????????本篇文章由我翻譯，全文共26頁，本篇為節(jié)選的第一部分約7頁內容，原文為英文并附于末尾，紅色標注為原文附帶的注釋，藍色標注為我添加的補充和注釋。文章中引用部分若已有漢譯本，則一概使用漢譯本的翻譯，并補充標注漢譯本的引用文獻。

逃離黑格爾

約翰·羅森塔爾

?

摘要：自羅曼·羅斯多爾斯基(1)的《馬克思〈資本論〉的形成》出版以來，對于任何希望證明馬克思的政治經濟學是建立在黑格爾主義“邏輯”基礎上的人來說，《政治經濟學批判大綱》都是他們觀點的一個根本依據。然而，與羅斯多爾斯基的解讀相反，《政治經濟學批判大綱》實際上可以被解讀為一場馬克思逃離他的黑格爾哲學傳統(tǒng)(heritage)的戲劇。黑格爾的“辯證法”并非一種邏輯論證的方法，而是一種倒錯的神秘化“方法”。馬克思他自己在《政治經濟學批判大綱》中構建經濟范疇的“辯證推導”的嘗試使他陷入了理論的死胡同，只有摒棄這些冒進，馬克思才能在他的經濟學研究中取得真正的突破。盡管如此，在《資本論》中，尤其是在第一章中，某種典型的黑格爾主義公式(formulae)的殘余(persistence)——盡管，請注意，這并非典型的黑格爾主義論證結構的殘余——依然是馬克思最初研究對象的，即貨幣的，本體論特征的職能，且并沒有反映出任何“方法論”選擇。馬克思在《資本論》中的論證本質上并非“辯證的”，而是“先驗的”，從給定的市場現象（價格、利潤等等）出發(fā)，回到它們的可能性條件上。

?

“有必要對唯心主義的敘述方法作一糾正，這種敘述方法造成一種假象，似乎探討的只是一些概念規(guī)定和這些概念的辯證法?！?/p>

????????----馬克思，《政治經濟學批判大綱》[1]

?????????

????????一、黑格爾馬克思主義的復活

????????在最近的二十多年里（指二十世紀七十年代到九十年代末），馬克思主義的方法論討論被對其中的黑格爾傳統(tǒng)(legacy)的各種攻擊所主導，而近些年來更令人感到好奇的理論發(fā)展之一是形成了所謂的“新”黑格爾馬克思主義。我在這里并不想揣測各式各樣的個人動機，但毋庸置疑，至少在英語語境下，馬克思主義學者“回歸黑格爾”的一個直接原因就是二十世紀八十年代中期出現的對馬克思主義理論的“分析性”重構，它聲稱自己表明了馬克思的“意圖”，并使用了新古典經濟學的方法論工具。的確，在“方法論個人主義”的旗幟下，“分析馬克思主義者”(2)將新古典經濟學的方法論提升到了所有“現代”社會科學研究中的正典(the canon)(3)地位，而根據這一觀點，傳統(tǒng)馬克思主義者的主張則被當作頑固原始人那難以理解的嚎叫。毋庸置疑，無論是出于何種意圖和目的，這種自封的“沒有廢話的馬克思主義”很快就暴露出它自己只不過是一種根本沒有馬克思的“馬克思主義”（見Schweickart, 1988），而更傳統(tǒng)的馬克思主義學者們的回應顯然是更合理的?，F如今，“分析馬克思主義學者”實際上對黑格爾并沒有什么確切的說法。在他們的著作中，人們找不到任何對黑格爾（以及黑格爾馬克思主義者）的“辯證法”的基于具體文本的批判，就像是科萊蒂(4)的那種批判，或更寬泛地說，阿爾都塞(5)的那種隱晦的批判。盡管如此，他們也確實習慣于將他們在馬克思文本中發(fā)現的令人厭惡的和無法理解的內容放到“黑格爾主義”的標題下（這種習慣更可能是從對熊彼特(6)或瓊·羅賓遜(7)的理解中獲得的，而不是通過與黑格爾哲學的任何實際第一手接觸獲得的）。尤其是，這種習慣甚至被應用在馬克思政治經濟學的基礎，他的價值理論上，因而使馬克思的價值理論可以被總結為一個已經過時的價格決定理論，因為一切表明這一理論并非如此的——或更確切地說，不止如此的——復雜細節(jié)都被視為受到了“黑格爾主義”的嚴重污染，所以不值得認真考慮。

????????顯然，馬克思經濟理論中的許多內容，實際上幾乎是所有內容都由于這種方法而消亡了，因此“新”黑格爾馬克思主義者對“分析馬克思主義”發(fā)起的挑戰(zhàn)的回應實際上就相當于通過證明馬克思經濟學中所謂的“黑格爾”方面來努力挽救馬克思：在假定黑格爾主義論證結構確實在馬克思的分析中發(fā)揮了系統(tǒng)性作用的情況下，甚至，在其中一種最具野心的分支下，在假定后者完全由前者支配的情況下，努力證明其中的“黑格爾”成分不僅僅是“胡說八道”。（順帶一提，“新”黑格爾馬克思主義在闡述特定主題時會強調“辯證”模式做出的所謂貢獻的體系性，這使得他們區(qū)別于歷史主義分支的“舊”黑格爾馬克思主義，例如盧卡奇(8)舉例說明的那種。[2]）因此，“新”黑格爾馬克思主義者傾向于將列寧的格言作為他們的口號，其大意是：“不鉆研和不理解黑格爾的全部邏輯學，就不能完全理解馬克思的《資本論》，特別是它的第1章?！?span id="s0sssss00s" class="color-pink-03">[3]

????????在這里我并不是想暗示猛藥比沉疴更糟糕。但我確實想說，這并不是一種完全正確的解藥——甚至有可能會產生完全有害的效果，它使人自我感覺更好，但實際上沒有糾正任何問題。有的人可能會說，“辯證法”只不過是馬克思主義知識分子的鴉片。盡管如此，馬克思的價值分析與黑格爾對“范疇”的闡述之間存在著驚人的形式相似性是一個不爭的事實，而且“新”黑格爾馬克思主義確實至少將這一事實暴露了出來。[4] 但我認為，任何從這種相似性中獲取靈感并接著推斷出馬克思的“方法”必定是黑格爾主義的的觀點，不僅是不合理的，而且是一個嚴重的錯誤。事實上，這種話語上的相似性與“方法”之間沒有任何關系，而僅僅只是馬克思所分析的實際對象與黑格爾形而上學中對象性本身的特征之間相似性的反映：一個特別的（尤其是唯心主義的）形而上學體系與某種——恰好——與形而上學“相一致”的特定對象之間相似性的反映。與“價值理論家”的實踐使人們認同的觀點相反，馬克思價值分析的主要對象實際上并非價格或價格體系，而是價格體系得以存在的客觀的可能性條件：即價值形式本身，或者用更通俗的語言來說，貨幣?，F在，碰巧，貨幣就是一種“實在的一般性”("real universal")(9)——根據黑格爾形而上學的獨特公式，一切事物（或至少“實際存在的一切事物”）都應當具有這種“實在的一般性”?；蛘撸鼫蚀_地說，商品貨幣就是這種“實在的一般性”，而商品貨幣就是這種在馬克思的理論中被明確視作基礎的貨幣（而究竟是出于歷史上的偶然原因還是出于某種本質原因尚無法在這里確定）。

?????????

????????二、貨幣與其他神秘對象

????????如果要說貨幣商品是一種“實在的一般性”，就是在說它是某種特殊種類的東西，在這里也就是一種代表了——實際上是“作為”("is")——所有特殊種類的共同“本質”的特殊商品，而且不僅這些特殊種類不同于這種特殊商品，同屬于相同類(genus)的它們之間也互不相同。也就是說，它是一種在經濟實踐中代表了所有作為交換價值的商品的共同本質或一般性的特殊的商品或“使用價值”。馬克思在《資本論》第一章的1867年最初版本中寫道：“就像除了分類組成動物界不同屬、種、亞種、科等等的獅子、老虎、兔子和其他等等所有實在的動物以外，還存在著作為整個動物界的單個體現的動物一樣?！?[5]

????????為了搞明白我們從上述觀察中得到了些什么東西，就需要強調一般的實在性是如何在邏輯上與黑格爾的特殊(particulars)的虛幻性——或者換句話說，物質世界的虛幻性(10)——相一致的，并因此成為黑格爾唯心主義——實際上黑格爾自己也會說，這是任何哲學中唯心主義——的一部分。[6] 由于擔心被指責為唯心主義，黑格爾馬克思主義，不論是“舊的”還是“新的”，都有著一套傳統(tǒng)的辯護詞，聲稱黑格爾的“辯證方法”可以以某種方式從他的唯心主義形而上學體系中解救出來，并合理地應用在“唯物主義”上，例如科學。相反，我的觀點是，馬克思恰好在貨幣的本體論特征中為黑格爾的唯心主義，或者更準確地說，為后者的公式特征找到了合理的科學應用。

????????當然，這并不是說這些公式的內容在馬克思應用它們的時候沒有發(fā)生改變。黑格爾對“一般性”(Allgemeinheit)的論述存在系統(tǒng)性的歧義，它可以被理解為相對更具包容性，即類(class)概念的含義，也可以被理解為包羅萬象的或“真的無限物”("true infinite")的含義，而后者的實在性——“一般”("the" universal)(11)的實在性——在黑格爾的論述中，通過一系列非常特別的方式，或許可以稱之為“轉喻”滑變("metonymic" slippages)，在它的所有更具體“規(guī)定”的所謂實在性中得到證明。然而，貨幣商品并不是某種地位像“一般”一樣高的東西的現實體現。正如之前已經指出的，它只是所有作為交換價值的商品的一般性所取得的實在形式。在沒有國家來發(fā)行和保證所謂“法定貨幣”的情況下，在經濟實踐中必須存在一種特殊的商品來代表其他所有商品全都具有的一般價值特性，盡管大小不一。這種商品不僅是甚至主要是出于衡量目的的體系化經濟的必然產物——盡管眾所周知，貨幣商品自身的單位確實提供了一個可以使所有其他商品的相對價值都得以表達并得以通約的同質單位。然而，貨幣商品所執(zhí)行的這一觀念的價值尺度的職能，是它作為交換媒介所執(zhí)行的實在的流通職能的結果。正是在交換實踐中，貨幣商品才“代表了”商品的一般本質——它是實在的，因此是商品內含價值特性存在(existence)的現實可占有形式——因為如果所有商品不普遍具有可轉換為貨幣商品的能力，那它們之間的一般交換就根本不可能實現。因此，這種作為貨幣的特殊商品就被賦予了“一般商品”的地位。它就是——回想一下黑格爾在討論經驗普遍性時最喜歡舉的一個例子——君主，而其他商品則是它的臣民；它就是太陽，而其他商品則是它的衛(wèi)星；它是基督，而其他商品則是基督徒。

????????但事實上，盡管這些類比意味深長，但并不完全準確。對于黑格爾來說，不僅一般的實在性與特殊的非實在性相一致，而且在給定種類的現存特殊的范圍中，應當有其中一個恰好代表了其余部分的“個別一般性”，并與其余部分相對。黑格爾在這方面的典型范例之一是福音書中所描繪的作為“神人”("God-man")(12)的基督與被創(chuàng)造出來的個人（個別）之間的關系，太陽和君主則分別代表了自然和“客觀精神”領域中的類似案例。[7] 但貨幣商品不是以某種個別商品的形式，而是以某種特殊種類商品的形式代表所有商品的一般性。換句話說，貨幣商品與其他商品的關系是一種特殊種類與其他所有種類的關系，而個別商品之所以包含在這種關系之中，只是因為它們是其他這些種類的樣本。

????????為了繼續(xù)討論眼前的問題，這里就不再詳細討論交換體系是如何以及為什么能產生商品交換價值的具體化身了（見Rosenthal, 1998, ch.15）。但鑒于這一問題在所謂的馬克思的“價值理論”中的核心地位被完全忽視，因此有必要引用下面這段《政治經濟學批判》中有些冗長的文本作為根據。馬克思在這本著作中所提到的“分離出來的”商品(die ausschlie?liche Ware)是那（種）通過其他商品的“行動”——或者更確切地說，它們的所有者的行動，只要在交換中給他們正確的數額，他們就總是愿意接受這種商品——而從后者的行列中“分離出來”(ausgeschlossen)并作為它們的一般可交換性的代表的商品。

????????在交換過程中，一切商品都同作為商品一般的那個分離出來的商品發(fā)生關系，都同作為一般勞動時間在一種特殊使用價值中存在的那種商品發(fā)生關系。因此，它們作為特殊商品同一個作為一般商品的特殊商品對立起來。這樣一來，商品所有者相互把他們的勞動作為一般社會勞動來對待的關系，就表現為他們把他們的商品作為交換價值來對待的關系，而商品在交換過程中彼此作為交換價值相互對待的關系，就表現為它們把一種特殊商品作為它們交換價值的最適當的表現的全面關系，這反過來又表現為這種特殊商品同一切其他商品的特定關系，因而表現為一個物品的一定的仿佛是天生的社會性質。這樣地代表一切商品的交換價值的最適當存在的特殊商品，或者說，作為一種分離出來的特殊商品的商品交換價值，就是貨幣。(Marx, 1970, 48/MEW, Vol. 13, 34.)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第31卷第441-2頁）

????????

????????注釋：

????????[1] 見Marx, 1973, 151/ Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 42, 85-6.（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第101頁）所有對馬克思著作英文版的引用都將附帶對標準多卷德文版Marx-Engels Werke的引用（以下簡稱MEW）。正如它們所表明的那樣，對馬克思的英文翻譯時常被扭曲。如果沒有引用英文版的話，那就是我翻譯的。

????????[2] 關于傳統(tǒng)黑格爾馬克思主義的歷史主義，見Rosenthal, 1998, part 1.

????????[3] （《列寧全集》第55卷第151頁）近來的英文著作顯然包含在這里的描述范圍之內，例如，Arthur, 1993; Shamsavari, 1991; 以及Smith, 1990. 在英語圈中，有一些對馬克思的黑格爾主義重構的早期嘗試，鑒于其出版日期，實際上與“分析”馬克思主義之間的斗爭無關，而似乎是由于與西德黑格爾—馬克思學者漢斯-格奧爾格?巴克豪斯(Hans-Georg Backhaus)(13)解讀方法的偶然學術接觸而受到了或多或少的啟發(fā)。例如，見Banaji, 1979; Eldred and Hanlon, 1981. 但除此之外，巴克豪斯理論中的曲折細節(jié)并非對英語世界的討論產生太大影響——鑒于直到最近，他的貢獻甚至在很大程度上都難以用德語表達，這一點也就不足為奇了。隨著Backhaus, 1997的出版，這一問題現在已經得到了解決?？偠灾?，我在這里所提到的“新”黑格爾馬克思主義，由于它主要是英語學術圈的一種現象，所以是以一種類似的方式獨立于近來的德語討論而發(fā)展起來的，盡管總的來說更復雜一些。后者與英語版本的“新”黑格爾馬克思主義有著相同的“方法論”主張，因此也有著一些相同的缺陷，對后者成熟作品更豐富的解讀細節(jié)和見解，參見Brentel, 1989.

????????[4] 然而，在這一流派最臭名昭著的例子中可以發(fā)現，黑格爾的《邏輯學》和馬克思的《資本論》之間存在的大量“對應關系”只不過是基于完全間接的文本證據，而且往往是以對后者的嚴重歪曲和刻意解釋為代價的。因此，它們實際上是為了轉移人們對這些類推的注意力，以防人們注意到這些類比是刻意的。

????????[5] Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Zweite Abteilung, Band 5, 37. （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第42卷第47頁）實際上，馬克思在這段話中的表達方式有些模棱兩可。對于任何代表動物性的一般“范疇”的動物來說，相對于其他所有動物物種來說，其本身就可能是一個特殊的物種，而不是馬克思指的“單個動物”。正如接下來可以直接看到的那樣，馬克思在這方面的困惑幾乎可以肯定是受到了黑格爾的啟發(fā)。相同的困惑也出現在馬克思根據他的類比所得到的試探性的話中：“這樣一種個別的東西，本身包含著同一事物的所有實際存在的種類，就是一般的東西，如動物、上帝等等。”（同上）

????????[6] 黑格爾在他的《邏輯學》中這樣寫道：“有限物是觀念的這一命題構成唯心主義。哲學的唯心主義無非是不承認有限物是真的有的東西。每一種哲學本質上都是唯心主義，或至少以唯心主義為原則……一種哲學，假如把有限的實有本身也算作真的、最后的、絕對的有，就不配承當哲學這個名字；古代或近代哲學的本原，如水或物質或原子，都是思想、一般性和觀念物，而不是直接當前的、感性中的個別事物……” (Hegel, 1969, 154-5)（黑格爾，《邏輯學》上，商務印書館，第156頁，譯文有改動）

????????[7] 見《邏輯學》，黑格爾在這本著作中寫道：“在物質世界中，是類(genus)、但又是單個客體的個別一般性及其機械過程的，正是中心體。”（黑格爾，《邏輯學》下，商務印書館，第408頁，譯文有改動）

????????

????????譯者注：

????????(1) 羅曼·羅斯多爾斯基(Roman Rosdolsky)是一位烏克蘭裔馬克思主義政治活動家，他不認為自己是經濟學家或哲學家。羅斯多爾斯基青年時期就參加了烏克蘭社會主義者組織德拉霍曼諾夫小組，參與創(chuàng)立了國際革命社會民主黨(IRSD)。他在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)當中加入了具有反戰(zhàn)性質的“加利西亞國際社會主義青年”組織，這一組織后來發(fā)展成西烏克蘭共產黨。戰(zhàn)后羅斯多爾斯基成為東加利西亞共產黨中央委員會成員。在20世紀20-30年代，他的思想逐漸發(fā)生轉變，顯示出脫離斯大林主義的傾向，并且接觸到了E.普列奧布拉任斯基、伊薩克·魯賓等獨立經濟學家的理論。也是在此期間，他成為托洛茨基的追隨者。1925年，羅斯多爾斯基因拒絕譴責托洛茨基及其路線而被開除出黨，并開始了他的流亡生涯。1926-1931年他曾擔任莫斯科馬恩研究院在維也納的聯絡員，之后不幸于1942年在克拉科夫被德國納粹逮捕，先后被移送到奧斯維辛、奧拉寧堡和拉文斯布呂克集中營關押，直至1945年。戰(zhàn)后在奧地利短暫任教后，羅斯多爾斯基于1947年移居美國。1948年，他在紐約布廷格檔案館發(fā)現了1939年俄國出版的《大綱》，至此開始了他漫長的研究生涯，后形成著作《馬克思〈資本論〉的形成》（有中譯本）。在這本書中，羅斯多爾斯基將《大綱》與黑格爾的《邏輯學》直接聯系在一起，并引用盧卡奇在《歷史與階級意識》中的話，否定了那種無視馬克思理論中的黑格爾成分的庸俗主張。

????????(2) 分馬是當代馬克思主義的一個流派，采用了分析哲學而拋棄了辯證法，并致力于維護歷史唯物主義。這一流派主要代表人物包括科恩(G. A. Cohen), 約翰·羅默(John E. Roemer), 戴維·施韋卡特(David Schwickart), William Shaw, Jon Elster等人，代表性著作包括《馬克思主義經濟理論的分析基礎》（有中譯本）、《在自由中喪失》（有中譯本）、《剝削和階級的一般理論》、《社會主義的未來》（有中譯本）、《反對資本主義》（有中譯本）、《超越資本主義》（有中譯本）等。這一流派的基本特征已由羅森塔爾在文中簡要指明，它實際上是部分馬克思主義者在遭遇理論和政治挫折之后向新古典主義靠攏的表現。

????????(3) 分馬認為新古典方法論是唯一正確的方法論，因為相比于缺乏清晰定義的辯證法，它能夠清晰區(qū)分各種概念并對命題進行嚴格論證，因而分馬認為馬克思主義也必須采用它才能證明自己是科學的，并嘗試利用分析哲學重新解讀馬克思文本。分馬不僅僅有經濟學內容，在哲學、歷史、政治方面也同樣有許多論述。Canon一詞最初來源于古希臘手工業(yè)者使用的標準度量，后逐漸延伸為基督教的標準典籍，而其他典籍副本都應以正典為準。音樂卡農也同樣與這一含義相關，其中所有聲部都模仿著一個聲部。

????????(4) 科萊蒂(Colletti)是意大利共產黨人，與其老師德拉-沃爾佩(Della-Volpe)同為新實證主義馬克思主義的主要代表人物。

????????德拉-沃爾佩對蘇聯的辯證唯物主義和教條主義持有強烈的批判態(tài)度，盡管在蘇共二十大和匈牙利事件后并未像其他知識分子一樣退出意共，但作為意共黨員的他于1962年與意共領導人之間爆發(fā)了嚴重的理論分歧導致所任職的編輯部被解散。相比于盧卡奇、葛蘭西，他強調馬克思主義辯證法與黑格爾辯證法之間的連續(xù)性，德拉-沃爾佩更強調馬克思主義辯證法與黑格爾辯證法的斷裂性，認為馬克思主義是在對黑格爾辯證法的深入批判中形成的。德拉-沃爾佩將馬克思的辯證法科學主義化，提出了馬克思主義辯證法是科學辯證法的著名觀點，以科學辯證法取代黑格爾主義的唯心辯證法、神秘主義辯證法。在政治方面，德拉-沃爾佩認為盧梭是馬克思主義政治理論的前輩。德拉-沃爾佩主要著作包括：《邏輯是一門實證科學》、《盧梭和馬克思》（有中譯本）、《趣味批判》（有中譯本）。

????????科萊蒂繼承了德拉-沃爾佩的主要觀點，也是一位反黑格爾主義馬克思主義者。他在意共批判德拉-沃爾佩的會議上與意共領導人發(fā)生理論上的直接沖突，最終于1964年退黨?？迫R蒂同樣反對黑格爾主義，推崇康德哲學，認為康德是馬克思主義的哲學前輩。在政治方面，科萊蒂也同樣認為盧梭是馬克思和列寧政治理論的前輩?？迫R蒂的主要著作包括：《從盧梭到列寧》、《馬克思主義與黑格爾》、《政治哲學札記》、《矛盾與對立：馬克思主義和辯證法》等。

????????(5) 阿爾都塞(Althusser)也是一位著名的法國反黑格爾主義馬克思主義者，其用結構主義觀點重新解釋馬克思主義（這一點可能會存在異議）。在《讀〈資本論〉》以及其他著作中，阿爾都塞反復強調馬克思與黑格爾之間的斷裂性（多元決定論與一元決定論、結構的因果性與表現的因果性），并暗中批判黑格爾主義。阿爾都塞著作頗豐，且很多都得到了翻譯和引進，主要著作包括：《保衛(wèi)馬克思》（有中譯本）、《論再生產》（有中譯本）、《讀〈資本論〉》（有中譯本）、《政治與歷史：從馬基雅維利到馬克思》（有中譯本）、《孟德斯鳩：政治與歷史》（有中譯本）、《在哲學中成為馬克思主義者》（有中譯本）、《列寧和哲學》（有臺版中譯本）等等；此外有陳越翻譯的文集《哲學與政治：阿爾都塞讀本》。

????????(6) 熊彼特(Schumpeter)是一位知名經濟學家，他出生于奧匈帝國捷克地區(qū)的一個小工廠主家庭中，后隨母親改嫁到維也納，成為上層階級的一份子，曾跟隨奧地利學派學習過，非常了解新古典經濟學。熊彼特的主要貢獻包括指出創(chuàng)新對經濟增長和商業(yè)周期的重要作用，并重新發(fā)掘了長波理論。除此之外，熊彼特對經濟學說史也有些了解。熊彼特并非一位社會主義者，但他認為社會主義取代資本主義可能是必然的，并因此對人類社會的未來感到悲觀。他的主要著作有：《經濟發(fā)展理論》（有中譯本）、《資本主義、社會主義與民主》（有中譯本）、《經濟分析史》（有中譯本）、《十位偉大的經濟學家：從馬克思到凱恩斯》（有中譯本）等等；此外，有個人學術傳記《約瑟夫·熊彼特》（有中譯本）。

????????(7) 瓊·羅賓遜(Joan Robinson)是一位英國女性經濟學家，后凱恩斯經濟學的主要代表人物之一，也是上世紀六七十年代扛起反新古典主義大旗的主將。羅賓遜具有如李嘉圖一樣敏銳洞察力，能夠洞察出表面上和諧的新古典主義理論中潛藏的邏輯矛盾，但也如李嘉圖一樣，這份洞察力并沒能讓她的視野穿透經驗表象的層面，這使羅賓遜略遜于斯拉法和卡萊斯基。羅賓遜同樣著作頗豐，且大多得到了翻譯引進，主要著作包括：《現代經濟學導論》（有中譯本）、《資本積累論》（有中譯本）、《論馬克思主義經濟學》（有中譯本）、《經濟學的異端》（有中譯本）、《經濟學的尷尬》（有中譯本）、《經濟哲學》（有中譯本）、《不完全競爭經濟學》（有中譯本）等等；此外有個人傳記《瓊·羅賓遜》（有中譯本）和《瓊·羅賓遜與兩個劍橋之爭》（有中譯本）。

????????(8) 盧卡奇(Lukács)是一位著名的匈牙利馬克思主義哲學家，在本文作者的分類下，他屬于“舊”黑格爾馬克思主義者。盧卡奇的理論貢獻非常豐富，以至于難以用短短幾句話加以總結，其思想在不同階段里也不斷反復。盧卡奇曾在《歷史與階級意識》中對“正統(tǒng)馬克思主義”做出過一個“驚世駭俗”的定義，這一定義對于任何試圖了解馬克思主義而不是把它當作教條的人都具有非凡的價值。他的主要著作包括：《歷史與階級意識》（有中譯本）、《存在主義還是馬克思主義？》（有中譯本）、《理性的毀滅》（有中譯本）、《關于社會存在的本體論》（有中譯本）等等。

????????(9) "Real"以及其他具有相同詞根的單詞，我將視我的判斷，在不同的語境下分別翻譯為“實在”和“現實”。"universal"和"universality"以及其他具有相同詞根的單詞同理，我將在不同的語境下分別翻譯為“一般”和“普遍”。我的判斷必定不會完全準確，因此請讀者閱讀時注意這一點。

????????(10) “既然事物作為特殊僅存在于經驗中，那么它必然‘一般’相背離，因此它們必然失去經驗實體，必然消亡，‘因此’它們的消亡證明了它們的所謂獨立性只不過是一種虛幻的性質?！币奟osenthal, 1997, p. 157-8，這一部分的譯文可見我之前的專欄。

????????(11) 按照羅森塔爾在其他著作中的敘述，這里的“一般”與“精神”("Geist")所指代的應當是同一概念。

????????(12) 基督教中的耶穌既是完全的神又是完全的人，既具有神性也具有人性，這二者一方面相互統(tǒng)一、不可分割，另一方面也不存在混淆、混合，因此基督耶穌就是“神人合一”("God-man")。

????????(13) 漢斯-格奧爾格?巴克豪斯(Hans-Georg Backhaus)是一位德國經濟學家、哲學家。他的代表作《論價值形式的辯證法》是整個資本—邏輯學派的里程碑之一（另一個是羅曼·羅斯多爾斯基的《馬克思〈資本論〉的形成》）?！墩搩r值形式的辯證法》曾由李乾坤翻譯，譯文刊登于《社會批判理論紀事》第11輯。對這一傳統(tǒng)的分支之一的介紹，請見李乾坤的著作《價值形式、國家衍生與批判理論——德國新馬克思閱讀運動研究》。

????????

????????參考文獻

?????????

????????Arthur, Christopher J. 1991. Review Article. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britaim 23/24, 79-90.

????????--------. 1993. "Hegel’s Logic and Marx’s Capital." In Fred Moseley, ed., Marx’s Method in Capital: A Re-examination. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press.

????????Backhaus, Hans-Georg. 1997. Dialektik der Wertform. Freiburg: ?a ira Verlag.

????????Banaji, Jairus. 1979. "From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel's Dialectic in Marx's Capital. "In Diane Elson, ed., Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism. London: CSE Books.

????????Brentel, Helmut. 1989. Soziale Form und ?konomisches Objekt: Studien zum Gegenstandsund Methodenverst?ndnis der Kritik der politischen ?konomie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

????????Eldred, M. and M. Hanion. 1981. "Reconstructing Value-Form Analysis." Capital and Class, 13 (Spring), 24-60.

????????Hegel, G. W. F. 1969. The Science of Logic. Trans. A. V. Miller. London: Allen & Unwin.

????????--------. 1970. Enzyklop?die der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Erster Teil. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

????????Marx, Karl. 1970. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. New York: International.

????????--------. 1973. Grundrisse. Middlesex: Penguin.

????????--------. 1975. Texts on Method, ed. Terrel Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

????????--------. 1976. Capital, Vol. I. Middlesex: Penguin.

????????Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe. 1972-. Berlin: Die tz Verlag.

????????Marx-Engels Werke. 1956-. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

????????Petry, Franz. 1916. Der soziale Gehalt derMarxschen Werttheorie. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer.

????????Rosenthal, John. 1991. "Freedom's Devices: The Place of the Individual in Hegel's Philosophy of Right." Radical Philosophy, 59, 27-32.

????????--------. 1993. "A Transcendental Deduction of the Categories without the Categories." International Philosophical Quarterly, XXXIII: 4, 449-64.

????????--------. 1998. The Myth of Dialectics: Re-interpreting the Marx-Hegel Relation. New York: St. Martins.

????????Schweickart, David. 1988. "Reflections on Anti-Marxism: Elster on Marx's Functionalism and Labor Theory of Value." Praxis International, 8:1, 109-22.

????????Shamsavari, Ali. 1991 . Dialectics and Sodai Theory: The Logic o/Capital. London: Merlin.

????????Smith, Tony. 1990. The Logic of Marx's Capital. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

The Escape from Hege

JOHN ROSENTHAL

ABSTRACT: At least since the publication of Roman Rosdolsky's The Making of Marx's Capital, the Grundrisse has been an essential reference for anyone wishing to demonstrate a significant dependence of Marx's political economy upon Hegelian "logic." Contrary to Rosdolsky's interpretation, however, the Grundrisse can in fact be read as the drama of Marx's escape from his Hegelian philosophical heritage. Hegel's "dialectical method" is not a method of logical argumentation, but a "method" of paralogical mystification. Marx's own attempts to construct "dialectical derivations" of economic categories in the Grundrisse lead him into theoretical culs-de-sac, and he is only able to make real progress in his economic investigations by precisely foregoing such adventures. The persistence, nonetheless, of certain characteristically Hegelian formulae - though, n.b., not characteristically Hegelian argumentational structures - in Capital, and especially in the first chapter, is a function of the ontological peculiarity of Marx's initial object of inquiry, viz., money, and does not reflect any "methodological" choice. Marx's arguments in Capital are not "dialectical" but rather "transcendental" in nature, starting from given market phenomena (prices, profit, etc.) and working back to their conditions of possibility.

It will be necessary later ... to correct the idealist manner of the presentation, which makes it seem as if it were merely a matter of conceptual determinations and of the dialectic of these concepts.

?- Marx, Grundrisse [1]

????????A Hegelian Marxist Revival

????????FOLLOWING MORE THAN TWO DECADES during which methodological discussions on Marxism were dominated by various waves of assaults on the Hegelian legacy in it, one of the more curious theoretical developments of recent years has been the formation of what might be called a "new" Hegelian Marxism. Without wishing to speculate on the diversity of individual motivations, one proximate cause that no doubt gave massive impulse to this "return to Hegel" among Marxist scholars, at least within the Anglo-American context, was the advent in the mid-1980s of a supposedly "analytical" reformulation of Marxian theory, which claimed to serve the "intentions" of Marx while employing the methodological tools of neoclassical economics. Indeed, under the banner of "methodological individualism," the "analytical Marxists" elevated the latter to the status of the canon for all "modern" social scientific inquiry whatsoever, according to which the pronouncements of classical Marxists were dismissed as unintelligible bleatings of stubborn primitives. Not surprisingly, this self-styled "Marxism without bullshit" quickly revealed itself to be a "Marxism," for all intents and purposes, without Marx (see Schweickart, 1988), and a response from more traditionally minded Marxist scholars was clearly in order. Now, the "analytical Marxists" did not in fact have anything very precise to say about Hegel. One will not find in their writings the detailed textually based critique of Hegelian (and Hegelian Marxist) "dialectics" of, say, a Colletti, nor even the suggestive, if more broadstroke, critical indications of an Althusser. Nonetheless, they did have the habit (a habit which was more likely acquired from readings of Schumpeter or Joan Robinson than through any actual first-hand engagement with Hegelian philosophy) of ranging everything they found most distasteful and incomprehensible in Marx's corpus under the epithet of "Hegelianism." This applied, above all, for the very foundation of Marx's political economy, his theory of value, which could thus be disposed of in summary fashion as an antequated theory of price determination, since all the knotty details which might have suggested that it is something other than that - or rather something more than that - were deemed too tainted with "Hegelianism" to merit serious consideration.

????????Correctly appreciating that much, indeed almost everything, of significance in Marx's economic theory is lost through such an approach, the "new" Hegelian Marxist response to the challenge of "analytical Marxism" has amounted, in effect, to an effort to salvage Marx by vindicating the allegedly "Hegelian" aspects of his economics: an effort to prove - on the assumption that Hegelian argumentational structures do indeed play a systematic role in Marx's analyses or even, in the most ambitious variant, that the course of the latter is entirely governed by the former - that these are not just "bullshit" after all. (It is, incidentally, in its emphasis upon the systematicity of the alleged contribution made by "dialectical" patterns in the exposition of a specific subject matter that the "new" Hegelian Marxism distinguishes itself from the "old" Hegelian Marxism of the historicist variety, as exemplified, for instance, by Lukács. [2]) Accordingly, the "new" Hegelian Marxists have tended to adopt as their slogan Lenin's famous aphorism to the effect that: "It is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having studied the whole of Hegel's Logic" They have thus prescribed strong medicine and in a notably large dosage. [3]

????????Now, I do not want to suggest that the prescribed medicine is worse than the disease. But I do want to suggest that it is not quite the right medicine - and even perhaps produces the not entirely wholesome effect of making one feel better without, however, in fact correcting the problem. "Dialectics," one might say, is the opiate of Marxist intellectuals. Nonetheless, the existence of striking formal similarities between Marx's value-analysis and Hegel's exposition of the "concept" is undeniable, and the "new" Hegelian Marxism has at least done a service in bringing them out. [4] But I would submit that any inference from the existence of such similarities to the conclusion that Marx's "method" of analysis must, then, be Hegelian in inspiration is not only unjustified, but constitutes a grave error. In fact such discursive similarities have nothing at all to do with "method," but are simply the reflection of a similitude between the actual object of Marx's analysis and the character which is ascribed to objectivity as such in Hegelian metaphysics: of a similitude, then, between a peculiar (and notably idealist) metaphysical system and some specific sort of object which - quite by chance - that metaphysics happens to "fit." For, contrary to what one would be led to believe by the practice of so many a "value theorist," the primary object of Marx's value-analysis is not in fact price or the system of prices, but rather the objective condition of the possibility that there even be a system of prices: viz. the value-form itself or, in more colloquial language, money. Now, it so happens that money is nothing less than a "real universal" -? which is what, according to the distinctive formulae of Hegel's metaphysics, everything (or at least "everything which is actual") is supposed to be. Or, more precisely, specifically commodity-money is a "real universal," and commodity-money is the sort of money which (whether for historically contingent or essential reasons cannot be decided upon here) is clearly treated as basic in Marx's theory.

????????

????????Money and Other Mystical Objects

????????To say that the money-commodity is a "real universal" is to say that it is some particular sort of thing, in this case a particular sort of commodity, which represents - in effect, "is" - the generic "essence" of all those particular sorts which are specifically different from both it and one another within a common genus. This is to say that it is a particular sort of commodity or "use-value" which represents in economic practice the generic essence or universality of all commodities qua exchange-values. "It is as if," Marx writes in the original 1867 version of the first chapter of Capital, "next to and apart from lions, tigers, hares and all other really existing animals, which together constitute the various genera, species, sub-species, families, etc. of the animal kingdom, there existed also the Animal, the individual incarnation of the animal kingdom in its entirety." [5]

????????Just to be clear about what we are getting ourselves into with the foregoing observations, it needs to be stressed that the claim for the reality of universais is logically coordinate in Hegel with the claim for the merely illusory character of particulars - or, in other words, of the material world - and hence is part and parcel of Hegel's, and indeed Hegel himself would say of every, idealism.6 Wary of the charge of idealism, the traditional alibi of Hegelian Marxism, both "old" and "new," has been that Hegel's "dialectical method" could somehow be extricated from the idealist metaphysics of his system and put to a properly "materialist," i.e., scientific, use. What I am proposing, on the contrary, is that it is precisely Hegel's idealism, or rather the formulae characteristic of the latter, for which Marx, by virtue of the ontological peculiarity of money, found a legitimate scientific application.

????????This is not, of course, to say that the content of those formulae remains unchanged in the usage which Marx makes of them. Hegel's talk of "universality" (Allgemeinheit) is systematically ambiguous between the sense of the relatively more inclusive, viz. in the manner of a class concept, and that of the all-inclusive or "true infinite," and it is the reality of the latter - of "the" universal - to which, by way of a remarkable series of what might be called "metonymic" slippages, the supposed reality of all its more specific "determinations" is called upon to testify in the Hegelian exposition. The money-commodity is not, however, a real embodiment of anything so elevated as "the" universal. It is rather, as noted, the real form acquired specifically by the universality of all commodities as exchange-values. In the absence of a state capable of issuing and guaranteeing the currency of so-called "fiat money," one particular sort of commodity must take on the function in economic practice of representing the universal value character shared in common, though in differing degrees, by all the rest. This is not only or even primarily a systematic economic necessity for purposes of measurement - though the intrinsic unit of the money-commodity does indeed provide, as is well known, the homogeneous unit in which the relative values of all other commodities are both given expression and made commensurable. That the money-commodity comes to discharge this ideal measurement function is, however, a consequence of the real circulatory function it is called upon to discharge, viz. as the medium of exchange. The money-commodity "represents" the generic essence of commodities in the very practice of exchange - it is the real and hence really appropriable form of existence of their implicit value character - since if all commodities were not in fact universally convertible into it, their generalized exchange would not be possible at all. The one particular sort of commodity serving as money is thus invested with the status of the "general commodity." It is - to recall Hegel's own favored illustrations of empirical universality - the sovereign, other commodities are its subjects; it is the sun, other commodities are its satellites; it is the Christ, other commodities are Christians.

????????In fact these analogies, though evocative, are not quite exact. For Hegel, it is not only the case that the reality of universais is coordinate with the irreality of particulars, but it is also the case that amidst any range of existing particulars of some given sort there ought to be one that represents precisely the u individual universality" of the rest and vis-à-vis the rest. The relation of the Christ as "God-man" to created individuals as depicted in the Gospels clearly provides Hegel's paradigm in this regard, and the sun and the sovereign are supposed to represent analogous instances of "individual universality" in the domains of nature and "objective spirit," respectively.7 But the money-commodity represents the universality of all commodities not in the form of some one individual commodity, but rather in the form of some one particular sort of commodity. In other words, the relation of the money-commodity to other commodities is a relation of a particular sort to all other sorts, with individual commodities being implicated in this relation only inasmuch as they are specimens of such sorts.

????????In order to get on with the business at hand, just how and why the system of exchange gives rise to a specific incarnation of the exchange- value of commodities cannot be gone into at any greater length here (see Rosenthal, 1998, ch.15) . But as the centrality of this theme to what gets called Marx's "value theory" has been so widely ignored, it is worth at least introducing into evidence the following somewhat lengthy passage from the Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. Marx's reference in it to the "exclusive" commodity (die ausschlie?liche Ware) is to that (sort of) commodity which through the "action" of other commodities - or, more precisely, the action of their owners, who are willing always to accept it in exchange, provided it be offered in the correct amount - is "set apart" (ausgeschlossen) from the ranks of these latter to serve as the representative of their exchangeability in general.

????????In the exchange process all commodities relate to the exclusive commodity as commodity as such, the commodity, embodiment of universal labour-time in a particular use-value. They are therefore as particular commodities opposed to one particular commodity as the universal commodity. The fact that commodity-owners relate to one another's labour as universal social labour thus gets represented in the form of their relating to their commodities as exchange-values; and the interrelation of commodities as exchange-values in the exchange process gets represented as their universal relation to a particular commodity as the adequate expression of their exchange-value; this, conversely, appears again as the specific relation of this particular commodity to all other commodities and hence as the determinate, as it were naturally-evolved, social character of a thing. The particular commodity which thus represents the adequate form of existence of the exchange-value of all commodities, or the exchange-value of commodities in the form of a particular exclusive commodity, is - money. (Marx, 1970, 48/MEW, Vol. 13, 34.)

????????

????????1 See Marx, 1973, 151 / Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 42, 85-6. All citations of English-language editions of Marx's work will be accompanied by citations of the standard multi-volume German-language edition, the Marx-EngeL? Werke (hereafter cited as MEW). As they appear here, the English renderings of Marx often have been modified. Where no English edition is cited, the translation is mine.

????????2 On the historicism of traditional Hegelian Marxism, see Rosenthal, 1998, part 1.

????????3 Recent works in English that clearly fall within the current described are, for instance, Arthur, 1993; Shamsavari, 1991; and Smith, 1990. Somewhat earlier attempts at Hegelian reconstructions of Marx in English, which given their dates of publication cannot in fact share the motivation of doing battle with "analytical" Marxism, seem to have been to a greater or lesser extent inspired by isolated academic encounters with the interpretive approach of the West German Hegel-Marx scholar Hans-Georg Backhaus. See, for instance, Banaji, 1979; Eldred and Hanlon, 1981. Otherwise, however, the tortuous details of Backhaus' theoretical itinerary have not had much impact upon English-language discussions - which is hardly surprising when one considers that until very recently his contributions were for the most part not even easily available in German. This problem has now been addressed with the publication of Backhaus, 1997. In general, what I am calling here the "new" Hegelian Marxism, inasmuch as it is a phenomenon of the Anglophone academy, has developed independently of recent German-language discussions in an analogous, though it must be said on the whole rather more sophisticated, vein. For a mature product of these latter, which shares a common "methodological" orientation with the "new" Hegelian Marxism in its Anglophone version and hence too some of its defects, but is rich in exegetical details and insights, see Brentel, 1989.

????????4 The worst examples of the genre, however, find too many "correspondences" between Hegel's Logic and Marx's Capital, on the basis of the most circumstantial of textual evidence and often at the cost of wildly misleading and contrived interpretations of the latter. Hence, they serve in fact to divert attention from such analogies as are more than just incidental.

????????5 Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Zweite Abteilung, Band 5, 37. Marx's manner of expression in this passage is in fact somewhat equivocal. For any animal which represented the universal "concept" of animality vis-à-vis all other species of animals would have itself presumably to be a particular species, not, as Marx implies, an "individual." As will be seen directly below, Marx's confusion in this regard was almost certainly of Hegelian inspiration. This same conclusion is suggested by the somewhat groping remark with which Marx follows his analogy: "Such an individual, which in itself comprises all really existent sorts of the same thing, is a Universal: like Animal, God, etc."

????????6 Thus Hegel writes in his Science of Logic. "The proposition that the finite is ideal constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle. ... A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existence as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms are thoughts, universais, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that is, in their sensuous individuality . . ." (Hegel, 1969, 154-5).

????????7 See the Science of Logic, where Hegel remarks: "In the material world it is the central body that is the genus, but it is the individual universality of the single objects and their mechanical process" (722).?