逃離黑格爾（二）
? ? ? ? 本篇文章由我翻譯，全文共26頁，本篇為節(jié)選的第二部分約4.5頁內(nèi)容，原文為英文并附于末尾，紅色標(biāo)注為原文附帶的注釋，藍(lán)色標(biāo)注為我添加的補(bǔ)充和注釋。文章中引用部分若已有漢譯本，則一概使用漢譯本的翻譯，并補(bǔ)充標(biāo)注漢譯本的引用文獻(xiàn)。由于專欄編輯器中不能設(shè)置斜體，我用加粗來代替斜體。?為了方便，我會在正文中加入頁碼，表示方法如【288】。
????????三、對“辯證法”中神秘性的部分揭示
????????我在前文已經(jīng)講到過，從馬克思與黑格爾文本的形式相似性到他們遵循著相同“方法”的推導(dǎo)不僅是無效的，而且是一個“嚴(yán)重的錯誤”。【290】我之所以這么認(rèn)為的原因非常簡單，黑格爾文本中最典型的論證方式顯然且確實是似是而非的。主張馬克思系統(tǒng)性地運用這些論證風(fēng)格——以及/或者主張馬克思即使在某些情況下并沒有這樣做，他也“打算”或應(yīng)當(dāng)這么做——就等同于主張將他的經(jīng)濟(jì)分析在同樣似是而非的邏輯基礎(chǔ)上重構(gòu)。我在這里只提出一個如此顯然的問題，而我在這里也對這一問題給出一個簡略的回答：即，黑格爾主義“辯證法”究竟是什么？[8] 與其他論證方式相比，“黑格爾主義”論證方式究竟有何特別之處？首先，我們需要承認(rèn)的是，黑格爾的敘述實際上并不遵循任何一個統(tǒng)一的論證方式，相反，它展現(xiàn)的是各種各樣的論證策略。這就是為什么我在這里用復(fù)數(shù)形式來表述這些黑格爾主義論證“風(fēng)格”("styles")。因此，黑格爾自稱他所遵循的“方法”——或者更準(zhǔn)確地說，作為他所主張的“絕對形式”，他應(yīng)當(dāng)“使自己的論證方式接近于其”的這種“方法”——與論證中實際遵循的“方法”之間時常存在著不一致。盡管如此，我們依然從“辯證法”自身的主張出發(fā)開始對其進(jìn)行簡要考察。
????????如果說黑格爾所說的“辯證”敘述有什么鮮明特征的話，那大概就是它發(fā)展的內(nèi)在性。盡管（正如黑格爾所說）“判斷形式”被運用在敘述中，但可以這么說，論證過程中的節(jié)點并非判斷，而是概念或“規(guī)定”(Bestimmungen)，不能僅僅把某一組判斷當(dāng)作給定條件，并從它們推導(dǎo)出其他的判斷。任何給定的概念或“規(guī)定”，如果孤立地考慮的話，都應(yīng)當(dāng)揭示出其自身是內(nèi)在矛盾的，因此對于它自己的概念把握活動(comprehension)，就需要使其“過渡”到另一個概念，在這個新概念中，它內(nèi)在的矛盾得到解決或“揚棄”(“aufgehoben”)。只要下一個概念或“規(guī)定”依然只是局部的概念或“規(guī)定”，即“有限者”的規(guī)定，【291】它就必須表明自己也是內(nèi)在不穩(wěn)定的，因此也需要繼續(xù)“過渡”到另一個概念或“規(guī)定”。這一過程不斷發(fā)生：直到抵達(dá)總體(totality)概念，而先前的所有規(guī)定最終都被表明其是總體中的各個方面或“環(huán)節(jié)”，從而代表了它們的“真理”。這種概念的發(fā)展應(yīng)當(dāng)直接發(fā)生，不需要引用任何無關(guān)的質(zhì)料或考察來推動這種“過渡”，而且無論如何，對于黑格爾而言——如果不是對所有黑格爾主義者而言的話——無論它以何種“局部規(guī)定”出現(xiàn)，都不應(yīng)該在整體(the whole)概念之前止步：這個整體概念就是“一般”，即前文所指出的第一個意義上，“真實的無限者”，其中的每個局部規(guī)定都僅僅只是從屬于“一般”的環(huán)節(jié)。
? ? ? ? 對局部“規(guī)定”的所謂“矛盾”性還有必要進(jìn)一步說明一下。盡管黑格爾馬克思主義者并未堅持這一點，但在黑格爾看來，“規(guī)定”的“矛盾”性意味著在經(jīng)過仔細(xì)考察后，它會趨向于與對立的“規(guī)定”相融合(collapse)（順帶說一句，這已經(jīng)有一些奇怪了，因為每個概念都有一個對立者這一點并不顯然）。因此，“矛盾的對立者”("contradictory opposites")，僅僅就它們作為特定的概念而言，在不斷地相互“過渡”，而真正的發(fā)展新階段只從向第三個概念過渡開始，在這個新概念中，它們的矛盾得到了解決，并因此表現(xiàn)為“（上述）對立者的統(tǒng)一體”["unity of (said) opposites"]。
????????現(xiàn)在，黑格爾的敘述真的表現(xiàn)出像我們剛才描述的那種方法(modus operandi)了嗎？好吧，簡而言之，在《邏輯學(xué)》的最開始，擺在我們面前的就是那些最抽象的“規(guī)定”（即“擺在我們面前的需要思考的東西”），這些規(guī)定被假定為推動了整個過程——而且實際上也的確如此。在證明抽象存在與抽象虛無(abstract nothingness)的概念實際上是無法相互區(qū)分的這一點上，以及在揭示這些“所謂的”(vermeint)對立者的同一性這一點上，黑格爾的“辯證法”達(dá)到了它的最佳境界。但是，當(dāng)嘗試“過渡到”一個代表著它們的“統(tǒng)一體”的概念時，黑格爾的論證還是在某種程度上已經(jīng)被它的包容性(capaciousness)所破壞，而盡管有著明確的意圖，但我還是認(rèn)為這種包容性在他的整體敘述中的越來越明顯。我們暫且不進(jìn)一步研究具體細(xì)節(jié)，只是在這里簡單說一下，黑格爾實際上一直提出作為“存在和無的統(tǒng)一體”(the "unity of being and nothing")的兩個候選者也只不過是這種包容性的代表性特征（癥候）：【292】首先是轉(zhuǎn)變(becoming)，接著是所謂的“定在”("determinate being")或Dasein（即德文的“定在”）？[9]
????????在這之后，在黑格爾敘述的后續(xù)發(fā)展中，在《邏輯學(xué)》的其余章節(jié)和整個有關(guān)自然和“精神”的更“具體的科學(xué)”中，就幾乎再也沒有聽到過黑格爾所承諾的內(nèi)在“辯證法”了。首先，黑格爾的論證在很多地方上甚至根本連表面上的內(nèi)在性都沒有，而是表現(xiàn)出了相當(dāng)明目張膽的目的論特征。在這種情況下，“過渡”并不是由所考察的概念自身的任何內(nèi)在“矛盾”所推動的，而是由根據(jù)所謂（黑格爾主義）“三段論”預(yù)先構(gòu)造的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來判斷的后者的所謂不足性(inadequacy)所推動的。后者的要旨與任何傳統(tǒng)邏輯意義上的三段論幾乎沒有任何關(guān)系，而是對于任何給定的“普遍”或“概念”，普遍只能在區(qū)別于自身的特殊領(lǐng)域下才能取得實質(zhì)上的實在性或“現(xiàn)實性”(Wirklichkeit)；然而，由于它們的特殊性恰恰在于它們與它們的“概念”在某些方面相背離，因此后者必須反過來表明它們真的服從于后者，因此它們僅僅在表面上才具有的獨立性(Selbst?ndigkeit)就被否定了。既然“一般”的目標(biāo)正是以所描述的方式取得實質(zhì)上的實在性，從而在它的“另一種存在”("other being")本身中“認(rèn)識它自己”（如果這沒有多大意義的話，非黑格爾主義者們也不應(yīng)當(dāng)對此感到沮喪），因此上述的普遍就必須區(qū)別于它自己，并反過來揚棄那些僅僅是設(shè)定出來的區(qū)別。此外，通過證明雜多東西(manifold)的元素（“一般”之前已將這些元素與它自身相區(qū)別）“本質(zhì)上”只不過是它的許多從屬“環(huán)節(jié)”或作用，“一般”證明了它自己就是賦予這些元素以它們的統(tǒng)一體的力量，從而將它們轉(zhuǎn)化為現(xiàn)存“個別”的器官(organs)。因此，黑格爾三段論的“一般圖式”("general schema")就是"U-P-I"，代表了“普遍性”("universality")、“特殊性”("particularity")和“個別性”("individuality")——在德語中就是"A-B-E"，代表了"Allgemeinheit"、"Besonderheit"和"Einzelheit"。【293】黑格爾沿著這條道路所構(gòu)建的論證不勝枚舉。例如，在《法哲學(xué)原理》中，這種向不法(Unrecht)概念的過渡出于“邏輯上更高的必然性，根據(jù)這個必然性，概念的各個環(huán)節(jié)——在這里是法權(quán)(Recht)的原則或作為普遍物的意志，以及實存中的法（這個實存就是意志的特殊性）——被設(shè)定為就其自身而言不同的東西……”（§81, 附釋）（參見Rosenthal, 1991; 1998, 103-6）(17)從“邏輯”("logic")到“自然”("nature")、從“自在的”“理念”("idea" "in itself")到外在的“理念”("idea" in its externality)的主要的系統(tǒng)性過渡，呈現(xiàn)出完全相同的結(jié)構(gòu)。
????????其次，黑格爾的敘述確實至少表面上堅持了遵循內(nèi)在發(fā)展過程的原則，就像在《邏輯學(xué)》中所表現(xiàn)的那樣，并且在這一體系的之后階段中表現(xiàn)得越來越少，我認(rèn)為，推動它從一個“規(guī)定”轉(zhuǎn)向下一個“規(guī)定”的實際動力并非上面所描述的自我超越的矛盾，而是（如分析哲學(xué)家們通常所主張的）相當(dāng)無趣的雙關(guān)語的使用。也就是說，黑格爾無情地利用了他話語中所有可能的歧義。實際上，他系統(tǒng)性地利用了一組引人注目又緊密相連的歧義，這些歧義建立在“概念”的三個基本“環(huán)節(jié)”上，而這些“環(huán)節(jié)”為他的整個敘述提供了框架。正如已經(jīng)指出的，Allgemeinheit在包羅萬象的含義和相對更具包容性的含義之間[“普遍性”("universality")和“一般性”("generality")(18)之間]存在著系統(tǒng)性的歧義；Besonderheit在絕對獨特性(the absolutely unique)的含義、獨特性(the sui generis)的含義以及相對更確定性的含義之間[“獨特性”("particularity")，即所謂的“單純性”("bare")、特殊性(particularity)和“特定性”("specificity")之間]存在著系統(tǒng)性的歧義；以及最后，Einzelheit在絕對唯一或完全確定的元素的含義(the absolutely unique or fully determinate element)和完全確定或包羅萬象的體系的含義之間[單純的特殊性或“個別性”和普遍性或“總體”之間](between bare particularity or "individuality" and universality or "totality")存在著系統(tǒng)性的歧義。因此，實際上，在黑格爾的話語中，Allgemeinheit和Besonderheit共同擁有著有限一般性(limited generality)或換句話說，特定性的內(nèi)涵；Besonderheit和Einzelheit則共同擁有著獨特性或“單個性”(the sui generis or "singular")的內(nèi)涵；而Einzelheit和Allgemeinheit則共同擁有著包含著它的所有規(guī)定的整體性或“真實的無限者”的內(nèi)涵。在以上所指出的三個基本混淆中，第二個混淆，即特定性與特殊性的混淆所造成的后果最為嚴(yán)重——實際上，它明顯是黑格爾唯心主義所導(dǎo)致的結(jié)果——【294】它允許黑格爾輕易地從一個關(guān)于概念規(guī)定性(determinacy)的合理的出發(fā)點（例如，后者是由系統(tǒng)性差別所引起的，并且至少在概念的某些特定類(classes)中是對立的）倒向一個關(guān)于事物定存(determinate existence)的非?；闹嚨慕Y(jié)論（例如，“一切事物都是自在的矛盾”）。盡管它引起的這一系列令人眼花繚亂的邏輯謬誤太過于復(fù)雜，以至于無法在這里一一敘述，但我認(rèn)為，黑格爾的論證中最典型的就是這種獨特的論證方式——在論證前預(yù)設(shè)結(jié)論(petitio)，也就是說，他的敘述似乎是建立在論證之上的（見Rosenthal, 1998, ch.10,尤其是125-8）。
????????注釋：
????????[8] 更多細(xì)節(jié)請見Rosenthal 1998, part II, on "'Dialectical' Contradiction and the Logicization of the Empirical."
????????[9] 當(dāng)然，黑格爾意識到了他的論述在這一方面上的獨特性，并試圖以某種方式勉強(qiáng)為其辯護(hù)。對于那些在訓(xùn)詁學(xué)上試圖為黑格爾辯護(hù)的人來說，這里是他本人的“解釋”（即他在所謂的“小”或“百科全書”《邏輯學(xué)》中所做出的解釋）：“轉(zhuǎn)變(becoming)中與無(nothing)為一體(one)的存在(being)，就像與存在為一體的無一樣，都只是轉(zhuǎn)瞬即逝的(transitory)。轉(zhuǎn)變由于其內(nèi)在的矛盾，融合為兩者/兩個[規(guī)定]皆被揚棄的統(tǒng)一體。由此所得的結(jié)果就是定在(being-there, determinate being)?！保℉egel, 1986, §89; 該段由本文作者翻譯）（但參考文獻(xiàn)并未給出Hegel, 1986，它可能是《哲學(xué)科學(xué)全書綱要》的英文版，但我未能找到這一版，也可能是單純的標(biāo)注錯誤；我翻譯的這段中文譯文同時參照了薛華譯的《小邏輯》、賀麟譯的《小邏輯》、先剛譯的《大邏輯》、作者翻譯的英文和英文版《小邏輯》；中括號中的“[規(guī)定]”一詞為作者本人的補(bǔ)充；“轉(zhuǎn)瞬即逝的”一句為我根據(jù)作者的翻譯進(jìn)行的翻譯，英文版對應(yīng)的譯文為“消逝著的[東西]”("vanishing [terms]")；最后的“定在”一詞，作者翻譯為"determinate being"，而英文版為"being-there"）
????????譯者注：
????????(17) 此處譯文參照了鄧安慶譯本和范揚、張企泰譯本的《法哲學(xué)原理》，譯文根據(jù)羅森塔爾的翻譯進(jìn)行了改動。
????????(18) 此處的“一般性”("generality")不同于之前的“一般”("the" universal)（比如我在譯者注(10)中所提及的“一般性”，但接近于譯者注(9)中所提及的“一般”），正如羅森塔爾所指出的那樣，這里的“一般性”指的是某種類似“概括性”的概念，例如馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)導(dǎo)言》中所提到的“生產(chǎn)一般”("Production in general"、"Production im Allgemeinen")和“勞動一般”("labour as such"、"Arbeit überhaupt")（請參見《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第30卷第26、46頁中的敘述），“生產(chǎn)一般”是對所有生產(chǎn)共同特征的概括，它相對某種具體的生產(chǎn)而言，例如資本主義生產(chǎn)，更具包容性，“勞動一般”也是同樣，相對于各種各樣的勞動比如耕種、紡織，勞動一般是對所有種類勞動的概括；而之前的“一般”("the" universal)則是某種比“普遍”更高的東西，也就是我在譯者注(11)中所指出的“精神”，它包羅萬象。我在這里舉一個例子（這一例子來自伊利因科夫），我們可以從足球、火星、軸承中概括出“圓”這一概念，我們叫它“圓一般”，“圓一般”就是足球、火星、軸承的“概括”，但顯然，我們不可能從“圓一般”出發(fā)，運用邏輯推導(dǎo)出足球、火星、軸承的存在，因為“圓一般”反映的僅僅只是足球、火星、軸承的共同特征；但我們可以從某種“一般性”或“普遍性”出發(fā)，運用黑格爾的圖式"U-P-I"，從中推導(dǎo)出足球、火星、軸承的存在，因為“一般性”或“普遍性”是包羅萬象的。在后文中，在可能引起歧義的時候，我會補(bǔ)充“一般性”所對應(yīng)的原文。而"Allgemeinen"、"Allgemeineheit"對應(yīng)的英文可以是"universal"、"universality"，也可以是"general"、"generality"，所以羅森塔爾說"Allgemeineheit"是有歧義的。
????????參考文獻(xiàn)
????????Arthur, Christopher J. 1991. Review Article. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britaim 23/24, 79-90.
????????--------. 1993. "Hegel’s Logic and Marx’s Capital." In Fred Moseley, ed., Marx’s Method in Capital: A Re-examination. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press.
????????Backhaus, Hans-Georg. 1997. Dialektik der Wertform. Freiburg: ?a ira Verlag.
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????????The Mysteries of "Dialectics" Somewhat Revealed
????????I said above that the inference from the formal similitude of the Marxian and Hegelian discourses to the commonality of the "method" that they obey is not only invalid, but constitutes a "grave error." The reason I consider this error to be grave is quite simply that the patterns of argumentation most characteristic of Hegel's exposition are demonstrably and indeed wildly specious. To insist that Marx systematically employed the same styles of argumentation - and/or that, even when on some occasion he did not, he "meant to" or should have - is to insist on a reconstruction of his economic analyses that places them all in principle on a similarly unsound logical basis. My claim here raises an obvious question, to which I can only in the present context give the most schematic of responses: viz., just what exactly are Hegelian "dialectics"? [8] What is especially distinctive about a "Hegelian" mode of argumentation as opposed to any other? Well, in the first place, it needs to be acknowledged that in practice Hegel's exposition does not follow any one unified canon of argumentation, but, on the contrary, exhibits a variety of argumentational strategies. This is why I have written here of Hegelian "styles" of argumentation, in the plural. Hence, there is frequently a discrepancy between the "method" that Hegel says his exposition is supposed to follow - or indeed that as "absolute form," he claims, is supposed to "develop itself" into that exposition - and what in fact takes place in it. Nonetheless, let us start our brief survey of "dialectics" with the self-image.
????????If there is anything conspicuously distinctive about a "dialectical" exposition as Hegel says it is supposed to proceed, it is precisely the immanence of its development. Though (as Hegel would put it) the "form of judgment" will be employed in the exposition, the, so to speak, nodal points of the progression are not judgments, some set of which would have simply to be taken as given in order for others to be inferred from them, but rather concepts or "determinations" (Bestimmungen). Any given concept or "determination," considered in isolation, is supposed to reveal itself as internally contradictory and hence to require for its own comprehension the "transition" into another concept in which the contradiction inherent in it is resolved or "aufgehoben." So long as this next concept or "determination" is likewise a merely partial one, viz. a determination of "finitude," it too must prove inherently unstable and hence demand the "transition" into yet another. And so on: until, namely, the concept of that totality is reached of which all the prior determinations are finally revealed to have been aspects or "moments" and which thus represents their "truth." This conceptual progression should proceed apace without any extraneous materials or considerations having to be simply adduced in order to motivate a "transition," and for Hegel at any rate, if not for all Hegelians, no matter with what "partial determination" it is engaged, it should not be able to stop short of the concept of the whole: which is to say, again, the "universal," viz. in the first sense indicated above, the "true infinite" of which every merely partial determination is a subordinate moment.
????????One further remark has to be made here as regards the allegedly "contradictory" character of the merely partial "determinations." Though Hegelian Marxists have not insisted upon this point, in Hegel the "contradictory" character of a "determination" is supposed to imply that upon careful consideration it tends literally to collapse into the opposite "determination" (which is already a bit odd, incidentally, since it is by no means obvious that every concept even has a contrary). The "contradictory opposites" are thus, simply qua the specific concepts that they are, in continual "transition" into one another, and the really new phase in the progression only begins with the transition to a third concept in which their contradiction is resolved and which thus represents the "unity of (said) opposites."
????????Now, does Hegel's exposition in fact exhibit a modus operandi such as that just described? Well, ever so briefly, at the very outset of the Logic, in presenting the most abstract "determinations" (just what is "there before us to be thought") which are supposed to set the entire progression in motion - indeed it does. In demonstrating that the concepts of abstract being and abstract nothingness are in fact indistinguishable from one another, in exposing the identity of these merely "supposed" (vermeint) opposites, Hegel's "dialectic" is at its best. Already, however, with the attempted "transition" to a concept representing their "unity," Hegel's argumentation, as it were, is marred by the capaciousness which, despite stated intentions, becomes, I will suggest, increasingly characteristic of his presentation as a whole. Without going into further details, it is alone symptomatic of such capriciousness that Hegel in fact persistently nominates two candidates to serve as the "unity of being and nothing": first, becoming, and then so-called "determinate being" or Dasein? [9]
????????Thereafter, in the subsequent development of Hegel's exposition, through the remainder of the Logic and throughout the more "concrete sciences" of nature and "spirit," the promised immanent "dialectic" is barely to be heard from again. In the first place, so much of Hegel's argumentation is not even just ostensibly immanent at all, but rather quite brazenly teleological in character. In such cases, the "transitions" are not motivated by any intrinsic "contradictoriness" of the concepts themselves under consideration, but rather by the alleged inadequacy of the latter as judged by the preconstructed standard of the so-called (Hegelian) "syllogism." The gist of the latter, which has precious little to do with syllogisms in any traditional logical sense of the term, is that for any given "universal" or "concept" that universal can only acquire substantial reality or "actuality" (Wirklichkeit) on the condition of differentiating from itself a domain of particulars; which latter, however, inasmuch as their particularity will consist precisely in their diverging in some respects from their "concept," must in turn be shown to be really subordinated to the latter, and their merely apparent independence (Selbst?ndigkeit) thereby negated. Since it is precisely the aim of "the" universal to acquire substantial reality in the manner described and thus to "know itself in its "other being" as such (non-Hegelians should not be dismayed if this does not make much sense), hence said universal must indeed differentiate itself and sublate in turn the merely "posited" difference. Through the demonstration, moreover, that the elements of the manifold which the "universal" has previously differentiated from itself are "in essence" just so many subordinate "moments" or functions of it, the "universal" proves itself to be the power that lends to such elements their unity and thus converts them into the organs of an existing "individual." Hence, Hegel's "general schema" of the syllogism is "U-P-I" for "universality," "particularity," and "individuality" - or, in the original German, "A-R-E" for "Allgemeinheit" "Besonderheit? and "Einzelheit." The examples of arguments constructed along these lines in Hegel are legion. For instance, in the Philosophy of Right, the transition to the category of wrong (Unrecht) is made by appeal to the "logical higher necessity that the moments of the concept - here the principle of right (Recht) or the will as universal, and right in its real existence, which is just the particularity of the will - should be posited as explicitly different . . ." (§81, addition) (cf. Rosenthal, 1991; 1998, 103- 6). The major systemic transition from "logic" to "nature," from the "idea" "in itself to the "idea" in its externality, exhibits exactly the same structure.
????????Second, where Hegel's exposition does at least maintain the appearance of following an immanent course of development, as is largely still the case in the Logic and less and less so in the subsequent stages of the system, I would suggest that the actual motor that drives it on from one "determination" to the next is not the dynamic of self-transcending contradiction adumbrated above, but rather (as analytical philosophers have indeed typically contended) quite pedestrian pun-making. This is to say that Hegel ruthlessly exploits every possible ambiguity in the terms of his discourse. Indeed, he systematically exploits a remarkable set of interlocking ambiguities which are built in to the three basic "moments" of the "concept" that provide the architecture for his entire exposition. Allgemeinheit, as already noted, is systematically ambiguous between the sense of the all-inclusive and that of the relatively more inclusive (between "universality" and "generality"); Besonderheit is systematically ambiguous between the sense of the absolutely unique, the sui generis, and that of the relatively more determinate (between "particularity," i.e., so-called "bar? particularity, and "specificity"); and Einzelheit, finally, is systematically ambiguous between the sense of the absolutely unique or fully determinate element and that of the fully determinate or all-inclusive system (between bare particularity or "individuality" and universality or "totality"). Thus, in effect, in Hegelian discourse, Allgemeinheit and Besonderheit share the connotation of a limited generality or, in other words, specificity; Besonderheit and Einzelheit share the connotation of the sui generis or "singular"; and Einzelheit and Allgemeinhdt share the connotation of a totality inclusive of all its determinations or "true infinity." Of the three elementary conflations indicated above, it is the second, that of specificity and particularity, which is the most fraught with consequences - and indeed manifestly idealist consequences at that - as it permits Hegel to slide effortlessly from claims that are quite legitimate as concerns the determinacy of concepts (for example, that the latter is a function of systematic differences and, at least in the case of certain special classes of concepts, opposition) to quite preposterous conclusions concerning the determinate existence of things (for instance, that "everything is in itself contradictory") . Though the dizzying series of paralogisms to which it gives rise in practice are far too convoluted to be gone into here, it is this distinctive petitio which is, I would suggest, the most characteristic tendency of Hegel's argumentation, i.e., to the extent that his exposition even appears to depend upon arguments (see Rosenthal, 1998, ch.10, esp. 125-8).
8 For the details, see Rosenthal 1998, part II, on "'Dialectical' Contradiction and the Logicization of the Empirical."
9 Of course, Hegel is aware of the peculiarity of his exposition in this respect and tries, after a fashion, to justify it. For those of hermeneutically charitable impulses, here is his "explanation" (viz. in the form in which it appears in the so-called "lesser" or "Encyclopedia" Logic): "Being in becoming as one with nothing, just as nothing as one with being, are merely transitory. Becoming, through its intrinsic contradiction, collapses into the unity in which both [determinations] are sublated. Its result is thereby determinate being" (Hegel, 1986, §89; author's translation).
