shù)是實(shí)現(xiàn)這一轉(zhuǎn)變的關(guān)鍵。馬士基首先整合了數(shù)字創(chuàng)新，讓客戶可以在Maersk.com網(wǎng)站上了解價(jià)格、完成預(yù)訂、處理文件并進(jìn)行支付。? ? ?

Technology was key to achieving that shift. The company started integrating digital innovations that allowed customers to go to Maersk.com to get prices, make bookings, handle documents, and make payments.

在位企業(yè)常常嫉妒敏捷的新入者不必承擔(dān)老舊體系的重荷，但這種態(tài)度會(huì)令在位企業(yè)忽視自身優(yōu)勢(shì)。馬士基并非如此，而是看到長(zhǎng)期從事航運(yùn)業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)歷和與成千上萬(wàn)客戶建立的聯(lián)系在向陸運(yùn)業(yè)務(wù)擴(kuò)展的過(guò)程中形成了巨大的優(yōu)勢(shì)——短短四年時(shí)間，馬士基就重新定義了價(jià)值主張，進(jìn)入新的市場(chǎng)。? ? ?

Incumbents often look with envy at agile new entrants that don’t have to contend with the burden of legacy systems. But in doing so, they fail to recognize their edge. That was not the case at Maersk, however. It saw that its longtime shipping business and existing relationships with thousands of customers gave it a tremendous advantage as it expanded into land-based transport—and within the short span of four years it had redefined its value proposition and moved into a new market.

雖然人們普遍認(rèn)為顛覆是大公司注定的命運(yùn)，但大公司不一定會(huì)消亡。必須學(xué)會(huì)發(fā)揮原有的強(qiáng)項(xiàng)，采取戰(zhàn)略在位行動(dòng)。

Despite the prevailing ethos that disruption is their inevitable fate, large legacy firms do not need to wither and die. Instead they must learn to tap into their inherent strengths and behave like strategic incumbents.

關(guān)鍵詞：顛覆

托馬斯·馬爾奈特（Thomas W. Malnight）艾維·布切（Ivy Buche）| 文

托馬斯·馬爾奈特是瑞士洛桑國(guó)際管理學(xué)院戰(zhàn)略教授、企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型項(xiàng)目學(xué)術(shù)主任，《準(zhǔn)備好了嗎？組織為未來(lái)做準(zhǔn)備的3個(gè)R》（Ready? The 3Rs of Preparing Your Organization for the Future，2013年出版）作者之一。艾維·布切是瑞士洛桑國(guó)際管理學(xué)院企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型項(xiàng)目副總監(jiān)。