Words?and Things?

文字與事物

Unlike his work in the empirical sciences, there are aspects of Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy which still have much to teach us. In particular, he says things of the highest interest about the nature of language, about the nature of reality, and about the relationship between the two.?

與他在經(jīng)驗科學(xué)中的工作不同，亞里士多德的理論哲學(xué)有一些方面仍然有很多東西可以教給我們。特別是，他說了一些關(guān)于語言的本質(zhì)、現(xiàn)實的本質(zhì)和兩者之間關(guān)系的最有趣的事情。

In his Categories Aristotle drew up a list of different types of things which might be said of an individual. It contains ten items: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, clothing, activity, and passivity. It would make sense to say of Socrates, for instance, that he was a human being (substance), was five feet tall (quantity), was gifted (quality), was older than Plato (relation), lived in Athens (place), was a man of the fifth-century bc (time), was sitting (posture), had a cloak on (clothing), was cutting a piece of cloth (activity), was killed by a poison (passivity). This classification was not simply a classification of predicates in language: each irreducibly different type of predicate, so Aristotle believed, stood for an irreducibly different type of entity. In ‘Socrates is a man’, for instance, the word ‘man’ stood for a substance, namely Socrates. In ‘Socrates was poisoned’ the word ‘poisoned’ stood for an entity called a passivity, namely the poisoning of Socrates.?

在他的《范疇論》中，亞里士多德列出了一個關(guān)于個體可能說的不同類型的事物的清單。它包含了十項：實體、數(shù)量、質(zhì)量、關(guān)系、地點、時間、姿態(tài)、衣著、活動和被動。比如，對蘇格拉底來說，有意義的是說他是一個人（實體），身高五英尺（數(shù)量），有才華（質(zhì)量），比柏拉圖年長（關(guān)系），住在雅典（地點），是公元前五世紀(jì)的一個人（時間），坐著（姿態(tài)），披著斗篷（衣著），剪一塊布（活動），被毒藥殺死（被動）。這個分類不僅僅是語言中謂詞的分類：每一種不可約化的不同類型的謂詞，亞里士多德相信，代表了一種不可約化的不同類型的實體。例如，在“蘇格拉底是人”中，單詞“人”代表了一種實體，即蘇格拉底。在“蘇格拉底被毒死”中單詞“毒死”代表了一種叫做被動的實體，即蘇格拉底的中毒。

Aristotle perhaps believed that every possible entity, however it might initially be classified, would be found ultimately to belong to one and only one of the ten categories. Thus, Socrates is a man,?an animal, a living being, and ultimately a substance; the murder committed by Aigisthos is a murder, a homicide, a killing, and ultimately an activity.?

亞里士多德或許相信，每一種可能的實體，無論最初如何分類，最終都會發(fā)現(xiàn)只屬于十個范疇中的一個。因此，蘇格拉底是一個人，一個動物，一個生命體，最終是一個實體；埃吉斯托斯犯下的謀殺是一場謀殺，一場殺人，一場殺戮，最終是一種活動。

The category of substance was of primary importance. Substances are things like women, lions, and cabbages which can exist independently, and can be identified as individuals of a particular kind; a substance is, in Aristotle’s homely phrase, ‘a(chǎn) this such-and-such’ – this cat, or this carrot. Things falling into the other categories (which Aristotle’s successors would call ‘a(chǎn)ccidents’) are not separable; a size, for instance, is always the size of something. Items in the ‘a(chǎn)ccidental’ categories exist only as properties or modifications of substances.?

實體的范疇是最重要的。實體是像女人、獅子和卷心菜這樣的東西，它們可以獨立存在，并且可以被識別為特定種類的個體；一個實體，用亞里士多德的樸素說法，就是“一個這樣的東西”——這只貓，或者這根胡蘿卜。屬于其他范疇的事物（亞里士多德的后繼者會稱之為“偶然”）是不可與實體分離的；例如，一個大小總是某物的大小。屬于“偶然”范疇的事物只作為實體的屬性或變化而存在。

Aristotle’s categories do not seem exhaustive, and appear to be of unequal importance. But even if we accept them as one possible classification of predicates, is it correct to regard predicates as standing for anything? If ‘Socrates runs’ is true, must ‘runs’ stand for an entity of some kind in the way that ‘Socrates’ stands for Socrates? Even if we say yes, it is clear that this entity cannot be the meaning of the word ‘runs’. For ‘Socrates runs’ makes sense even if it?is false; and so ‘runs’ here has meaning even if there is no such thing as the running of Socrates for it to stand for.?

亞里士多德的范疇似乎不是完備的，而且看起來重要性不一。但即使我們接受它們作為謂詞的一種可能的分類，把謂詞看作代表某物是否正確呢？如果“蘇格拉底跑步”是真的，那么“跑步”是否必須像“蘇格拉底”代表蘇格拉底一樣，代表某種實體呢？即使我們說是，也很明顯，這個實體不能是單詞“跑步”的意義。因為“蘇格拉底跑步”即使是假的也有意義；所以這里的“跑步”即使沒有蘇格拉底的跑步這樣的事物可以代表，也有意義。

If we take a sentence like ‘Socrates is white’ we may, on Aristotelian lines, think of ‘white’ as standing for Socrates’ whiteness. If so, what does the ‘is’ stand for??

如果我們拿一個像“蘇格拉底是白的”這樣的句子，我們可能按照亞里士多德的思路，把“白的”看作代表蘇格拉底的白色。如果是這樣，那么“是”代表什么呢？

To this question several answers seem possible.?

對于這個問題，似乎有幾種可能的答案。

(i) We may say that it stands for nothing, but simply marks the connection between subject and predicate.?

(i)?我們可以說它代表什么也沒有，只是標(biāo)志著主語和謂語之間的聯(lián)系。

(ii) We may say that it signifies existence, in the sense that if Socrates is white then there exists something – perhaps white Socrates, perhaps the whiteness of Socrates – which does not exist if Socrates is not white.?

(ii)?我們可以說它表示存在，意思是如果蘇格拉底是白的，那么就存在某物——也許是白色的蘇格拉底，也許是蘇格拉底的白色——如果蘇格拉底不是白的，這個東西就不存在。

(iii) We may say that it stands for being, where ‘being’ is to be taken as a verbal noun like ‘running’.?

(iii) 我們可以說它代表存在，其中“存在”要被看作是一個像“跑步”一樣的動詞名詞。

?

If we say this, it seems that we must add that there are various types of being:?

如果我們這樣說，似乎我們必須補充說，有不同類型的存在：

the being that is denoted by ‘is’ in the substantial predicate ‘. . . is a horse’ is substantial being, while the being that is denoted by ‘is’ in the accidental predicate ‘. . . is white’ is accidental being.?

在實體謂詞“……是馬”中被“是”所表示的存在是實體存在，而在偶然謂詞“……是白的”中被“是”所表示的存在是偶然存在。

In different places Aristotle seems to favour now one, now another, of these interpretations.?His favourite is perhaps the third.?

在不同的地方，亞里士多德似乎時而偏向這一種，時而偏向另一種解釋。他最喜歡的可能是第三種。

In the passages where he expresses it, he draws the consequence from it that ‘be’ is a verb of multiple meaning, a homonymous term with more than?one sense ( just as ‘healthy’ has different, but related, senses when we speak of a healthy person, a healthy complexion,?or a healthy climate).?

在他表達它的段落中，他從中得出了一個結(jié)論，即“是”是一個多義動詞，一個有多種意義的同音詞（就像“健康”在我們談?wù)摻】档娜恕⒔】档哪w色或健康的風(fēng)氣時有不同但相關(guān)的意義一樣）。

I said above that in ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘man’ was a predicate in the category of substance which stood for the substance Socrates.?

我在上面說過，在“蘇格拉底是人”這句話中，“人”是屬于實體范疇的一個謂詞，代表著蘇格拉底這個實體。

But that is not the only analysis which Aristotle gives of such a sentence.?

但這并不是亞里士多德對這樣的句子給出的唯一分析。

Sometimes it appears that ‘man’ stands rather for the humanity which Socrates has.?

有時候，“人”似乎更多地指的是蘇格拉底所具有的人性。

In such contexts, Aristotle distinguishes two senses of ‘substance’.?

在這樣的語境中，亞里士多德區(qū)分了“實體”的兩種意義。

A this such-and-such, e.g. this man Socrates, is a first substance; the humanity he has is a second substance.?

一個這樣那樣的東西，例如這個人蘇格拉底，是第一實體；他所具有的人性是第二實體。

When he talks like this, Aristotle commonly takes pains to avoid Platonism about universals.?

當(dāng)他這樣說的時候，亞里士多德常常努力避免關(guān)于普遍共相的柏拉圖主義。

The humanity that Socrates has is an individual humanity, Socrates’ own humanity; it is not a universal humanity that is participated in by all men.

蘇格拉底所具有的人性是一個個體的人性，蘇格拉底自己的人性；它不是一個被所有人所參與的普遍共相的人性。

Motion and Change?

運動和變化

One of the reasons why Aristotle rejected Plato’s Theory of Ideas was that, like Eleatic metaphysics, it denied, at a fundamental level, the reality of change.?

亞里士多德拒絕柏拉圖的理型論的原因之一是，它像伊利亞派的形而上學(xué)一樣，在根本層面上否認(rèn)了變化的現(xiàn)實性。

In his Physics and his Metaphysics Aristotle offered a theory of the nature of change intended to take up and disarm the challenge of Parmenides and Plato. This was his doctrine of potentiality and actuality.

在他的《物理學(xué)》和《形而上學(xué)》中，亞里士多德提出了一種關(guān)于變化本質(zhì)的理論，旨在接受并化解巴門尼德和柏拉圖的挑戰(zhàn)。這就是他的潛能性和實動性的學(xué)說。

If we consider any substance, such as a piece of wood, we find a number of things which are true of that substance at a given time, and a number of other things which, though not true of it at that time, can become true of it at some other time.?

如果我們考慮任何一種實體，比如一塊木頭，我們會發(fā)現(xiàn)有許多事情在某一時刻是關(guān)于那種實體的真理，還有許多其他的事情，雖然在那一時刻不是關(guān)于它的真理，但可以在另一時刻成為關(guān)于它的真理。

Thus, the wood, though it is cold, can be heated and turned into ash.?

因此，木頭雖然是冷的，但可以被加熱并變成灰燼。

Aristotle called the things which a substance is, its ‘a(chǎn)ctualities’, and the things which it can be, its ‘potentialities’: thus the wood is actually cold but potentially hot, actually wood, but potentially ash.?

亞里士多德稱實體所是的東西為“實動性”，實體所能是的東西為“潛能性”：因此，木頭實際上是冷的，但可能是熱的，實際上是木頭，但可能是灰燼。

The change from being cold to being hot is an accidental change which the substance can undergo while remaining the substance that it is; the change from wood to ash is a substantial change, a change from being one kind of substance to another.?

從冷變熱是一種偶然的變化，實體可以在保持自身實體性的同時經(jīng)歷這種變化；從木頭變成灰燼是一種本質(zhì)的變化，一種從一種實體變成另一種實體的變化。

In English, we can say, very roughly, that predicates which contain the word ‘can’, or a word with a modal suffix such as ‘a(chǎn)ble’ or ‘ible’, signify potentialities; predicates which do not contain these words signify actualities.?

在英語中，我們可以非常粗略地說，包含“can”這個詞或者有“able”或“ible”這樣的情態(tài)后綴的詞的謂詞表示潛能性；不包含這些詞的謂詞表示實動性。

Potentiality, in contrast to actuality, is the capacity to undergo a change of some kind, whether through one’s own action or through the action of other agents.

潛能性與實動性相對應(yīng)，是一種經(jīng)歷某種變化的能力，無論是通過自己的行動還是通過其他行動者的行動。

The actualities involved in changes are called ‘forms’, and ‘matter’ is used as a technical term for what has the capacity for substantial change.?

參與變化的實動性被稱為“形式”，而“物質(zhì)”被用作一個技術(shù)術(shù)語，指具有本質(zhì)變化能力的東西。

In everyday life we are familiar with the idea that one and the same parcel of stuff may be first one kind of thing and then another kind of thing.?

在日常生活中，我們熟悉這樣一個想法：同一堆東西可能先是一種東西，然后又是另一種東西。

A bottle containing a pint of cream may be found, after shaking, to contain not cream but butter.?

一個裝有一品脫奶油的瓶子，在搖晃之后，可能發(fā)現(xiàn)不是奶油而是黃油。

The stuff that comes out of the bottle is the same stuff as the stuff that went into the bottle: nothing has been added to it and nothing has been taken from it.?

從瓶子里出來的東西和進入瓶子里的東西是同樣的東西：沒有增加也沒有減少。

But what comes out is different in kind from what goes in.?

但出來的東西和進去的東西在種類上是不同的。

It is from cases such as this that the Aristotelian notion of substantial change is derived.

正是從這樣的例子中，亞里士多德關(guān)于本質(zhì)變化的概念得以產(chǎn)生。

Substantial change takes place when a substance of one kind turns into a substance of another kind.?

本質(zhì)變化發(fā)生在一種實體轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榱硪环N實體時。

The stuff which remains the same parcel of stuff throughout the change was called by Aristotle matter.?

在整個變化過程中保持同一堆東西不變的東西被亞里士多德稱為物質(zhì)。

The matter takes first one form and then another: first it is cream and then it is butter.?

物質(zhì)先取一個形式然后再取另一個形式：先是奶油然后是黃油。

A thing may change without ceasing to belong to the same natural kind, by a change falling not under the category of substance, but under one of the other nine categories:?

一個東西可能發(fā)生變化而仍然屬于同一自然種類，通過一個不屬于實體范疇，而屬于其他九個范疇之一的變化：

thus a human may grow, learn, blush and be vanquished without ceasing to be a human.?

因此，一個人可能成長、學(xué)習(xí)、臉紅和被征服而仍然是一個人。

When a substance undergoes an accidental change there is always a form which it retains throughout the change,?namely its substantial form.

當(dāng)一個實體經(jīng)歷一個偶然的變化時，總有一個形式是它在整個變化過程中保持的，即它的本質(zhì)形式。?

Aristotle gives straightforwardly biological accounts of the activities of nutrition, growth, and reproduction which are common to all living things.?

亞里士多德直接地從生物學(xué)的角度描述了所有生物共有的營養(yǎng)、生長和繁殖等活動。

Matters become more complicated, and more interesting, when he turns to explain sense?perception (peculiar to higher animals) and intellectual thought (peculiar to human beings).

當(dāng)他轉(zhuǎn)向解釋感覺知覺（高等動物特有的）和智力思維（人類特有的）時，物質(zhì)變得更加復(fù)雜和有趣。

In explaining sense-perception, Aristotle adapts the account in Plato’s Theaetetus according to which sensation is the outcome of an encounter between a sense-faculty (such as vision) and a sense-object (such as a visible object).?

在解釋感覺知覺時，亞里士多德借用了柏拉圖《泰阿泰德》中的說法，即感覺是感覺能力（如視覺）和感覺對象（如可見物）之間相遇的結(jié)果。

Only, whereas on Plato’s account the eye’s seeing a white object, and the whiteness of the object itself, are two twins begotten of the same intercourse, for Aristotle the seeing and the being seen are one and the same thing.?

只是，柏拉圖認(rèn)為眼睛看到一個白色的物體，和物體本身的白色，是同一交合所生的雙胞胎，而亞里士多德認(rèn)為看和被看是一回事。

He propounds the general thesis: a sense-faculty in actuality is identical with a sense-object in actuality.

他提出了一個一般的論題：實際上的感覺能力與實際上的感覺對象是相同的。

This initially obscure thesis is yet another application of Aristotle’s theory of actuality and potentiality.?

這個最初模糊的論題是亞里士多德關(guān)于實動性和潛能性理論的又一種應(yīng)用。

Let me illustrate its meaning by taking the example of taste.?

讓我用味道的例子來說明它的意義。

The sweetness of a piece of sugar, something which can be tasted, is a sense-object, and my sense of taste, my ability to taste things, is a sense-faculty.?

一塊糖的甜味，是可以被品嘗的東西，是一個感覺對象，而我的味覺，我的品嘗東西的能力，是一個感覺能力。

The operation of my sense of taste upon the sensible object is the same thing as the action of the sense-object upon my sense. That is to say, the sugar’s tasting sweet to me is one and the same event as my tasting the sweetness of the sugar.?

我的味覺對可感知對象的作用與感覺對象對我的味覺的作用是同一件事。也就是說，糖對我品嘗起來甜是與我品嘗糖的甜味同一事件。

The sugar itself is actually sweet all the time; but until the sugar is put into the mouth its sweetness is not actually, but only potentially, tasting sweet. (Being sweet is a first actuality, tasting sweet a second actuality.)?

糖本身始終是甜的；但直到糖放進嘴里，它的甜味才不是實際性上的，而只是潛能性上的，品嘗起來甜。（甜是第一實動性，品嘗甜是第二實動性。）

The sense of taste is nothing other than the power to do such things as taste the sweetness of sweet objects.?

味覺不過是做這樣的事情的能力，比如品嘗甜物的甜味。

The sensory property of sweetness is nothing other than the power to taste sweet to a suitable taster.?

甜味這種感覺屬性不過是對適當(dāng)?shù)钠穱L者品嘗起來甜的能力。

Thus Aristotle is correct to say that the property in action is one and the same thing as the faculty in operation.?

因此，亞里士多德說屬性在行動中與能力在運作中是同一件事是正確的。

Of course the power to taste and the power to be tasted are two very different things, the one in the taster and the other in the sugar.

當(dāng)然，品嘗的能力和被品嘗的能力是兩種非常不同的東西，一個在品嘗者身上，另一個在糖身上。

This account of sense-perception is superior to the Platonic one, because it allows us to say that things in the world really do have sensory qualities, even when not being sensed.?

這種對感覺知覺的解釋優(yōu)于柏拉圖的解釋，因為它允許我們說世界上的事物真的具有質(zhì)感，即使沒有被感知。

Things not being looked at are really coloured, things not being sniffed really do smell sour, sounds unheard may really be deafening.?

沒有被看到的東西真的有顏色，沒有被聞到的東西真的有酸味，沒有被聽到的聲音可能真的震耳欲聾。

Aristotle can say this because his analysis of actuality and potentiality allows him to explain that sensory qualities are really powers of a certain kind.

亞里士多德可以這樣說，因為他對實動性和潛能性的分析使他能夠解釋質(zhì)感實際上是某種能力。

Metaphysics?

形而上學(xué)?

‘There is a discipline,’ Aristotle says in the fourth book of his Metaphysics, ‘which theorizes about Being qua being, and the things which belong to Being taken in itself.’?

“有一門學(xué)科，”亞里士多德在他的《形而上學(xué)》的第四卷中說，“它是關(guān)于作為存在的存在，以及自身屬于存在的事物的理論。”

This discipline is called ‘first philosophy’, which he elsewhere describes as the knowledge of first principles and supreme causes.?

這門學(xué)科叫做“第一哲學(xué)”，他在別處描述它是對第一原則和最高原因的知識。

Other sciences, he says, deal with a particular kind of being, but the science of the philosopher concerns Being universally and not merely partially.?

其他的科學(xué)，他說，處理一種特定的存在，但哲學(xué)家的科學(xué)關(guān)注普遍的存在而不僅僅是部分的存在。

However, in other places Aristotle seems to restrict the object of first philosophy to a particular kind of being, namely divine, independent and immutable substance.?

然而，在其他地方，亞里士多德似乎把第一哲學(xué)的對象限制為一種特定的存在，即神圣的、獨立的和不可變的實體。

There are three theoretical philosophies, he says in one place – mathematics, physics, and theology; and the first, or most honourable philosophy, is theology.

他在一個地方說，有三種理論哲學(xué)——數(shù)學(xué)、物理學(xué)和天論；而第一或最尊貴的哲學(xué)是天論。

Theology is the best of the theoretical sciences because it deals with the most honourable among beings; it is prior to, and more universal than, physics or natural philosophy.

天論是理論科學(xué)中最好的，因為它處理最尊貴的存在；它先于、也比物理學(xué)或自然哲學(xué)更普遍。

Both sets of definitions so far considered treat of first philosophy as concerned with Being or beings; it is also spoken of as the science of substance or substances.?

到目前為止考慮過的兩組定義都把第一哲學(xué)看作是關(guān)注存在或存在者；它也被稱為實體或?qū)嶓w們的科學(xué)。

In one place Aristotle tells us that the old question, what is Being?, comes to the same as the question, what is substance? So that first philosophy can be called the theory of first and universal substance.

亞里士多德在一個地方告訴我們，古老的問題，什么是存在？等同于問題，什么是實體？因此，第一哲學(xué)可以被稱為第一和普遍實體的理論。

Are all these definitions of the subject matter of philosophy equivalent to each other – or indeed compatible with each other??

這些關(guān)于哲學(xué)主題的定義是否彼此等價——或者確實相容？

Some historians, thinking them incompatible, have attributed the different kinds of definition to different periods of Aristotle’s life.?

有些歷史學(xué)家認(rèn)為它們不相容，把不同種類的定義歸因于亞里士多德生命中不同的時期。

But with an effort we can show that the definitions can be reconciled.?

但是經(jīng)過努力我們可以證明這些定義可以被調(diào)和。

Before asking what Being qua being is, we need to settle what Being is.?

在問什么是作為存在的存在之前，我們需要確定什么是存在。

Aristotle is using the Greek phrase to on in the same way as Parmenides did:?Being is whatever is anything whatever.?

亞里士多德使用希臘語短語to on的方式與巴門尼德相同：存在是任何“”是任何東西"的東西。

Whenever Aristotle explains the senses of ‘to on’ he does so by explaining the sense of ‘einai’, the verb ‘to be’.?

每當(dāng)亞里士多德解釋“to on”的意義時，他都是通過解釋“einai”，即動詞“to be”的意義來做的。

Being, in its broadest sense, is whatever can appear, in some true sentence, followed by ‘is’.

存在，在它最廣泛的意義上，是任何可以出現(xiàn)在某個真實的句子中，后面跟著“is”的東西。

On this view, a science of being would be less like a science of the existent than a science of true predication.

從這個觀點來看，存在的科學(xué)與其說是存在者的科學(xué)，不如說是真實陳述的科學(xué)。

All the categories, Aristotle tells us, signify being, because any verb can be replaced by a predicate which will contain the verb ‘to be’: ‘Socrates runs’, for instance, can be replaced by ‘Socrates is a runner’.?

所有的范疇，亞里士多德告訴我們，都表示存在，因為任何動詞都可以被一個包含動詞“to be”的謂語所替代：“蘇格拉底跑步”，例如，可以被替換為“蘇格拉底是一個跑步者”。

And every being in any category other than substance is a property or modification of substance.?

而除了實體之外的任何范疇中的每一個存在都是實體的屬性或變化。

This means that wherever you have a subject–verb sentence in which the subject is not a term for a substance, you can turn it into another subject–verb sentence in which the subject term does denote a substance – a first substance, like a particular man or cabbage.

這意味著無論你在哪里有一個主語-動詞句子，其中主語不是一個實體的術(shù)語，你都可以把它變成另一個主語-動詞句子，其中主語術(shù)語確實表示一個實體——一個第一實體，比如一個特定的人或卷心菜。

With Aristotle, as with Parmenides, it is a mistake simply to equate being with existence.?

在亞里士多德那里，就像在巴門尼德那里一樣，僅僅把存在(being)等同于existence是一個錯誤。

When he discusses the senses of ‘being’ and ‘is’ in his philosophical lexicon in the Metaphysics Aristotle does not even mention existence as one of the senses of the verb ‘to be’, a use to be distinguished from the use of the verb with a complement in a predicate, as in ‘to be a philosopher’.?

當(dāng)他在《形而上學(xué)》中的哲學(xué)詞典中討論“存在”和“是”的意義時，亞里士多德甚至沒有提到存在作為動詞“to be”的一種意義，這種用法要與動詞帶有謂語補足語的用法區(qū)分開來，比如“to be a philosopher”。

This is surprising, because he seems himself to have made the distinction in earlier books. In the Sophistical Refutations, to counter the sophism that whatever is thought of must exist in order to be thought of, Aristotle distinguishes between ‘to be F’, where the verb is followed by a predicate (e.g. ‘to be thought of’) and ‘to be’ period.?

這令人驚訝，因為他似乎自己在早期的書中就做了這種區(qū)分。在《對智者詭辯術(shù)的反駁》中，為了反駁任何被思考的東西必須存在才能被思考的詭辯，亞里士多德區(qū)分了“to be F”，其中動詞后面跟著一個謂語（例如“to be thought of”）和“to be.” 。

He makes a similar move in connection with the being F of that which has ceased to be, period: e.g. from ‘Homer is a poet’ it does not follow that he is.

他在關(guān)于“曾經(jīng)是F現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)不存在了”的問題上做了類似的區(qū)分：例如，從“荷馬是一個詩人”不一定推出他存在。

It is a mistake, perhaps, to look in Aristotle for a single treatment of existence.?

也許，在亞里士多德那里尋找一個關(guān)于存在的單一處理是一個錯誤。

When philosophers pose problems about what things really exist and what things do not, they may have three different contrasts in mind: that between the abstract and the concrete (e.g. wisdom vs. Socrates), that between the fictional and the factual (e.g. Pegasus vs. Bucephalus), and that between the extant and the defunct (e.g. the Great Pyramid vs. the Colossus of Rhodes).?

當(dāng)哲學(xué)家提出關(guān)于什么東西真的存在和什么東西不存在的問題時，他們可能心中有三種不同的對比：抽象和具體之間的對比（例如，智慧與蘇格拉底），虛構(gòu)和事實之間的對比{例如，飛馬與布西發(fā)拉斯(古代的真實馬匹)} ，以及現(xiàn)存和消亡之間的對比（例如，大金字塔與羅得島巨像）。

In different places, Aristotle treats of all three problems.

在不同的地方，亞里士多德處理了這三個問題

He deals with the problem about abstractions when he discusses accidents: they are all modifications of substance.?

他在討論偶然性時處理了關(guān)于抽象的問題：它們都是實體的變化。

Any statement about abstractions (such as colours, actions, changes) must be analysable into one about concrete first substances.?

任何關(guān)于抽象的陳述（如顏色、動作、變化）都必須能夠分析成關(guān)于具體的第一實體的陳述。

He deals with the problem about fictions by introducing a sense of ‘is’ in which it means ‘is true’: a fiction is a genuine thought, but it is not, i.e. is not true.?

他通過引入一種“是”的意義來處理關(guān)于虛構(gòu)的問題，表示“是真的”：虛構(gòu)是一種真實的思想，但它不存在，即不是真的。

The problem about the extant and the defunct, problems about things which come into existence and go out of existence, are solved by the application of the doctrine of matter and form.?

關(guān)于現(xiàn)存和消亡的問題，關(guān)于進入存在和退出存在的事物的問題，是通過運用質(zhì)料和形式的學(xué)說來解決的。

To exist, in this sense, is to be matter under a certain form, it is to be a thing of a certain kind: Socrates ceases to exist if he ceases to be a human being. Being, for Aristotle, includes anything that?exists in any of these ways.

在這個意義上，存在就是在某種形式下的質(zhì)料，就是一種特定種類的東西：蘇格拉底如果不再是一個人類，就不再存在。對于亞里士多德來說，存在（Being）包括任何以這些方式存在的東西。

If that is what Being is, what then is Being qua Being? The answer is that there?is no such thing.?

如果這就是存在的意思，那么作為存在的存在又是什么呢？答案是沒有這樣的東西。

Certainly, you can study Being qua being, and you can look for?causes of Being qua being.?

當(dāng)然，你可以研究作為存在的存在，也可以尋找存在作為存在的原因。

But this is to engage in a special sort of study, to look?for a special sort of cause.?

但這是一種特殊的研究，尋找一種特殊的原因。

It is not to study a special kind of Being, or to look for?the causes of a special kind of Being.?

它不是研究一種特殊的存在，也不是尋找一種特殊的存在的原因。

Aristotle more than once insisted that ‘An?A qua F is G’ must be regarded as consisting of a subject A, and a predicate ‘is,?qua F, G’.?

亞里士多德不止一次地堅持，“An A qua F is G”必須被看作由一個主語A和一個謂語“is, qua F, G”組成。

It should not be regarded as consisting of a predicate ‘is G’ which is?attached to a subject An-A-qua-F.?

它不應(yīng)該被看作由一個謂語“is G”組成，這個謂語附著在一個主語An-A-qua-F上。

One example he gives is that ‘A good can be?known as good’ should not be analysed as ‘a(chǎn) good as good can be known’,?because ‘a(chǎn) good as good’ is nonsense.?

他給出的一個例子是，“A good can be known as good”不應(yīng)該被分析為“a good as good can be known”，因為“a good as good”是無意義的。

But if ‘A qua F’ is a pseudo-subject in ‘An A qua F is G’, equally, ‘A qua F’ is a?pseudo-object in ‘We study A qua F’.?

但是如果“A qua F”在“An A qua F is G”中是一個偽主語，同樣地，“A qua F”在“We study A qua F”中也是一個偽對象。

The object of that sentence is A, and the?verb is ‘study qua F’.?

這個句子的對象是A，而動詞是“study qua F”。

We are talking, not of the study of a special kind of object,?but of a special kind of study, a study which looks for special kinds of?explanation and causes, causes qua F.?

我們說的不是對一種特殊對象的研究，而是對一種特殊研究的研究，一種尋找特殊種類的解釋和原因的研究，即qua F的原因。

For instance, when we do human?physiology, we study men qua animals, that is to say, we study the structures andfunctions which humans have in common with animals.?

例如，當(dāng)我們做人類生理學(xué)時，我們研究人類作為動物，也就是說，我們研究人類與動物共有的結(jié)構(gòu)和功能。

There is no object which?is a man qua animal, and it would be foolish to ask whether all men, or only?some specially brutish men, are men qua animals.?

沒有一個對象是作為動物的人類，問所有人或只有一些特別野蠻的人是否是作為動物的人類是愚蠢的。

It is equally foolish to ask?whether Being qua Being means all beings or only some specially divine beings.

同樣地，問作為存在的存在是否意味著所有存在者或只有一些特別神圣的存在者也是愚蠢的。

However, you can study any being from the particular point of view of being,?that is you can study it in virtue of what it has in common with all other beings.?

然而，你可以從存在的特定角度來研究任何存在者，也就是說，你可以根據(jù)它與所有其他存在者共有的東西來研究它。

That, one might think, is surely very little: and indeed Aristotle himself says that?nothing has being as its essence or nature: there is nothing which is just a being?and nothing else.?

有人可能認(rèn)為，這一點肯定很少：而且亞里士多德自己也說沒有什么東西以存在為本質(zhì)或性質(zhì)：沒有什么東西只是一個存在而沒有別的。

But to study something?as a being?is to study something about?which true predications can be made, precisely from the point of view of the?possibility of making true predications of it.?

但作為一個存在者來研究某個東西就是研究關(guān)于可以做出真實陳述的東西，正是從做出真實陳述的可能性的角度來看。

Aristotle’s first philosopher is not?making a study of some particular kind of being; he is studying everything, the?whole of Being, precisely as such.?

亞里士多德的第一哲學(xué)不是在研究某一種特定的存在；他在研究一切事物，整個存在，正如它本身那樣。

Now an Aristotelian science is a science of causes, so that the science of Being?qua being will be a science which assigns the causes of there being any truths?whatever about anything.?Can there be such causes?

現(xiàn)在亞里士多德式的科學(xué)是一門原因之學(xué)，所以作為存在之學(xué)將會是一門指定任何關(guān)于任何事物都有真理之原因的科學(xué)。有這樣的原因嗎？

It is not too difficult to give?sense to a particular being’s having a cause qua being.?

要讓一個特定的存在者有一個作為存在者的原因，并不太困難。

If I had never been?conceived, there would never have been any truths about me; Aristotle says that?if Socrates had never existed neither ‘Socrates is well’ nor ‘Socrates is unwell’?would ever have been true.?

如果我從未被受孕，就永遠(yuǎn)不會有任何關(guān)于我的真理；亞里士多德說如果蘇格拉底從未存在過，“蘇格拉底身體好”或“蘇格拉底身體不好”就永遠(yuǎn)不會成立。

So my parents who brought me into existence are?causes of me, qua being. (They are, of course, also causes of me qua human.)?

所以把我?guī)氪嬖谥械母改妇褪俏易鳛榇嬖谥?。（他們?dāng)然也是我作為人類之原因。）

So?also are their parents, and their parents in turn, and ultimately, Adam and Eve, if?we are all descended from a single pair.?

他們的父母，以及他們父母的父母，最終，亞當(dāng)和夏娃，如果我們都是從一對夫婦衍生出來的。

And if there was anything which?produced Adam and Eve, that would be the cause of all human beings, qua?beings.

如果有什么東西產(chǎn)生了亞當(dāng)和夏娃，那就是所有人類作為存在之原因。

?

We can see from this clearly enough how the Christian God, the maker of the world, could be regarded as the cause of Being qua being – the cause, in his own existence, of truths about himself, and as creator the efficient cause of the possibility of any truth about anything else.?

我們可以從這里清楚地看出，基督教的上帝，世界的造物主，如何能被視為存在之所以存在的原因——他自己的存在是關(guān)于他自己的真理的原因，而作為創(chuàng)造者，他是任何其他事物的真理可能性的有效原因。

But what is the cause of Being qua being in Aristotle’s system, in which there is no maker of the world??

但是在亞里士多德的體系中，沒有世界的造物主，那么存在之所以存在的原因是什么呢？

At the supreme point of Aristotle’s hierarchy of beings are the moved and unmoved movers which are the final causes of all generation and corruption. They are therefore in one respect the causes of all perceptible and corruptible beings, in so far as they are beings.?

在亞里士多德的存在層級中，最高點是動者和不動者，它們是一切生成和腐敗的終極原因。因此，在某種意義上，它們是所有可感知和可腐敗的存在的原因，只要它們是存在。

The science which reaches up to the unmoved mover will be studying the explanation of all true predication whatever, and therefore will be studying every being qua being.?

能夠達到不動者的科學(xué)將會研究一切真實陳述的解釋，因此也將會研究每一個作為存在的存在。

In his Metaphysics Aristotle explains that there are three kinds of substances: perishable bodies, eternal bodies, and immutable beings.?

在他的《形而上學(xué)》中，亞里士多德解釋說有三種實體：可滅亡的身體，永恒的身體，和不變的存在。

The first two kinds belong to natural science and the third to first philosophy.?

前兩種屬于自然科學(xué)，而第三種屬于第一哲學(xué)。

Whatever explains substances, he says, explains all things; since without substances there would be neither active nor passive change.?

他說，只要能夠解釋實體，就能夠解釋一切事物；因為沒有實體就不會有主動或被動的變化。

He then goes on to prove the existence of an unmoved mover; and concludes ‘on such a principle the heavens and nature depend’ – i.e. eternal bodies and perishable bodies alike depend on immutable being.?

他接著證明了不動者的存在；并且總結(jié)說“諸天和自然都依賴于這樣一個原則”——也就是說，永恒的身體和可滅亡的身體都依賴于不變的存在。

And this is the divine, the object of theology.?

而這就是神圣的，天論的對象。

The unmoved mover is prior to other substances and substances are prior to all other beings.?

不動者先于其他實體，而實體先于所有其他存在。

‘Prior’ is here used not in a temporal sense, but to denote dependency: A is prior to B if you can have A without B and you cannot have B without A.?

“先于”在這里不是用來表示時間上的意義，而是用來表示依賴關(guān)系：如果你可以有A而沒有B，并且你不能有B而沒有A，那么A就先于B。

If there was no unmoved mover, there would be no heavens and no nature; if there were no substances there would be no other beings.?

如果沒有不動者，就不會有諸天和自然；如果沒有實體，就不會有其他存在。

We can see now why Aristotle says that what is prior has greater explanatory power than what is posterior, and why the science of the divine beings can be said to be the most universal science because it is prior: it deals with beings which are prior, i.e. further back in the chain of dependence.?

我們現(xiàn)在可以看出，為什么亞里士多德說先東西比后東西有更大的解釋力，以及為什么神圣存在的科學(xué)可以被說是最普遍的科學(xué)，因為它是先于的：它處理的是先于的存在，也就是說，在依賴鏈中更靠后的存在。

The science of divine beings is more universal than the science of physics because it explains both divine beings and natural beings; the science of physics explains only natural beings and not also divine beings.?

神圣存在的科學(xué)比物理學(xué)更普遍，因為它解釋了神圣存在和自然存在；物理學(xué)只解釋了自然存在，而不也解釋了神圣存在。

We can at last see how the different definitions of first philosophy cohere together.?

我們終于可以看出，第一哲學(xué)的不同定義是如何相互協(xié)調(diào)的。

Any science can be defined either by giving the field it is to explain, or by specifying principles by which it explains.?

任何科學(xué)都可以通過給出它要解釋的領(lǐng)域，或者通過指定它用來解釋的原則來定義。

First philosophy is universal in its field: it undertakes to offer one kind of explanation of everything whatever, to assign one of the causes of the truth of every true predication.?

第一哲學(xué)在它的領(lǐng)域中是普遍的：它承擔(dān)了提供一種對一切事物的解釋，給出每一個真實陳述的真理的一個原因。

It is the science of Being qua being.?

它是存在之所以存在的科學(xué)。

But if we turn from the explicandum to the explicans, we can say that first philosophy is the science of the divine; for what it explains, it explains by reference to the divine unmoved mover.?

但是如果我們從被解釋者轉(zhuǎn)向解釋者，我們可以說第一哲學(xué)是神圣的科學(xué)；因為它所解釋的，它是通過參照神圣的不動者來解釋的。

It does not deal just with a single kind of Being, for it gives an account not only of the divine itself, but of everything else that exists or is anything.

它不僅僅處理一種存在，因為它不僅給出了關(guān)于神圣本身的描述，而且還給出了關(guān)于其他一切存在或任何事物的描述。

But it is par excellence the science of the divine, because it explains everything not, like physics, by reference to nature, but by reference to the divine.?

但是它是最優(yōu)秀的神圣科學(xué)，因為它不像物理學(xué)那樣通過參照自然來解釋一切，而是通過參照神圣來解釋一切。

Thus theology and the science of Being qua being are one and the same first philosophy.?

因此，天論和存在之所以存在的科學(xué)是同一個第一哲學(xué)。

One is sometimes invited to believe that the final stage in the understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics is an appreciation of the profound and mysterious nature of Being qua Being.?

在理解亞里士多德時，有時候亞里士多德會請求人們認(rèn)同形而上學(xué)的最后階段是對存在作為存在深刻和神秘本質(zhì)的欣賞。

Rather, the first step towards such an understanding is the realization that Being qua Being is a chimerical spectre engendered by inattention to Aristotle’s logic.?

相反，邁向這種理解的第一步是認(rèn)識到，存在作為存在是一個因不注意亞里士多德邏輯而產(chǎn)生的虛幻幽靈。