【每天一篇經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人配套學(xué)習(xí)文本】017-Local debt in China 中國(guó)的地方債務(wù)
Local debt in China 中國(guó)的地方債務(wù)
Local debt in China 中國(guó)的地方債務(wù)
A property slowdown sheds light on a huge hidden-debt problem

第一段:
When officials in the southern city of Liuzhou began a routine auction of parcels of land in June, they found few takers. Only one of five plots received a bid; the rest went unsold. As in many cities across China, a downturn in the property market has meant less demand for the land on which apartment towers are built.
今年6月,當(dāng)南方城市柳州的官員開(kāi)始例行的土地拍賣(mài)時(shí),幾乎沒(méi)有買(mǎi)家。五個(gè)地塊中只有一個(gè)中標(biāo);其余的未售出。與中國(guó)許多城市一樣,房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的低迷意味著對(duì)公寓樓用地的需求減少。
第二段:
That is bad news for local governments, which rely on the sales for the bulk of their revenues. It is also a troubling sign for the holders of bonds issued by local-government financing vehicles (LGFVs), the half-public, half-corporate concoctions that have become a cornerstone of Chinese development. Cities’ land-sale revenues are often used to repay these bonds. After the auctions flopped in Liuzhou, rating agencies downgraded two of the city’s LGFVs on fears that the government would struggle to service their debts.
這對(duì)地方政府來(lái)說(shuō)是個(gè)壞消息,因?yàn)樗鼈兊拇蟛糠质杖攵家蕾?lài)于銷(xiāo)售。對(duì)于地方政府融資平臺(tái)(lgfv)發(fā)行的債券持有人來(lái)說(shuō),這也是一個(gè)令人不安的信號(hào)。lgfv是一種半公半企的混合物,已成為中國(guó)發(fā)展的基石。城市的土地銷(xiāo)售收入經(jīng)常被用來(lái)償還這些債券。柳州的拍賣(mài)失敗后,評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)下調(diào)了該市兩家地方政府融資平臺(tái)的評(píng)級(jí),擔(dān)心政府難以?xún)斶€債務(wù)。
第三段:
LGFVs are one of China’s oddest financial innovations. In the mid-1990s the central government implemented budget laws to stop local bureaucrats building up massive debts. In response, regional governments crafted LGFVs as a workaround. The vehicles, which number in the thousands, became important drivers of economic growth, helping build bridges, homes and roads. They also became one of China’s biggest kinds of liabilities, building up some 53trn yuan ($8.3trn, or 52% of GDP) in onshore and offshore debts, according to Goldman Sachs, a bank. Although such borrowing does not appear on public balance-sheets, local authorities are responsible for paying it back. The runaway debts now threaten to throw the financial system into turmoil.
地方政府融資平臺(tái)是中國(guó)最奇特的金融創(chuàng)新之一。上世紀(jì)90年代中期,中央政府實(shí)施了預(yù)算法,以阻止地方官僚積累巨額債務(wù)。作為回應(yīng),地方政府制定了地方政府融資平臺(tái)作為一種變通辦法。成千上萬(wàn)的汽車(chē)成為經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的重要推動(dòng)力,幫助修建橋梁、房屋和道路。根據(jù)高盛銀行的數(shù)據(jù),它們也成為中國(guó)最大的債務(wù)種類(lèi)之一,在岸和離岸債務(wù)累積了約53萬(wàn)億元人民幣(8.3萬(wàn)億美元,占GDP的52%)。盡管這些借款并不出現(xiàn)在公共資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上,但地方政府有責(zé)任償還。如今,失控的債務(wù)有可能讓金融體系陷入動(dòng)蕩。
第四段:
The central government has spent years trying to reform China’s shadow financial system, but debts that are hidden off balance-sheets have been slow to shrink. Take shadow banking, for instance. Although it has declined as a share of banking-system assets, outstanding shadow loans remain high, at 57.6trn yuan at the end of September. Similarly, a municipal-bond market now lets cities and provinces raise funds. Yet LGFV debts at the end of 2020 still exceeded outstanding central and local government bonds combined.
中央政府花了數(shù)年時(shí)間試圖改革中國(guó)的影子金融體系,但隱藏在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表之外的債務(wù)一直在緩慢收縮。以影子銀行為例。盡管影子貸款占銀行系統(tǒng)資產(chǎn)的比例有所下降,但影子貸款余額仍處于高位,截至9月底為57.6萬(wàn)億元。類(lèi)似地,一個(gè)市級(jí)債券市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)在允許各省市籌集資金。然而,截至2020年底,地方政府融資平臺(tái)的債務(wù)仍超過(guò)了中央和地方政府債券的余額總和。
第五段:
Many LGFVs make meagre earnings on the bridges, roads and water systems they build. Officials used to be able to make up the shortfall with land-sale revenues, but this is becoming harder. In a round of sales this year for 22 of China’s biggest cities, the premium fetched on parcels was just 4.7% above the government’s reserve price, compared with 16.7% earlier in the year, according to Enodo Economics, a research firm. The default of Evergrande, a developer with $300bn in liabilities, and wider malaise in the property industry?means demand for land could continue to suffer. New home prices fell for a third consecutive month in November, according to figures published on December 15th.
許多地方政府融資平臺(tái)在他們建造的橋梁、道路和供水系統(tǒng)上賺取微薄的收入。過(guò)去,官員們可以通過(guò)賣(mài)地收入來(lái)彌補(bǔ)差額,但現(xiàn)在這變得越來(lái)越困難。研究公司Enodo Economics的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,在今年中國(guó)22個(gè)最大城市的一輪拍賣(mài)中,地塊溢價(jià)僅比政府的底價(jià)高出4.7%,而今年早些時(shí)候這一比例為16.7%。背負(fù)3000億美元債務(wù)的開(kāi)發(fā)商恒大(Evergrande)的違約,以及房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)的普遍低迷,意味著土地需求可能繼續(xù)受到影響。12月15日公布的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,11月新房?jī)r(jià)格連續(xù)第三個(gè)月下跌。
第六段:
No LGFV has yet defaulted on a bond. But many market-watchers, such as Larry Hu of Macquarie, a bank, believe it is only a matter of time. The vehicles will face repayments of offshore bonds of $32.2bn in 2022, up from $26.9bn in 2021, reckons Nomura, a Japanese bank. Many of them issue short-term debt simply to pay off other maturities. Guangxi Liuzhou Dongcheng, an LGFV that was downgraded by S&P, a rating agency, in October, had 25.7bn yuan ($4bn) in short-term maturities, for instance. An average of 60% of LGFV bond issuance has gone not to new growth-generating projects but towards paying off maturing debts in 2020 and 2021.
地方政府融資平臺(tái)尚未出現(xiàn)債券違約。但許多市場(chǎng)觀察人士,如麥格理銀行的Larry Hu,認(rèn)為這只是時(shí)間問(wèn)題。據(jù)日本野村證券(Nomura)估計(jì),這些工具將在2022年面臨322億美元的離岸債券償付,高于2021年的269億美元。許多銀行發(fā)行短期債券只是為了償還其他到期債務(wù)。例如,去年10月被評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)標(biāo)普(s&p;P)下調(diào)信用評(píng)級(jí)的地方政府融資平臺(tái)廣西柳州東城(LGFV)持有257億元人民幣(合40億美元)短期債券。地方政府融資平臺(tái)發(fā)行的債券中,平均有60%沒(méi)有用于新的增長(zhǎng)項(xiàng)目,而是用于償還2020年和2021年到期的債務(wù)。
第七段:
Many local governments appear to be preparing for a financial storm. Liuzhou has used an estimated 20bn yuan in public funds to make up a capital shortfall at Dongtong Investment and Development Group, a vehicle that was downgraded in August by Fitch, another rating agency. An LGFV in the city of Chongqing defaulted on bankers’ acceptance bills in March. Subsidiaries of a provincial vehicle in Guangxi have gone bankrupt. Provincial governments in Jiangsu and Yunnan have issued guidelines calling for collapsing LGFVs to go into formal bankruptcy instead of being hidden under more debt.
許多地方政府似乎正在為一場(chǎng)金融風(fēng)暴做準(zhǔn)備。柳州已經(jīng)動(dòng)用了大約200億元的公共資金來(lái)彌補(bǔ)東通投資發(fā)展集團(tuán)(Dongtong Investment and Development Group)的資本缺口。今年8月,另一家評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)惠譽(yù)(Fitch)下調(diào)了東通投資發(fā)展集團(tuán)的評(píng)級(jí)。今年3月,重慶市一家地方政府融資平臺(tái)拖欠銀行承兌匯票。廣西某省級(jí)汽車(chē)子公司已破產(chǎn)。江蘇和云南的省政府已經(jīng)發(fā)布指導(dǎo)意見(jiàn),要求破產(chǎn)的地方政府融資平臺(tái)正式破產(chǎn),而不是隱藏在更多的債務(wù)之下。
第八段:
Such reforms will not come easily. The value of onshore LGFV bonds stood at 11.9trn yuan in June, six times those issued by developers and a tenth of China’s onshore-bond market (see chart). A slight shift in sentiment towards the government’s implicit guarantee for LGFVs could roil markets. This was highlighted by the caution around “Document No. 15”, an internal circular issued by the banking regulator in July, which told lenders to cut access to working-capital loans for some LGFVs. If upheld, the new rules could have caused a cash crunch for the vehicles—similar to the squeeze that brought down Evergrande. But they were quickly abandoned. Letting LGFVs fail is a line the central government is not yet willing to cross.
這樣的改革并不容易。6月份,在岸地方政府融資平臺(tái)的債券價(jià)值為11.9萬(wàn)億元,是開(kāi)發(fā)商發(fā)行債券的6倍,是中國(guó)在岸債券市場(chǎng)的1 / 10(見(jiàn)圖表)。對(duì)政府為地方政府融資平臺(tái)提供隱性擔(dān)保的看法稍有轉(zhuǎn)變,可能會(huì)擾亂市場(chǎng)。這一點(diǎn)在銀監(jiān)會(huì)7月發(fā)布的內(nèi)部通知第15號(hào)文件的警告中得到了突顯。該通知要求銀行減少對(duì)一些地方政府融資平臺(tái)的流動(dòng)資金貸款。如果這項(xiàng)新規(guī)定得到支持,可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致這些汽車(chē)出現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金短缺,類(lèi)似于導(dǎo)致恒大破產(chǎn)的那種情況。但它們很快就被拋棄了。讓地方政府融資平臺(tái)倒閉,是中央政府目前還不愿跨越的一條紅線。
第九段:
The situation illustrates the market-distorting power of missed reforms. Many other sectors, such as property and non-core state-owned enterprises, are no longer seen as backed by the central government. The fact that the authorities did not decisively end their implicit support for LGFVs earlier this year has led many asset managers in China to consider them safe. LGFV bond yields have fallen towards those on government bonds. Funds have poured in. “They are becoming a haven,” says Mr Hu. They should be anything but.
這種情況表明,錯(cuò)過(guò)的改革會(huì)扭曲市場(chǎng)。許多其它行業(yè),如房地產(chǎn)和非核心國(guó)有企業(yè),已不再被視為受到中央政府的支持。今年早些時(shí)候,中國(guó)政府沒(méi)有果斷結(jié)束對(duì)地方政府融資平臺(tái)的隱性支持,這一事實(shí)導(dǎo)致中國(guó)許多資產(chǎn)管理公司認(rèn)為,地方政府融資平臺(tái)是安全的。地方政府融資平臺(tái)的債券收益率已跌向政府債券。資金大量涌入。胡士泰表示,它們正成為一個(gè)避風(fēng)港。他們不應(yīng)該是。