作者：John Haldon約翰·哈爾頓

出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

自翻：流瀲紫琳

Strategy

戰(zhàn)略

????????? Strategic dispositions evolved to meet the needs of the moment. In the 6th century and up to the period of the Arab invasions the units established in garrisons along and behind the frontier were called limitanei, frontier soldiers, usually comprised of the older legions and auxiliary regiments, while the field armies were largely formed of more recently established units, and located across the provinces, often well behind the frontier, in strategic bases from which they could meet any incursions into Roman territory. One result of the loss of the eastern and Danubian provinces during the 7th century was the disappearance of the former and the withdrawal into Asia Minor of the latter, where they settled down to form the themes to which we have already referred to in the 'Outbreak' chapter. In the later 10th century new and much smaller territories under doukes, 'dukes' grew up along both the eastern and northern frontiers, serving both as a zone of defence and as a springboard for further advances. At the same time, the old themes became increasingly demilitarised with the growth in the use of mercenaries, as we have also seen. The collapse of the later 11th century brought with it a need to reorganise, and although the changes wrought by the Komnenoi produced a series of new thernata and new frontiers in Asia Minor, the basic principles of 11th-century strategy - an in-depth defence based in fortresses and similar strongpoints supported by a single imperial field force based in and around Constantinople - were maintained. The last two centuries of the empire, from the 1250s until 1453, saw no substantial change, although numbers were very much reduced as the empire's resources shrank.

（戰(zhàn)略部署不斷發(fā)展以滿足當下的需要。在 6 世紀和直到阿拉伯入侵時期，在邊境沿線和后方的駐軍中建立的部隊被稱為邊防軍，即邊境士兵，通常由較老的軍團和輔助團組成，而野戰(zhàn)軍則主要由較新近的部隊組成。 已建立的單位，位于各行省，通常遠在邊境后方，位于戰(zhàn)略基地，可以應對任何入侵羅馬領土的行為。7 世紀東部和多瑙河省喪失的結果之一是前者消失，后者撤退到小亞細亞，在那里他們定居下來形成我們在“爆發(fā)”中提到的軍區(qū) ' 章節(jié)。在 10 世紀后期，在杜克之下的新的和小得多的領土上，“公爵”在東部和北部邊境長大，既作為防御區(qū)又作為進一步前進的跳板。與此同時，正如我們所看到的，隨著雇傭軍使用的增加，舊的主題變得越來越非軍事化。11 世紀后期的崩潰帶來了重組的需要，盡管科穆寧帶來的變化在小亞細亞產(chǎn)生了一系列新的軍區(qū)和新的前沿，但 11 世紀戰(zhàn)略的基本原則——縱深防御 以堡壘和類似的堡壘為基地，由位于君士坦丁堡及其周邊地區(qū)的單一帝國野戰(zhàn)部隊支持。帝國的最后兩個世紀，從 1250 年代到 1453 年，沒有發(fā)生實質(zhì)性變化，盡管隨著帝國資源的萎縮，數(shù)量大大減少。）

Logistics

后勤

????????? There can be little doubt that one reason for the empire's survival from the 7th century on was its effective logistical administration. The road system, although both greatly reduced in scope and degraded in quality when compared with that of the Roman period, remained an important asset. In addition, the carefully managed fiscal system was closely tied into the needs of the army, and although the exact administrative and organisational structures evolved over the period in question, the arrangements for supplying the soldiers in either peacetime or war were effective. Resources were collected in either money or in kind, depending upon a number of variables: whether the areas in question supported enough market activity; whether the agricultural or other resources needed by the army were available and could be stored; what the particular needs of the army at that point in fact were; and how many soldiers and animals needed to he fed and housed over what length of time. The effects of an army on the land and its population were well understood, and there are in the written sources of the period both recommendations to commanders not to keep concentrations of troops for too long on Byzantine territory and descriptions of what happened when this advice was not followed.

（毫無疑問，帝國自 7 世紀以來得以幸存的原因之一是其有效的后勤管理。 盡管與羅馬時期相比，道路系統(tǒng)的范圍和質(zhì)量都大大減少，但仍然是一項重要的資產(chǎn)。此外，精心管理的財政制度與軍隊的需要密切相關，雖然確切的行政和組織結構在相關時期發(fā)生了變化，但無論是和平時期還是戰(zhàn)爭時期，供應士兵的安排都是有效的。資源是以金錢或實物形式收集的，這取決于許多變量：相關領域是否支持足夠的市場活動； 軍隊所需的農(nóng)業(yè)或其他資源是否可用并可以儲存； 當時軍隊的特殊需求實際上是什么；以及他需要在多長的時間內(nèi)喂養(yǎng)和收容多少士兵和動物。軍隊對土地及其人口的影響是眾所周知的，在這一時期的書面資料中有建議指揮官不要在拜占庭領土上駐軍太久，也有關于不聽從建議會發(fā)生什么情況的描述。）

????????? When a campaign was planned, local fiscal officials liaised with the central authorities and the military records department at Constantinople, so that the right amount and type of supplies were provided for the numbers involved. The outlay was often very heavy, and accounts from the 10th century show just how heavy the burden could be, especially when the emperor and his household were on the expedition. Each of the regions through which the army passed had to put aside adequate supplies of grain, meat (usually on the hoof) and oil or wine for the required numbers of troops. Large expeditionary armies — which would generally be divided into several smaller columns, each taking a separate route and heading for a pie-arranged rendezvous on the frontier — numbered as many as 20,000 or more, and very occasionally as many as 30,000; but the average theme force might he no more than 3,000-4,000, often far fewer, confronting armies of the same size, or shadowing larger forces until they could be ambushed or taken on in a full-scale battle. Providing resources for such armies involved a considerable organisational effort. In addition to food, horses and pack-animals had to be provided, weapons and other items of military equipment replaced and, for expeditions intended to take enemy strongholds, wagons or carts carrying siege machinery and artillery. While food and supplies were generally provided by the districts through which the army passed, weapons and other equipment, as well as cavalry mounts and pack-animals, might come from more distant provinces. In a 10th-century account, for example, detailing some of the preparations for an expediton by sea, some provinces were commissioned to produce a certain number of weapons: the region of Thessaloniki was ordered to deliver 200,000 arrows, 3,000 heavy infantry spears and 'as many shields as possible'; the region of Hellas was asked to produce 1,000 heavy infantry spears; while the governor of Eurippos in Greece, and the commanders of the themes of Nikopolis and of the Peloponnese all undertook to provide 200,000 arrows and 3,000 heavy infantry spears. The same document specifies also that other governors or officers were commissioned to levy thousands of nails and similar items from their provinces for ship construction.

（在計劃一場戰(zhàn)役時，地方財政官員與中央當局和君士坦丁堡的軍事檔案部門保持聯(lián)系，以便為所涉及的人數(shù)提供適當數(shù)量和類型的物資。支出往往非常沉重，10 世紀的記載表明負擔可能有多么沉重，尤其是當皇帝和他的家人在遠征時。 軍隊經(jīng)過的每個地區(qū)都必須為所需數(shù)量的軍隊儲備足夠的糧食、肉類（通常在蹄上）和油或酒。大型遠征軍——通常會被分成幾個較小的縱隊，每個縱隊走一條不同的路線，前往邊境的一個派式集合點——人數(shù)多達 20,000 人或更多，偶爾多達 30,000 人；但平均主題部隊可能不超過 3,000-4,000 人，通常要少得多，面對同樣規(guī)模的軍隊，或在更大的部隊受到伏擊或在全面戰(zhàn)斗中被接手之前，他們會受到影響。為這些軍隊提供資源涉及相當大的組織工作。除了食物之外，還必須提供馬匹和馱畜，更換武器和其他軍事裝備，對于打算攻占敵人據(jù)點的遠征，運載攻城機器和大炮的馬車或手推車。雖然食物和補給通常由軍隊經(jīng)過的地區(qū)提供，但武器和其他裝備，以及騎兵坐騎和馱畜，可能來自更遠的省份。例如，在一個 10 世紀的記載中，詳細描述了海上遠征的一些準備工作，一些省份被委托生產(chǎn)一定數(shù)量的武器：塞薩洛尼基地區(qū)奉命交付 200,000 支箭、3,000 支重型步兵矛和“ 盡可能多的盾牌'; 希臘地區(qū)被要求生產(chǎn)1000支重型步兵矛；而希臘的歐里波斯總督、尼科波利斯和伯羅奔尼撒主題的指揮官都承諾提供20萬支箭和3000支重步兵長矛。 同一份文件還規(guī)定，其他州長或官員被委托從他們的省份征收數(shù)以千計的釘子和類似物品用于造船。）

????????? Military manuals stressed that excess personal baggage and servants should not be taken by the officers or wealthier men, since it caused problems in respect of food and transport; and while many commanders clearly enforced such regulations, there is evidence that many did not and that discipline in this area was slack - with all the consequences that brought with it. The imperial household, on the other hand, necessitated a vast amount of 'excess baggage', since the luxuries to which the emperors were accustomed were rarely left behind. The imperial baggage train in the later 9th and 10th centuries was supposed to have almost 600 pack-animals of one sort or another, to carry the household tents, carpets and other furniture - including a portable commode with gilded seat for the imperial person(!), folding tables, cushions, tableware, a private portable chapel, a portable 'Turkish' bath, with supplies, high-quality wines, meat and fowl, spices and herbs, as well as medicines and various other items for personal use. Large numbers of gifts in the form of both cash - gold and silver coin - and richly-decorated luxury cloths and items of clothing were also taken, in part intended as rewards to the provincial officers, in part as gifts and bribes for foreign guests of distinction or even deserters from the other side. The attitude of the generals, who were generally members of the social elite and wealthy in their own right, varied. Some led a fairly ascetic life while on campaign, winning the respect of their men and other observers by sharing the soldiers' lifestyle; others insisted on taking as many home comforts along with them as they could, in part in order to stress their own status. Yet in general, the system of campaign organisation and logistics was efficient and effective, and kept Byzantine armies in the field in even the most difficult circumstances. Sometimes, of course, in particular in the context of the guerrilla warfare of the frontier regions, this logistical apparatus was irrelevant: soldiers had to live off the land and move in unpredictable directions in order to keep track of and to harass enemy columns. But even here the provincial fiscal apparatus made it possible to claim back through the following year's tax assessment what could be demonstrated to have been consumed by the army, although this, like all such systems, tended to be cumbersome, inefficient, slow and unfair.

（軍事手冊強調(diào)，軍官或富人不應帶走多余的個人行李和仆人，因為這會導致食品和運輸方面的問題； 盡管許多指揮官明確執(zhí)行了此類規(guī)定，但有證據(jù)表明，許多指揮官沒有這樣做，而且該領域的紀律很松懈 - 并帶來了隨之而來的所有后果。另一方面，皇室需要大量的“超重行李”，因為皇帝習慣的奢侈品很少被遺棄。9 世紀后期和 10 世紀后期的皇家行李列車應該有近 600 只各種各樣的動物，以運送家用帳篷、地毯和其他家具——包括一個帶有鍍金座椅的便攜式馬桶，供皇帝使用（！)、折疊桌、靠墊、餐具、一個私人便攜式小教堂、一個便攜式“土耳其”浴室，提供用品、優(yōu)質(zhì)葡萄酒、肉類和家禽、香料和草藥，以及藥品和其他各種供個人使用的物品。還收繳了大量現(xiàn)金——金銀幣——以及裝飾華麗的豪華服裝和服飾，部分是為了獎勵省級官員，部分是作為饋贈和賄賂外賓的禮物。另一邊的區(qū)別甚至逃兵。 將軍們的態(tài)度各不相同，他們通常是社會精英的一員，本身就很富有。 有些人在競選期間過著相當苦行的生活，通過分享士兵的生活方式贏得了他們的士兵和其他觀察者的尊重；其他人堅持盡可能多地隨身攜帶舒適的家，部分是為了強調(diào)自己的地位。 然而，總的來說，戰(zhàn)役組織和后勤系統(tǒng)是高效的，即使在最困難的情況下，拜占庭軍隊也能保持在戰(zhàn)場上。 當然，有時，尤其是在邊疆游擊戰(zhàn)的背景下，這種后勤機構是無關緊要的：士兵們不得不在陸地上生活并朝著不可預測的方向移動，以跟蹤和騷擾敵軍縱隊。但即使在這里，省級財政機構也可以通過下一年的稅收評估來索回可以證明已被軍隊消耗的東西，盡管這與所有此類系統(tǒng)一樣，往往是繁瑣、低效、緩慢和不公平的。）

????????? Where Byzantine armies failed it was generally due to poor leadership, or to a combination of poor morale and lack of discipline, themselves often a direct result of the quality and abilities of the commanding officers. They defended their territory, with varying success, for some 600 years, from the 6th and 7th centuries well into the 12th century, if we include the counter-offensives in Asia Minor under the emperors Alexios I, John II and Manuel I Komnenos in the period from the 1080s to the 1170s. For in spite of some often very heavy defeats, they nevertheless maintained the territorial integrity of the eastern Roman state and were even able, on several occasions, to go over to the offensive. The logistical arrangements maintained by the empire were a major, if not the major, contributory factor to this. Only when the political and economic environment in which the empire had to survive had changed sufficiently for it no longer to be able to maintain this logistical basis did the medieval east Roman state ultimately fail.

（拜占庭軍隊失敗的原因通常是領導不力，或者士氣低落和缺乏紀律，這往往是指揮官素質(zhì)和能力的直接結果。如果我們把 1080 年代到 1170 年代在阿歷克西斯一世、約翰二世和曼努埃爾一世科姆尼諾斯皇帝領導下的小亞細亞反攻包括在內(nèi)，從 6 世紀和 7 世紀一直到 12 世紀，他們在大約 600 年的時間里捍衛(wèi)了自己的領土，取得了不同程度的成功。因為盡管經(jīng)常遭受非常嚴重的失敗，他們?nèi)匀槐３至藮|羅馬國家的領土完整，甚至有幾次能夠發(fā)動進攻。帝國維持的后勤安排是一個主要的，如果不是主要的，促成這種情況的因素。只有當?shù)蹏囈陨娴恼魏徒?jīng)濟環(huán)境發(fā)生了足夠的變化，使其不再能夠維持這種后勤基礎時，中世紀的東羅馬國家才最終失敗。）

未完待續(xù)