Was your degree really worth it?

Crunching the puny financial benefits of many university courses

壓榨許多大學(xué)課程微不足道的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益

Is university worth it? That question once seemed a no-brainer. For decades young adults in rich countries have flocked to higher education. Governments have touted college as a boon for social mobility and economic growth. Yet as fees rise and graduate earnings stagnate, disillusionment is growing. A poll published by the Wall Street Journal on March 31st suggests a crisis of confidence has worsened: 56% of Americans now believe a degree is no longer worth the time and money spent on it.

大學(xué)值得嗎？這個(gè)問(wèn)題曾經(jīng)似乎是一個(gè)不用動(dòng)腦筋的問(wèn)題。幾十年來(lái)，富裕國(guó)家的年輕人紛紛涌向高等教育。各國(guó)政府將大學(xué)吹捧為社會(huì)流動(dòng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的福音。然而，隨著學(xué)費(fèi)的上漲和畢業(yè)生收入的停滯，幻滅感正在加劇。《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》3月31日公布的一項(xiàng)民意調(diào)查顯示，信心危機(jī)已經(jīng)惡化：56%的美國(guó)人現(xiàn)在認(rèn)為學(xué)位不再值得花費(fèi)時(shí)間和金錢(qián)。

For an average undergraduate, at least, this is not consistent with the facts. In most places, for most learners, the financial returns to higher education remain extremely strong. Yet undertaking a degree has become riskier. The rewards for the best performers are increasing, but a troublingly high share of students see negative returns from their studies.

至少對(duì)于一個(gè)普通的本科生來(lái)說(shuō)，這與事實(shí)不符。在大多數(shù)地方，對(duì)大多數(shù)學(xué)生來(lái)說(shuō)，高等教育的經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào)仍然非常強(qiáng)勁。然而，攻讀學(xué)位的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)卻越來(lái)越大。對(duì)表現(xiàn)最好的學(xué)生的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)正在增加，但令人不安的是，有很高比例的學(xué)生從他們的學(xué)習(xí)中看到了負(fù)面的回報(bào)。

New data sets, such as tax records, are illuminating this dispersion like never before. They can track how much students taking specific courses, at specific institutions, earn in later life. In time that detail will help students avoid the worst pay-offs and seize the best. Choice of subject and timely graduation matter hugely; choice of institution somewhat less so. It could also be useful to governments tempted to crack down on “l(fā)ow-value degrees”.

新的數(shù)據(jù)集，如稅務(wù)記錄，正在以前所未有的方式揭示這種分散。他們可以跟蹤在特定機(jī)構(gòu)學(xué)習(xí)特定課程的學(xué)生在以后的生活中賺了多少錢(qián)。隨著時(shí)間的推移，這些細(xì)節(jié)將幫助學(xué)生避免最壞的和抓住最好的機(jī)會(huì)。選擇專(zhuān)業(yè)和及時(shí)畢業(yè)關(guān)系重大;機(jī)構(gòu)的選擇就不那么重要了。對(duì)于那些試圖打擊“低價(jià)值學(xué)位”的政府來(lái)說(shuō)，這也可能是有用的。

A boom in graduate earnings began in the 1980s in the rich world. Back then the difference in the salaries of people who gain at least a bachelor’s degree and those who do not—commonly called the “college-wage premium”—began to soar. In the 1970s an American with a university education was earning on average 35% more than a high-school graduate. By 2021 that advantage had risen to 66%.

在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，畢業(yè)生的收入在20世紀(jì)80年代開(kāi)始激增。那時(shí)，至少獲得學(xué)士學(xué)位的人和那些沒(méi)有獲得學(xué)士學(xué)位的人的工資差異——通常被稱(chēng)為“大學(xué)工資溢價(jià)”——開(kāi)始飆升。在20世紀(jì)70年代，一個(gè)受過(guò)大學(xué)教育的美國(guó)人的平均收入比一個(gè)高中畢業(yè)生高出35%。到2021年，這一優(yōu)勢(shì)上升到66%。

Recently the wage premium in many countries has either stagnated or begun to fall. And in places that actually charge students for their degrees, costs have gone up (see chart 1). Tuition in England has soared from nothing in the late 1990s up to ￡9,250 ($11,000) a year, the highest in the rich world. In America, the out-of-pocket fee paid by an average bachelor’s-degree student increased from $2,300 a year in the 1970s to some $8,000 in 2018, in real terms, according to Jaison Abel and Richard Deitz at the New York Federal Reserve. (Students at public universities often pay much less; those at private non-profits can pay a lot more.)

最近，許多國(guó)家的工資溢價(jià)要么停滯不前，要么開(kāi)始下降。而在那些對(duì)學(xué)生的學(xué)位收費(fèi)的地方，成本也在上升（見(jiàn)表1）。英國(guó)的學(xué)費(fèi)從20世紀(jì)90年代末的零飆升至每年9,250英鎊（11,000美元），為發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家中最高。根據(jù)紐約聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行（紐約聯(lián)邦Reserve）的Jaison Abel和Richard Deitz的數(shù)據(jù)，在美國(guó)，本科生平均每年支付的自付費(fèi)用從20世紀(jì)70年代的2,300美元增加到2018年的8,000美元左右。（公立大學(xué)的學(xué)生通常支付的費(fèi)用要少得多;那些在私人非營(yíng)利組織的人可以支付更多。)

Yet the average degree remains valuable. In 2019 Mr Abel and Mr Deitz roughly estimated the annual financial return on the money that a typical American invests in a bachelor’s degree. They guess that the typical rate of return for a bachelor’s degree is around 14%. That has dropped from a peak of 16% in the early 2000s. But it is still a princely sum. And it is well above the 8-9% that American graduates were recouping in the 1970s, before graduate wages, and tuition fees, began to soar. These calculations include not only fees but also the money individuals might expect to earn if they were working full-time instead.

然而，平均學(xué)位仍然是有價(jià)值的。2019年，Abel和Deitz粗略估算了一個(gè)典型的美國(guó)人在學(xué)士學(xué)位上投資的年財(cái)務(wù)回報(bào)率。他們猜測(cè)，學(xué)士學(xué)位的典型回報(bào)率約為14%。這已經(jīng)從21世紀(jì)初16%的峰值下降。但這仍然是一筆可觀(guān)的數(shù)目。這一比例遠(yuǎn)高于上世紀(jì)70年代美國(guó)畢業(yè)生的8-9%，當(dāng)時(shí)畢業(yè)生的工資和學(xué)費(fèi)還沒(méi)有開(kāi)始飆升。這些計(jì)算不僅包括費(fèi)用，還包括個(gè)人如果全職工作可能期望獲得的收入。

The average hides a very wide range of outcomes, however. Until recently economists seeking to identify the winners and losers were mostly limited to surveys. The trend now is for governments, such as those of Britain and Norway, to proffer hefty, anonymised databases showing actual earnings for millions of university-goers. That makes it much easier to compare people like-for-like. The disaggregated data reveal that a high share of students graduate with degrees that are not worth their cost.

然而，平均值隱藏了非常廣泛的結(jié)果。直到最近，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們?cè)噲D找出贏(yíng)家和輸家的方法大多僅限于調(diào)查?，F(xiàn)在的趨勢(shì)是政府，如英國(guó)和挪威，提供大量的匿名數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)，顯示數(shù)百萬(wàn)大學(xué)生的實(shí)際收入。這使得比較人們更容易。分類(lèi)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，很大一部分學(xué)生畢業(yè)時(shí)獲得的學(xué)位不值得花費(fèi)。

In England 25% of male graduates and 15% of female ones will take home less money over their careers than peers who do not get a degree, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies (ifs), a research outfit. America has less comprehensive data but has begun publishing the share of students at thousands of institutions who do not manage to earn more than the average high-school graduate early on. Six years after enrolment, 27% of students at a typical four-year university fail to do so, calculate researchers at Georgetown University in Washington, dc. In the long tail, comprised of the worst 30% of America’s two- and four-year institutions, more than half of people who enroll lag this benchmark.

根據(jù)英國(guó)財(cái)政研究所（ifs）的調(diào)查，在英國(guó)，25%的男性畢業(yè)生和15%的女性畢業(yè)生在職業(yè)生涯中的收入比沒(méi)有獲得學(xué)位的同齡人要少。美國(guó)沒(méi)有那么全面的數(shù)據(jù)，但已經(jīng)開(kāi)始公布數(shù)千所院校中那些在早期掙不到比普通高中畢業(yè)生更高收入的學(xué)生的比例。據(jù)華盛頓喬治城大學(xué)的研究人員計(jì)算，在一所典型的四年制大學(xué)，入學(xué)六年后，27%的學(xué)生未能做到這一點(diǎn)。在長(zhǎng)尾中，包括美國(guó)兩年制和四年制大學(xué)中最差的30%，超過(guò)一半的入學(xué)者落后于這一基準(zhǔn)。

Dropping out without any qualification is an obvious way to make a big loss. Taking longer than usual to graduate also destroys value (because it eats up years that might otherwise have been spent earning full-time). Both these outcomes are common. Across the rich world less than 40% of people studying for undergraduate degrees complete their courses in the expected number of years. About one-third still have no qualifications three years after that.

沒(méi)有任何資格就退出是一種明顯的大損失方式?；ㄙM(fèi)比平時(shí)更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間畢業(yè)也會(huì)破壞價(jià)值（因?yàn)樗鼤?huì)消耗掉原本可以用來(lái)全職工作的時(shí)間）。這兩種結(jié)果都很常見(jiàn)。在富裕國(guó)家，只有不到40%的本科生能在預(yù)期的年限內(nèi)完成學(xué)業(yè)。大約三分之一的人在三年后仍然沒(méi)有資格。

Choosing the right subject is crucial to boosting earning power. Negative returns are likeliest for Britons who study creative arts (less than 10% of men make a positive return), social care and agriculture (see chart 2). By far the best-earning degrees in America are in engineering, computer science and business. Negative returns seem especially likely for music and the visual arts. Using America’s available data to guess lifetime earnings by programme is a stretch. But Preston Cooper at freopp, a think-tank, ventures that more than a quarter of bachelor’s-degree programmes in America will lead to negative returns for most enrolled students.

選擇正確的主題對(duì)提高盈利能力至關(guān)重要。學(xué)習(xí)創(chuàng)造性藝術(shù)（不到10%的男性獲得正回報(bào)）、社會(huì)關(guān)懷和農(nóng)業(yè)的英國(guó)人最有可能獲得負(fù)回報(bào)（見(jiàn)表2）。到目前為止，美國(guó)收入最高的學(xué)位是工程、計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)和商業(yè)。音樂(lè)和視覺(jué)藝術(shù)的負(fù)回報(bào)率似乎尤其可能。用美國(guó)現(xiàn)有的數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)推測(cè)每個(gè)項(xiàng)目的終身收入是一種延伸。但是智囊團(tuán)freopp的普雷斯頓庫(kù)珀冒險(xiǎn)說(shuō)，美國(guó)超過(guò)四分之一的學(xué)士學(xué)位課程將導(dǎo)致大多數(shù)注冊(cè)學(xué)生的負(fù)回報(bào)。

What you study generally matters more than where you do it. That comes with caveats: the worst colleges and universities provide students with little value, whatever they teach. But on average people who enroll in America’s public universities get a better return over their lifetimes than students who go to its more prestigious private non-profit ones, reckon the Georgetown researchers. High fees at the non-profits is one of the reasons why.

你學(xué)什么通常比你在哪里學(xué)更重要。最差的學(xué)院和大學(xué)無(wú)論教什么，對(duì)學(xué)生都沒(méi)有什么價(jià)值。但喬治城大學(xué)的研究人員估計(jì)，平均而言，美國(guó)公立大學(xué)的學(xué)生在一生中獲得的回報(bào)要比那些去更有聲望的私立非營(yíng)利大學(xué)的學(xué)生更好。非營(yíng)利組織的高收費(fèi)是原因之一。

Earnings data in Britain call into question the assumption that bright youngsters will necessarily benefit from being pushed towards very selective institutions, says Jack Britton of the ifs. In order to beat fierce competition for places, some youngsters apply for whatever subject seem easiest, even if it is not one that usually brings a high return. Parents fixated on getting their offspring into Oxford or Cambridge, regardless of subject, should take note. But there is also evidence that tackling a high-earning course for the sake of it can backfire. Norwegian research finds that students whose true desire is to study humanities, but who end up studying science, earn less after ten years than they probably otherwise would have.

ifs的杰克布里頓說(shuō)，英國(guó)的收入數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)聰明的年輕人必然會(huì)從被推向非常挑剔的機(jī)構(gòu)中受益的假設(shè)提出了質(zhì)疑。為了在激烈的入學(xué)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中勝出，一些年輕人會(huì)申請(qǐng)任何看起來(lái)最容易的科目，即使它通常不會(huì)帶來(lái)很高的回報(bào)。那些一心想讓自己的孩子進(jìn)入牛津或劍橋的父母?jìng)?，不管是哪門(mén)學(xué)科，都應(yīng)該注意了。但也有證據(jù)表明，為了高收入而上高收入課程可能會(huì)適得其反。挪威的一項(xiàng)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，那些真正想學(xué)習(xí)人文學(xué)科，但最終卻學(xué)習(xí)了科學(xué)的學(xué)生，十年后的收入可能會(huì)比他們?cè)镜氖杖肷佟?/p>

Men have more reason than women to worry that their investments in higher education will be a bust. That is because they have a higher chance of earning well without a degree. University is a risk for those with mediocre school grades as they often earn less after graduation than better-prepared peers who hold the same degrees.

男性比女性更有理由擔(dān)心他們?cè)诟叩冉逃系耐顿Y會(huì)失敗。這是因?yàn)樗麄儧](méi)有學(xué)位就有更高的機(jī)會(huì)賺得更好。對(duì)于那些學(xué)業(yè)成績(jī)平平的人來(lái)說(shuō)，上大學(xué)是一種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)樗麄儺厴I(yè)后的收入往往低于那些擁有相同學(xué)位、準(zhǔn)備更充分的同齡人。

In Britain the return from a degree is generally higher for South Asian students than for white ones, as they tend to study subjects such as business, and generally lower for black students (compared with what people of the same race typically earn if they do not go to university). In America, Asian students seem to have the least trouble paying off their student debts, compared with white and black students.

在英國(guó)，南亞學(xué)生的學(xué)位回報(bào)率通常高于白色學(xué)生，因?yàn)樗麄儍A向于學(xué)習(xí)商業(yè)等科目，而黑人學(xué)生的回報(bào)率通常較低（與同一種族的人如果不上大學(xué)的通常收入相比）。在美國(guó)，與白色和黑人學(xué)生相比，亞裔學(xué)生似乎在償還學(xué)生債務(wù)方面遇到的麻煩最少。

Marks and markets

What are the implications of all this new information? Already there are signs that the higher-education market is evolving. People are already searching out better returns of their own accord at different educational stages. In America the number of degrees conferred annually in English and in history fell by around one-third between 2011 and 2021. The number of degrees in computer science more than doubled in that time (see chart 3). Others are skipping college altogether. The number of people enrolling has fallen every year since 2011.

所有這些新信息的含義是什么？已經(jīng)有跡象表明高等教育市場(chǎng)正在發(fā)展。人們已經(jīng)在不同的教育階段主動(dòng)尋找更好的回報(bào)。在美國(guó)，2011年至2021年間，英語(yǔ)和歷史專(zhuān)業(yè)每年授予的學(xué)位數(shù)量下降了約三分之一。計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)學(xué)位的數(shù)量在此期間翻了一番多（見(jiàn)表3）。其他人則干脆不上大學(xué)。自2011年以來(lái)，入學(xué)人數(shù)每年都在下降。

Institutions are also shifting by culling humanities. In February the trustees of Marymount University in Virginia voted to abolish majors in nine subjects including English, history, philosophy and theology. Calvin University in Michigan and Howard University in Washington, dc are among those which have abandoned classics. And archaeology’s future at the University of Sheffield in Britain looks precarious.

機(jī)構(gòu)也在通過(guò)剔除人文學(xué)科而轉(zhuǎn)變。今年2月，弗吉尼亞州瑪麗蒙特大學(xué)的校董們投票決定取消包括英語(yǔ)、歷史、哲學(xué)和神學(xué)在內(nèi)的9門(mén)學(xué)科的專(zhuān)業(yè)。密歇根州的卡爾文大學(xué)和華盛頓特區(qū)的霍華德大學(xué)都是放棄經(jīng)典的大學(xué)。英國(guó)謝菲爾德大學(xué)考古學(xué)的未來(lái)看起來(lái)岌岌可危。

Employers are adapting, too. Firms are becoming a bit less likely to demand that job applicants have degrees, according to analysis by Joseph Fuller of Harvard Business School, and others. Tight labour markets and a desire for more diverse workers help explain why. A few years ago some 80% of the jobs that ibm, a tech giant, advertised in America required a degree, says Kelli Jordan, one of its vice-presidents. Now it is about half. “A degree does not have to be the only indicator of skills that someone may have,” explains Ms Jordan.

雇主也在適應(yīng)。根據(jù)哈佛商學(xué)院的約瑟夫·富勒和其他人的分析，公司越來(lái)越不可能要求求職者有學(xué)位。緊張的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)和對(duì)更多樣化工人的渴望有助于解釋原因。幾年前，科技巨頭ibm在美國(guó)發(fā)布的招聘廣告中，80%的工作崗位都要求有學(xué)位，其副總裁之一Kelli Jordan說(shuō)?，F(xiàn)在大約是一半。喬丹解釋說(shuō)：“學(xué)位不一定是衡量一個(gè)人可能擁有的技能的唯一指標(biāo)。”

Should governments amplify these trends? In Estonia one-fifth of an institution’s funding depends on meeting a variety of targets; one relates to the share of students graduating on time. Similar systems exist in Finland, Israel, Lithuania and Sweden. Australia’s government is trying to encourage learners to make socially useful choices. In 2021 it doubled what undergraduates pay to study social sciences, political science or communications and halved the fee for nursing and teaching. Students do not appear much moved yet, possibly because of the generosity of Australia’s student-debt repayment terms. Britain’s government reckons it can alter behaviour by giving everyone in England an online account listing a maximum cash sum that they are entitled to borrow from the state for studies over their lifetime. The idea is to make school-leavers more parsimonious.

政府應(yīng)該擴(kuò)大這些趨勢(shì)嗎？在愛(ài)沙尼亞，一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)五分之一的資金取決于實(shí)現(xiàn)各種目標(biāo);其中一個(gè)涉及按時(shí)畢業(yè)的學(xué)生比例。芬蘭、以色列、立陶宛和瑞典也有類(lèi)似的制度。澳大利亞政府正試圖鼓勵(lì)學(xué)習(xí)者做出對(duì)社會(huì)有益的選擇。2021年，它將本科生學(xué)習(xí)社會(huì)科學(xué)、政治學(xué)或傳播學(xué)的費(fèi)用增加了一倍，并將護(hù)理和教學(xué)費(fèi)用減半。學(xué)生們似乎還沒(méi)有被打動(dòng)，可能是因?yàn)榘拇罄麃唽W(xué)生債務(wù)償還條款的慷慨。英國(guó)政府認(rèn)為，它可以通過(guò)給每個(gè)英國(guó)人一個(gè)在線(xiàn)賬戶(hù)來(lái)改變他們的行為，該賬戶(hù)列出了他們一生中有權(quán)從國(guó)家借款用于學(xué)習(xí)的最高現(xiàn)金金額。這樣做的目的是讓畢業(yè)生更加節(jié)儉。

Others still splurge. President Joe Biden hopes that the Supreme Court will soon approve a plan, announced last year, to write off a big chunk of America’s student loans. He also wants a more lenient repayment system. The associated costs could mount to hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade. Mr Biden also promises an official list of “l(fā)ow-financial value” courses. More compelling is talk of preventing feeble programmes from benefitting from federal student loans. But without an act of Congress this would mainly affect for-profit colleges (which enroll only a fraction of America’s learners).

其他人仍在揮霍?？偨y(tǒng)喬·拜登希望最高法院能盡快批準(zhǔn)去年宣布的一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃，注銷(xiāo)美國(guó)大部分學(xué)生貸款。他還希望有一個(gè)更寬松的還款制度。在未來(lái)十年內(nèi)，相關(guān)成本可能高達(dá)數(shù)千億美元。拜登還承諾將列出一份“低財(cái)務(wù)價(jià)值”課程的官方清單。更有說(shuō)服力的是防止薄弱項(xiàng)目從聯(lián)邦學(xué)生貸款中受益的討論。但如果沒(méi)有國(guó)會(huì)的法案，這將主要影響營(yíng)利性大學(xué)（這些大學(xué)只招收了美國(guó)學(xué)生的一小部分）。

To many, a growing focus on the financial returns to higher education is crude. Graduates in public service are bound to earn less than those on Wall Street. Very many disciplines are worth studying for their own sake. Yet students frequently tell pollsters that improving their earning power is a priority. Good returns are vital to the poorest learners, for whom the financial burden of degrees is highest. Today bad degrees are surprisingly common. A combination of better information, market forces and smarter policy can reduce their prevalence.

對(duì)許多人來(lái)說(shuō)，越來(lái)越多地關(guān)注高等教育的財(cái)務(wù)回報(bào)是不明智的。從事公共服務(wù)的畢業(yè)生肯定比華爾街的畢業(yè)生掙得少。很多學(xué)科都是值得研究的。然而，學(xué)生們經(jīng)常告訴民意調(diào)查者，提高他們的賺錢(qián)能力是一個(gè)優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。良好的回報(bào)對(duì)最貧窮的學(xué)生至關(guān)重要，對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō)，學(xué)位的經(jīng)濟(jì)負(fù)擔(dān)最重。如今，糟糕的學(xué)位令人驚訝地普遍。更好的信息、市場(chǎng)力量和更明智的政策相結(jié)合，可以減少其流行。