American Economic Journal：Microeconomics2023年第2期

VOL. 15, NO. 2, MAY 2023

——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

Dynamic Privacy Choices

動(dòng)態(tài)隱私選擇

ShotaIchihashi

I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates more information about the consumer, thereby increasing platform profits. When the platform can commit to the future privacy policy, it collects information by committing to gradually decreasing the level of privacy protection. In the long run consumers lose privacy and receive low payoffs but choose high activity levels. In contrast, the platform with weaker commitment power may attain the commitment outcome or fail to collect any data depending on consumer expectations regarding future privacy protection.

研究了一個(gè)消費(fèi)者隱私的動(dòng)態(tài)模型和平臺(tái)數(shù)據(jù)收集。在每個(gè)階段，消費(fèi)者選擇自己的平臺(tái)活動(dòng)水平。更多的活動(dòng)產(chǎn)生更多關(guān)于消費(fèi)者的信息，從而增加平臺(tái)利潤(rùn)。當(dāng)平臺(tái)可以承諾未來(lái)的隱私政策時(shí)，它通過(guò)承諾逐步降低隱私保護(hù)水平來(lái)收集信息。從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，消費(fèi)者失去了隱私，獲得了較低的回報(bào)，但選擇了高活動(dòng)水平。相比之下，承諾權(quán)力較弱的平臺(tái)可能會(huì)根據(jù)消費(fèi)者對(duì)未來(lái)隱私保護(hù)的預(yù)期，實(shí)現(xiàn)承諾結(jié)果或無(wú)法收集任何數(shù)據(jù)。

Blind Disclosure

盲目的披露

AaronKolb,?Marilyn?Pease,?Daniel W.?Sacks?and?Joshua?Quick

We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private signal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature's canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if their preliminary signal exceeds a cutoff. This cutoff rule leads to partial unraveling in environments with either risk aversion or moral hazard, and disclosure decreases with uncertainty. Using unique administrative data on disclosed and undisclosed grades in a large university, we find that the model is consistent with student choices during spring 2020 to conceal letter grades by switching to optional pass-fail grades.

我們發(fā)展并測(cè)試了一種盲目披露的理論。發(fā)送端基于一個(gè)初步的私有信號(hào)選擇是否公開(kāi)信息。在唯一均衡中，與文獻(xiàn)的典型解離結(jié)果相反，發(fā)送者只有在他們的初步信號(hào)超過(guò)截止點(diǎn)時(shí)才會(huì)披露。這一界限規(guī)則導(dǎo)致在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避或道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的環(huán)境中部分解開(kāi)，披露隨著不確定性的增加而減少。利用一所大型大學(xué)的公開(kāi)和未公開(kāi)成績(jī)的獨(dú)特管理數(shù)據(jù)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)該模型與2020年春季學(xué)生的選擇一致，即通過(guò)轉(zhuǎn)換為可選的及格-不及格成績(jī)來(lái)隱藏字母成績(jī)。

Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers

具有數(shù)據(jù)敏感消費(fèi)者的最優(yōu)非線性定價(jià)

DanielKr?hmer?and?Roland?Strausz

We study monopolistic screening when some consumers are data sensitive and incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals information to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates between data-sensitive and classical consumers using privacy mechanisms that consist of a direct mechanism and a privacy option. A privacy mechanism is optimal for large privacy costs and leaves classical consumers better off than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation. When privacy preferences become public information, data-sensitive consumers and the monopolist gain, whereas classical consumers lose. Our results are relevant for policies targeting consumers' data awareness, such as the European General Data Protection Regulation.

Competition in Pricing Algorithms

定價(jià)算法的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)

Zach Y.Brown?and?Alexander?MacKay

We document new facts about pricing technology using high-frequency data, and we examine the implications for competition. Some online retailers employ technology that allows for more frequent price changes and automated responses to price changes by rivals. Motivated by these facts, we consider a model in which firms can differ in pricing frequency and choose pricing algorithms that are a function of rivals' prices. In competitive (Markov perfect) equilibrium, the introduction of simple pricing algorithms can increase price levels, generate price dispersion, and exacerbate the price effects of mergers.

我們利用高頻數(shù)據(jù)記錄了有關(guān)技術(shù)定價(jià)的新事實(shí)，并研究了其對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響。一些在線零售商采用技術(shù)，允許更頻繁地調(diào)整價(jià)格，并自動(dòng)對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的價(jià)格變化做出反應(yīng)。在這些事實(shí)的推動(dòng)下，我們考慮了一個(gè)模型，在該模型中，企業(yè)可以不同的定價(jià)頻率，并選擇定價(jià)算法，這是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手價(jià)格的函數(shù)。在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)(馬爾可夫完美)均衡下，引入簡(jiǎn)單定價(jià)算法可以提高價(jià)格水平，產(chǎn)生價(jià)格離散，加劇合并的價(jià)格效應(yīng)。

Targeted Product Design

針對(duì)性的產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)

HeskiBar-Isaac,?Guillermo?Caruana?and?Vicente?Cu?at

We propose an intuitive representation of product design in which firms locate inside a circle and consumers in its outer circumference. Designs trade off horizontal and vertical transport costs. Our setting encompasses all linear demand rotations. Firms with lower quality or higher marginal costs choose niche designs that cater to specific consumers at the expense of alienating the rest. Firms choose intermediate designs or more polarized ones, instead, depending on the convexity of the vertical transport cost. We examine such design choices in monopoly, duopoly, and monopolistic competition settings.

我們提出了一種直觀的產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)表示法，在這種表示法中，企業(yè)位于圓周內(nèi)，而消費(fèi)者位于圓周外。設(shè)計(jì)權(quán)衡了橫向和縱向運(yùn)輸成本。我們的設(shè)置包含了所有的線性需求旋轉(zhuǎn)。質(zhì)量較低或邊際成本較高的公司選擇迎合特定消費(fèi)者的利基設(shè)計(jì)，以疏遠(yuǎn)其他消費(fèi)者為代價(jià)。相反，企業(yè)會(huì)根據(jù)垂直運(yùn)輸成本的凸度選擇中間設(shè)計(jì)或更極化的設(shè)計(jì)。我們研究了壟斷、雙壟斷和壟斷競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境下的設(shè)計(jì)選擇。

The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information

好的、壞的和復(fù)雜的:不完全信息的產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)

VladimirAsriyan,?Dana?Foarta?and?Victoria?Vanasco

We study the joint determination of product quality and complexity.?In our model complexity affects how difficult it is for an agent to acquire information about product quality. An agent can accept or reject a product proposed by a designer, who can affect the quality and the complexity of the product. We find that complexity is not a necessary feature of low-quality products. An increase in designer–agent alignment leads to more complex but better-quality products. However, higher product demand or lower competition among designers leads to more complex and lower-quality products. We relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence.

我們研究了產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量和復(fù)雜性的聯(lián)合確定。在我們的模型中，復(fù)雜性影響了代理獲取產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量信息的難度。代理人可以接受或拒絕設(shè)計(jì)師提出的產(chǎn)品，設(shè)計(jì)師可以影響產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量和復(fù)雜性。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，復(fù)雜性并不是低質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的必要特征。設(shè)計(jì)器-代理一致性的增加導(dǎo)致了更復(fù)雜但質(zhì)量更好的產(chǎn)品。然而，更高的產(chǎn)品需求或更低的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，設(shè)計(jì)師導(dǎo)致更復(fù)雜和更低質(zhì)量的產(chǎn)品。我們將我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)與現(xiàn)有的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)聯(lián)系起來(lái)。

Ad Clutter, Time Use, and Media Diversity

廣告混亂，時(shí)間使用和媒體多樣性

Simon P.Anderson?and?Martin?Peitz

We introduce advertising congestion along with a time use model of consumer choice among media. Both consumers and advertisers multihome. Higher equilibrium advertising levels ensue on less popular media platforms because platforms treat consumer attention as a common property resource: smaller platforms internalize less of the congestion from advertising and so advertise more. Platform entry raises the ad nuisance price to consumers and diminishes the quality of the consumption experience on all platforms. For consumer welfare this price effect of entry dominates the positive effect of more variety in some settings; thus, consumers will then be worse off after entry.

我們引入了廣告擁塞以及消費(fèi)者選擇媒體的時(shí)間使用模型。消費(fèi)者和廣告商都有多個(gè)家。在不太受歡迎的媒體平臺(tái)上，更高的均衡廣告水平隨之而來(lái)，因?yàn)槠脚_(tái)將消費(fèi)者的注意力視為一種共同的財(cái)產(chǎn)資源：較小的平臺(tái)內(nèi)化較少的廣告擁塞，因此投放更多廣告。進(jìn)入平臺(tái)提高了消費(fèi)者的廣告滋擾價(jià)格，并降低了所有平臺(tái)的消費(fèi)體驗(yàn)質(zhì)量。對(duì)于消費(fèi)者福利而言，這種進(jìn)入的價(jià)格效應(yīng)在某些情況下優(yōu)于更多品種的正向效應(yīng)；因此，消費(fèi)者在進(jìn)入后會(huì)變得更糟。

Reference Dependence and Attribution Bias: Evidence from Real-Effort Experiments

參考依賴(lài)和歸因偏差:來(lái)自真實(shí)實(shí)驗(yàn)的證據(jù)

BenjaminBushong?and?Tristan?Gagnon-Bartsch

We document a form of attribution bias wherein people wrongly ascribe sensations of positive or negative surprise to the underlying disutility of a real-effort task. Participants in our experiments learned from experience about two unfamiliar tasks, one more onerous than the other. We manipulated expectations about which task they would face: some participants were assigned their task by chance, while others knew their assignment in advance. Hours later, we elicited willingness to work again on that same task. Participants assigned the less (more) onerous task by chance were more (less) willing to work than those who knew their assignment in advance.

我們記錄了一種歸因偏差，即人們錯(cuò)誤地將積極或消極的驚喜感覺(jué)歸因于實(shí)際努力任務(wù)的潛在負(fù)效用。在我們的實(shí)驗(yàn)中，參與者從兩個(gè)不熟悉的任務(wù)中學(xué)習(xí)，一個(gè)比另一個(gè)更繁重。我們對(duì)他們將面臨的任務(wù)的預(yù)期進(jìn)行了操縱:一些參與者是隨機(jī)分配任務(wù)的，而另一些人則事先知道他們的任務(wù)。幾個(gè)小時(shí)后，我們又得到了再次從事同樣任務(wù)的意愿。被隨機(jī)分配任務(wù)的參與者比那些事先知道任務(wù)的參與者更愿意(更不愿意)工作。

The Doors of Perception: Theory and Evidence of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability

知覺(jué)之門(mén):框架依賴(lài)性理性化之理論與證據(jù)

GaryCharness?and?Alessandro?Sontuoso

We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about the game. In our games the action set consists of visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match the counterpart's choice. We propose a model where different player-types are aware of different attributes of the action set (hence, different frames). One of the novelties is an epistemic structure that allows players to think about new frames, after initial unawareness of some attributes. To test the model, our experimental design brings about multiple frames by varying subjects' awareness of several attributes.

我們調(diào)查策略行為是如何受到游戲中使用的概念(框架)的影響。在我們的游戲中，動(dòng)作集由視覺(jué)對(duì)象組成:每個(gè)玩家必須私下選擇一個(gè)，試圖匹配對(duì)方的選擇。我們提出了一個(gè)模型，在這個(gè)模型中，不同的玩家類(lèi)型會(huì)意識(shí)到動(dòng)作集的不同屬性(因此，不同的幀)。其中一個(gè)新奇之處在于認(rèn)知結(jié)構(gòu)，它允許玩家在最初不知道某些屬性后思考新的框架。為了驗(yàn)證該模型，我們的實(shí)驗(yàn)設(shè)計(jì)通過(guò)改變被試對(duì)幾種屬性的感知來(lái)產(chǎn)生多個(gè)幀。

Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market

參考定價(jià)作為進(jìn)入的威懾:來(lái)自歐洲醫(yī)藥市場(chǎng)的證據(jù)

LucaMaini?and?Fabio?Pammolli

External reference pricing (ERP), the practice of benchmarking?domestic drug prices to foreign prices, generates an incentive for firms to withhold products from low-income countries. Using a novel moment inequality approach, we estimate a structural model to measure how ERP policies affect access to innovative drugs across Europe. We find that ERP increases entry delays in eight low-income European countries by up to one year per drug. The European Union could remove these delays without replacing ERP by compensating firms through lump-sum transfers at the cost of around €18 million per drug.

外部參考定價(jià)(ERP)是一種將國(guó)內(nèi)藥品價(jià)格與國(guó)外價(jià)格進(jìn)行比較的做法，它會(huì)激勵(lì)企業(yè)不向低收入國(guó)家出口產(chǎn)品。利用一種新穎的時(shí)刻不平等方法，我們估計(jì)了一個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)模型來(lái)衡量ERP政策如何影響整個(gè)歐洲的創(chuàng)新藥物獲取。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在8個(gè)低收入歐洲國(guó)家，ERP使每種藥物最多增加了一年的入境延遲。歐盟可以在不取代ERP的情況下消除這些延遲，通過(guò)一次性轉(zhuǎn)移補(bǔ)償公司，每一種藥物的成本約為1800萬(wàn)歐元。

Complexity and Procedural Choice

復(fù)雜性和程序選擇

JamesBanovetz?and?Ryan?Oprea

We test the core ideas of the "automata" approach to bounded rationality, using simple experimental bandit tasks. Optimality requires subjects to use a moderately complex decision procedure, but most subjects in our baseline condition instead use simpler (often sub-optimal) procedures that economize on "states" in the algorithmic structure of the rule. When we artificially remove the mental costs of tracking states by having the computer track and organize past events, subjects abandon these simpler rules and use maximally complex optimal rules instead. The results thus suggest that the main type of complexity described in the automata literature fundamentally influences behavior.

我們使用簡(jiǎn)單的實(shí)驗(yàn)強(qiáng)盜任務(wù)來(lái)測(cè)試有限理性的“自動(dòng)機(jī)”方法的核心思想。最優(yōu)性要求受試者使用適度復(fù)雜的決策過(guò)程，但在我們的基線條件下，大多數(shù)受試者反而使用更簡(jiǎn)單(通常是次最優(yōu))的過(guò)程，在規(guī)則的算法結(jié)構(gòu)中節(jié)省“狀態(tài)”。當(dāng)我們通過(guò)讓計(jì)算機(jī)跟蹤和組織過(guò)去的事件來(lái)人為地消除跟蹤狀態(tài)的心理成本時(shí)，受試者就會(huì)放棄這些更簡(jiǎn)單的規(guī)則，轉(zhuǎn)而使用最大限度地復(fù)雜的最優(yōu)規(guī)則。結(jié)果表明，自動(dòng)機(jī)文獻(xiàn)中描述的主要復(fù)雜性類(lèi)型從根本上影響行為。

Biased Beliefs in Search Markets

對(duì)搜索市場(chǎng)的偏見(jiàn)

TobiasGamp?and?Daniel?Kr?hmer

We study the implications of biased consumer beliefs for search market outcomes in the seminal framework due to Diamond (1971). Biased consumers base their search strategy on a belief function that specifies for any (true) distribution of utility offers in the market a possibly incorrect distribution of utility offers. If biased consumers overestimate the best offer in the market, a novel type of equilibrium may emerge in which firms make exceptionally favorable offers in order to meet biased consumers' unreasonably high expectations, which then become partially self-fulfilling. Consequently, the presence of biased consumers may improve the welfare of all consumers.

在Diamond(1971)的研究框架中，我們研究了有偏見(jiàn)的消費(fèi)者信念對(duì)搜索市場(chǎng)結(jié)果的影響。有偏見(jiàn)的消費(fèi)者將他們的搜索策略建立在一個(gè)信念函數(shù)上，該函數(shù)指定了市場(chǎng)上任何(真實(shí))的效用分配，這可能是不正確的效用分配。如果有偏見(jiàn)的消費(fèi)者高估了市場(chǎng)上的最佳報(bào)價(jià)，那么就會(huì)出現(xiàn)一種新的均衡，即企業(yè)為了滿足有偏見(jiàn)的消費(fèi)者不合理的高期望而提供格外優(yōu)惠的報(bào)價(jià)，然后這種期望就會(huì)部分自我實(shí)現(xiàn)。因此，有偏見(jiàn)的消費(fèi)者的存在可能會(huì)提高所有消費(fèi)者的福利。

At the Helm, Kirk or Spock? The Pros and Cons of Charismatic Leadership

掌舵，柯克還是斯波克?魅力型領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的利弊

Benjamin E.Hermalin

Charismatic leaders are often desired. At the same time, experience, especially with demagogues, as well as social science studies, raise doubts about such leaders. This paper offers explanations for charismatic leadership's "mixed report card." It offers insights into why and when charismatic leadership can be effective; which, when, and why certain groups will prefer more to less charismatic leaders; and how being more charismatic can make leaders worse in other dimensions, particularly causing them to work less hard on their followers' behalf.

有魅力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者往往是人們所渴望的。與此同時(shí)，經(jīng)驗(yàn)，尤其是與煽動(dòng)者的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，以及社會(huì)科學(xué)研究，都讓人對(duì)這些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人產(chǎn)生了懷疑。本文為魅力型領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的“混合成績(jī)單”提供了解釋。它提供了關(guān)于魅力型領(lǐng)導(dǎo)為什么以及何時(shí)可以有效的見(jiàn)解;哪些、何時(shí)以及為什么某些群體會(huì)更喜歡魅力較弱的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者;以及更有魅力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者如何在其他方面變得更糟，特別是導(dǎo)致他們不那么努力地為追隨者工作。

Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents

好得令人難以置信?嘈雜代理的保留規(guī)則

FranciscoEspinosa???Debraj?Ray

An agent who privately knows his type seeks to be retained by a principal. Agents signal their type with some ambient noise, but can alter this noise, perhaps at some cost. Our main finding is that in equilibrium, the principal treats extreme signals in either direction with suspicion, and retains the agent if and only if the signal falls in some intermediate bounded set. In short, she follows the maxim: "if it seems too good to be true, it probably is." We consider extensions and applications, including non-normal signal structures, dynamics with term limits, risky portfolio management, and political risk-taking.

一個(gè)私下里知道自己類(lèi)型的代理人會(huì)尋求被委托人雇用。代理通過(guò)一些環(huán)境噪聲來(lái)標(biāo)記它們的類(lèi)型，但可以改變這些噪聲，也許需要付出一些代價(jià)。我們的主要發(fā)現(xiàn)是，在平衡中，主宰者以懷疑的態(tài)度對(duì)待任意方向的極端信號(hào)，當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)信號(hào)落在某個(gè)中間有界集合時(shí)，主宰者保留代理。簡(jiǎn)而言之，她遵循的格言是:“如果它看起來(lái)好得令人難以置信，它可能就是真的?！蔽覀兛紤]了擴(kuò)展和應(yīng)用，包括非常態(tài)信號(hào)結(jié)構(gòu)、期限限制的動(dòng)態(tài)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資組合管理和政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions

T. TonyKe,?Christopher?Li?and?Mikhail?Safronov

This paper explores potential inefficiencies of incomplete contracts in a dynamic career concerns context. In a firm-worker relationship, the worker performs public tasks that have trade-offs between productivity and informativeness. We show that the first-best outcome can be obtained with short-term contracts if the wage can depend on the task choice. This provides an explanation for wage jumps at promotions—the worker is assigned the more productive but less informative task after promotion. If task choice is not contractible, then inefficiency arises: the worker has an endogenous bias toward informativeness, while the firm is biased toward productivity.

本文探討了動(dòng)態(tài)職業(yè)關(guān)注情境下不完全契約的潛在低效率。在公司與員工的關(guān)系中，員工執(zhí)行公共任務(wù)，在生產(chǎn)力和信息含量之間進(jìn)行權(quán)衡。研究表明，如果工資與任務(wù)選擇存在一定的依賴(lài)關(guān)系，短期合同可以獲得最優(yōu)結(jié)果。這就解釋了晉升時(shí)工資上漲的原因——員工在晉升后被分配了更有生產(chǎn)力但信息量更少的任務(wù)。如果任務(wù)選擇是不可收縮的，那么低效率就會(huì)產(chǎn)生:工人的內(nèi)生性傾向于信息含量，而企業(yè)的內(nèi)生性傾向于生產(chǎn)率。

Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking

相對(duì)財(cái)富擔(dān)憂、高管薪酬和管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)

QiLiu?and?Bo?Sun

This paper theoretically examines how relative wealth concerns affect equilibrium contracting and systemic risk-taking. We find that such externalities can generate pay for luck as an equilibrium strategy. In expectation of pay for luck in other firms, tying managerial pay to luck provides insurance to managers against a compensation shortfall relative to executive peers. We also show that an effort-inducing mechanism exists: managers have additional incentives to exert effort in utilizing investment opportunities, which helps them keep up with their peers during industry movements; however, pay for luck that is efficient within firms can nonetheless exacerbate aggregate fluctuations, especially during periods of heightened market risk.

本文從理論上考察了相對(duì)財(cái)富擔(dān)憂對(duì)均衡契約和系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，作為一種均衡策略，這種外部性可以為運(yùn)氣帶來(lái)回報(bào)。在其他公司，人們期待運(yùn)氣帶來(lái)的薪酬，將管理人員的薪酬與運(yùn)氣掛鉤，為管理人員提供了保障，以應(yīng)對(duì)相對(duì)于高管同行的薪酬短缺。研究還發(fā)現(xiàn)，經(jīng)理人的努力激勵(lì)機(jī)制存在:經(jīng)理人有額外的激勵(lì)來(lái)努力利用投資機(jī)會(huì)，這有助于他們?cè)谛袠I(yè)變動(dòng)中跟上同行的步伐;然而，在公司內(nèi)部有效的運(yùn)氣支付可能會(huì)加劇總體波動(dòng)，特別是在市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高的時(shí)期。

Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes

提高門(mén)檻:認(rèn)證門(mén)檻和市場(chǎng)結(jié)果

XiangHui,?Maryam?Saeedi,?Giancarlo?Spagnolo?and?Steven?Tadelis

Certification of sellers by trusted third parties helps alleviate information asymmetries in markets, yet little is known about the impact of a certification's threshold on market outcomes. Exploiting a policy change on eBay, we study how a more selective certification threshold affects the distribution of quality and incumbent behavior. We develop a stylized model that shows how changes in selectivity change the distribution of quality and prices in markets. Using rich data from hundreds of online categories on eBay.com, we find support for the model's hypotheses. Our results help inform the design of certification selectivity in electronic and other markets.

由可信賴(lài)的第三方對(duì)賣(mài)家進(jìn)行認(rèn)證有助于緩解市場(chǎng)上的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)，但人們對(duì)認(rèn)證門(mén)檻對(duì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)果的影響知之甚少。利用eBay上的政策變化，我們研究了一個(gè)更具選擇性的認(rèn)證門(mén)檻如何影響質(zhì)量和在位行為的分布。我們開(kāi)發(fā)了一個(gè)程式化的模型，展示了選擇性的變化如何改變市場(chǎng)上的質(zhì)量和價(jià)格分布。通過(guò)使用eBay.com上數(shù)百個(gè)在線類(lèi)別的豐富數(shù)據(jù)，我們找到了對(duì)該模型假設(shè)的支持。我們的結(jié)果有助于在電子和其他市場(chǎng)的認(rèn)證選擇性設(shè)計(jì)。

Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts

有契約的穩(wěn)定高效的資源配置

BobakPakzad-Hurson

Consider indivisible-object allocation with contracts, such as college admissions, where contracts specify majors. Can a designer guarantee a stable and (student) efficient matching? I show that contracts put stability and efficiency at odds; a necessary condition to ensure these properties is student-lexicographic priorities—schools must rank contracts from "second-tier" students consecutively. I present the weakest restriction guaranteeing stability and efficiency, and characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for any mechanism within a general class to deliver a stable and efficient matching in an incentive compatible manner. I apply this result to two well-known mechanisms: deferred acceptance and top trading cycles.

考慮一下有合同的不可分割對(duì)象分配，比如大學(xué)招生，合同規(guī)定了專(zhuān)業(yè)。設(shè)計(jì)師能否保證一個(gè)穩(wěn)定和(學(xué)生)高效的搭配?我指出，契約使穩(wěn)定和效率發(fā)生沖突;確保這些屬性的一個(gè)必要條件是學(xué)生-字典優(yōu)先級(jí)-學(xué)校必須連續(xù)排列來(lái)自”二線”學(xué)生的合同。本文提出了保證穩(wěn)定性和效率的最弱約束，并刻畫(huà)了一般類(lèi)內(nèi)的任何機(jī)制以激勵(lì)相容的方式實(shí)現(xiàn)穩(wěn)定高效匹配的充要條件。我將這一結(jié)果應(yīng)用于兩個(gè)眾所周知的機(jī)制:延遲接受和頂級(jí)交易周期。

Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions

逆向選擇和隱藏行為下的最優(yōu)任務(wù)調(diào)度

MuraliAgastya?and?Oleksii?Birulin

A Principal owns a project consisting of several tasks. Tasks differ, both in their innate success probabilities and their incremental benefits. Moreover, only specialists can perform these tasks. Subject to moral hazard and adverse selection, in what order should the Principal commission the tasks, and when should she terminate the project? What investments into changing tasks' characteristics yield the highest marginal profit? These are typical issues that arise in sequencing R&D activities and other sequential production processes. We show that, despite informational constraints, a simple index—a task's effective marginal contribution—determines the optimal schedule/mechanism.

一個(gè)負(fù)責(zé)人擁有一個(gè)由幾個(gè)任務(wù)組成的項(xiàng)目。任務(wù)是不同的，無(wú)論是在其固有的成功概率還是它們的增量收益上。此外，只有專(zhuān)家才能執(zhí)行這些任務(wù)。在道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和逆向選擇的情況下，委托人應(yīng)該以什么順序委托任務(wù)，她應(yīng)該在什么時(shí)候終止項(xiàng)目?改變?nèi)蝿?wù)特征的投資能產(chǎn)生最高的邊際利潤(rùn)?這些是在排序研發(fā)活動(dòng)和其他順序生產(chǎn)過(guò)程中出現(xiàn)的典型問(wèn)題。我們的研究表明，盡管存在信息約束，一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的索引-任務(wù)的有效邊際貢獻(xiàn)-決定了最優(yōu)調(diào)度/機(jī)制。

Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection

具有類(lèi)型內(nèi)逆向選擇的市場(chǎng)

AnhNguyen?and?Teck Yong?Tan

We study bilateral trade with a seller owning multiple units of a good, where each unit is of binary quality. The seller privately knows her "type"—defined by the number of lemons that she own—and which units in her endowments are the lemons ("within-type adverse selection"). We characterize the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations and show that every such allocation must involve a trade characterized by a threshold λ?, with types having less (more) than λ??units of lemons selling only their lemons (selling their entire endowment). We provide conditions for a distribution shift that give Pareto-improving allocations.

我們研究與一個(gè)擁有多個(gè)商品單元的賣(mài)方的雙邊貿(mào)易，其中每個(gè)單元的質(zhì)量都是二元的。賣(mài)家私下里知道她的“類(lèi)型”——由她擁有的檸檬數(shù)量定義——以及她的稟賦中哪些單位是檸檬(“類(lèi)型內(nèi)逆向選擇”)。我們描述了信息約束的帕累托最優(yōu)分配集合，并表明每一種分配都必須涉及一個(gè)以閾值λ?為特征的交易，類(lèi)型的檸檬數(shù)量少于(多于)λ?，只出售檸檬(出售其全部稟賦)。我們?yōu)榉峙滢D(zhuǎn)移提供了帕累托改進(jìn)分配的條件。