1. How Much Should We Trust Estimates of Firm Effects and Worker Sorting?

我們應(yīng)該在多大程度上相信企業(yè)效應(yīng)和工人分類(lèi)的估計(jì)值？

Stéphane?Bonhomme,?Kerstin?Holzheu,?Thibaut?Lamadon,?Elena?Manresa,?Magne?Mogstad, and?Bradley?Setzler

Many studies use matched employer-employee data to estimate a statistical model of earnings determination with worker and firm fixed effects. Estimates based on this model have produced influential yet controversial conclusions. The objective of this paper is to assess the sensitivity of these conclusions to the biases that arise because of limited mobility of workers across firms. We use employer-employee data from the United States and several European countries while taking advantage of both fixed effects and random effects methods for bias correction. We find that limited mobility bias is severe and that bias correction is important.

許多研究使用匹配的雇主-雇員數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)估算帶有工人和公司固定效應(yīng)的收入決定統(tǒng)計(jì)模型?；谠撃Ｐ偷墓浪愕贸隽艘恍┯杏绊懥Φ袪?zhēng)議的結(jié)論。本文的目的是評(píng)估這些結(jié)論對(duì)工人在企業(yè)間有限流動(dòng)性所產(chǎn)生的偏見(jiàn)的敏感性。我們使用了美國(guó)和幾個(gè)歐洲國(guó)家的雇主-雇員數(shù)據(jù)，同時(shí)利用固定效應(yīng)和隨機(jī)效應(yīng)方法進(jìn)行偏差校正。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，有限流動(dòng)性偏差非常嚴(yán)重，因此偏差校正非常重要。

2.?Network Connections and Board Seats: Are Female Networks Less Valuable？

網(wǎng)絡(luò)連接和董事會(huì)席位：女性網(wǎng)絡(luò)更有價(jià)值嗎？

Emma?von Essen?and Nina?Smith

We investigate how sizes of professional networks affect the probability of appointment to a supervisory board and whether the effect is gendered. Using an employer-employee data set of the Danish labor market, 1995–2011, we find larger networks to associate with a higher probability of becoming a first-time director. The effect is larger for men. One explanation is that men, compared with women, have more connections to larger and listed firms and to other males—attributes that increase the appointment probability. Women who have connections to incumbent directors before being appointed director have more labor market experience than other directors.

我們研究了職業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的規(guī)模如何影響監(jiān)事會(huì)成員的任命概率，以及這種影響是否具有性別特征。利用 1995-2011 年丹麥勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的雇主-雇員數(shù)據(jù)集，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)規(guī)模越大，成為首次董事的概率越高。男性受到的影響更大。一種解釋是，與女性相比，男性與大型公司、上市公司和其他男性有更多聯(lián)系，而這些屬性會(huì)增加任命概率。與其他董事相比，在被任命為董事之前與現(xiàn)任董事有聯(lián)系的女性擁有更多的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

3.?Labor Market Discrimination against Family Responsibilities: A Correspondence Study with Policy Change in China?

勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)對(duì)家庭責(zé)任的歧視： 中國(guó)政策變化的對(duì)應(yīng)研究

Haoran?He,?Sherry Xin?Li, and Yuling?Han

China shifted its controversial one-child policy (1979–2015) to a two-child policy in 2016. We take advantage of this unexpected policy change and the heterogeneities in the prechange environment to investigate labor market discrimination against expected family responsibilities. In a two-wave correspondence study before and after the policy change, we sent 8,848 fictitious resumes with ages 22–29 in response to online job advertisements. Their gender and only-child/siblinged status were systematically varied. We find that women—but not men—are subject to labor market discrimination for expected family responsibilities. This discrimination worsens with the increase in women’s reproductive age.

2016 年，中國(guó)將備受爭(zhēng)議的獨(dú)生子女政策（1979-2015 年）轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)?span id="s0sssss00s" class="color-blue-03">二胎政策。我們利用這一意料之外的政策變化和變化前環(huán)境的異質(zhì)性來(lái)研究勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)對(duì)預(yù)期家庭責(zé)任的歧視。在政策變化前后的兩波對(duì)應(yīng)研究中，我們發(fā)送了 8848 份年齡為 22-29 歲的虛構(gòu)簡(jiǎn)歷，以回應(yīng)在線招聘廣告。他們的性別和獨(dú)生子女/兄弟姐妹身份被系統(tǒng)地改變。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，女性（而非男性）因預(yù)期的家庭責(zé)任而受到勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)歧視，這種歧視隨著女性生育年齡的增加而加劇。

4.?Mothers Working during Preschool Years and Child Skills: Does Income Compensate?

學(xué)齡前母親工作與兒童技能： 收入補(bǔ)償嗎？

Cheti?Nicoletti,?Kjell G.?Salvanes, and?Emma?Tominey

Increasing mother’s labor supply during a child’s preschool years may reduce time investments, yielding a negative direct effect on midchildhood and teenage outcomes. But as mother’s work hours increase, income will rise. Can income compensate for the negative effect of hours? Our mediation analysis exploits exogenous variation in both mother’s hours and family income. Results suggest a negative, insignificant direct effect from increasing mother’s hours on child test scores. However, the positive mediating effect of income creates a positive total effect on test scores (26% of a standard deviation) for a 10-hour increase in mother’s weekly hours in preschool years.

在孩子學(xué)齡前階段，增加母親的勞動(dòng)力供給可能會(huì)減少時(shí)間投資，從而對(duì)兒童中期和青少年時(shí)期的結(jié)果產(chǎn)生負(fù)面的直接影響。但隨著母親工作時(shí)間的增加，收入也會(huì)增加。收入能否彌補(bǔ)工時(shí)的負(fù)面影響？我們的中介分析利用了母親工時(shí)和家庭收入的外生變化。結(jié)果表明，母親工時(shí)的增加對(duì)孩子考試成績(jī)的直接影響是負(fù)面的，但并不顯著。然而，收入的正向中介效應(yīng)會(huì)對(duì)學(xué)齡前兒童的考試成績(jī)產(chǎn)生正向的總體影響（一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差的 26%）。

5. When the Stadium Goes Silent: How Crowds Affect the Performance of Discriminated Groups?

當(dāng)球場(chǎng)鴉雀無(wú)聲時(shí)：人群如何影響受歧視群體的表現(xiàn)?

Mauro?Caselli,?Paolo?Falco, and?Gianpiero?Mattera

Using a natural experiment induced by COVID-19, we test how the sudden absence of fans at football games impacts player performance in Italy. We find that African players, who are most commonly targeted by racial harassment, play better when fans are no longer at the stadium. A similar, albeit weaker, effect is detected among black players. Using official records of racist behavior by fans, we show that performance improves the most on teams that were subject to abuse before the lockdown. Our evidence suggests that racist pressure can harm discriminated groups and lower the overall quality of the game.

通過(guò) COVID-19 引發(fā)的自然實(shí)驗(yàn)，我們測(cè)試了在意大利，足球比賽中球迷的突然缺席對(duì)球員表現(xiàn)的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，非洲球員是最常見(jiàn)的種族騷擾對(duì)象，當(dāng)球迷不再出現(xiàn)在球場(chǎng)時(shí)，他們的表現(xiàn)會(huì)更好。在黑人球員中也發(fā)現(xiàn)了類(lèi)似的效果，盡管較弱。利用官方對(duì)球迷種族主義行為的記錄，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在禁賽前受到辱罵的球隊(duì)的表現(xiàn)改善最大。我們的證據(jù)表明，種族主義壓力會(huì)損害受歧視群體的利益，并降低比賽的整體質(zhì)量。

6. Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning

工作場(chǎng)所激勵(lì)機(jī)制與組織學(xué)習(xí)

Francesco?Amodio?and?Miguel A.?Martinez-Carrasco

This paper studies learning among coworkers when incentives change. We use a simple principal-agent model to show that when workers are not fully informed on the global shape of the production function, (1) their effort choice changes over time as information is disclosed and processed and (2) changing incentives can trigger this learning process. We test this prediction using personnel data from an egg production plant in Peru. Exploiting a sudden change in the contract parameters, we find that workers learn from each other over the shape of the production function. This adjustment process is costly for the firm.

本文研究激勵(lì)機(jī)制發(fā)生變化時(shí)同事之間的學(xué)習(xí)。我們使用一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的委托-代理模型來(lái)證明，當(dāng)工人不完全了解生產(chǎn)函數(shù)的全局形狀時(shí)，（1）他們的努力選擇會(huì)隨著信息的披露和處理而改變；（2）激勵(lì)機(jī)制的變化會(huì)觸發(fā)這一學(xué)習(xí)過(guò)程。我們利用秘魯一家雞蛋生產(chǎn)廠的人員數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)這一預(yù)測(cè)進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn)。利用合同參數(shù)的突然變化，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)工人們會(huì)相互學(xué)習(xí)生產(chǎn)函數(shù)的形狀。這一調(diào)整過(guò)程對(duì)企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)代價(jià)高昂。

7. Optimal Allocation of Seats in the Presence of Peer Effects: Evidence from a Job Training Program?

存在同伴效應(yīng)時(shí)的席位優(yōu)化配置： 來(lái)自就業(yè)培訓(xùn)項(xiàng)目的證據(jù)?

Matthew D.?Baird,?John?Engberg, and?Isaac M.?Opper

We model optimal treatment assignment in programs with a limited number of seats and study how the presence of peer effects impacts the optimal allocation rule. We then use data from a randomized control trial to show evidence that there are large peer effects in the context of job training for disadvantaged adults in the United States. Finally, we combine the model and the empirics to show that the program would have had a much greater impact if the assignment choices had accounted for the peer effects.

我們建立了名額有限的項(xiàng)目中的最優(yōu)治療分配模型，并研究了同伴效應(yīng)的存在如何影響最優(yōu)分配規(guī)則。然后，我們利用隨機(jī)對(duì)照試驗(yàn)的數(shù)據(jù)，證明在美國(guó)為弱勢(shì)成人提供就業(yè)培訓(xùn)時(shí)存在巨大的同伴效應(yīng)。最后，我們將模型與經(jīng)驗(yàn)相結(jié)合，證明如果分配選擇考慮了同伴效應(yīng)，該計(jì)劃的影響會(huì)更大。

8. Foreign Students in College and the Supply of STEM Graduates

外國(guó)留學(xué)生與STEM畢業(yè)生的供給

Massimo?Anelli,?Kevin?Shih, and?Kevin?Williams

Do foreign students affect the likelihood that domestic students obtain a STEM degree and occupation? Using administrative student records from a US university, we exploit idiosyncratic variation in the share of foreign classmates in introductory math classes and find that foreign classmates displace domestic students from STEM majors and occupations. However, displaced students gravitate toward high-earning social science majors, so their expected earnings are not penalized. We explore several mechanisms. Results indicate that displacement is concentrated in classes where foreign classmates possess weak English language ability, suggesting that diminished in-class communication and social interactions might play an important role.

外國(guó)學(xué)生是否會(huì)影響國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)生獲得 STEM 學(xué)位和職業(yè)的可能性？我們利用美國(guó)一所大學(xué)的學(xué)生管理記錄，利用數(shù)學(xué)入門(mén)課程中外國(guó)同學(xué)比例的特異性變化，發(fā)現(xiàn)外國(guó)同學(xué)會(huì)將國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)生從 STEM 專(zhuān)業(yè)和職業(yè)中淘汰。然而，被取代的學(xué)生傾向于選擇高收入的社會(huì)科學(xué)專(zhuān)業(yè)，因此他們的預(yù)期收入并沒(méi)有受到影響。我們探討了幾種機(jī)制。結(jié)果表明，被取代的學(xué)生集中在外國(guó)同學(xué)英語(yǔ)能力較弱的班級(jí)，這表明課上交流和社會(huì)互動(dòng)的減少可能起到了重要作用。