正文翻譯

In February, First Republic Bank’s well-heeled customers were yanking money from their accounts. The bank tried to stem the tide by offering higher rates on certificates of deposit. Even that was a tough sell.

二月份，第一共和銀行的富?？蛻粽趶乃麄兊馁~戶中提取資金。該銀行試圖通過提供更高的存款利率來遏制資金流失。但即使這樣也難以說服客戶。

Jim Herbert, the bank’s 78-year-old founder, usually a reassuring presence, slammed his hand on the table during an all-hands meeting. We’ve got to get more deposits, he said, according to people familiar with the matter.

據(jù)知情人士透露，這家銀行的78歲創(chuàng)始人吉姆·赫伯特通常是一副氣定神閑的樣子，但在這一次全員會議上，他重重地拍打著桌子，表示“我們必須獲取更多的存款”。

That was before the March banking panic that toppled two of First Republic’s peers, Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank. Its troubles only worsened after that.

接著在3月份，銀行業(yè)恐慌爆發(fā)，該銀行的兩個同行——硅谷銀行和Signature Bank都倒閉了。此后，該銀行的困境只變得更加嚴(yán)重。

Early Monday morning, regulators seized First Republic and struck a deal to sell the bulk of its operations to JPMorgan Chase & Co., the largest bank in the country.

周一早間，監(jiān)管機構(gòu)接管了第一共和銀行，并達(dá)成將該行大部分業(yè)務(wù)出售給美國最大銀行摩根大通公司(JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPM)的交易。

The collapse of First Republic marks the second-biggest bank failure in U.S. history, behind the 2008 collapse of Washington Mutual Inc. It also spells the end of what was considered one of the most successful strategies in banking: luring wealthy depositors and giving them five-star service.

第一共和銀行的崩塌是美國歷史上第二大銀行倒閉案。一度被認(rèn)為是銀行業(yè)最成功的策略之一也由此終結(jié)，該策略就是吸引富有儲戶并給予他們五星級的服務(wù)。

Few could have predicted the speed and magnitude of the March bank run. First Republic lost more than half of its deposits, around $100 billion, in just a few days. Yet as Mr. Herbert’s urgent message reveals, the bank’s business was already fraying.

幾乎沒有人預(yù)測到3月銀行擠兌的速度和規(guī)模。第一共和銀行短短幾天內(nèi)流失了約1,000億美元存款，相當(dāng)于其存款總額的一半以上。然而，正如Herbert的緊急信息所揭示的，該銀行的業(yè)務(wù)此前已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了裂紋。

First Republic’s undoing was triggered by the Federal Reserve’s rapid series of interest-rate increases, which led depositors to seek better returns elsewhere. That meant it had to pay more to keep them, just when rising rates were battering the value of its mortgage portfolio. It was a problem obvious in hindsight, but First Republic, among others, thought they would survive the Fed’s inflation fighting just fine.

第一共和銀行的困境是美聯(lián)儲一系列快速加息引發(fā)的，這些加息促使儲戶到其他地方尋求更好的回報。這意味著該行需要支付更多的錢留住儲戶，同時利率上升導(dǎo)致住房抵押貸款組合價值受到?jīng)_擊?；仡^來看，這個問題顯而易見，但第一共和銀行等銀行當(dāng)時都認(rèn)為，它們將在美聯(lián)儲對抗通脹的政策下安然無恙。

“Clients stay with us,” Mr. Herbert told investors last November. “They grow, they compound, their deposits compound, their loans compound, and they bring their friends. It’s not a complicated model, and it works in all environments.”

“客戶會留在我們這，”Herbert去年11月對投資者說?！翱蛻魰鲩L，會復(fù)合式增長，他們的存款有復(fù)利，他們的貸款有復(fù)利，他們會介紹朋友來。這個模式并不復(fù)雜，在所有的環(huán)境下都是有效的?！?/p>

A spokesman for Mr. Herbert declined to comment.

Herbert的一位發(fā)言人不予置評。

This wasn’t supposed to happen. First Republic, based in San Francisco, was a big bank with a small-town feel, the ultimate relationship bank. Wealthy customers, the thinking went, wanted high-touch service more than a few extra dollars in interest on their deposits.

該行的崩塌本不該發(fā)生?？偛课挥谂f金山的第一共和銀行是一家具有小城鎮(zhèn)銀行風(fēng)格的大銀行，是終極版關(guān)系銀行。其理念是，高凈值客戶更想要的是高接觸服務(wù)，而不是從他們的存款中多賺一點利息。

First Republic gathered these clients, paid them minimal interest and used their deposits to fund mortgages. More deposits meant more loans for condo projects in Manhattan or second homes in Hawaii. First Republic got back far more from these borrowers—3.03% in interest charged on average in 2021—than it paid out to depositors, 0.12% on average.

第一共和銀行吸引了這些客戶，向他們支付非常低的利息，并用他們的存款發(fā)放房貸。存款更多，就意味著可以為購買曼哈頓公寓項目或在夏威夷買二套房提供更多貸款。第一共和銀行通過發(fā)放這些貸款獲得的回報遠(yuǎn)高于向儲戶支付的利息，2021年平均收取3.03%的房貸利息，向儲戶支付的利息平均為0.12%。

These loans often had bespoke features, and they almost never went bad.

這些貸款通常有定制的特點，而且基本從未變成壞賬。