一、救生艇

las規(guī)則中隊(duì)停機(jī)的檢查要求是所有停機(jī)，每周檢查一次，啟動(dòng)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)試機(jī)不少于三分鐘。規(guī)定救生艇重力式降放設(shè)備在操作上有一人在船舶甲板上，或者在救生艇內(nèi)部都能進(jìn)行降放操作。還船上配備救生艇，吊艇架的種類主要有兩種，一種是重力式吊艇架一種自由降落艇的降放裝置調(diào)停下行，吊艇架橫張索所至少固定兩根救生索

二、

各種類型自動(dòng)舵都應(yīng)和羅經(jīng)組合,并具有三種操舵方式自動(dòng),隨動(dòng),應(yīng)急。

在使用自動(dòng)舵時(shí),下列情況中哪些應(yīng)換成人工操舵①在避讓時(shí)和霧航時(shí);②大風(fēng)浪航行時(shí);③狹水道航行時(shí);④航行于漁區(qū),礁區(qū)等復(fù)雜海區(qū)時(shí)。

使用自動(dòng)舵航行時(shí)應(yīng)每個(gè)航行班次檢查手操舵裝置一次。

自動(dòng)舵的比例調(diào)節(jié)旋鈕(舵角調(diào)節(jié))的調(diào)節(jié)①重載時(shí)調(diào)大些;②輕載時(shí)調(diào)大些;③如部分舵葉露出水面時(shí)應(yīng)調(diào)大些;④海況惡劣調(diào)大些。

自動(dòng)舵調(diào)節(jié)旋鈕中的壓舵調(diào)節(jié)用以抵消單側(cè)偏航的作用。

自動(dòng)舵面板上的"反舵角調(diào)節(jié)"旋鈕消除偏航時(shí)的慣性。

Doubling the column then stretching two miles to?the rear, General Keiser and General Bradley came?south to the pass shortly before 1530. They needed no long study to see that further movement depended first on suppressing the fire?being poured into the defile. While ground troops in and near the cut were making such an attempt, strong air attacks seemed the only real solution.63

Fighter-bombers responding to an earlier call for air support from Keiser began pounding the ground bordering the pass about the time the two generals completed their reconnaissance and returned to their command vehicles now just north of the pass. Near 1630, after movement through the pass had been blocked for more than an hour, Keiser conferred with his G-3, Colonel Holden, and momentarily considered abandoning all vehicles and taking his troops out cross-country. But by then the air strikes were, beginning to have an effect. Mosquito control pilots reported that it was impossible to miss the Chinese clustered in the heights on either side of the road, and to make sure of hitting their targets, pilots flew in so low that the men in the pass expected the planes to crash. Machine gun bullets from the aircraft struck the rocky embankments less than seventyfive yards above the men in the cut, and burning napalm spilled onto the road to set several vehicles afire. As the air strikes dampened the Chinese fire, Keiser sent two light tanks from his reconnaissance company to bulldoze a path through the wrecked?vehicles in the pass. The column of troops and trucks could move south again, although they continued to receive some fire from the?surrounding heights. Darkness fell and forced away?the supporting planes before the last of this?portion of the division column entered the pass, but the column moved steadily toward safety.64

As the last of the military police company and a few troops of the 38th Infantry at the end of this section descended from the quieted pass, some fire ranged in on their left flank. Just below the pass, where the road jogged west, crossed a stream, then turned south again a short distance beyond, was the small village of Karhyon-dong. After receiving the strong air attacks in the pass heights, part of the Chinese blocking force took cover in Karhyon-

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dong and trained a few automatic weapons and mortars to the northwest. This fire would be the heaviest faced in the pass area by the last section of Keiser's column, which included four artillery battalions, the division engineers, and the remainder of the 9th Infantry. Whereas the 23d Regimental Combat Team originally was scheduled to bring up the rear over the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road, the long delay caused by the Chinese fire block to the south coupled with enemy pressure from the north had prompted Colonel Freeman to choose another way out; by dusk his forces already were moving over the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route.65

The 17th Field Artillery Battalion, the only 8inch howitzer unit in Korea, led the last section of Keiser's column. After passing through sporadic machine gun fire, the battalion halted in midafternoon just below the village of Wa-dong, a little over two miles north of the pass. Following one stiff exchange of fire with nearby Chinese forces, the 17th started to move again at dark. The battalion negotiated the pass without trouble, but, on descending and turning west to ford the stream west of Karhyon-dong, a howitzer tipped over and rolled into a deep gulley. When an artilleryman went into the gulley to destroy the gun, lights turned on to help him see attracted mortar fire from Karhyon-dong. Harassed by continued fire, the remaining tractors and howitzers crossed the stream slowly and one at a time. It was midnight when the battalion got out of the fire, but losses were light in spite of the slowness. The battalion suffered 1 killed and 16 wounded and lost 1 howitzer, 22 vehicles, and 11 trailers.66

The?37th Field Artillery Battalion, next in column, suffered more than double the 17th's losses. By the time?the 105s of the 37th cleared the ford?west of Karhyon-dong, the battalion had lost 35 men killed,?wounded, or missing, and had left 10?howitzers, 53 vehicles, and 39 trailers strewn along the?road to the rear. But, like the 17th,?the 37th was still intact.67

To the?rear, the story was different. Whereas the 503d?and 38th Field Artillery Battalions, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, and remainder of the 9th Infantry had started down the road behind the 37th, only a trickle of troops and trucks would come through the pass. Although some of the Chinese had climbed down from the bordering heights to firing positions nearer the road, none so far had made an assault on the division column. But after dark, just below the division's point of departure, strong Chinese forces opened attacks against the two remaining artillery battalions and the engineers. Vehicles knocked out during the assaults blocked the raod in considerable depth, and enemy fire during and following the assaults defeated all attempts to remove the obstructions. Only a few troops near?the head of the 503d Field Artillery Battalion managed to break away and continue down the road. The others, including the remainder of the 9th Infantry caught at the very end of the?division column, abandoned all

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guns,?equipment, and remaining vehicles and left the road?to make their way to Sunch'on cross-country. Not all succeeded in getting past the Chinese around them. Of those who did, the last straggler would not reach safety for some days to come.68

In view of this debacle, Colonel Freeman had?made a wise choice in electing to withdraw over the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route. By early afternoon he was convinced of the improbability?that the 23d Regimental Combat Team could withdraw via the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road before?dark and was deeply concerned over the pressure being exerted against his forces by the Chinese concentrated in and around Kunu-ri. Twice, at 1430 and an hour later, Freeman reported to division headquarters-although by feeble and interrupted radio contact-that the 23d's situation was becoming increasingly precarious. He made the earlier report to General Bradley and at that time proposed that he be allowed at least two hours before darkness or when in Freeman's judgment the situation became critical to?withdraw the combat team using the I Corps?roads. Although the weak radio signal caused some confusion at division headquar-

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ters as to Freeman's exact plan, General Bradley at 1600 authorized him to put the plan into effect.69

In preparation, Freeman invited the commander of the 38th?Field Artillery Battalion and the officer in charge?of the rearmost troops of the 9th Infantry,?both nearby and not yet able to move south over the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road, to join in withdrawing through the I Corps sector. Both declined. Therefore, only the combat team's attachments- Battery B of the 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, the 72d Tank Battalion less Company C, and the 15th Field Artillery Battalion- would accompany Freeman's infantry. With the agreement of the commander of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, Freeman decided?not to take the howitzers out. For one reason, the fewer towed pieces on the road, the less?chance there would be of having the column blocked by an accident at a sharp turn or defile. Second, he wanted the guns in action up to the moment of withdrawal to discourage any?pursuit by the Chinese then pressing his position.70

In?the?hour?and?a half before sunset Freeman spotted all available transportation on the road behind his?rearguard position, then began peeling troops from the front a battalion at a time, beginning with the easternmost. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion meanwhile began a phenomenal shoot, firing all ammunition on hand in just over twenty?minutes at deep and?close-in targets. After gunners exploded thermite grenades in the already damaged tubes, the artillerymen boarded their?trucks and joined the withdrawal. A noticeable and prolonged lull?in enemy fire followed the heavy artillery?bombardment, and forward observers watched the Chinese hurriedly dig in to the front of the infantry positions being vacated. Colonel Freeman credited the artillery action with having made a safe withdrawal possible. Under continued air cover, his leading troops made their way behind the 5th Regimental Combat Team's position near Anju by?sunset; by?dark his last troops-from the 3d Battalion and?72d Tank Battalion-were clear of the rearguard?position; and just before midnight, the combat team closed in an assembly area near?Sukch'on.71

A?count?rendered on 1 December listed 2d Division battle?casualties at 4,940 for the last half of?November. Of these, 90 percent, or about 4,500, had been incurred since the 25th. Officer casualties alone numbered 237 and touched most?grades and branches. These losses represented one-third of the division's actual strength of 15,000 on 15 November, and when reconciled?with nonbattle casualties, replacements, and returnees, left the division 8,662 men short of authorized strength, Equipment losses were equally heavy. In addition to hundreds of trucks and trailers, the major losses included 64 artillery pieces,?almost all of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion's?equipment, and between 20 and 40 per-

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cent of the?signal?equipment carried by the various division?units.73

Although this?early tally of losses was not wholly certifiable, the?figures clearly showed the 2d Division no longer?effective. While the 1st Cavalry Division?stretched itself thinner to cover the sector of the?new army line originally assigned to the 2d Division, General Keiser on 1 December began moving his depleted division to Chunghwa, about?ten miles south of Pyongyang, for rehabilitation.74

Notes

1 1st?Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2109, 29 Nov 50; 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50.2 7th Cav Hist?Rpt, Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 Nov 50; 1st Cavalry Division, Korea, June 1950 to January 1952 (Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises, n.d.).3 Rad,?GX 30074 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps et al., 28 Nov 50.4 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 JnI, 29 Nov 50; 1st Cavalry Division, Korea, June 1950 to January 1952.5 Ibid.6 25th?Div Hist, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50.7 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.8 "Turkish U.N. Brigade?Advisory Group, 20 Nov 13 Dec 50."9 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.10 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.11?"Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 Dec 50."12 I Corps Intel Sums 226 and 227, 29 Nov 50; I Corps PORs 233 and 234, 29 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, Nov 50; 25th Div WD, Nov 50.13?Rad, GX 30085 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I?Corps et al., 29 Nov 50.14 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 Dec 50."15 "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov13 Dec 50."16 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.17 Ibid.; "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13?Dec 50."18 Ibid.; Futrell, The United?Stales Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, pp. 328-29, 377-78.19 2d Div G3 Jul, Entry 72, 29 Nov 50.20 Ibid.; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.21 Ltr, Lt Col Maurice C. Holden to Maj Roy E. Appleman, 26 Feb 52; "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13?Dec 50."22 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.23 Ibid.; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.24 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.25 I Corps Opn Dir 28, 29 Nov 50.26 I?Corps PORs 234 and 235, 29 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, Nov 50; 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, Nov 50.27 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50.28 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl. 29 and 30 Nov 50; 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov?50

29?24th?Div WD, Nov 50; I Corps POR 234, 29 Nov 50.

30 24th?Div WD, Nov?50.

31?Ibid.

32 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div G2-G3 Jnl, Entry J-1456, 29 Nov 50; 2d Div WD,?Nov 50.

33 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 72d Tk Bn Comd and Unit Hist Rpt, Nov 50; IX Corps G3?Spot Rpt 2107, 29 Nov 50.

34 Ltr, Holden to Applemen, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div G2-G3 Jnl, Entries J-1459, J-1457, and J-1475, 29?Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2114, 29 Nov 50.

35?Rad, IXACT-402, CG IX Corps?to CG 27th Brit Brig, 29 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts 2101 and 2110, 29 Nov 50.

36 Ltr, Holden to?Appleman, 26 Feb 52.

37 Ibid.; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p.?269.

38?IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt?2164, 30 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52.

39 Rad, GX 30090 KGOO, CG Eighth?Army to CG I Corps et al., 29 Nov 50.

40 Rad, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 30 Nov 50; 1 Corps POR 236, 30 Nov 50; 1 Corps WD, Nar, Nov 50; 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, Nov 50.

41 I Corps WD, Nar, Nov 50; 1 Corps WD, 30 Nov 50; 25th Div 01 24, 30 Nov 50; 5th RCT Unit Rpt 109, 1 Dec 50; 5th RCT S3 Jul, 30 Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, Nov 50; 89th Med Tk Bn Unit Rpt, Nov 50; 25th Div Recon Co WD, Nov?50

42 IX Corps Opn O 6 (confirms fragmentary orders already issued), 30 Nov 50.

43 Ltr, Holden to Applemen, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Entry 58, Nov 50.

44 2d Div WD, G3 Activ Rpt, Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2140, 29 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Entry 61, Nov 50.

45 The order of march is given in 2d Div Arty POR 98, 1 Dec 50.

46 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div WD, Nov 50; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, p.57; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

47 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 270.

48 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 270-72.

54 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div?Arty WD,?Nov 50.

55 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Marshall, River and the Gauntlet, pp. 280-81.

56 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50.

57 38th?Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov?50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 289-94.

58 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Eighth Army G3?Jnl, 30 Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 286-87.

59 2d Div G2-G3 Jnl, Entry J-1490; 30 Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 Jot, 30 Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 287-88.

60 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Marshall, The?River?and the Gauntlet, pp. 288-90, 306-07.

61?9th Inf?Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman,?26 Feb?52; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; Marshall,?The River?and the Gauntlet, pp. 318, 326.

62?Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 310-311,?318.

63?Ibid., p.?320.

64 Eighth Army G3 Briefing Rpt, 1 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Entry 2147, 30 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, pp. 237-38; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 318-19, 326-27, 331-32; 2d Div G2 Jul, Entry 1490, 30 Nov 50.

65 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 340; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Ltr, Col Paul L. Freeman to CG, 2d Inf Div, 9 Dec 50, sub: Withdrawal of the 23d Infantry From KUNU-RI.

66 17th FA Bn WD, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 58-60; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 342-44.

67 37th FA Bn WD, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 347.

68 Comd Rpt, 503d FA Bn, Nov 50; Comd Rpt, 38th FA Bn, Nov 50; Hist Rpt, 2d Engr C Bn, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 347-61.

69 Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50; Ltr, Maj Gen J. S. Bradley to Maj Roy E. Appleman,?2 Apr 52.

70 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 328; Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50.

71?Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 329; Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50; 23d Inf Comd?Rpt, Nov 50; Comd and Unit Hist Rpt, 72d Tk Bn, Nov 50.

72 2d Div Pers?Per Rpt no. 12, 1 Dec 50. This report shows the following?breakdown:

Unit Auth? Strength Battle Casualties

15-30 Nov 50 Actual

Strength

1 Dec 50

9th Inf

3793 1267 1406

23d Inf

3793 485 2244

38th Inf

3793 1075 1762

Div Arty

3695 1461 ?1970

72d Tk Bn

681 19 576

2d Engr Bn

977? ?561??266

2d Med Bn

341- 329

2d MP Co

187 13 142

2d?Recon Co

171 27? 115

2d QM Co

252-232

702d Ord Co

321-283

Div?Band

70?- 89

2d Repl Co

34??- 51

Div Hq Co

190?15 166

Div?Hq?

233 3?249

2d Sig Co

369 10? 363

Med Det Div Hq

14 - 13

CIC Det

17? 3? 13

Total

18,931 4,940? 10,269

73?2d Div WD,?Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50.

74 Eighth Army?Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50.

page created 2 February 2001

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