題目：Director Appointments: It Is Who You Know

摘要：Using 9,801 director Appointments during 2003–2014, we document the dramatic impact of connections. Sixty-nine percent of new directors have professional ties to incumbent boards, a group representing 13% of all potential candidates. Consistent with facilitating coordination and reducing search costs, connections help boards bring in gender diversity, newskills, and newindustry background. More complex firms and firms in more competitive environments tend to Appoint connected directors and experience better market reactions and higher shareholder votes. Connections to incumbent CEOs, however, result in lower announcement returns and shareholder votes.We use death (merger)-induced network loss (gain) as instruments.

研究問題：In this study, we aim to provide comprehensive evidence on this key aspect of director selection: the role of board networks in director Appointments.（在位董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)與新晉董事任命）

研究動(dòng)機(jī)：While anecdotes suggest the importance of social networks in director Appointments, surprisingly little empirical research is available on this subject.（此前關(guān)注的更多社會(huì)關(guān)系，但是關(guān)注于在位董事的professional network較少）

研究理論：Whether Appointments of connected directors are beneficial to shareholders is an empirical question. The coordination hypothesis asserts the benefits from connected directors whose priorwork relationship with the incumbent directors fosters trust and facilitates better board coordination. The search cost hypothesis suggests lower information acquisition cost for connected candidates, which is particularly important when a higher level of details about the candidate is required. In contrast, the homophily hypothesis views connected Appointments as perpetuating homogeneous opinions and lack of creativity. In addition, the agency hypothesis views the director Appointees connected to the CEO as perpetuating managerial cronyism.

研究貢獻(xiàn)：First, we provide comprehensive evidence of the importance of social connections in director Appointments in a large sample study.Second, a number of recent papers have examined board diversity and its impact on firm policies and performance.

研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：?

• ?We find support for the agency, coordination, and search cost hypotheses, and limited evidence for the homophily hypothesis. Boards needing greater coordination and when facing higher costs of acquiring information about director candidates, (e.g., complex firms and those in more competitive environments), are more likely to Appoint connected directors.

• The price reaction to connected Appointees and votes for connected directors in subsequent board elections are also significantly higher in these situations. In addition, firms with weak internal controls are more likely to Appoint directors connected to the incumbent CEOs.

• The price reaction for such Appointments and shareholder votes for these directors are significantly lower. Further,we find that firms are less likely to Appoint a director connected or similar to a departing director if the departing director leaves on bad terms, and the market and shareholders react negatively to such Appointments.

• Finally, a candidate with a second-degree connection is more likely to be Appointed if her recommender is more reputable, and complex firms benefit from such Appointments
  

特別有意思的一篇文章，值得細(xì)細(xì)品讀