God, Death and Time （英譯本）

作者：列維納斯 Emmanuel Levinas

?????? Translated by Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, 2000

?

????偶然找到了英譯本，覺得內(nèi)容挺有意思發(fā)上來。中譯本也是有的，但據(jù)說翻譯一般。隨便機(jī)翻了一下方便大家看得沒那么累，如果覺得有意思的話可以去買中譯本看看。以后可能還會更新后續(xù)的部分，但不會再翻譯了。

????（也不一定）

????中譯本信息放到文章最底部了，為的就是讓大家哪怕看一眼正文。

Part I. Death and Time

?Initial Questions

?????? ---Friday, November 7, 1975

?????黑色為正文，深藍(lán)色為翻譯。有一點點語義上的調(diào)整，但是有的部分還是省略了。還請參考英語一同閱讀。?

????In question in this course is, above all, time—this is a course on the of time. The word duration of time is chosen for several reasons:

????這堂課的疑問，總的來說，是時間——這節(jié)課將會討論時間的Duration。以下是選擇Duration這一詞的原因：

????—It indicates that we will not be posing, here, the question "What is . . . ?" In the same way, in an unpublished lecture prior to , Heidegger said that one cannot pose the question "What is time?" because one then immediately posits time as being.

????—（Duration一詞）表明了，“什么是……”這樣的問題不會在這里被提出。同理，海德格爾在《存在與時間》之前的一次尚未發(fā)表的演講中也表明，人們不能提出“什么是時間？這樣的問題，因為這立即假定了時間是一種存在。

????—There is no action in the of time, which is itself (this being said as against the intentional approach).

????在時間的被動中沒有任何行動，時間本身就是耐心（this being said as against the intentional approach）。

????—The word avoids ideas of and of , which make us think of a liquid substance and announce the possibility of a measure of time (time measured, or clock time, is not the authentic time). As temporalization——the word "" avoids all these misunderstandings and avoids the confusion between what flows within time and time itself.

????一詞避免了某種流或者流動的概念，二者會使我們想到一些流動的實質(zhì)并昭示了某種測量時間的可能（被測量的時間，或者說鐘表的時間，并不是真正的時間）。就像Zeitigung一詞，duration試圖避免了所有的誤解以及那些對時間內(nèi)部的流動的東西與時間本身的混淆。

????—It is a term that above all would leave to time its own mode.

????（沒翻這句話，因為不理解意思）

????Within the duration of time—whose signification should perhaps not be referred to the couple "being and nothingness," understood as the ultimate reference of meaning, of everything meaningful and everything thought, of everything human—death is a point from which time takes all its patience; this expectation that escapes its own intentionality qua expectation; this "patience and length of time," as the proverb says, where patience is like the emphasis of passivity. Whence the direction of this course: death understood as the patience of time.

????在一段時間內(nèi)（其含義可能不應(yīng)該被稱為“存在與虛無”），這是對意義，對所有有意義的事物和對思想，對人類的一切事物的最終指稱。 它的耐心； 逃避自己預(yù)期意圖的期望； 俗話說，這種“耐心和時間的長短”，耐心就像是消極的強(qiáng)調(diào)。 此課程的方向：死亡被理解為時間的耐心。

????This search for death within the perspective of time (of time not considered as a horizon of being, of the essence of being) does not signify a philosophy of . It is thus differentiated from the thought of Heidegger; this is the case, whatever the debt of every contemporary thinker might be to Heidegger, a debt that he often owes to his regret. However, if the , posited as equivalent to being in regard to nothingness, does not exactly seem to posit death within time, this refusal to treat time and death in relation to being does not reserve us the facility of a recourse to eternal life.

????Death: an irreversible (see book on death, wherein I know from the first lines that I shall have to die my own death

????But is that which opens with death nothingness, or the unknown? Can being at the point of death be reduced to the ontological dilemma of being or nothingness? That is the question that is posed here. For the reduction of death to this dilemma of being or nothingness is a reverse dogmatism, whatever the feelings of an entire generation suspicious of the positive dogmatism of the immortality of the soul, considered as the sweetest "opium of the people."

????在時間（不視之為一種存在的視域或者本質(zhì)）的角度上探尋死亡，并不意味著一種Sein zum Tode [being-toward-death]向死而生的哲學(xué)。因此，它與海德格爾的思想有所區(qū)別；this is the case, whatever the debt of every contemporary thinker might be to Heidegger, a debt that he often owes to his regret.但是，如果Sein zum Tode被認(rèn)同為“向虛無而生”，卻似乎并沒有在時間上確定死亡，那么這種對之于存在的時間和死亡的拒絕就不會為我們提供追索永恒的路徑。

????死亡：不可逆轉(zhuǎn)（參見揚克列維奇關(guān)于死亡的書，從我的第一行中我知道我將不得不死掉自己的死亡）。

????但是，那以死亡所綻開的是虛無還是未知？存在可以在死亡時被還原為存在或虛無的本體論困境嗎？這就是提出的問題。將死亡減少到存在或虛無的困境是一種反向的教條主義，不管整代人對靈魂永生的積極教條主義的懷疑如何，都被認(rèn)為是最甜美的“人民鴉片”。

????At first, it seems to us that all that we can say or think about death and dying, and their inevitability, comes to us secondhand. We know it by hearsay or by empirical knowledge. All that we know comes to us from the language that names death and dying, the language that utters propositions: common words, proverbial, poetic, or religious ones. This knowledge comes to us from the experience and observation of other men, of their behavior as dying and as mortals aware of [connaissant] their death and forgetful of their death (which does not here mean a diversion: there is a forgetting of death that is not a diversion). Is death separable from the relation with the other \autrui\t The negative character of death (annihilation) is inscribed in hatred or the desire to murder. It is in the relation with the other that we think death in its negativity. We have this awareness [connaissance] through banal or scientific knowledge [savoir]. Death is the disappearance in beings of those expressive movements that made them appear as living, those movements that are always responses. Death will touch, above all, that autonomy or that expressiveness of movement that can go to the point of masking [couvrir] someone within his face. Death is the no-response [sans-reponse]. Those movements both hide and inform the vegetative movements. Death strips that which is thus covered over and offers it up to medical examination. Dying, when understood from language and the observation of the other man dying, names a halting of these movements and the reduction of someone to something decomposable—an immobilization. There is not transformation, but annihilation, the end of a being, the stopping of those movements that were so many signs (see Phado H7e-n8a on the death of Socrates).4 The annihilation of a mode of being that dominates all the others (the face), beyond the objective residue of matter, which subsists even if it is decomposed and dispersed. Death appears as the passage from being to no-longer-being, understood as the result of a logical operation: negation. But at the same time, death is a departure: it is a decease [deces]. (In this idea of departure there nevertheless remains negativity.) A departure toward the unknown, a departure without return, a departure "with no forwarding address." Death—as the death of the other [autrui]—cannot be separated from this dramatic character; it is emotion par excellence, affection or being affected par excellence. It is in this sense that we see, in the Phado, at the beginning and the end, the evocation of the death of Socrates. Beside those who find in this death every reason to hope, certain among them (e.g., Apollodorus, "the women") weep more than they should; they weep without measure: as if humanity were not consumed or exhausted by measurement, as if there were an excess in death. It is a simple passage, a simple departure—and yet a source of emotion contrary to every effort at consolation.

????首先，在我們看來，關(guān)于死亡和垂死及其必然性的所有我們能說或想的都是二手的。我們通過傳聞或經(jīng)驗知識知道這一點。我們所知道的一切都來自命名死亡和垂死的語言，發(fā)出命題的語言：常用詞，諺語，詩意或宗教用語。這些知識來自其他人的經(jīng)歷和觀察，他們的生命垂死，凡人知道[connaissant]他們的死，忘記了他們的死（這在這里并不意味著轉(zhuǎn)移注意力：遺忘了死亡，不是轉(zhuǎn)移）。死亡和與他人的關(guān)系是可分離的嗎？死亡（滅絕）的消極特征是仇恨或謀殺的欲望。我們認(rèn)為與否有關(guān)的死亡是消極的。我們通過平庸或科學(xué)的知識[才智]擁有這種[意識形態(tài)]意識。死亡是使那些表現(xiàn)為生命的表達(dá)運動消失的存在，而這些運動始終是生命的反應(yīng)。最重要的是，死亡將觸及那種可以掩蓋[couvrir]臉孔內(nèi)人的自主權(quán)或動作表現(xiàn)力。死亡是無反應(yīng)[無反應(yīng)]。這些運動既掩蓋了營養(yǎng)運動又為營養(yǎng)運動提供了信息。死亡剝奪了被掩蓋的東西，并將其提供給醫(yī)學(xué)檢查。從語言和對另一個即將死去的人的觀察中可以理解，死是指這些運動的停止，并將某人減少為可分解的東西-一種固定化。這不是一種轉(zhuǎn)變，而是滅亡，滅絕，存在的終結(jié)，如此多的運動跡象的停止（見Phado H7e-n8a蘇格拉底之死）。滅絕主導(dǎo)一切其他一切的存在方式（面部），即使物質(zhì)已經(jīng)分解和分散，它仍然存在于物質(zhì)的客觀殘留物之外。死亡是從存在到不再存在的通道，被理解為邏輯操作的結(jié)果：否定。但與此同時，死亡是一種背離：這是一種死亡。 （但是，在離開的想法中仍然存在否定性。）朝未知的地方離開，沒有回頭路的離開，“沒有轉(zhuǎn)寄地址”的離開。死亡-就像另一個[autrui]的死亡-不能脫離這種戲劇性的特征。它是卓越的情感，情感或受到卓越的影響。從這個意義上講，我們在Phado中看到蘇格拉底之死的開始和結(jié)束。除了那些在這場死亡中找到一切希望的人之外，其中某些人（例如，阿波羅多洛斯（“ Apollodorus”，“婦女”））肯定比他們應(yīng)有的哭泣還多。他們不知不覺地哭泣：仿佛人類沒有被度量所消耗或精疲力盡，仿佛死亡人數(shù)過多。這是一個簡單的段落，一個簡單的離開，但與每一次安慰的努力相反，都是一種情感來源。

????My relation with death is not limited to this secondhand knowledge. For Heidegger (see Being and Time), it is the certitude par excellence. There is an a priori of death. Heidegger calls death certain to the point of seeing in this certitude of death the origin of certitude itself, and he will not allow this certitude to come from the experience of the death of others. It is nonetheless not certain that death can be called a certitude, nor is it certain that death has the meaning of annihilation. My relation with death is also made up of the emotional and intellectual repercussions of the knowledge of the death of others. But this relation is disproportionate relative to all secondhand experience. Hence the question: Can the relation with death, and the manner by which death strikes our life, its impact upon the duration of the time that we live, its irruption within time—or its eruption outside of time—which is sensed in fear or in anguish, can this relation still be assimilated to a knowledge and thus to an experience, to a revelation? Does the impossibility of reducing death to an experience, this truism about the impossibility of an experience of death, and about a noncontact between life and death—do these not signify a being affected, an affection more passive than a trauma? As if there were a passivity beyond shock. And a fission that affects us more than presence, an a priori move than a priori? Mortality as the modality of time that must not be reduced to an anticipation, even a passive one; a modality irreducible to an experience, to a comprehension of nothingness. And we must not decide too quickly that only nothingness is dreadful, as in a philosophy wherein man is a being who has to be, who persists in his being, without posing to himself the question of knowing what the dreadful and the dreaded are. Here, death takes a meaning other than an experience of death. It takes a meaning that comes from the death of another person [dautrui], of what concerns us therein. A death without experience and yet dreadful: does that not mean that the structure of time is not intentional, that it is not made up of the protentions and retentions that are the modes of experience?

????我與死亡的關(guān)系并不局限于此二手知識。對于海德格爾來說（見《存在與時間？），it is the certitude par excellence.有一種死亡的先驗。海德格爾稱死亡一定要在這個確定性死亡確信自身的起源，他不會讓這種確定性來自他人的死亡的經(jīng)驗。它仍然是不肯定的是，死亡可以被稱為確定性，也不是某些死亡有湮滅的意義。我與死亡的關(guān)系也由他人死亡的知識的情感和智力的反響了。但是，相對于所有二手經(jīng)驗而言，這種關(guān)系是不成比例的。因此，問題：可以用死亡這時間是在恐懼感測的關(guān)系，并通過其死亡打擊我們的生活的方式，它基于的是我們生活的持續(xù)時間的影響，它的內(nèi)突時間或者其噴發(fā)的外部或在痛苦，可這關(guān)系仍然被同化的知識，從而體驗到一個啟示？是否減少死亡的經(jīng)驗，這種真理關(guān)于死亡的經(jīng)歷是不可能的可能性，以及對生活之間的非接觸式死亡做到這些并不表示一個受到影響，一個感情比外傷更被動？至于是否有超越休克被動。這影響到我們不止存在，不是先驗舉動裂變？死亡率隨著時間的形態(tài)必須不能降低到一個預(yù)期，即使是被動的;一種模式束縛，以一種體驗，虛無的理解。我們絕不能決定太快，只有虛無是可怕的，在哲學(xué)，其中的人是存在誰有權(quán)，誰在他的存在依然存在，沒有冒充自己知道什么是可怕的和可怕的是問題。在這里，死亡時間比死亡的體驗不同的含義。它接受來自另一個人死亡[dautrui]，什么我們關(guān)注其中的含義。沒有經(jīng)驗，但可怕的一死，就等于說是時間的結(jié)構(gòu)是不是故意的，它不是由那些經(jīng)驗的模式專長和保持率的呢？

????作者: [法]勒維納斯

????出版社: 生活·讀書·新知三聯(lián)書店

????譯者: 余中先

????出版年: 1997-11

????頁數(shù): 299

????定價: 12

????裝幀: 平裝

????叢書: 法蘭西思想文化叢書

????ISBN: 9787108009890

（吐槽一下，好像專欄不能改字體，也不能復(fù)制粘貼，其實蠻傷害觀看體驗的?？烧鎵蚵闊┑模?/span>