The Review of Economic Studies ?2023年第2期

Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023

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——更多動態(tài)，請持續(xù)關注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨

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1.Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable

抵押貸款再融資，消費者支出和競爭:來自家庭負擔得起的證據(jù)

Sumit Agarwal,?Gene Amromin,?Souphala Chomsisengphet,?Tim Landvoigt,?Tomasz Piskorski?...

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 499–537,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac039

We examine the ability of the government to impact mortgage refinancing activity and spur consumption by focusing on the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) that relaxed housing equity constraints by extending government credit guarantee on insufficiently collateralized refinanced mortgages. Difference-in-difference tests based on program eligibility criteria reveal a significant increase in refinancing activity by HARP. More than three million eligible borrowers with primarily fixed-rate mortgages refinanced under HARP, receiving an average reduction of 1.45|$\%$|?in interest rate ($3,000 in annual savings). Durable spending by borrowers increased significantly after refinancing. Regions more exposed to the program saw a relative increase in non-durable and durable consumer spending, a decline in foreclosure rates, and faster recovery in house prices. Competitive frictions in the refinancing market hampered the program’s impact: the take-up rate and annual savings among those who refinanced were reduced by 10–20|$\%$|?, with amplified effects for the most indebted borrowers.

通過聚焦于住房可負擔再融資計劃(HARP)，我們考察了政府影響抵押貸款再融資活動和刺激消費的能力?；陧椖抠Y格標準的雙重差分測試顯示，HARP的再融資活動顯著增加。超過300萬主要以固定利率抵押貸款的合格借款人在HARP下再融資，平均利率下降1.45|$\%$|(每年節(jié)省3000美元)。借款人的耐用支出在再融資后顯著增加。受該計劃影響較大的地區(qū)非耐用品和耐用品消費支出相對增加，止贖率下降，房價更快復蘇。再融資市場的競爭摩擦阻礙了該計劃的影響:再融資者的接受率和年度儲蓄減少了10-20 |$\%$|?，對負債最多的借款人產(chǎn)生了放大效應。

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2.Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing

自愿披露和個性化定價

S Nageeb Ali,?Greg Lewis,?Shoshana Vasserman

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 538–571,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac033

Firms have ever-increasing access to consumer data, which they use to personalize their advertising and to price discriminate. This raises privacy concerns. Policymakers have argued in response that consumers should be given control over their data, able to choose what to share and when. Since firms learn about a consumer’s preferences both from what they do and do not disclose, the equilibrium implications of consumer control are unclear. We study whether such measures improve consumer welfare in monopolistic and in competitive markets. We find that consumer control can improve consumer welfare relative to both perfect price discrimination and uniform pricing. First, consumers can use disclosure to amplify competitive forces. Second, consumers can disclose information to induce even a monopolist to lower prices. Whether consumer control improves welfare depends on the disclosure technology and market competitiveness. Simple disclosure technologies suffice in competitive markets. When facing a monopolist, a consumer needs partial disclosure possibilities to obtain any welfare gains.

企業(yè)獲得消費者數(shù)據(jù)的機會越來越多，它們利用這些數(shù)據(jù)進行個性化廣告和價格歧視。這引起了人們對隱私的擔憂。政策制定者對此的回應是，應該讓消費者控制自己的數(shù)據(jù)，讓他們能夠選擇分享什么以及何時分享。由于企業(yè)通過做什么和不做什么來了解消費者的偏好，消費者控制的均衡含義尚不清楚。我們研究了這些措施是否在壟斷和競爭市場中提高了消費者福利。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，相對于完全差別定價和統(tǒng)一定價，消費者控制能夠提高消費者福利。首先，消費者可以利用信息披露來放大競爭力。第二，消費者可以披露信息，甚至誘導壟斷者降低價格。消費者控制是否提高福利取決于披露技術和市場競爭力。簡單的披露技術在競爭市場上已經(jīng)足夠。當面對壟斷者時，消費者需要部分披露可能性才能獲得任何福利收益。

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3.Market Power in Neoclassical Growth Models

新古典增長模型中的市場勢力

Laurence Ball,?N Gregory Mankiw

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 572–596,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac029

This article examines the optimal accumulation of capital and the effects of government debt in neoclassical growth models in which firms have market power and therefore charge prices above marginal cost. In this environment, the real interest rate earned by savers is less than the net marginal product of capital. We establish a new method for evaluating dynamic efficiency that can be applied in such economies. A plausible calibration suggests that the wedge between the real interest rate and the marginal product of capital is about 4 percentage points and that the US economy is dynamically efficient. In addition, government Ponzi schemes can have different implications for welfare than they do under competition. Even if the government can sustain a perpetual rollover of debt and accumulating interest, the policy may nonetheless reduce welfare by depressing steady-state capital and aggregate consumption. These findings suggest that even with low interest rates, as have been observed recently, fiscal policymakers should still be concerned about the crowding-out effects of government debt.

本文研究了在新古典增長模型中，資本的最優(yōu)積累和政府債務的影響，在這些模型中，企業(yè)擁有市場力量，因此收費價格高于邊際成本。在這種環(huán)境下，儲蓄者賺取的實際利率低于資本的凈邊際產(chǎn)出。我們建立了一種新的動態(tài)效率評估方法，可用于此類經(jīng)濟體。一個合理的校準表明，實際利率與資本邊際產(chǎn)出之間的差距約為4個百分點，而美國經(jīng)濟是動態(tài)高效的。此外，政府的龐氏騙局對福利的影響可能與它們在競爭中的影響不同。即使政府能夠維持永久的債務展期和不斷累積的利息，該政策仍可能通過抑制穩(wěn)態(tài)資本和總消費而降低福利。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，即使像最近觀察到的那樣，在低利率的情況下，財政政策制定者仍然應該擔心政府債務的擠出效應。

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4.Estimating the Costs of Standardization: Evidence from the Movie Industry

估計標準化的成本:來自電影行業(yè)的證據(jù)

El Hadi Caoui

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 597–633,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac036

This article studies the decentralized adoption of a technology standard when network effects are present. If the new standard is incompatible with the current installed base, adoption may be inefficiently delayed. I quantify the magnitude of “excess inertia” in the switch of the movie distribution and exhibition industries from 35 mm film to digital. I specify and estimate a dynamic game of digital hardware adoption by theatres and digital movies supply by distributors. Counterfactual simulations establish that excess inertia reduces surplus by?|$16\%$|?relative to the first-best adoption path; network externalities explain?|$41\%$|?of the surplus loss. Targeted adoption subsidies or a mandate on digital distribution help bridge this welfare gap.

本文研究在網(wǎng)絡效應存在的情況下，技術標準的去中心化采用。如果新標準與當前安裝的基礎不兼容，采用可能會效率低下地延遲。我量化了電影發(fā)行和展覽行業(yè)從35毫米膠片到數(shù)字膠片轉換過程中“過剩慣性”的程度。我指定并估計了影院采用數(shù)字硬件和分銷商提供數(shù)字電影的動態(tài)游戲。反事實模擬表明，相對于第一最佳采用路徑，超額慣性減少了|$16\%$|的盈余;網(wǎng)絡外部性解釋了盈余損失的|$41 %$|。有針對性的采用補貼或數(shù)字分發(fā)授權有助于彌合這一福利差距。

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5.Tax Policy and Lumpy Investment Behaviour: Evidence from China’s VAT Reform

稅收政策與投資行為波動:來自中國增值稅轉型的證據(jù)

Zhao Chen,?Xian Jiang,?Zhikuo Liu,?Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato,?Daniel Yi Xu

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 634–674,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac027

We incorporate the lumpy nature of firm-level investment into the study of how tax policy affects investment behaviour. We show that tax policies can directly impact the lumpiness of investment. Extensive-margin responses to tax policy are key to understanding the effects of different tax reforms and to designing effective stimulus policies. We illustrate these results by studying China’s 2009 VAT reform, which lowered the tax cost of investment and reduced partial irreversibility—the price gap between new and used capital. Using comprehensive tax survey data and a difference-in-differences design, we estimate a 36|$\%$|?relative investment increase that is driven by investment spikes. Using a dynamic investment model that fits the reduced-form effects of the reform, we show that policies that directly reduce the likelihood of firm inaction are more effective at stimulating investment.

在研究稅收政策如何影響投資行為時，我們將公司層面投資的波動性納入研究。研究表明，稅收政策可以直接影響投資的波動性。對稅收政策的廣泛邊際反應是理解不同稅收改革影響和設計有效刺激政策的關鍵。本文以中國2009年增值稅轉型為研究對象，研究結果表明，增值稅轉型降低了投資的稅收成本，降低了部分不可逆性，即新增資本與使用資本之間的價格差距。利用綜合稅收調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)和雙重差分設計，我們估計了由投資激增驅動的36|$\%$|相對投資增長。通過一個擬合改革簡化形式效應的動態(tài)投資模型，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，直接降低企業(yè)不作為可能性的政策在刺激投資方面更有效。

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6.Economic and Social Outsiders but Political Insiders: Sweden’s Populist Radical Right?

經(jīng)濟和社會局外人，但政治圈內(nèi)人:瑞典的民粹主義激進右翼

Ernesto Dal Bo’,?Frederico Finan,?Olle Folke,?Torsten Persson,?Johanna Rickne

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 675–706,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac037

We study the politicians and voters of the Sweden Democrats, a major populist radical-right party. Based on detailed administrative data, we present the first comprehensive account of which politicians are selected into such a party. Surveys show that politicians and voters of the Sweden Democrats share strong anti-establishment and anti-immigration attitudes that drastically set them apart from Sweden’s other parties. Searching for individual traits that link naturally to these attitudes, we classify the universe of Swedish politicians and voters by social and economic marginalization and exposure to immigration. Politicians from the Sweden Democrats over-represent marginalized groups without strong attachments to the labour market or to traditional nuclear families, which instead are under-represented among politicians in all other parties. Among voters, the Sweden Democrats have higher electoral support in precincts with higher shares of the same marginalized groups. We see the mobilization of the marginalized as an important driver of the party’s success. Finally, we uncover that Sweden-Democrat politicians score lower on a number of valence traits than other-party politicians. In sum, the rise of the Sweden Democrats raised political representation for marginalized groups, but this came at a valence cost.

我們研究了瑞典民主黨的政客和選民，這是一個主要的民粹主義激進右翼政黨。根據(jù)詳細的行政數(shù)據(jù)，我們首次全面介紹了哪些政客被選入這樣一個政黨。調(diào)查顯示，瑞典民主黨的政客和選民都有強烈的反建制和反移民態(tài)度，這使他們與瑞典其他政黨截然不同。在尋找與這些態(tài)度自然相關的個人特征時，我們根據(jù)社會和經(jīng)濟邊緣化以及對移民的暴露程度對瑞典政客和選民進行了分類。瑞典民主黨(Sweden Democrats)的政客們代表了與勞動力市場或傳統(tǒng)核心家庭沒有強烈聯(lián)系的邊緣化群體，而這些群體在所有其他政黨的政客中都沒有得到足夠的代表。在選民中，瑞典民主黨在同樣被邊緣化的群體所占比例較高的選區(qū)獲得了更高的選舉支持。我們認為，動員邊緣化群體是黨的成功的重要動力。最后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)瑞典民主黨的政治家在一些效價特征上得分低于其他政黨的政治家。總而言之，瑞典民主黨的崛起提高了邊緣化群體的政治代表權，但這是有代價的。

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7.Revealed Price Preference: Theory and Empirical Analysis

揭示的價格偏好:理論與實證分析

Rahul Deb,?Yuichi Kitamura,?John K H Quah,?J?rg Stoye

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 707–743,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac041

To determine the welfare implications of price changes in demand data, we introduce a revealed preference relation over prices. We show that the absence of cycles in this relation characterizes a consumer who trades off the utility of consumption against the disutility of expenditure. Our model can be applied whenever a consumer’s demand over a strict subset of all available goods is being analysed; it can also be extended to settings with discrete goods and non-linear prices. To illustrate its use, we apply our model to a single-agent data set and to a data set with repeated cross-sections. We develop a novel test of linear hypotheses on partially identified parameters to estimate the proportion of the population who are revealed better off due to a price change in the latter application. This new technique can be used for non-parametric counterfactual analysis more broadly.

為了確定需求數(shù)據(jù)中價格變化對福利的影響，我們引入了對價格的揭示偏好關系。我們表明，在這種關系中沒有周期的特征是，消費者在消費的效用與支出的負效用之間進行權衡。我們的模型可以在分析消費者對所有可用商品的嚴格子集的需求時應用;它也可以擴展到具有離散商品和非線性價格的設置。為了說明它的使用，我們將我們的模型應用于單代理數(shù)據(jù)集和具有重復截面的數(shù)據(jù)集。我們開發(fā)了一種對部分確定參數(shù)的線性假設的新檢驗，以估計在后一種應用中，由于價格變化而顯示出更富裕的人口比例。這種新技術可以更廣泛地用于非參數(shù)反事實分析。

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8.Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Model with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Income Risk

具有不可保特質(zhì)收入風險模型的最優(yōu)財政政策

Sebastian Dyrda,?Marcelo Pedroni

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 744–780,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac031

We study optimal fiscal policy in a standard incomplete-markets model with uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, where a Ramsey planner chooses time-varying paths of proportional capital and labour income taxes, lump-sum transfers (or taxes), and government debt. We find that (1) short-run capital income taxes are effective in providing redistribution since the tax base is relatively unequal and inelastic; (2) an increasing pattern of labour income taxes over time mitigates intertemporal distortions from capital income taxes; (3) the optimal policy increases overall transfers, calibrated initially to the US welfare system, by roughly?|$50\%$|?; (4) two-thirds of the welfare gains come from redistribution and the remaining third come mostly from insurance; and (5) redistribution also leads to a more efficient allocation of labour via wealth effects on labour supply—lower productivity households can afford to work relatively less.

我們在一個標準的不完全市場模型中研究了最優(yōu)財政政策。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)在稅基相對不平等且缺乏彈性的情況下，短期資本所得稅能夠有效地提供再分配;(2)隨著時間的推移，勞動所得稅的增加模式緩解了資本所得稅的跨期扭曲;(3)最優(yōu)政策增加了總體轉移支付，最初校準為美國福利制度，約為|$50\%$|?;(4)三分之二的福利收益來自再分配，其余三分之一主要來自保險;(5)再分配還通過對勞動力供給的財富效應導致勞動力的更有效分配，生產(chǎn)率較低的家庭可以承擔相對更少的工作。

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9.Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning: A Martingale Approach

錯誤學習下的信念收斂:鞅方法

Mira Frick,?Ryota Iijima,?Yuhta Ishii

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 781–814,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac040

We present an approach to analyse learning outcomes in a broad class of misspecified environments, spanning both single-agent and social learning. We introduce a novel “prediction accuracy” order over subjective models and observe that this makes it possible to partially restore standard martingale convergence arguments that apply under correctly specified learning. Based on this, we derive general conditions to determine when beliefs in a given environment converge to some long-run belief either locally or globally (i.e. from some or all initial beliefs). We show that these conditions can be applied, first, to unify and generalize various convergence results in previously studied settings. Second, they enable us to analyse environments where learning is “slow”, such as costly information acquisition and sequential social learning. In such environments, we illustrate that even if agents learn the truth when they are correctly specified, vanishingly small amounts of misspecification can generate extreme failures of learning.

我們提出了一種方法來分析在一個廣泛的錯誤指定的環(huán)境中學習的結果，涵蓋了單一代理和社會學習。我們在主觀模型上引入了一種新的“預測精度”順序，并觀察到這使得部分恢復標準鞅收斂參數(shù)成為可能，這些參數(shù)適用于正確指定的學習。在此基礎上，我們推導出一般條件，以確定在給定環(huán)境中的信念何時收斂到局部或全局的某種長期信念(即從一些或所有初始信念)。我們證明，這些條件可以應用，首先，統(tǒng)一和推廣各種收斂結果在以前的研究設置。其次，它們使我們能夠分析學習“緩慢”的環(huán)境，例如代價高昂的信息獲取和連續(xù)的社會學習。在這樣的環(huán)境中，我們表明，即使代理在被正確指定時學習了真相，少量的錯誤指定也可能導致學習的極端失敗。

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9.Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds

市政債券拍賣中的稅收優(yōu)惠和不完全競爭

Daniel Garrett,?Andrey Ordin,?James W Roberts,?Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 815–851,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac035

We study the interaction between tax advantages for municipal bonds and the market structure of auctions for these bonds. We show that this interaction can limit a bidder’s ability to extract information rents and is a crucial determinant of state and local governments’ borrowing costs. Reduced-form estimates show that increasing the tax advantage by 3 pp lowers mean borrowing costs by 9–10|$\%$|?. We estimate a structural auction model to measure markups and to illustrate and quantify how the interaction between tax policy and bidder strategic behaviour determines the impact of tax advantages on municipal borrowing costs. We use the estimated model to evaluate the efficiency of Obama and Trump administration policies that limit the tax advantage for municipal bonds. Because reductions in the tax advantage inflate bidder markups and depress competition, the resulting increase in municipal borrowing costs more than offsets the tax savings to the government. Finally, we use the model to analyse a recent non-tax regulation that affects entry into municipal bond auctions.

我們研究了市政債券的稅收優(yōu)惠和這些債券的拍賣市場結構之間的相互作用。我們表明，這種相互作用可以限制投標人提取信息租金的能力，是州和地方政府借貸成本的關鍵決定因素。簡化形式的估計表明，增加3個pp的稅收優(yōu)勢將降低9-10 |$\%$|?。我們估計了一個結構性拍賣模型來衡量加成，并說明和量化稅收政策和投標人戰(zhàn)略行為之間的相互作用如何決定稅收優(yōu)惠對城市借貸成本的影響。我們使用估計模型來評估奧巴馬和特朗普政府限制市政債券稅收優(yōu)勢的政策的效率。由于稅收優(yōu)惠的減少抬高了投標人的加成，壓低了競爭，因此市政借款成本的增加超過了政府的稅收節(jié)省。最后，我們利用該模型分析了最近影響進入市政債券拍賣的非稅監(jiān)管。

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10.Preferences and Performance in Simultaneous First-Price Auctions: A Structural Analysis?

第一價格同步拍賣中的偏好和表現(xiàn):結構分析

Matthew Gentry,?Tatiana Komarova,?Pasquale Schiraldi

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 852–878,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac030

Motivated by the prevalence of simultaneous bidding across a wide range of auction markets, we develop and estimate a model of strategic interaction in simultaneous first-price auctions when objects are heterogeneous and bidders have non-additive preferences over combinations. We establish non-parametric identification of primitives in this model under standard exclusion restrictions, providing a basis for both estimation and testing of preferences over combinations. We then apply our model to data on Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) highway procurement auctions, quantifying the magnitude of cost synergies and evaluating the performance of the simultaneous first-price mechanism in the MDOT marketplace.

在廣泛拍賣市場中普遍存在的同時競價的激勵下，我們開發(fā)并估計了一個在同時進行的第一價格拍賣中，當物品是異質(zhì)的且競標者對組合有非加性偏好時，戰(zhàn)略互動的模型。我們在標準排除限制下建立了該模型中基元的非參數(shù)識別，為組合偏好的估計和檢驗提供了基礎。然后，我們將我們的模型應用于密歇根州運輸部(MDOT)公路采購拍賣的數(shù)據(jù)，量化成本協(xié)同效應的規(guī)模，并評估MDOT市場上同步第一價格機制的表現(xiàn)。

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11.A Risk-based Theory of Exchange Rate Stabilization

基于風險的匯率穩(wěn)定理論

Tarek A Hassan,?Thomas M Mertens,?Tony Zhang

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 879–911,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac038

We develop a novel, risk-based theory of the effects of exchange rate stabilization. In our model, the choice of exchange rate regime allows policymakers to make their currency, and by extension, the firms in their country, a safer investment for international investors. Policies that induce a country’s currency to appreciate when the marginal utility of international investors is high lower the required rate of return on the country’s currency and increase the world-market value of domestic firms. Applying this logic to exchange rate stabilizations, we find a small economy stabilizing its bilateral exchange rate relative to a larger economy can increase domestic capital accumulation, domestic wages, and even its share in world wealth. In the absence of policy coordination, small countries optimally choose to stabilize their exchange rates relative to the currency of the largest economy in the world, which endogenously emerges as the world’s “anchor currency”, Larger economies instead optimally choose to float their exchange rates. The model therefore predicts an equilibrium pattern of exchange rate arrangements that is remarkably similar to the one in the data.

我們發(fā)展了一個新穎的、基于風險的匯率穩(wěn)定效應理論。在我們的模型中，匯率制度的選擇使政策制定者能夠使他們的貨幣，進而使他們本國的企業(yè)，成為國際投資者更安全的投資。當國際投資者的邊際效用較高時，促使一國貨幣升值的政策會降低該國貨幣的必需回報率，并增加國內(nèi)企業(yè)的世界市場價值。將這一邏輯應用于匯率穩(wěn)定，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，相對于較大經(jīng)濟體，穩(wěn)定雙邊匯率的小型經(jīng)濟體可以增加國內(nèi)資本積累、國內(nèi)工資，甚至在世界財富中所占的份額。在缺乏政策協(xié)調(diào)的情況下，小國最優(yōu)選擇穩(wěn)定其相對于世界最大經(jīng)濟體貨幣的匯率，而最大經(jīng)濟體貨幣內(nèi)生地成為世界”錨定貨幣”，大經(jīng)濟體反而最優(yōu)選擇浮動匯率。因此，該模型預測的匯率安排的均衡模式與數(shù)據(jù)中的模式非常相似。

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12.Under Suspicion: Trust Dynamics with Secret Undermining

被懷疑:秘密破壞的信任動態(tài)

Aaron Kolb,?Erik Madsen

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 912–947,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac034

We study how an organization should dynamically screen an agent of uncertain loyalty whom it suspects of committing damaging acts of undermining. The organization controls the stakes of the relationship, while the agent strategically times undermining, which can occur repeatedly and is detected only stochastically. The optimal commitment stakes policy exhibits both discreteness and gradualism, with distinct “untrusted” and “trusted” phases featuring gradually rising stakes during the untrusted phase and a discrete gap in stakes between phases. This policy is also the equilibrium outcome when the organization cannot commit, and the agent’s equilibrium undermining policy exhibits variable, non-monotonic intensity.

我們研究了組織應該如何動態(tài)地篩選一個不確定忠誠的代理人，它懷疑代理人實施了破壞性的破壞行為。組織控制著關系的利害關系，而代理有策略地計時破壞，這可以反復發(fā)生，而且只能隨機發(fā)現(xiàn)。最優(yōu)承諾股權政策既具有離散性，又具有漸進式特征，“不可信”和“可信”兩個階段表現(xiàn)為不可信階段的股權逐漸上升，階段之間的股權存在離散性缺口。該政策也是組織不能承諾時的均衡結果，代理人破壞政策的均衡表現(xiàn)為可變的、非單調(diào)的強度。

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13.Matching with Externalities?

外部性匹配

Marek Pycia,?M Bumin Yenmez

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 948–974,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac032

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.

我們將外部性納入雙邊市場穩(wěn)定匹配理論。將經(jīng)典的替代條件推廣到具有外部性的市場，證明了當代理選擇滿足可替代性時，存在穩(wěn)定匹配。我們證明了可替代性是穩(wěn)定匹配存在的一個必要條件，并給出了可替代性選擇函數(shù)的一個刻劃。此外，我們將匹配理論的標準見解，如側最優(yōu)穩(wěn)定匹配的存在性和延遲接受算法，擴展到具有外部性的情況，盡管標準定點技術并不適用。

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14.Redeemable Platform Currencies

可贖回平臺貨幣

Kenneth Rogoff,?Yang You

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 2, March 2023, Pages 975–1008,?https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac028

Can massive online retailers such as Amazon and Alibaba issue digital tokens that potentially compete with bank debit accounts? There is a long history of trading stamps and loyalty points, but new technologies are poised to sharply raise the significance of redeemable assets as a store of value. Here, we develop a simple stylized model of redeemable tokens that can be used to study sales and pricing strategies for issuing tokens, including ICOs. Our central finding is that platforms can potentially earn higher revenues by making tokens non-tradable unless they can generate a sufficiently high outside-platform convenience yield.

亞馬遜(Amazon)和阿里巴巴(Alibaba)等大型在線零售商能否發(fā)行可能與銀行借記卡賬戶競爭的數(shù)字代幣?郵票和積分的交易歷史悠久，但新技術將大幅提高可贖回資產(chǎn)作為價值儲存手段的重要性。在這里，我們開發(fā)了一個簡單的可贖回代幣程式化模型，可用于研究發(fā)行代幣(包括ico)的銷售和定價策略。我們的主要發(fā)現(xiàn)是，平臺可以通過讓代幣不可交易來獲得更高的收入，除非它們能夠產(chǎn)生足夠高的平臺外便利收益率。

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