Journal of Labor Economics 2023年第2期

Volume 41, Number 2, April 2023

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——更多動態(tài)，請持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨

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How Much Should We Trust Estimates of Firm Effects and Worker Sorting?

我們應(yīng)該在多大程度上相信企業(yè)效應(yīng)和工人排序的估計?

Stéphane?Bonhomme,Kerstin?Holzheu,Thibaut?Lamadon,Elena?Manresa,Magne?Mogstad,Bradley?Setzler

Many studies use matched employer-employee data to estimate a statistical model of earnings determination with worker and firm fixed effects. Estimates based on this model have produced influential yet controversial conclusions. The objective of this paper is to assess the sensitivity of these conclusions to the biases that arise because of limited mobility of workers across firms. We use employer-employee data from the United States and several European countries while taking advantage of both fixed effects and random effects methods for bias correction. We find that limited mobility bias is severe and that bias correction is important.

許多研究使用匹配的雇主-雇員數(shù)據(jù)來估計具有工人和企業(yè)固定效應(yīng)的收入決定的統(tǒng)計模型?；谶@一模型的估計產(chǎn)生了有影響力但有爭議的結(jié)論。本文的目的是評估這些結(jié)論對由于公司間工人流動性有限而產(chǎn)生的偏見的敏感性。我們使用來自美國和幾個歐洲國家的雇主-雇員數(shù)據(jù)，同時利用固定效應(yīng)和隨機效應(yīng)方法進(jìn)行偏差校正。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)有限移動偏差是嚴(yán)重的，偏差糾正是重要的。

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Network Connections and Board Seats: Are Female Networks Less Valuable?

人脈和董事會席位:女性人脈的價值降低了嗎?

Emma?von Essen?and

Nina?Smith

We investigate how sizes of professional networks affect the probability of appointment to a supervisory board and whether the effect is gendered. Using an employer-employee data set of the Danish labor market, 1995–2011, we find larger networks to associate with a higher probability of becoming a first-time director. The effect is larger for men. One explanation is that men, compared with women, have more connections to larger and listed firms and to other males—attributes that increase the appointment probability. Women who have connections to incumbent directors before being appointed director have more labor market experience than other directors.

我們研究了職業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的規(guī)模如何影響監(jiān)事會任命的概率，以及這種影響是否存在性別差異。使用1995-2011年丹麥勞動力市場的雇主-雇員數(shù)據(jù)集，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，更大的人際網(wǎng)絡(luò)與成為首次董事的更高概率相關(guān)。對男性的影響更大。一種解釋是，與女性相比，男性與更大的上市公司和其他男性有更多的聯(lián)系——這些屬性增加了任命的可能性。在被任命為董事之前與現(xiàn)任董事有關(guān)系的女性比其他董事有更多的勞動力市場經(jīng)驗。

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Labor Market Discrimination against Family Responsibilities: A Correspondence Study with Policy Change in China

勞動力市場對家庭責(zé)任的歧視:與中國政策變化的對應(yīng)研究

Haoran?He,Sherry Xin?Li, andYuling?Han

China shifted its controversial one-child policy (1979–2015) to a two-child policy in 2016. We take advantage of this unexpected policy change and the heterogeneities in the prechange environment to investigate labor market discrimination against expected family responsibilities. In a two-wave correspondence study before and after the policy change, we sent 8,848 fictitious resumes with ages 22–29 in response to online job advertisements. Their gender and only-child/siblinged status were systematically varied. We find that women—but not men—are subject to labor market discrimination for expected family responsibilities. This discrimination worsens with the increase in women’s reproductive age.

2016年，中國將備受爭議的獨生子女政策(1979-2015年)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槎⒄?。我們利用這種意外的政策變化和變化前環(huán)境中的異質(zhì)性來調(diào)查勞動力市場對預(yù)期家庭責(zé)任的歧視。在政策改變前后的兩波通信研究中，我們發(fā)送了8848份年齡在22-29歲之間的虛構(gòu)簡歷來回應(yīng)在線招聘廣告。他們的性別和獨生子女/兄弟姐妹身份有系統(tǒng)的差異。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，女性——而不是男性——在預(yù)期的家庭責(zé)任方面受到勞動力市場的歧視。這種歧視隨著婦女生育年齡的提高而加劇。

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Mothers Working during Preschool Years and Child Skills: Does Income Compensate?

母親在學(xué)齡前工作和孩子的技能:收入補償嗎?

Cheti?Nicoletti,Kjell G.?Salvanes, and Emma?Tominey

Increasing mother’s labor supply during a child’s preschool years may reduce time investments, yielding a negative direct effect on midchildhood and teenage outcomes. But as mother’s work hours increase, income will rise. Can income compensate for the negative effect of hours? Our mediation analysis exploits exogenous variation in both mother’s hours and family income. Results suggest a negative, insignificant direct effect from increasing mother’s hours on child test scores. However, the positive mediating effect of income creates a positive total effect on test scores (26% of a standard deviation) for a 10-hour increase in mother’s weekly hours in preschool years.

在孩子學(xué)齡前增加母親的勞動力供應(yīng)可能會減少時間投資，對兒童中期和青少年的結(jié)果產(chǎn)生負(fù)面的直接影響。但是隨著母親工作時間的增加，收入也會增加。收入能彌補工作時間的負(fù)面影響嗎?我們的中介分析利用了母親工作時間和家庭收入的外生變化。結(jié)果表明，增加母親的工作時間對孩子的考試成績有負(fù)面的、微不足道的直接影響。然而，收入的正向中介效應(yīng)對測試成績產(chǎn)生了正的總效應(yīng)(26%的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差)，在學(xué)齡前，母親每周工作時間增加10小時。

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When the Stadium Goes Silent: How Crowds Affect the Performance of Discriminated Groups

當(dāng)體育場安靜下來:人群如何影響受歧視群體的表現(xiàn)

Mauro?Caselli,Paolo?Falco, and Gianpiero?Mattera

Using a natural experiment induced by COVID-19, we test how the sudden absence of fans at football games impacts player performance in Italy. We find that African players, who are most commonly targeted by racial harassment, play better when fans are no longer at the stadium. A similar, albeit weaker, effect is detected among black players. Using official records of racist behavior by fans, we show that performance improves the most on teams that were subject to abuse before the lockdown. Our evidence suggests that racist pressure can harm discriminated groups and lower the overall quality of the game.

在意大利，我們利用COVID-19引發(fā)的自然實驗，測試了足球比賽中球迷的突然缺席對球員表現(xiàn)的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，最常成為種族騷擾目標(biāo)的非洲球員，在球迷不在球場時表現(xiàn)得更好。在黑人玩家中也發(fā)現(xiàn)了類似的效應(yīng)，盡管效果較弱。通過使用球迷種族主義行為的官方記錄，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在封鎖前遭受辱罵的球隊的表現(xiàn)改善最多。我們的證據(jù)表明，種族主義壓力會傷害受歧視的群體，降低比賽的整體質(zhì)量。

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Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning

工作場所激勵與組織學(xué)習(xí)

Francesco?Amodio?and Miguel A.?Martinez-Carrasco

This paper studies learning among coworkers when incentives change. We use a simple principal-agent model to show that when workers are not fully informed on the global shape of the production function, (1) their effort choice changes over time as information is disclosed and processed and (2) changing incentives can trigger this learning process. We test this prediction using personnel data from an egg production plant in Peru. Exploiting a sudden change in the contract parameters, we find that workers learn from each other over the shape of the production function. This adjustment process is costly for the firm.

本文研究了激勵機制變化時同事間的學(xué)習(xí)行為。我們使用一個簡單的委托-代理模型來證明，當(dāng)工人不完全了解生產(chǎn)函數(shù)的整體形狀時，(1)他們的努力選擇隨著信息的披露和處理而隨時間變化，(2)不斷變化的激勵機制可以觸發(fā)這一學(xué)習(xí)過程。我們使用秘魯一家雞蛋生產(chǎn)廠的人員數(shù)據(jù)來驗證這一預(yù)測。利用契約參數(shù)的突然變化，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)工人們在生產(chǎn)函數(shù)的形狀上相互學(xué)習(xí)。這個調(diào)整過程對公司來說代價高昂。

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Optimal Allocation of Seats in the Presence of Peer Effects: Evidence from a Job Training Program

存在同伴效應(yīng)的座位最優(yōu)分配:來自職業(yè)培訓(xùn)計劃的證據(jù)

Matthew D.?Baird,John?Engberg, and Isaac M.?Opper

We model optimal treatment assignment in programs with a limited number of seats and study how the presence of peer effects impacts the optimal allocation rule. We then use data from a randomized control trial to show evidence that there are large peer effects in the context of job training for disadvantaged adults in the United States. Finally, we combine the model and the empirics to show that the program would have had a much greater impact if the assignment choices had accounted for the peer effects.

我們在有限席位的項目中建立了最優(yōu)治療分配模型，并研究了同伴效應(yīng)的存在如何影響最優(yōu)分配規(guī)則。然后，我們使用來自隨機對照試驗的數(shù)據(jù)來證明，在美國弱勢成年人的職業(yè)培訓(xùn)背景下，有很大的同伴效應(yīng)。最后，我們將模型和經(jīng)驗結(jié)合起來，表明如果分配選擇考慮了同伴效應(yīng)，該項目將產(chǎn)生更大的影響。

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Foreign Students in College and the Supply of STEM Graduates

大學(xué)外國留學(xué)生和STEM畢業(yè)生的供應(yīng)

Massimo?Anelli,

Kevin?Shih, and

Kevin?Williams

Do foreign students affect the likelihood that domestic students obtain a STEM degree and occupation? Using administrative student records from a US university, we exploit idiosyncratic variation in the share of foreign classmates in introductory math classes and find that foreign classmates displace domestic students from STEM majors and occupations. However, displaced students gravitate toward high-earning social science majors, so their expected earnings are not penalized. We explore several mechanisms. Results indicate that displacement is concentrated in classes where foreign classmates possess weak English language ability, suggesting that diminished in-class communication and social interactions might play an important role.

外國學(xué)生是否會影響國內(nèi)學(xué)生獲得STEM學(xué)位和職業(yè)的可能性?利用一所美國大學(xué)的行政管理學(xué)生記錄，我們挖掘了外國同學(xué)在數(shù)學(xué)入門課上所占比例的特質(zhì)差異，發(fā)現(xiàn)外國同學(xué)取代了STEM專業(yè)和職業(yè)的國內(nèi)學(xué)生。然而，被淘汰的學(xué)生被吸引到高收入的社會科學(xué)專業(yè)，所以他們的預(yù)期收入不會受到懲罰。我們探索了幾種機制。結(jié)果表明，在外國同學(xué)英語語言能力較弱的班級中，外語學(xué)習(xí)者的外語遷移集中在這些班級，這表明課堂交流和社會互動的減少可能起著重要作用。