Journal of Political Economy 2022年第12期

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1．The Comparative Advantage of Firms

企業(yè)的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)

Johannes Boehm；Swati Dhingra；John Morrow

Resource-based theories propose that firms grow by diversifying into products that use common capabilities. We provide evidence for common-input capabilities, using a policy that removed entry barriers in input markets to show that the similarity of a firm’s and an industry’s input mix determines firm production choices. We model industry choice and economies of scope from input capabilities. When the model is estimated for Indian manufacturing, input complementarities make firms 5% more likely to produce in an industry and are quantitatively as important as time-invariant drivers of coproduction rates. Upstream entry barriers were equivalent to a 9.5% tariff on inputs.

資源基礎(chǔ)理論認(rèn)為，企業(yè)通過多樣化生產(chǎn)到使用共同能力的產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)增長(zhǎng)。我們?yōu)楣餐度肽芰μ峁┳C據(jù)，使用消除投入市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入壁壘的政策來(lái)證實(shí)公司和行業(yè)投入組合的相似性決定了企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)選擇。我們根據(jù)輸入能力對(duì)行業(yè)選擇和范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)行建模。當(dāng)對(duì)印度制造業(yè)進(jìn)行模型估計(jì)時(shí)，投入互補(bǔ)性使企業(yè)在一個(gè)行業(yè)中生產(chǎn)的可能性增加5%，并且在數(shù)量上與共同生產(chǎn)率的時(shí)不變驅(qū)動(dòng)因素一樣重要。上游進(jìn)入壁壘相當(dāng)于對(duì)投入品征收9.5%的關(guān)稅。

DOI: 10.1086/720630

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2．Exit versus Voice

退出與話語(yǔ)權(quán)

Eleonora Broccardo；Oliver Hart；Luigi Zingales

We study the relative effectiveness of exit (divestment and boycott) and voice (engagement) strategies in a world where companies generate externalities and some agents care about the social impact of their decisions. We show that if the majority of investors are even slightly socially responsible, voice achieves the socially optimal outcome. In contrast, exit does not unless everybody is significantly socially responsible. If the majority of investors are purely selfish, exit is a more effective strategy, but neither strategy generally achieves the first best. We also show that exit can sometimes reduce social welfare.

我們研究了退出（撤資和抵制）和話語(yǔ)權(quán)（參與）策略的相對(duì)有效性，在這個(gè)世界中，公司產(chǎn)生外部性，一些代理商關(guān)心其決策的社會(huì)影響。本文表明，如果大多數(shù)投資者有輕微的社會(huì)責(zé)任感，話語(yǔ)權(quán)就會(huì)達(dá)到社會(huì)最優(yōu)的結(jié)果。相反，除非每個(gè)人都有重大的社會(huì)責(zé)任，否則不會(huì)退出。如果大多數(shù)投資者純粹是自私的，退出是一種更有效的策略，但這兩種策略通常都不能達(dá)到最優(yōu)的。本文還表明，退出有時(shí)會(huì)減少社會(huì)福利。

DOI: 10.1086/720516

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3．Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices

資產(chǎn)管理合約和均衡價(jià)格

Andrea M. Buffa；Dimitri Vayanos；Paul Woolley

We model asset management as a continuum between active and passive: managers can deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise trader–induced distortions, but agency frictions constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets have high volatility, and the risk-return relationship becomes inverted. Distortions are more severe for overvalued assets than for undervalued ones because trading against the former entails more risk and tighter constraints. We provide empirical evidence supporting our model’s main mechanisms. Using the data, we infer the constraints’ tightness and compute a measure of effective arbitrage capital.

我們將資產(chǎn)管理建模為主動(dòng)和被動(dòng)之間的連續(xù)統(tǒng)一體：經(jīng)理可以偏離基準(zhǔn)指數(shù)來(lái)利用噪音交易者引起的扭曲，但機(jī)構(gòu)摩擦限制了這些偏差。由于約束迫使管理人在資產(chǎn)升值時(shí)購(gòu)買他們減持的資產(chǎn)，因此高估的資產(chǎn)具有高波動(dòng)性，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)回報(bào)關(guān)系變得反轉(zhuǎn)。高估資產(chǎn)的扭曲比低估資產(chǎn)的扭曲更為嚴(yán)重，因?yàn)榕c前者進(jìn)行交易會(huì)帶來(lái)更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和更嚴(yán)格的限制。我們提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)支持我們模型的主要機(jī)制。利用這些數(shù)據(jù)，我們推斷了約束的緊密性，并測(cè)算了度量有效套利資本的一個(gè)指標(biāo)。

DOI: 10.1086/720515

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4．Vertical Contracts with Endogenous Product Selection: An Empirical Analysis of Vendor Allowance Contracts

內(nèi)生產(chǎn)品選擇的縱向合約：基于供應(yīng)商配額合同的實(shí)證分析

Sylvia Hristakeva

Producers frequently provide retailers with financial incentives to secure product distribution. These payments often take the form of vendor allowances: lump-sum transfers to retailers that do not directly depend on quantity sold. I introduce an estimation strategy that uses observed product selections to inform unobserved allowances. I use retailers’ replacement threats, which may allow them to capture both vendor transfers and lower wholesale prices. A counterfactual restricts firms to contract on only wholesale prices. Results show that vendor allowances may have not only (negative) product distortion effects but also (potentially positive) pricing effects.

生產(chǎn)商經(jīng)常為零售商提供經(jīng)濟(jì)激勵(lì)，以確保產(chǎn)品分銷。這些付款通常采取供應(yīng)商津貼的形式：一次性轉(zhuǎn)移給零售商，不直接取決于銷售數(shù)量。我介紹了一種估計(jì)策略，該策略使用觀察到的產(chǎn)品選擇來(lái)告知未觀察到的津貼。我使用零售商的替換威脅，這可能使他們能夠捕獲供應(yīng)商轉(zhuǎn)移和較低的批發(fā)價(jià)格。反事實(shí)限制公司只能以批發(fā)價(jià)格簽訂合同。結(jié)果表明，供應(yīng)商津貼不僅可能產(chǎn)生（負(fù)面）產(chǎn)品扭曲效應(yīng)，還可能產(chǎn)生（潛在的積極）定價(jià)效應(yīng)。

DOI: 10.1086/720631

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5．Breaking the Cycle? Intergenerational Effects of an Antipoverty Program in Early Childhood

打破循環(huán)？幼兒反貧困計(jì)劃的代際效應(yīng)

Andrew Barr；Chloe R. Gibbs

Despite substantial evidence that resources and outcomes are transmitted across generations, there has been limited inquiry into the extent to which antipoverty programs actually disrupt the cycle of bad outcomes. We leverage the rollout of the United States’s largest early-childhood program, Head Start, to estimate the effect of early-childhood exposure among mothers on their children’s long-term outcomes. We find evidence of intergenerational transmission of effects in the form of increased educational attainment, reduced teen pregnancy, and reduced criminal engagement in the second generation. These effects correspond to an estimated increase in discounted second-generation wages of 6%–11%, depending on specification. Exploration of earlier outcomes suggests an important role for changes in parenting behavior and potential noncognitive channels.

盡管有大量證據(jù)表明資源和結(jié)果是代代相傳的，但對(duì)反貧困計(jì)劃在多大程度上實(shí)際會(huì)破壞不良結(jié)果循環(huán)的調(diào)查有限。我們利用美國(guó)最大的幼兒計(jì)劃“Head Start”的推出來(lái)估計(jì)母親的幼兒早期接觸其對(duì)子女長(zhǎng)期結(jié)果的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)有證據(jù)表明，第二代人受教育程度提高、青少年懷孕率降低和犯罪參與減少，其形式是代際傳遞效應(yīng)。這些影響對(duì)應(yīng)于第二代貼現(xiàn)工資的估計(jì)增長(zhǎng)6%-11%，具體取決于規(guī)范化。對(duì)早期結(jié)局的探索表明，育兒行為和潛在的非認(rèn)知渠道的變化起著重要作用。

DOI: 10.1086/720764

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6．Aggregate Implications of Changing Sectoral Trends

行業(yè)變動(dòng)趨勢(shì)的總體影響

Andrew T. Foerster；Andreas Hornstein；Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte；Mark W. Watson

We describe how capital accumulation and the network structure of US production interact to amplify the effects of sectoral trend growth rates in total factor productivity and labor on trend GDP (gross domestic product) growth. We derive expressions that conveniently summarize this long-run amplification effect by way of sectoral multipliers. We estimate that sector-specific factors have historically accounted for approximately three-fourths of long-run changes in GDP growth. Trend GDP growth fell by nearly 3 percentage points over the postwar period, with especially significant contributions from the Construction sector in 1950–80 and the Durable Goods sector in 2000–2018. No sector has contributed any steady significant increase to the trend growth rate of GDP in the past 70 years.

我們描述了資本積累和美國(guó)生產(chǎn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)如何相互作用，以放大全要素生產(chǎn)率和勞動(dòng)力的行業(yè)趨勢(shì)增長(zhǎng)率對(duì)趨勢(shì)GDP（國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值）增長(zhǎng)的影響。我們推導(dǎo)出的表達(dá)式可以通過行業(yè)乘數(shù)方便地總結(jié)這種長(zhǎng)期放大效應(yīng)。我們估計(jì)，從歷史上看，特定行業(yè)的因素約占GDP增長(zhǎng)長(zhǎng)期變化的四分之三。趨勢(shì)GDP增長(zhǎng)在戰(zhàn)后下降了近3個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，其中1950-80年建筑業(yè)和2000-2018年耐用品業(yè)的貢獻(xiàn)尤其重大。在過去70年中，沒有一個(gè)行業(yè)對(duì)GDP的趨勢(shì)增長(zhǎng)率做出任何穩(wěn)定的顯著增長(zhǎng)。

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