勞動的價值理論（二）
????????本篇文章由我翻譯，全文共63頁，本篇為節(jié)選的第二部分約9頁內(nèi)容，原文為英文并附于末尾，紅色標(biāo)注為原文附帶的注釋，藍(lán)色標(biāo)注為我添加的補充和注釋。文章中引用部分若已有漢譯本，則一概使用漢譯本的翻譯，并補充標(biāo)注漢譯本的引用文獻(xiàn)。
????????3.抽象勞動價值理論？(An abstract labour theory of value?)
????????當(dāng)然，對上一節(jié)中的“勞動價值理論”(“l(fā)abour theory of value”)是否存在于馬克思的著作中的質(zhì)疑并非首次提出(參見Pilling, 1972; Banaji, 1976)。在最近的社會主義經(jīng)濟學(xué)家聯(lián)合會的辯論中，抽象勞動被人們置于非常重要的地位上，以將馬克思的價值理論與前面所討論的兩種適用于李嘉圖理論而不適用于馬克思理論的解讀方式區(qū)分開來。馬克思確信，他的價值理論與李嘉圖的不同之處在于他對勞動形式的關(guān)注，以及他對抽象勞動(abstract labour)和具體勞動(concrete labour)的區(qū)分。（例如，參見《剩余價值理論》，第二卷，p.164, 172.）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第34卷第181-2頁、第190-1頁）在《資本論》中，馬克思告訴我們，
????????“商品中包含的勞動的這種二重性，是首先由我批判地證明的。這一點是理解政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)的樞紐……”(Capital, I, p. 132.)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第54-55頁）
????????希梅爾魏特(Himmelweit)和莫恩(Mohun)基于他們對斯蒂德曼的回復(fù)，于1978年提出了這一觀點：
????????“我們在李嘉圖主義的凝結(jié)勞動價值論(embodied-labour theory of value)和基于抽象勞動范疇的馬克思主義價值論之間做了區(qū)分。前者打算直接成為一種價格理論，而后者要成為一種價格理論只有經(jīng)過幾個中間過渡階段或媒介。”(Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978, p. 94.)（伊恩?斯蒂德曼和保羅?斯威齊等，2016，p. 289.）
????????他們暗示，如果我們將馬克思強調(diào)的這一區(qū)別牢記于心，我們就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，冗余性和邏輯不一致的指控雖然適用于李嘉圖的價值理論，但是不適用于馬克思的價值理論。
????????他們的觀點并不完全令人信服，原因有二。首先，斯蒂德曼聲稱已將勞動視為抽象勞動，并將其批判目標(biāo)準(zhǔn)確地指向抽象勞動價值理論(abstract labour theory of value)（見Steedman, 1977, p. 19）（揚?斯蒂德曼，1991，6），希梅爾魏特和莫恩沒有明確面對這一主張。顯然，這在很大程度上取決于如何理解抽象勞動的概念。例如，斯威齊認(rèn)為抽象勞動概念并非李嘉圖和斯密勞動概念的替代品，而是對他們著作的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展和澄清。(Sweezy, 1962, p. 31.)（保羅?斯威齊，2016，p. 53.）馬克思自己并沒有把“物化勞動”(“embodied labour”)和“抽象勞動”對立起來的傾向，比如說，“充當(dāng)?shù)葍r物的商品的物體總是當(dāng)作抽象人類勞動的化身”(“The body of the commodity, which serves as the equivalent, always figures as the embodiment of abstract human labour”)。(Capital ,1, p. 150.)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第73頁）
????????其次，他們在進(jìn)行循環(huán)論證：他們從商品形式推導(dǎo)出抽象勞動的概念，然后希望用抽象勞動范疇再來解釋商品形式(Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978, p. 73.)（伊恩?斯蒂德曼和保羅?斯威齊等，2016，p. 270.）。
????????在我看來，抽象勞動和具體勞動的區(qū)別是馬克思和李嘉圖理論之間的一個重要區(qū)別，但不是唯一的區(qū)別。更根本的是理論對象和分析方法方面的區(qū)別。在抽象勞動范疇的含義和意義變得清晰之前，需要厘清這些區(qū)別到底是什么。
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????????4.勞動作為馬克思價值理論的對象
????????我的觀點是馬克思的價值理論的對象根本不是價格，我這里的意思不是說馬克思關(guān)于價格的價值理論(Marx's value theory of price)比李嘉圖的更復(fù)雜。這不意味著馬克思不關(guān)心價格，也不關(guān)心價格的數(shù)值如何由價值決定，而是說交換現(xiàn)象并非這一理論的對象。（同樣的，這并非完全是一個新觀點，見Hussain, 本卷, p. 84.）我的觀點是，馬克思價值理論的對象是勞動。這不是一個試圖解釋價格如何決定和如何從勞動中找出這種決定關(guān)系的理論。而是試圖解釋為什么勞動采取這種形式，以及其在政治上會產(chǎn)生什么結(jié)果的理論。
????????我們在馬克思第一次深入研究亞當(dāng)?斯密時（見《早期著作》中的《經(jīng)濟學(xué)哲學(xué)手稿》，特別是p. 287-9.）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第3卷第223頁起）就可以發(fā)現(xiàn)他在關(guān)注這一方面?！兜乱庵疽庾R形態(tài)》為這一觀點提供了支撐性證據(jù)：
????????“個人怎樣表現(xiàn)自己的生活，他們自己也就怎樣。因此，他們是什么樣的，這同他們的生產(chǎn)是一致的——既和他們生產(chǎn)什么一致，又和他們怎樣生產(chǎn)一致。”（同前，p. 42.）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第5卷，未出版；《馬克思恩格斯全集》第一版第3卷第24頁）
????????以及在《資本論》中，馬克思指出了一個將他的分析方向與政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)區(qū)分開來的關(guān)鍵問題：
????????“為什么這一內(nèi)容采取這種形式呢？為什么勞動表現(xiàn)為價值，用勞動時間計算的勞動量表現(xiàn)為勞動產(chǎn)品的價值量呢？一些公式本來在額上寫著，它們是屬于生產(chǎn)過程支配人而人還沒有支配生產(chǎn)過程的那種社會形態(tài)的，但在政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)的資產(chǎn)階級意識中，它們竟像生產(chǎn)勞動本身一樣，成了不言而喻的自然必然性?！?Capital, I, p. 174-5.)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第98-99頁）
????????馬克思在這里表示的不是在政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)中“加入歷史視角”，而是理論對象上的差異（另見Hussain, 本卷, p. 86.）。正因勞動是馬克思理論的對象，所以馬克思從生產(chǎn)性商品開始分析，認(rèn)為它是“勞動產(chǎn)品在當(dāng)代社會中表現(xiàn)出來的最簡單的社會形式”（見《瓦格納的批注》，p.50.）。而且，并不像龐巴維克(B?hm-Bawerk)所聲稱的那樣，與價格決定相矛盾（另見Kay, 本卷, p. 48-50）。
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????????5.一種可能的誤解：勞動力的社會分配
????????為什么勞動采取這種形式的問題不僅僅是一個分配問題。在這里，馬克思于1868年7月寫給庫格曼(Kugelmann)的那封著名的信可能非常誤導(dǎo)人，馬克思寫道：
????????“要想得到和各種不同的需要量相適應(yīng)的產(chǎn)品量，就要付出各種不同的和一定數(shù)量的社會總勞動量。這種按一定比例分配社會勞動的必要性，決不可能被社會生產(chǎn)的一定形式所取消，而可能改變的只是它的表現(xiàn)形式，這是不言而喻的。自然規(guī)律是根本不能取消的。在不同的歷史條件下能夠發(fā)生變化的，只是這些規(guī)律借以實現(xiàn)的形式。而在社會勞動的聯(lián)系體現(xiàn)為個人勞動產(chǎn)品的私人交換的社會制度下，這種勞動按比例分配所借以實現(xiàn)的形式，正是這些產(chǎn)品的交換價值?！保ā锻ㄐ偶罚琾. 251.）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第一版第32卷第541頁）
????????就這封信本身來說，它可以支持這樣一種觀點：該理論的對象僅僅是各個個體在預(yù)先給定的工作結(jié)構(gòu)中分配和聯(lián)系在一起的方式。這種觀點可以從“黑格爾主義”的魯賓(I. I. Rubin)到“反黑格爾主義”的阿爾都塞(Althusser)等一系列數(shù)量龐大且觀點各異的學(xué)者中找到。
????????對于魯賓來說，價值理論是一個與商品經(jīng)濟中的生產(chǎn)調(diào)節(jié)有關(guān)的理論。在商品生產(chǎn)中，“沒有人有意識地組織或調(diào)節(jié)社會勞動力在各種各樣的產(chǎn)業(yè)部門之間分配，以適應(yīng)給定的生產(chǎn)力狀態(tài)。”(Rubin, 1973, p. 77.)在他著作的開頭，魯賓清晰地表示，組成各個產(chǎn)業(yè)部門的生產(chǎn)力是物質(zhì)—技術(shù)過程的產(chǎn)品(Rubin, 1973, p. 1-3)。對于他來說，社會僅僅只是在這個預(yù)先給定的結(jié)構(gòu)中，人們之間的聯(lián)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)：
????????“把馬克思的理論看做對勞動與作為勞動產(chǎn)品的物的分析也同樣是不正確的。勞動與物的關(guān)系是一種給定的具體勞動形式與一種給定的具體的物的關(guān)系。這是一種技術(shù)關(guān)系，其本身并非價值理論關(guān)注的內(nèi)容。價值理論關(guān)注的是各種勞動形式在它們的分配過程中的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系，這種聯(lián)系建立在這些物的交換關(guān)系之上，即建立在勞動產(chǎn)品的交換關(guān)系之上。” (Rubin, 1973, p. 67.)
????????但起到最終決定作用的是預(yù)先給定的結(jié)構(gòu)：
????????“我們可以注意到，人與人之間的社會生產(chǎn)關(guān)系由生產(chǎn)的物質(zhì)條件和技術(shù)生產(chǎn)資料在不同社會群體之間的分配所決定……從唯物史觀的角度來看，這是一條適用于所有社會形式的普遍社會規(guī)律?！?(Rubin, 1973, p. 29.)
????????顯然，阿爾都塞對馬克思的解讀與魯賓的解讀之間存在很多差別，但阿爾都塞也引用了馬克思寫給庫格曼的信，并寫道：
????????“馬克思的勞動價值理論(Marx's labour theory of value)……只能被理解為理論的一種特例，馬克思和恩格斯將其稱為‘價值規(guī)律’或各個產(chǎn)業(yè)部門之間可用勞動力分配定律……”(Althusser, 1977, p. 87.)
????????或，
????????“人分成各個社會階級(the distribution of men into social classes exercising functions in the production process)（人分成在生產(chǎn)過程中行使不同職能的各個社會階級）?！?Althusser, 1975, p. 167.)（阿爾都塞, 巴里巴爾, 2008, p. 152.）
????????這些“生產(chǎn)過程中的職能”由生產(chǎn)中的物質(zhì)和技術(shù)條件決定。
????????“因此，勞動過程就是人類的勞動力按照相應(yīng)的（技術(shù)）規(guī)則，使用一定的勞動工具把勞動對象（原材料，已經(jīng)加工過的材料或未加工過的原料）加工成有用產(chǎn)品時的耗費……作為物質(zhì)機制的勞動過程，是由自然和工藝的物質(zhì)規(guī)律來支配的。”(Althusser, 1975, p. 170-1.) （阿爾都塞, 巴里巴爾, 2008, p. 155.）
????????雖然這種觀點確實“否定了任何將人類勞動視為純粹創(chuàng)造能力的‘人道主義’概念”，但它并沒有否定（實際上鼓勵了）對馬克思的技術(shù)主義解讀而具有潛在的災(zāi)難性政治意義。
????????對我們對馬克思的價值理論的分析來說更為重要的是，由于技術(shù)主義解讀的對象是將各個個體分配到生產(chǎn)過程中預(yù)先給定的場所或職能的分配過程，因此其往往會重新引入勞動價值理論(the labour theory of value)，盡管其形式更復(fù)雜，且因果關(guān)系相互交錯。勞動時間不僅僅被視為交換價值的決定因素；交換價值也被視為勞動時間的決定因素。也就是說，交換價值都處于均衡狀態(tài)且等于體現(xiàn)在商品中的社會必要勞動時間；而且在不同商品上的總勞動時間分配情況由不同商品之間的市場價格和要求的相對勞動時間之差調(diào)節(jié)。魯賓對這一過程的解釋實際上與斯威齊相同。(見Rubin, 1973, 第8、9、10章; Sweezy, 1962, 第2、3章.) （保羅?斯威齊，2016，第2、3章.）
????????“在一個簡單商品經(jīng)濟中，一個生產(chǎn)部門，例如制鞋部門的10小時勞動與另一個部門例如制衣部門的8小時勞動的產(chǎn)品相交換，必然會導(dǎo)致（如果制鞋和制衣使用的勞動力復(fù)雜程度相當(dāng)）兩個部門生產(chǎn)的收益不同，以及勞動力從制鞋部門向制衣部門轉(zhuǎn)移。”(Rubin, 1973, p. 103.)
????????不同之處在于斯威齊明確承認(rèn)了這種觀點的出處是《國富論》，但魯賓聲稱他沒有重復(fù)“亞當(dāng)?斯密的錯誤”。(Rubin, 1973, p. 167.)他聲稱他的不同之處在于他證明了“收益相等”是由一個客觀的社會過程來強制執(zhí)行的，這個社會過程強迫個人以這種方式行動。但這種觀點站不住腳。并不存在這樣一個社會壓力使一個使用自己和家庭勞動力而非雇傭勞動的簡單商品生產(chǎn)者比較不同生產(chǎn)部門每小時勞動的報酬差異。（關(guān)于小農(nóng)經(jīng)濟案例的討論，參見Banaji, 1977, p. 32.）只有資本家才會被迫計算生產(chǎn)中耗費的勞動時間，因為他們總是在與其他資本家在勞動市場（以及其他所有市場）上競爭。但資本家是以貨幣計算的成本，而不是直接用勞動時間與市場價格相比較，因為他們計算的不是自己的勞動時間。(5)
????????魯賓的觀點與斯威齊稍有不同，前者并沒有將價值視為生產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域中形成的一個范疇，而斯威齊則相反。但這一點僅僅意味著在魯賓的分析中，價值和交換價值之間的關(guān)系被模糊了，而在斯威齊（以及米克、多布等人）的分析中，則是價值和勞動時間的關(guān)系被模糊了。這四位學(xué)者的共同點是將馬克思著作中的三個范疇（勞動時間、價值和交換價值）簡化為兩個。魯賓認(rèn)為價值是
????????“市場價格波動的中心且所有價格都與之重合的平均水平，如果社會勞動在生產(chǎn)部門之間按比例分配的話。”(Rubin, 1973, p. 64)
????????因此，它只是一個流通中形成的范疇，且交換價值和價值之間并不存在系統(tǒng)性的區(qū)別。(6)
????????斯威齊、多布和米克（以及他們所代表的傳統(tǒng)）認(rèn)為價值是勞動時間；例如，
????????“馬克思一開始將商品的價值定義為從始至終為生產(chǎn)它所普遍需要的勞動總量。” (Meek, 1977, p. 95)
????????因此，其只是生產(chǎn)中形成的一個范疇。
????????不過魯賓也與他們贊同這樣一個相同的觀點，即生產(chǎn)是一個相對獨立的過程，在這一過程中可以發(fā)現(xiàn)具有最終決定作用的“獨立變量”。
????????“……改變整個價值體系的動力來源于物質(zhì)—技術(shù)生產(chǎn)過程。勞動生產(chǎn)力的增長表現(xiàn)為生產(chǎn)中投入的具體勞動平均數(shù)量的減少。由于勞動作為具體勞動和抽象勞動的雙重性，因此，這種被視為‘社會’或‘抽象’的勞動數(shù)量，作為社會總同質(zhì)勞動的一部分減少了。勞動生產(chǎn)力的提高改變了生產(chǎn)所需的抽象勞動的數(shù)量，它引起了勞動產(chǎn)品價值的改變。產(chǎn)品價值的改變反過來影響力社會勞動在各生產(chǎn)部門的分配。勞動生產(chǎn)力——抽象勞動——價值——社會勞動分配：這就是商品經(jīng)濟的機制?！?Rubin, 1973, p. 66.)
????????因此，魯賓依然站在勞動價值理論(the labour theory of value)的立場上。這一理論的對象依然處于循環(huán)論證過程中——它只是擴大到了包括勞動時間以及勞動產(chǎn)品的流通上了。
????????
????????6.人類勞動的不固定性(7)
????????但是，如果馬克思的價值理論并不是以勞動的流動（或分配）作為對象，來填補給定生產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)的空缺，那么它的對象是什么？ 有人嘗試將其解釋為生產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)的決定與該結(jié)構(gòu)中勞動分配。但這仍然是一個過于機械、過于結(jié)構(gòu)化的隱喻。馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)批判大綱》中有一段生動的描寫：
????????“勞動是活的、造形的火；是物的易逝性，物的暫時性，這種易逝性和暫時性表現(xiàn)為這些物通過活的時間而被賦予形式?！?Op. cit., p. 361.)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第329頁）
????????勞動是流動的，也是一種潛能，在任何社會中，都必須由特定的人以特定的方式在特定物品的生產(chǎn)中社會性地“固定”或?qū)ο蠡?。人類在生物學(xué)上并沒有被預(yù)先設(shè)計來進(jìn)行特定的活動。與螞蟻和蜜蜂不同，人類社會中存在著各種各樣的職業(yè)，任何人都有可能從事其中任何一種。正如Braverman所說，
????????“人類勞動擺脫了由動物本能支配的刻板軌道，變成了不確定的東西” (Braverman, 1974, p. 51.)（《勞動與壟斷資本》，哈里·布雷德曼，商務(wù)印書館，1978年，第48頁）
????????勞動的流動性不僅僅是不斷發(fā)展的工業(yè)經(jīng)濟的一個特征：人類勞動在任何社會形態(tài)中都是流動的，因此需要確定。但是，只有隨著工業(yè)化發(fā)展，勞動的流動性才會直接顯現(xiàn)出來，因為個人從事的職業(yè)顯然并非完全由“傳統(tǒng)”、宗教、家庭關(guān)系等等因素決定[3]，而且人們確實經(jīng)常更換他們所從事的工作。正如馬克思所說：
????????“……一看就知道，在我們資本主義社會里，隨著勞動需求方向的改變，總有一定部分的人類勞動時而采取縫的形式，時而采取織的形式。勞動形式發(fā)生這種變換時不可能沒有摩擦，但這種變換是必定要發(fā)生的?！?Capital, I, p. 134.)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第57頁）
????????Arthur承認(rèn)“在發(fā)達(dá)的工業(yè)經(jīng)濟中，社會勞動作為一種生產(chǎn)力，其在表現(xiàn)形式上具有流動性”(Arthur, 1978, p.89.)；但由于他沒能區(qū)分表現(xiàn)形式與本質(zhì)，因此他將這種流動性，這種對確定勞動的要求局限于資本主義經(jīng)濟中。在前資本主義社會中，人類勞動本質(zhì)上的不固定性并不顯而易見，但這并不意味著它不存在。
????????因此，根本問題是，所有社會中的人類勞動是如何確定的？當(dāng)然，這里提到的“確定”并不意味著否定個體對其職業(yè)所具有的選擇權(quán)。它指的是這樣一個事實，即個人不能隨意做出選擇，他們不能從零開始重新創(chuàng)造世界，而必須從提供給他們的可選方案中選擇。[4]正如幾位學(xué)者所指出的，馬克思的確定范疇不是“決定性的”。（例如，見Oilman, 1976, p. 17; Thompson 1978, p. 241-242.）盡管馬克思強調(diào)，確定永遠(yuǎn)不能僅僅是個人意志的行使，但他也強調(diào)，確定并不獨立于個人的行動，也不完全在個人行動之外：
????????“社會結(jié)構(gòu)和國家經(jīng)常是從一定個人的生活過程中產(chǎn)生的?！保ā兜乱庵疽庾R形態(tài)》，p. 46.）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第5卷，未出版；《馬克思恩格斯全集》第一版第3卷第29頁）
????????但是
????????“這里所說的個人不是他們自己或別人想像中的那種個人，而是現(xiàn)實中的個人，也就是說，這些個人是從事活動的，進(jìn)行物質(zhì)生產(chǎn)的，因而是在一定的物質(zhì)的、不受他們?nèi)我庵涞慕缦?、前提和條件下能動地表現(xiàn)自己的?！?（同上，p. 47.）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第5卷，未出版；《馬克思恩格斯全集》第一版第3卷第29頁）
????????社會勞動的分配并不是對這個確定過程的一個合適描述，因為這種分配總是從某種預(yù)先給定的、固定的、確定的結(jié)構(gòu)開始，這種結(jié)構(gòu)被置于社會確定過程之外。我們所需要的是從不固定到確定的社會確定過程的概念化；從可能性到實際性；從無形到有形。《資本論》就在試圖提供這一點。它使用了一種馬克思自己的研究方法論，他聲稱這種方法論在過去從來沒有人在經(jīng)濟學(xué)科上應(yīng)用過（法文版前言，Capital, I, p. 104.）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第43卷第13頁），此后也沒有得到太多應(yīng)用。我認(rèn)為，對馬克思價值理論的誤讀在很大程度上是由于在理解馬克思的方法論時面臨的困難。下一節(jié)將更詳盡地分析馬克思的方法論，并將其與“勞動價值理論”(“the labour theory of value”)的傳統(tǒng)解讀作比較。
????????當(dāng)然，《資本論》是從很多年前就已經(jīng)開始的在社會勞動確定方面著作的頂峰。我不會討論《資本論》中價值理論的形成。我只是注意到，馬克思的許多早期文本都極度含糊，很有可能是因為在研究勞動所采取的社會形式時，馬克思從政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)的問題起步。他對這一問題的部分轉(zhuǎn)變是通過理解哪些政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)問題是馬克思自己所關(guān)注的，而不是李嘉圖和斯密所關(guān)注的，特別是對價值實體的關(guān)注來實現(xiàn)的。（見Aumeeruddy and Tortajada, 本卷, p. 11-12.)）在一些文本中，我們可以同時發(fā)現(xiàn)有關(guān)于“勞動價值理論”(“l(fā)abour theory of value”)和“勞動的價值理論”(“a value theory of labour”)的要素。甚至在1859年出版的《政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)批判》中也存在這種現(xiàn)象，這比《資本論》第一卷早了八年。在這篇文本中，價值與交換價值之間，內(nèi)在聯(lián)系與其表現(xiàn)形式之間并沒有清晰地區(qū)分，而這一區(qū)分在《資本論》的論點中起著重要作用，我們可以在《剩余價值理論》的評注中看出其成熟形式，尤其是在第三部分的批判貝利的部分中可以看出。因此，本文將重點關(guān)注《資本論》中的價值理論，必要時補充《剩余價值理論》中的解釋，以及在少數(shù)與貨幣有關(guān)的情形中，補充《政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)批判》中的解釋。
????????
????????注釋：
????????[3]一個明顯的例外是性別分工。這種情況是由“自然”的生物性因素決定的，且尚未完全消失。
????????[4]在選擇理論的技術(shù)分析中，單個個體在選擇集內(nèi)進(jìn)行選擇，但不選擇選擇集本身。誰選擇選擇集的問題，或者更嚴(yán)格地說，選擇集如何解釋則是一個更嚴(yán)重的問題，這一問題通常被選擇邏輯的擁護(hù)者們假定不存在。
????????
????????譯者注：
????????(5)魯賓可能如傳統(tǒng)馬克思主義理論的觀點一樣將簡單商品經(jīng)濟視為一個與資本主義商品經(jīng)濟不同的前資本主義經(jīng)濟，但又沒能正確區(qū)分這兩者，這導(dǎo)致魯賓將商品交換視為資本主義的本質(zhì)性特征，從而忽視了資本主義真正的本質(zhì)性特征，進(jìn)而引發(fā)了一系列混亂和錯誤。
????????(6)魯賓因此被批判：抽象勞動只能產(chǎn)生于交換活動，進(jìn)而價值也只能產(chǎn)生于交換活動，如果商品出售失敗就意味著勞動沒能生產(chǎn)出價值。（而在傳統(tǒng)馬克思主義理論中，價值生產(chǎn)是在生產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域中進(jìn)行的，而價值實現(xiàn)則是在流通領(lǐng)域中進(jìn)行的，出售失敗僅僅意味著價值未能實現(xiàn)，但若使用價值并沒有消滅，價值并不會因為出售失敗而消失。）他試圖補救這一點，但就結(jié)果而言并沒有成功。這是因為他將商品交換視為資本主義的本質(zhì)性特征，進(jìn)而將資本主義生產(chǎn)關(guān)系也視為簡單的價值關(guān)系，與簡單商品生產(chǎn)并無本質(zhì)不同。魯賓雖然如傳統(tǒng)馬克思主義理論那樣將簡單商品經(jīng)濟與資本主義經(jīng)濟區(qū)分開，但他沒能像傳統(tǒng)馬克思主義理論一樣把握住這兩者的區(qū)別，因此他實際上是一直在簡單商品經(jīng)濟的背景下分析價值。最終，魯賓雖然對傳統(tǒng)馬克思主義理論的非歷史性方面進(jìn)行了正確的批判，但他并沒能發(fā)展出一套能夠幫助我們正確理解資本主義的完整理論。盡管如此，魯賓的理論依然非常富有啟發(fā)性，經(jīng)過改進(jìn)（去除其中的一些“黑格爾”特征）并與其他一些理論的結(jié)合后依然是一個非常有吸引力和說服力的理論。（不過我依然覺得新解NI看起來有點蠢）
????????(7)在這一小節(jié)中，據(jù)我理解，“不固定性”(indeterminateness)、“不固定”(indeterminate)、“確定”(determination)、“確定”(determinate)、“決定性的”(deterministic)雖然具有相同的詞根，但其含義的方面并不相同。人類勞動具有流動性，即可以根據(jù)個人意愿，在一定程度上從一個工作轉(zhuǎn)移至另一個工作上，因此人類勞動并不像螞蟻、蜜蜂一樣被事先“固定”或“決定”。但又因為人類勞動具有流動性，所以人類勞動總要被“確定”在某一特定工作上，因此產(chǎn)生了“固定”、“決定”和“確定”之間的區(qū)別。
????????
????????參考文獻(xiàn)
????????阿爾都塞, 巴里巴爾. (2008). 讀《資本論》. 中央編譯出版社.
????????保羅?斯威齊. (2016). 資本主義發(fā)展論. 商務(wù)印書館.
????????揚?斯蒂德曼. (1991). 按照斯拉法思想研究馬克思. 商務(wù)印書館.
????????伊恩?斯蒂德曼和保羅?斯威齊等. (2016). 價值問題的論戰(zhàn). 商務(wù)印書館.
????????Althusser, L (1975), Reading Capital, New Left Books, London.
????????Althusser, L (1977), Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, New Left Books, London.
????????Arthur, C J (1978), 'Labour: Marx's Concrete Universal', Inquiry, No. 2.
????????Aumeeruddy, A and Tortajada, R (1979), 'Reading Marx on Value: A Note on the Basic Texts' in Elson, D (ed.) op. cit.
????????Banaji, J (1976), 'Marx, Ricardo and the Theory of the Value-Form. Prelude to a Critique of Positive Marxism , Marxistisk Antropologi, 2,2-3.
????????Banaji, J (1977), 'Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History, Capital & Class, No. 3.
????????Braverman, H (1974), Labour and Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press, New York and London.
????????Himmelweit, S and Mohun, S (1978), 'The Anomalies of Capital', Capital & Class No. 6.
????????Hussain, A (1979), 'Misreading Marx's Theory of Value: Marx's Marginal Notes on Wagner', in Elson, D (ed.), op. cit.
????????Kay, G (1979), 'Why Labour is the starting point of Capital', in Elson, D (ed.), op. cit.
????????Marx, K (1969-72), Theories of Surplus Value, Parts One, Two and Three, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
????????Marx, K (1973), Grundrisse, translated by M Nicolaus, Penguin Books, London.
????????Marx, K (1973), 1857 Introduction, included in Grundrisse, pp. 83-111, Penguin Books, London.
????????Marx, K (1974), Capital, translated by Moore and Aveling in three volumes, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
????????Marx, K (1915), Early Writings, Penguin Books, London.
????????Marx, K (1976), Capital, Vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes, Penguin Books, London.
????????Marx, K and Engels, F (n.d.), Selected Correspondence, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.
????????Marx, K and Engels, F (1974), The German Ideology, Lawrence and Wishart, London.?
????????Meek, R L (1977), Smith, Marx and After, Chapman and Hall, London.
????????Oilman, B (1976), Alienation (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.?
????????Pilling, G (1972), "The Law of Value in Ricardo and Marx', Economy and Society, Vol I, No. 3.
????????Rubin, II (1973), Essays on Marx's Theory of Value, Black Rose Books, Montreal.
????????Steedman, I (1977),Marx after Sraffa, New Left Books, London.
????????Sweezy, P (1962), The Theory of Capitalist Development, Dennis Dobson Ltd, London.
????????Thompson, E P (1978), The Poverty of Theory, Merlin Press, London.
????????3. An abstract labour theory of value?
????????It is, of course, by no means original to question whether the 'labour theory of value' discussed in the last section is to be found in the works of Marx, (see for instance Pilling, 1972; Banaji, 1976). In recent CSE debates much stress has been placed on abstract labour as a means of differentiating Marx's theory of value from the interpretations so far discussed which are held to apply to Ricardo rather than to Marx. Marx certainly claims that his theory of value differes from that of Ricardo in the attention he pays to the form of labour, and the distinction he introduces between abstract labour and concrete labour. (See for instance, Theories of Surplus Value, Part 2, p. 164, 172.) In Capital we are told that the author,
????????Svas the first to point out and examine critically this two-fold nature of labour contained in commodities... this point is crucial to an understanding of political economy.' (Capital, I, p. 132.)
????????This point is taken up by Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978, who base their reply to Steedman, 1977, on
????????'a distinction between Ricardian embodied-labour theory of value and a Marxian theory of value based on the category of abstract labour. While the former is intended immediately to be a theory of price, the latter is only so after several mediations.' (op. cit., p. 94.)
????????They suggest that if we bear this distinction in mind, we shall find that the allegations of redundancy and incoherence, while they apply to Ricardo's theory of value, cannot be sustained for that of Marx.
????????Their argument is not altogether convincing for two reasons. The first is that Steedman claims to have treated labour as abstract labour and to direct his critique precisely at an abstract labour theory of value (see Steedman, 1977, p. 19), and Himmelweit and Mohun nowhere explicitly confront this claim. Clearly much depends on how the concept of abstract labour is understood. Sweezy, for instance, sees in the concept of abstract labour not an alternative to the concepts of Ricardo and Smith, but a further development and clarification of their work. (Sweezy, 1962, p. 31.) Marx himself did not tend to use 'embodied labour' and 'abstract labour' as if they were opposites, stating for instance that,
????????'The body of the commodity, which serves as the equivalent, always figures as the embodiment of abstract human labour,' (Capital ,1, p. 150.)
????????The second reason is that their argument becomes circular: they derive the concept of abstract labour from the commodity form, and then wish to use the concept of abstract labour to explain the commodity form (op. cit., p. 73).
????????In my view the distinction between abstract and concrete labour is an important differentiation between Marx's and Ricardo's theories, but it is not the only differentiation. More fundamental are differences in the object of the theory and the method of analysis. The clarification of these is required before the meaning and significance of the concept of abstract labour becomes apparent.
????????
????????4. Labour as the object of Marx's theory of value
????????My argument will be, not that Marx's value theory of price is more complex than Ricardo's, but that the object of Marx's theory of value is not price at all. This does not mean that Marx was not concerned with price, nor its relation to the magnitude of value, but that the phenomena of exchange are not the object of the theory. (Again this is not a completely new thought, see Hussain, this volume, p. 84.) My argument is that the object of Marx's theory of value was labour. It is not a matter of seeking an explanation of why prices are what they are and finding it in labour. But rather of seeking an inderstanding of why labour takes the forms it does, and what the political consequences are.
????????We can see Marx focusing on this question in his first intensive study of Adam Smith ('Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in Early Writings, esp. p. 287-9). The German Ideology is a sustained argument for the centrality of this question:
????????'As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce.' (Op. cit., p. 42.)
????????And in Capital, Marx notes the critical question that separates the direction of his analysis from that of political economy as:
????????Svhy this content has assumed that particular form, that is to say why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product. These formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite, appear to the political economists' bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself.' (Capital, I, p. 174-5.)
????????Here Marx is signaEing, not an 'addition of historical perspective' to political economy, but a difference in the object of the theory, (see also Hussain, this volume, p. 86). It is because labour is the object of the theory that Marx begins his analysis with produced commodities, as being 'the simplest social form in which the labour product is represented in contemporary society.' (Marginal Notes on Wagner, p. 50); and not, as Bohm-Bawerk claimed, to rig the terms of the explanation of prices (see also Kay, this volume, p. 48-50).
????????
????????5. A possible misconception: the social distribution of labour
????????The question of why labour takes the forms it does is not simply a distributional question. Here the famous letter to Kugelmann in July 1868 can be very misleading, for Marx writes:
????????'the mass of products corresponding to the different needs require different and quantitatively determined masses of the total labour of society. That this necessity of distributing social labour in definite proportions cannot be done away with by the particular form of social production, but can only change the form it assumes, is self evident. No natural laws can be done away with. What can change in changing historical circumstances, is the form in which these laws operate.' (Selected Correspondence, p. 251.)
????????Taken by itself, this letter can lend support to the view that the object of the theory is simply the way in which individuals are distributed and linked together in a pre-given structure of tasks. This view is held by a wide spectrum of writers from the 'Hegelian' I. I. Rubin to the 'anti-Hegelian' Althusser.
????????For Rubin the theory of value is about the regulation of production in a commodity economy, where 'no one consciously supports or regulates the distribution of social labour among the various industrial branches to correspond with the given state of productive forces.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 77.) From the beginning of his book, Rubin makes it quite clear that the productive forces which constitute the various industrial branches are autonomous products of a material-technical process (Rubin, 1973, p. 1-3). What for him is social is merely the network of links between people in this pre-given structure:
????????'It is also incorrect to view Marx's theory as an analysis of relations between labour and things, things which are the products of labour. The relation of labour to things refers to a given concrete form of labour and a given concrete thing. This is a technical relation which is not, in itself, the subject of the theory of value. The subject matter of the theory of value is the interrelations of various forms of labour in the process of their distribution, which is established through the relation of exchange among things, i.e. products of labour.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 67).
????????But it is the pre-given structure which has ultimate causal significance:
????????'We can observe that social production relations among people are causally dependent on the material conditions of production and on the distribution of the technical means of production among the different social groups . . . From the point of view of the theory of historical materialism, this is a general sociological law which holds for all social formations.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 29.)
????????Clearly there are many differences between Rubin's reading of Marx and that of Althusser, but the latter also invokes the letter to Kugelmann, and writes:
????????'Marx's labour theory of value . . . is intelligible, but only as a special case of a theory which Marx and Engels called the law of value' or the law of the distribution of the available labour power between the various branches of production . . . ' (Althusser, 1977, p. 87.)
????????or,
????????'the distribution of men into social classes exercising functions in the production process'. (Althusser, 1975, p. 167.)
????????These 'functions in the production process' are determined by the material and technical conditions of production.
????????The labour process therefore implies an expenditure of the labour-power of men who, using defined instruments of labour according to adequate (technical) rules, transform the object of labour (either a natural material or an already worked material or raw material) into a useful product. . . the labour process as a material mechanism is dominated by the physical laws of nature and technology.' (Althusser, 1975, p. 170-1.)
????????While it is true that such a thesis is 'a denial of every 'humanist' conception of human labour as pure creativity', it is not a denial of, (indeed it positively encourages) a technieist reading of Marx, with potentially disastrous political implications.
????????What is more immediately important for our consideration of Marx's theory of value is that the technicist reading of the theory, as having as its object the process of distribution of individuals to pregiven places or functions in the production process, tends to lead to a re-introduction of the labour theory of value, albeit in more complex form with reciprocal causality. Not only is labour-time seen as the determinant of exchange-value; exchange-value is also seen as the determinant of labour-time. That is, exchange-values are in equilibrium equal to socially necessary labour-time embodied in commodities; and the distribution of total labour-time between different commodities is regulated by the difference between market price and relative labour-time requirements of different commodities. Rubin in fact presents an exposition of the way in which this works which is practically the same as that of Sweezy. (See Rubin, 1973, chapters 8, 9 and 10; Sweezy, 1962, chapters II and III.)
????????'In a simple commodity economy, the exchange of 10 hours of labour in one branch of production, for example shoe-making, for the product of 8 hours labour in another branch, for example clothing production, necessarily leads (if the shoe-maker and clothes-maker are equally qualified) to different advantages of production in the two branches, and to the transfer of labour from shoe-making to clothing production.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 103.)
????????The difference is that while Sweezy explicitly acknowledges the provenance of this type of argument in The Wealth of Nations, Rubin claims that he has not repeated 'the mistakes of Adam Smith'. (Rubin, 1973, p. 167.) He claims to differ from Smith in showing that the 'equalisation of advantage' is enforced by an objective social process which compels individuals to behave in this way. But this argument is invalid. There is no social pressure on a simple commodity producer who uses his own or his family's labour (but not hired labour) to compare the different rewards of an hour of labour in different branches of production. (See Banaji, 1977, p. 32 for discussion in the case of peasant agriculture.) It is only capitalists who are forced to account for all labour-time spent in production because they are in competition with other capitalists in the labour market (and all other markets). But capitalists make their calculations in money terms, not by a direct comparison of labour-time with market price, because it is not their own labour-time that they are accounting for.
????????There is some difference between Rubin's position and Sweezy's position, insofar as the former does not pose value as a category of the production process, whereas the latter does. But this simply means that in Rubin it is the relation between value and exchange-value which is obscured, while in Sweezy (and Meek, Dobb etc.) it is the relation between value and labour-time. What all four authors have in common is a tendency to reduce the categories of the analysis from the three found in Marx's writings (labour-time, value and exchange-value) to two. Rubin identifies value with
????????'that average level around which market prices fluctuate and with which prices would coincide if social labour were proportionately distributed among the various branches of production'. (Rubin, 1973, p. 64);
????????and thus poses it simply as a category of circulation, and has no systematic distinction between exchange value and value.?
????????Sweezy, Dobb, Meek (and the tradition they represent) identify value with labour-time; for example,
????????'Marx began by defining the Value' of a commodity as the total quantity of labour which was normally required from first to last to produce it.' (Meek, 1977, p. 95);
????????and thus pose it simply as a category of production.
????????Rubin also shares the view that production is a discretely distinct process in which are to be found the 'independent variables' which are of ultimate causal significance.
????????' . . . the moving force which transforms the entire system of value originates in the material-technical process of production. The increase of productivity of labour is expressed in a decrease in the quantity of concrete labour which is factually used up in production, on the average. As a result of this (because of the dual character of labour as concrete and abstract), the quantity of this labour, which is considered 'social' or 'abstract', i.e. as a share of the total, homogeneous labour of the society, decreases. The increase of productivity of labour changes the quantity of abstract labour necessary for production. It causes a change in the value of the products of labour. A change in the value of products in turn affects the distribution of social labour among the various branches of production. Productivity of labour - abstract labour-value -distribution of social labour: this is the scheme of a commodity economy.' (Rubin, 1973, p. 66.)
????????Thus Rubin is still on the terrain of the labour theory of value. The object of the theory is still located in the process of circulation—it has simply been widened to include the circulation of labour time as well as of the products of labour.
????????
????????6. The indeterminateness of human labour
????????But if Marx's theory of value does not have as its object the circulation (or distribution) of labour so as to fill the slots in a pre-given structure of production, what is its object? One way of trying to explain would be to say that it is about the determination of the structure of production as well as the distribution of labour in that structure. But that is still far too mechanical, too structural a metaphor. In a vivid passage in the Grundrisse, Marx describes labour thus:
????????'Labour is the living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things, their temporality, as their formation by living time.' (Op. cit., p. 361.)
????????It is a fluidity, a potential, which in any society has to be socially 'fixed' or objectified in the production of particular goods, by particular people in particular ways. Human beings are not preprogrammed biologically to perform particular tasks. Unlike ants or bees, there is a potentially vast range in the tasks that any human being can undertake. As Braverman puts it,
????????'Freed from the rigid paths dictated in animals by instinct, human labour becomes indeterminate.' (Braverman, 1974, p. 51).
????????This fluidity of labour is not simply an attribute of growing industrial economies: human labour is fluid, requiring determination, in all states of society. But it is true that only with industrialisation does the fluidity of labour become immediately apparent, because the jobs that individuals do are obviously not completely determined by 'tradition', religion, family ties etc.,3 and individuals do quite frequently change the job they do. As Marx put it:
????????' . . . We can see at a glance that in our capitalist society a given portion of labour is supplied alternatively in the form of tailoring and in the form of weaving, in accordance with changes in the direction of the demand for labour. This change in the form of labour may well not take place without friction, but it must take place.' (Capital, I, p. 134.)
????????Arthur, 1978, recognises that 'in a developed industrial economy social labour, as a productive force, has a fluidity in its forms of appearance' (op. cit. p. 89); but because he fails to distinguish between essence and forms of appearance, he limits this fluidity, this requirement for determination, to capitalist economies. The fact that the essential indeterminateness of human labour is not immediately apparent in pre-capitalist societies does not mean that it does not exist.
????????So the fundamental question about human labour in all societies is, how is it determined? To speak of 'determination' here does not, of course, mean the denial of any choice on the part of individuals about their work. Rather it is to point to the fact that individuals can't just choose anything, are unable to re-invent the world from scratch, but must choose from among alternatives presented to them.4 As several authors pointed out, Marx's concept of determination is not 'deterministic'. (See for instance, Oilman, 1976, p. 17; Thompson 1978, p. 241-242.) Although Marx stresses that determination can never be simply an exercise of individual wills, he also stresses that it is not independent of and completely exterior to the actions of individuals:
????????"The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life process of definite individuals.' (German Ideology, p. 46.)
????????But
????????'of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, pre-suppositions and conditions independent of their will'. (German Ideology, p. 47.)
????????Distribution of social labour is not an adequate metaphor for this process of determination, because such distribution always begins from some pre-given, fixed, determinate structure, which is placed outside the process of social determination. What is required is a conceptualisation of a process of social determination that proceeds from the indeterminate to the determinate; from the potential to the actual; from the formless to the formed. Capital is an attempt to provide just that. It uses a method of investigation which is peculiarly Marx's own, a method which he claimed had not previously been applied to economic subjects (Preface to French Edition, Capital, I, p. 104), and which has not been much applied since. I think that it is in large part the difficulties of understanding this method which have lead to misreadings of Marx's theory of value. The next section considers this method in some detail, and contrasts it with the method of 'the labour theory of value' as traditionally understood.
????????Capital is, of course, the culmination of work on the social determination of labour that began many years before, and went through various phases. I shall not be discussing the formation of the theory of value presented in Capital. I merely note that many of Marx's earlier texts are extremely ambiguous, probably because in investigating the social form that labour takes, Marx began from the problematic of political economy. Part of his transformation of this problematic was carried out by reading into the texts of political economy concerns which were those of Marx, rather than of Ricardo, Smith etc., in particular the concern to locate the substance of value. (See Aumeeruddy and Tortajada, this volume, p. 11-12.) In some texts we may find elements of both a "labour theory of value' and a Value theory of labour'. There are symptoms of this even in Critique of Political Economy, published in 1859, eight years before the first volume of Capital. In this text there is no clear distinction between value and exchange-value, between the inner relation and its form of appearance, a distinction which plays an important role in the argument of Capital, and which one can see being developed in the commentaries of Theories of Surplus Value, particularly in the critique of Bailey in Part 3. Accordingly, this paper will focus on the theory of value as it appears in Capital, supplementing this where necessary with clarifications deriving from Theories of Surplus Value, and, in a few cases relating to money, from Critique of Political Economy.
