2020 年，馬里生產(chǎn)了超過 71 噸黃金，價值數(shù)十億美元。但馬里從那塊黃金中只看到了 8.5 億美元。而且這種情況并不是唯一的：非洲其他一些黃金豐富的國家沒有看到他們應(yīng)該給予黃金價格的收入。發(fā)生什么了？Lyla Latif 深入研究外國公司如何利用非洲國家的資源。

[由 Jeffig Le Bars 執(zhí)導(dǎo)，

Jet Propulsion，Karen Marie 旁白，André Aires 配樂]。

Gold is one of Earth’s most valuable resources,?with one kilogram regularly valued at over 55,000 US dollars.?In 2020, Mali produced an estimated 71.2 tons of gold.?But Mali only saw $850 million from gold in 2020,?when that amount is worth billions,?not to mention that the country likely produced much more?than the reported 71.2 tons.?The situation isn’t unique:?a number of other gold-rich countries in Africa,?including Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire,?Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Niger?also aren’t seeing the income they should, given the price of gold.?The force behind this is greed?on an individual, corporate, and national scale,?and a corrupt system that perpetuates itself.

黃金是地球上最寶貴的資源?之一，每公斤黃金通常價值超過 55,000 美元。?2020 年，馬里估計生產(chǎn)了 71.2 噸黃金。?但馬里在 2020 年僅從黃金中獲得了 8.5 億美元，?當(dāng)時這個數(shù)字價值數(shù)十億美元，?更不用說該國的產(chǎn)量可能遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)?超過報告的 71.2 噸。?這種情況并非獨(dú)一無二：考慮到價格?，非洲其他一些黃金豐富的國家，?包括毛里塔尼亞、塞內(nèi)加爾、幾內(nèi)亞、科特迪瓦、?加納、布基納法索和尼日爾，?也沒有看到應(yīng)有的收入金子的。?這背后的力量是?個人、企業(yè)和國家層面的貪婪，?以及一個持續(xù)存在的腐敗系統(tǒng)。

Although Mali has abundant gold,?the country lacks the infrastructure to mine and export it.?So the government allows multinational corporations to apply for licenses?to mine gold in exchange for taxes paid to Mali’s government.?These taxes should, theoretically, finance development,?like building the infrastructure to mine gold, improve the economy,?and provide citizens with public goods like healthcare and education.?Tax money alone isn’t enough to do these things, of course:?a government also has to be invested in its people’s well-being,and government corruption can prevent progress.?But without adequate funds,?even the best intentioned government doesn’t stand a chance?of improving circumstances for its citizens.

盡管馬里擁有豐富的黃金，?但該國缺乏開采和出口黃金的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。?因此，政府允許跨國公司申請?開采黃金的許可證，以換取向馬里政府繳納的稅款。?從理論上講，這些稅收應(yīng)該為發(fā)展提供資金，例如建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施以開采黃金、改善經(jīng)濟(jì)?并為公民提供醫(yī)療保健和教育等公共產(chǎn)品。?當(dāng)然，僅靠稅收是不夠的：?政府還必須投資于人民的福祉，?政府的腐敗會阻礙進(jìn)步。?但如果沒有足夠的資金，?即使是善意的政府也沒有機(jī)會?改善其公民的環(huán)境。

Foreign corporations exploit Mali’s need for tax revenue?to get the government to sign on to very unfavorable yet perfectly legal contracts.?For example, one such contract stated that no corporate taxes would be owed?for the first five years, costing Mali millions in tax revenue.?Meanwhile, mining licenses sometimes allow these corporations to take samples of gold?out of the country without registering them?or paying taxes on them.These should be small amounts of gold used to test for quality,but the license doesn’t limit the size of samples,?so this creates a loophole?where corporations export large amounts of gold without paying any tax.

外國公司利用馬里對稅收的需求，?讓政府簽署非常不利但完全合法的合同。?例如，一份這樣的合同規(guī)定，?頭五年不拖欠公司稅，這使馬里損失了數(shù)百萬的稅收。?同時，采礦許可證有時允許這些公司在沒有登記?或納稅的情況下將黃金樣品帶出國外。?這些應(yīng)該是用于測試質(zhì)量的少量黃金，但許可證并沒有限制樣本的大小，因此這造成了公司出口大量黃金而無需繳納任何稅款的漏洞。

The multinational corporations are also evading taxes?they are legally required to pay.?They filter profits through a labyrinth of tax havens that’s difficult to trace.?Or they exaggerate their expenses so they end up owing very little in taxes.?For instance, a corporation in Mali uses a subsidiary in Ireland?to manage its operations and another subsidiary in the Netherlands?to license its brand name.?The corporation in Mali pays management fees to the Irish subsidiary?and pays intellectual property license fees to the Dutch company,?all for enormous sums.?These costs are deducted from overall profits,?leaving the amount subject to taxes at a bare minimum.

跨國公司也在逃避?法律要求他們繳納的稅款。?他們通過難以追蹤的迷宮般的避稅天堂過濾利潤。?或者他們夸大了他們的開支，所以他們最終欠的稅很少。?例如，馬里的一家公司使用愛爾蘭的一家子公司?來管理其業(yè)務(wù)，并使用荷蘭的另一家子公司?來授權(quán)其品牌名稱。馬里的公司向愛爾蘭子公司支付管理費(fèi)，?向荷蘭公司支付知識產(chǎn)權(quán)許可費(fèi)，?這些都是巨額費(fèi)用。?這些成本會從整體利潤中扣除，?從而將需要繳納的稅款降至最低。

These companies also buy gold on the black market.?Local, small-scale miners often operate without a license,?so the government is unaware of how much gold they mine.Corporations buy gold from these miners,?avoiding the cost of mining the gold themselves,?and pay the miners far below market value.?Then they turn around and tell the government?they incurred huge expenses mining gold they didn’t mine at all.There’s no way for Mali’s revenue authority to verify this information,?causing the country to lose even more tax money.

這些公司也在黑市上購買黃金。?當(dāng)?shù)氐男∫?guī)模礦工經(jīng)常無照經(jīng)營，因此政府不知道他們開采了多少黃金。?公司從這些礦工那里購買黃金，?避免了自己開采黃金的成本，?并且支付給礦工遠(yuǎn)低于市場價值的費(fèi)用。?然后他們轉(zhuǎn)身告訴政府?，他們在開采黃金時付出了巨額費(fèi)用，而他們根本沒有開采。?馬里的稅收當(dāng)局無法核實(shí)這些信息，?導(dǎo)致該國損失更多的稅款。

Similarly, corporations pay corrupt government officials?to help them smuggle gold across borders, primarily to the United Arab Emirates,?rather than operating through legal channels.?In 2016, Mali reported around $200 million of exported gold,?but the UAE reported receiving slightly over $1.5 billion of imported gold?from Mali that same year.?The gold is then sold to European, American, and Asian markets from the UAE,?with no questions asked about its origins.?Similar patterns can be seen with gold-rich countries across Africa,?indicating that gold smuggling is happening on a massive scale,?without ever being subject to taxes.

同樣，公司付錢給腐敗的政府官員?，幫助他們跨境走私黃金，主要運(yùn)往阿拉伯聯(lián)合酋長國，?而不是通過合法渠道經(jīng)營。?2016 年，馬里報告的黃金出口額約為 2 億美元，但阿聯(lián)酋報告稱?，同年從馬里進(jìn)口的黃金略高于 15 億美元。?然后黃金從阿聯(lián)酋出售到歐洲、美國和亞洲市場，沒有人詢問其來源。非洲黃金豐富的國家也可以看到類似的模式，這表明黃金走私正在大規(guī)模發(fā)生，而且從未被征稅。

All of this creates a vicious cycle,?forcing a continued reliance?on the corporations that helped create the situation in the first place.More than half of Mali’s citizens live below the international poverty line,?while their nation’s wealth lines the pockets of foreign corporations?and corrupt officials.

所有這些都造成了一個惡性循環(huán)，?迫使人們繼續(xù)依賴?最初幫助創(chuàng)造這種情況的公司。?馬里一半以上的公民生活在國際貧困線以下，?而他們國家的財富則落入了外國公司?和腐敗官員的腰包。