International Economic Review 2023年第1期

Volume64,?Issue1, February 2023

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——更多動態(tài)，請持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨

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1.OPENING THE FLOODGATES: PARTIAL AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ADJUSTMENTS TO LABOR IMMIGRATION

打開閘門:勞動力移民的部分均衡和一般均衡調(diào)整

Bernt Bratsberg,?Andreas Moxnes,?Oddbj?rn Raaum,?Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe

We investigate the impact of a large immigration shock on occupational wages. We develop a general equilibrium model where individuals sort into occupations and confront testable hypotheses with data. To identify the effect of the labor supply shock, we introduce a novel instrument that exploits that immigrants systematically sort into different occupations than natives. We study the immigration wave to Norway after the Eastern enlargement and find that immigration led to lower relative occupational wages. A quantification of the general equilibrium shows welfare effects of immigration close to zero for natives, but negative effects for the pre-existing population of?immigrants.

我們考察了大規(guī)模移民沖擊對職業(yè)工資的影響。我們開發(fā)了一個一般均衡模型，其中個人分類到職業(yè)，并面對數(shù)據(jù)可檢驗的假設(shè)。為了確定勞動力供給沖擊的影響，我們引入了一種新的工具，利用移民系統(tǒng)地將其分為不同的職業(yè)，而不是本國人。我們研究了東擴后挪威的移民潮，發(fā)現(xiàn)移民導(dǎo)致了相對較低的職業(yè)工資。對一般均衡的量化表明，移民對本國人口的福利效應(yīng)接近于零，但對已存在的移民人口的負(fù)面影響。

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2.MEDIEVAL MATCHING MARKETS

中世紀(jì)的配對市場

Lars Boerner,?Daniel Quint

We study the regulation of brokerage in wholesale markets in premodern Central Western Europe. Examining 1,804 sets of rules from 82 cities, we find brokerage was primarily a centralized matchmaking mechanism. Brokerage was more common in towns with larger populations, better access to sea ports and trade routes, and greater political autonomy. Brokers' fee structures varied systematically: price-based fees were more common for highly heterogeneous goods, quantity-based fees for more homogeneous goods. We show theoretically that this was broadly consistent with total surplus maximization, and that brokerage was more valuable in markets with unequal numbers of buyers and?sellers.

我們研究批發(fā)市場在前現(xiàn)代中歐的經(jīng)紀(jì)監(jiān)管。通過對來自82個城市的1804套規(guī)則的考察，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，經(jīng)紀(jì)主要是一種集中的撮合機制。經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)務(wù)在人口較多、更容易進(jìn)入海港和貿(mào)易路線以及更大的政治自主權(quán)的城鎮(zhèn)更為常見。經(jīng)紀(jì)人的收費結(jié)構(gòu)存在系統(tǒng)性差異:對于高度異質(zhì)性的商品，基于價格的收費更為普遍，而對于同質(zhì)性較強的商品，基于數(shù)量的收費更為普遍。我們從理論上表明，這與總盈余最大化大致一致，在買賣雙方數(shù)量不平等的市場上，經(jīng)紀(jì)更有價值。

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3.THE IMPACT OF LOCAL FISCAL AND MIGRATION POLICIES ON HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND INEQUALITY IN CHINA

地方財政和移民政策對中國人力資本積累與不平等的影響

Holger Sieg,?Chamna Yoon,?Jipeng Zhang

We develop and estimate a spatial overlapping generations model with heterogeneous households to study the feasibility of a recently proposed reform of internal migration policies that offers the potential of decreasing inequality within China. We find that this policy change significantly increases the college attainment of migrant children born in rural areas and, therefore, promises to increase the number of high-skill workers. However, it requires significant tax increases to offset the reduction of the positive fiscal externalities provided by?migrants.

我們開發(fā)并估計了一個包含異質(zhì)家庭的空間代際重疊模型，以研究最近提出的內(nèi)部移民政策改革的可行性，該改革提供了減少中國內(nèi)部不平等的潛力。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，這一政策變化顯著提高了出生在農(nóng)村的流動人口子女的大學(xué)學(xué)歷，從而有望增加高技能工人的數(shù)量。然而，這需要大幅增稅，以抵消移民帶來的積極財政外部性的降低。

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3.ENDOGENOUS PROCYCLICAL LIQUIDITY, CAPITAL REALLOCATION, AND?q

內(nèi)生性順周期流動性、資本再配置和托賓q

Melanie Cao,?Shouyong Shi

Capital reallocation is procyclical and an economic boom has a cleansing effect by shifting the distribution of firms from low quality to high quality. We explain these facts by modeling search frictions for used capital in the business cycle. The article characterizes the stochastic equilibrium analytically to prove that the liquidity and the price of reallocated capital are procyclical endogenously. We calibrate the model and construct proxies in the data for the unemployment rate of capital and the time on the market. These two variables have a strong positive relationship in both the model and the?data.

資本重新配置是順周期的，經(jīng)濟繁榮具有清潔效應(yīng)，將企業(yè)的分布從低質(zhì)量轉(zhuǎn)移到高質(zhì)量。我們通過對商業(yè)周期中使用資本的搜索摩擦進(jìn)行建模來解釋這些事實。本文通過對隨機均衡的分析刻畫，證明了流動性和再配置資本的價格具有內(nèi)生性的順周期性。我們對模型進(jìn)行了校準(zhǔn)，并在數(shù)據(jù)中構(gòu)建了資本失業(yè)率和上市時間的代理。這兩個變量在模型和數(shù)據(jù)中都存在較強的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。

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4.ADVERSE SELECTION, LEARNING, AND COMPETITIVE SEARCH

逆向選擇、學(xué)習(xí)和競爭搜索

Karin Mayr-Dorn

I develop a model that allows for an analysis of the effects of time on adverse selection in the presence of search frictions. I find that, as a firm takes longer to adjust a worker's contract in response to learning about his type, inefficient overwork during the time before wage adjustment (probation) decreases. This provides a rationale for an optimal (minimum) probation period of about one month in the baseline scenario. Optimal probation duration varies with the degree of search frictions, the cost of effort, the relative productivity of different types of workers, and minimum wage?regulations.

我開發(fā)了一個模型，用于分析在存在搜索摩擦的情況下，時間對逆向選擇的影響。我發(fā)現(xiàn)，由于企業(yè)需要更長的時間來調(diào)整工人的合同以了解他的類型，因此，在工資調(diào)整(試用期)之前的時間內(nèi)，低效率的過度工作減少。這為基線方案中大約一個月的最佳(最低)試用期提供了理論依據(jù)。最佳試用期因搜索摩擦程度、努力成本、不同類型工人的相對生產(chǎn)率和最低工資規(guī)定而異。

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5.MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS

會面和交易機制

Xiaoming Cai,?Pieter Gautier,?Ronald Wolthoff

This article shows how meeting frictions affect equilibrium trading mechanisms and allocations in an environment where identical sellers post mechanisms to compete for buyers with ex ante heterogeneous private valuations. Multiple submarkets can emerge, each consisting of all sellers posting a particular mechanism and the buyers who visit those sellers. Under mild conditions, high-valuation buyers are all located in the same submarket, and low valuation buyers can be in: (i) the same submarket, (ii) a different submarket, and (iii) a mixture of (i) and (ii). The decentralized equilibrium is efficient when sellers can post auctions with reserve prices or entry?fees.

本文展示了在一個相同的賣方通過事前異質(zhì)性的私人估值來競爭買方的環(huán)境中，會面摩擦如何影響均衡交易機制和分配。可以出現(xiàn)多個子市場，每個子市場由所有發(fā)布特定機制的賣家和訪問這些賣家的買家組成。在溫和的條件下，高估值買家都位于同一子市場，低估值買家可以位于:(i)同一子市場，(ii)不同的子市場，以及(iii) (i)和(ii)的混合。當(dāng)賣家可以以保留價格或進(jìn)入費用發(fā)布拍賣時，去中心化均衡是有效的。

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6.PARENTAL TIME INVESTMENT AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY

父母的時間投入與代際流動性

Minchul Yum

This article constructs an overlapping generations general equilibrium model to explore the extent to which heterogeneity in time investment shapes intergenerational mobility of lifetime income. The calibrated model successfully accounts for untargeted distributional aspects of income mobility. Counterfactual exercises show that removing heterogeneity in parental time investment reduces intergenerational persistence by around 7–8% for early childhood but only marginally in later childhood. Policy experiments find that an asset-tested subsidy for parental monetary investments in early childhood can raise intergenerational mobility in a cost-effective way, though it reduces mobility substantially if given to parents with older school-aged?children.

本文通過構(gòu)建代際重疊一般均衡模型，探討時間投資異質(zhì)性對終身收入代際流動性的影響程度。校準(zhǔn)后的模型成功地考慮了收入流動性的非目標(biāo)分配方面。反事實實驗表明，消除父母時間投資的異質(zhì)性會使兒童早期的代際持久性降低約7-8%，但對兒童后期的影響甚微。政策實驗發(fā)現(xiàn)，對父母在幼兒時期的貨幣投資進(jìn)行資產(chǎn)測試的補貼可以以一種具有成本效益的方式提高代際流動性，但如果向有學(xué)齡兒童的父母提供這種補貼，則會大幅降低流動性。

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7.INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS: PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC FLOWS IN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

國際資本流動:發(fā)展中國家和發(fā)達(dá)國家的私人與公共資本流動

Yun Jung Kim,?Jing Zhang

Empirically, net capital inflows are procyclical in developed countries and countercyclical in developing countries. Private inflows are procyclical and public inflows are countercyclical in both groups of countries. The dominance of private (public) inflows in developed (developing) countries drives the difference in net inflows. We rationalize these patterns using a two-sector model of a small open economy facing borrowing constraints. Private agents overborrow because of the pecuniary externality arising from these constraints. The government saves to reduce aggregate debt, making the economy resilient to adverse shocks. Differences in borrowing constraints and shock processes across countries explain the empirical patterns of capital?inflows.

從經(jīng)驗上看，資本凈流入在發(fā)達(dá)國家是順周期的，在發(fā)展中國家是反周期的。在這兩類國家中，私人資本流入是順周期性的，而公共資本流入是反周期性的。發(fā)達(dá)(發(fā)展中)國家私人(公共)資金流入占主導(dǎo)地位，這導(dǎo)致了凈流入的差異。我們利用面臨借貸限制的小型開放經(jīng)濟的兩部門模型對這些模式進(jìn)行了合理化。私人代理人過度借貸，是因為這些約束所產(chǎn)生的金錢外部性。政府儲蓄以減少總債務(wù)，使經(jīng)濟能夠抵御不利沖擊。各國借款約束和沖擊過程的差異解釋了資本流入的經(jīng)驗?zāi)Ｊ健?/p>

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8.THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF COVID-19 AND OPTIMAL MITIGATION POLICIES

COVID-19的分配效應(yīng)和最優(yōu)緩解政策

Sewon Hur

This article develops a quantitative heterogeneous agent–life cycle–epidemiological model that is used to study the aggregate and distributional consequences of COVID-19 and mitigation policies. First, a stay-at-home subsidy is preferred to a lockdown because it reduces deaths by more and output by less. Second, Pareto-improving policies can reduce deaths by nearly 45% without any reduction in output relative to no public mitigation. Finally, it is possible to simultaneously improve public health and economic outcomes, suggesting that debates regarding a trade-off between economic and health objectives may be?misguided.

本文開發(fā)了一個定量的異質(zhì)代理-生命周期-流行病學(xué)模型，用于研究COVID-19和緩解政策的總體和分配后果。首先，與封鎖相比，居家補貼更受青睞，因為它能更多地降低死亡人數(shù)，更少地降低產(chǎn)出。第二，相對于沒有公共緩解措施，改善帕累托的政策可以在不減少產(chǎn)出的情況下將死亡率降低近45%。最后，有可能同時改善公共衛(wèi)生和經(jīng)濟成果，這表明關(guān)于經(jīng)濟目標(biāo)和衛(wèi)生目標(biāo)之間取舍的辯論可能是錯誤的。

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9.INEQUALITY AND PANEL INCOME CHANGES: CONDITIONS FOR POSSIBILITIES AND IMPOSSIBILITIES

不平等和面板收入變化:可能性和不可能性的條件

Robert Duval-Hernández,?Gary S. Fields,?George H. Jakubson

Income changes in an economy are usually assessed through the changes over time in cross-sectional variables such as economy-wide inequality. An alternative is to use panel data to gauge income changes among identified income recipients. In this article, we analyze these two approaches?taken together, each measured in multiple ways. We establish that under specific conditions, it is impossible to have falling inequality together with divergent panel income changes. We also provide conditions explaining when rising inequality can arise together with convergent panel changes. We provide the intuition behind these results and show when such results fail to?hold.

一個經(jīng)濟體的收入變化通常通過跨部門變量(如整個經(jīng)濟體的不平等)隨時間的變化來評估。另一種方法是使用面板數(shù)據(jù)來衡量已確定的收入接受者的收入變化。在本文中，我們綜合分析這兩種方法，每一種方法都以多種方式進(jìn)行測量。我們確定，在特定條件下，不可能在不平等下降的同時出現(xiàn)不同的面板收入變化。我們還提供了條件，解釋什么時候不平等加劇可以與趨同的面板變化一起出現(xiàn)。我們提供了這些結(jié)果背后的直覺，并顯示了當(dāng)這些結(jié)果不成立時。

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10.GROUPED VARIATION IN FACTOR SHARES: AN APPLICATION TO MISALLOCATION

要素份額的分組變異:錯配的一個應(yīng)用

Jose Asturias,?Jack Rossbach

A striking feature of microlevel plant data is the presence of significant variation in factor cost shares across plants within an industry. We develop a methodology based on cluster analysis to decompose cost shares into idiosyncratic and group-specific components. We apply our methodology to Chilean plant-level data and find that group-specific variation accounts for approximately one-third of the variation in cost shares. We study the implications of these groups in cost shares on the gains from eliminating misallocation. We place bounds on their importance and find that ignoring them can overstate the gains from eliminating misallocation by up to one-third?.

微觀層面工廠數(shù)據(jù)的一個顯著特征是，在一個行業(yè)內(nèi)，不同工廠之間的要素成本份額存在顯著差異。我們開發(fā)了一種基于聚類分析的方法，將成本份額分解為特質(zhì)和群體特定的組成部分。我們將我們的方法應(yīng)用于智利工廠層面的數(shù)據(jù)，發(fā)現(xiàn)特定群體的變化約占成本份額變化的三分之一。我們研究了這些群體在成本分擔(dān)方面對消除錯配收益的影響。我們?yōu)樗鼈兊闹匾栽O(shè)定了界限，發(fā)現(xiàn)忽視它們可能會將消除錯配帶來的收益夸大三分之一。

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11.STORABLE GOOD MARKET WITH INTERTEMPORAL COST VARIATIONS

具有跨期成本變化的可儲存商品市場

Fabio Antoniou,?Raffaele Fiocco

We investigate a firm's dynamic pricing policy in a storable good market where the cost of production varies over time. In anticipation of a cost increase, the firm selects its prices to affect consumer storage. Price dynamics hinge upon the curvature of demand and the magnitude of the consumer storage cost. When demand is not too convex, the consumers' reluctance to store leads the firm to reduce prices to stimulate consumer storage. This shapes the firm's cost pass-through and the price commitment effects. Our analysis provides a novel explanation for the well-documented puzzling patterns of incomplete and negative cost?pass-through.

我們研究了在生產(chǎn)成本隨時間變化的可儲存商品市場中公司的動態(tài)定價策略。在預(yù)期成本增加的情況下，該公司選擇其價格來影響消費者的存儲。價格動態(tài)取決于需求曲率和消費者存儲成本的大小。當(dāng)需求不是太凸時，消費者不愿意存儲，導(dǎo)致企業(yè)降低價格以刺激消費者存儲。這就形成了企業(yè)的成本傳遞和價格承諾效應(yīng)。我們的分析為充分記錄的不完全和負(fù)成本傳遞的令人困惑的模式提供了一個新穎的解釋。

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12.IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

動態(tài)博弈中的不可逆性和監(jiān)控:實驗證據(jù)

Eungik Lee,?Andrew Choi,?Syngjoo Choi,?Yves Guéron

This article provides experimental evidence on the impacts of irreversibility and imperfect monitoring on the efficiency and the equity of a repeated public goods game. We find that irreversibility and imperfect monitoring both lead to inefficient and unequal outcomes through different channels. Irreversibility lowers public goods contribution in earlier periods and makes the initial-period contribution gap between two players long-lasting. Imperfect monitoring hampers conditional cooperation and persistently reduces group contribution. A finite mixture estimation with conditional cooperators provides a coherent account of the treatment?effects.

本文就不可逆性和不完善監(jiān)控對重復(fù)公共產(chǎn)品博弈效率和公平性的影響提供了實驗證據(jù)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，不可逆性和不完善的監(jiān)測都會通過不同的渠道導(dǎo)致低效和不平等的結(jié)果。不可逆性降低了前期的公共品貢獻(xiàn)，使得前期雙方的貢獻(xiàn)差距持續(xù)存在。不完善的監(jiān)督阻礙了有條件的合作，持續(xù)減少了團隊的貢獻(xiàn)。有限混合估計與條件合作提供了一個連貫的帳戶處理效果。

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13.GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM

利用選擇性錄取系統(tǒng)

Frances Xu Lee,?Wing Suen

A university uses both early-stage selection outcome (high-school affiliation) and late-stage admission test outcome (standardized test scores) to select students. We use this model to study policies that have been proposed to combat inefficient gaming in college admissions. Increasing university enrollment size can exacerbate gaming and worsen the selection outcome. Abolishing standardized tests for university admissions increases gaming targeting high-school admissions and worsens the selection outcome, whereas eliminating high-school ability sorting may improve the university selection outcome under some cost conditions of gaming. Committing to a lower-powered selection scheme can improve the selection outcome by reducing gaming?behaviors.

大學(xué)在選拔學(xué)生時，會同時使用前期選拔結(jié)果(高中所屬學(xué)校)和后期入學(xué)考試結(jié)果(標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化考試成績)。我們使用這個模型來研究旨在打擊大學(xué)招生中低效博弈的政策。擴大大學(xué)招生規(guī)模會加劇博弈，并使選擇結(jié)果惡化。取消大學(xué)錄取的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化考試增加了針對高中錄取的游戲，并惡化了選擇結(jié)果，而取消高中能力排序可能會在某些游戲成本條件下改善大學(xué)選擇結(jié)果。采用低功耗的選擇方案可以通過減少游戲行為來改善選擇結(jié)果。