上一篇請見專欄【翻譯文稿】

Ivan Ilyin is the most important political theorist shaping the ideological underpinning of the modern Russian state of Vladimir Putin.

伊萬·伊林是造就當(dāng)代普京俄羅斯的意識形態(tài)的最重要的政治理論家。

But, there are other political theorists who have influence over the politics of the modern Russian regime.

但是，有其他的政治理論家對當(dāng)代俄羅斯的政治有影響。

After Ivan Elin, one of the most important among them would believe Lev Gumilev.

在伊萬·伊林之后，最重要的人之一就是列夫·谷米廖夫。

Lev Gumilev was a Soviet intellectual who wrote during the second half of the 20th century.

列夫·谷米廖夫是一個(gè)蘇聯(lián)知識分子，在20世紀(jì)后半開始寫作。

He attempted to explain the presence of Communism in the eastern bloc as opposed to the west through the means of geography, climatology, anthropology and weird astrology.

他試圖去通過地理、氣象、人類學(xué)和奇怪的星相學(xué)解釋共產(chǎn)主義為什么在歐洲東部國家而不是西方國家出現(xiàn)。

When the Communists took over Russia, they faced the problem of the Tatar yoke, or Russian backwardness, which I prefer to call Russian lawlessness.

當(dāng)蘇共接管俄國時(shí)，他們面臨著韃靼羈軛或者俄羅斯落后性這個(gè)問題，而我更愿意稱其為俄羅斯不法性。

They initially saw themselves as tasked with overcoming it, but they failed at that task.

他們一開始認(rèn)為他們的任務(wù)是去克服它，然而他們失敗了。

So instead of confronting its legacies and institutions, the Soviets came up with a different idea: the crafting of a new narrative of political history.

所以，與其直面它的歷史包袱和遺留的體制，蘇共想出了一個(gè)新的主意：編撰一個(gè)新的政治歷史理論。

We are no longer the backward ones; We may have once been backward, but now in fact you in the west are the backward ones;

我們不再是落后的那個(gè)了；我們可能曾經(jīng)落后過，但是現(xiàn)在實(shí)際上是你們西方落后了；

And through the guidance of Marxism, we have leap-frogged ahead of you, and we will eventually guide you into that progress.

通過馬克斯主義的引導(dǎo)，我們彎道超了你們的車，而我們終有一天會引導(dǎo)你們來走向進(jìn)步。

Lev Gumilev was one of the Soviet intellectuals tasked with creating narratives of history that could explain and underpin this idea.

列夫·谷米廖夫是被賦予了撰寫這個(gè)新史，并使其能夠解釋并給這個(gè)思想奠基這個(gè)任務(wù)的蘇聯(lián)學(xué)者之一。

His political innovation was to rebrand Eurasianism, a traditionally right-wing position, as part of the Marxist political canon.

他的政治創(chuàng)新在于重新包裝了歐亞主義，一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)上右翼的立場，并把它編進(jìn)馬克斯政治學(xué)正史之中。

He described the separation of east and west as a phenomenon created by geography, climate, astrology, Mongols, and Jewish conspiracies.

他把東西方的劃分描述為一個(gè)由地理、氣候、星象、蒙古人和猶太陰謀論造成的現(xiàn)象。

He claimed that by having access to the world's oceans, the peoples of the west, be they British, Scandinavian, Dutch, French, Iberian or American, had lost their societal and cultural connection to land.

他宣稱，因?yàn)槲鞣饺四軌蚶檬澜绲暮Ｑ?，西方的人們，無論是英國人、北歐人、丹麥人、法國人、伊比利亞人或是美國人，失去了他們對土地的社會和文化鏈接。

Rather than working their lands as peasants, they had become peoples of the sea, through traveling the oceans and trade.

與其在他們的土地上作為農(nóng)民過活，他們通過航行和經(jīng)商成為了“海民”。

They thereby surrendered their deep-rooted traditions and cultures that tied them to land in favor of capitalism, and the politics of individuality and selfishness.

他們于是放棄了他們把他們維系在土地上根深蒂固的傳統(tǒng)和文化，并選擇了資本主義和個(gè)人主義和自私自利的政治。

Russians meanwhile, through remaining landlocked, were people of the soil.

這時(shí)的俄羅斯人，因?yàn)樯钤趦?nèi)陸，是“地民”。

Through never developing a merchant class, bourgeoisie or an industrial proletariat, the Russians remained a nation of peasants, a people who worked their lands and were also bound to them.

因?yàn)閺臎]有發(fā)展出商人階層，布爾喬亞或是工業(yè)無產(chǎn)階級，俄羅斯人仍然是一個(gè)農(nóng)民民族，一個(gè)在土地上勞作并附著于土地的民族。

Gumilev claimed that through being forbidden to ever leave, these peasants developed a communal culture that tied them deeper and more consciously to their land.

谷米廖夫聲稱因?yàn)檫@些農(nóng)民永遠(yuǎn)無法離開，他們發(fā)展出了一個(gè)把他們更緊密、更有意識地與土地連結(jié)的社會文化。

By these means, they were never corrupted by capitalist ideas that had corrupted the west, and remained a people deeply tied, through their labor and communities, to the soil they lived on.

因?yàn)檫@些，他們從來沒有像西方那樣被資本主義思想腐化過，并仍然是一個(gè)被他們的勞作和群落所附著于他們賴以生存的土地上的民族。

It has to be pointed out that Gumilev and his writings are anti-semitic, and are an expression of the often-ignored Marxist anti-Semitism.

這里必須指出，谷米廖夫和他的著作是反猶太的，并且是常常被忽略的馬克思主義反猶傾向的表現(xiàn)。

He described the Jews as an inherently landless people, who through having no conception of a connection in tradition and culture to land or soil, nor an idea of tradition of manual labor in agriculture on land or soil, developed an inherently parasitic culture and politics of feeding off and manipulating other peoples.

他把猶太人描繪成天生沒有土地的民族，他們因?yàn)閭鹘y(tǒng)和文化中沒有對土地連結(jié)的概念，也沒有對土地上農(nóng)業(yè)人力勞作的概念，從而發(fā)展出了一個(gè)天生寄生式的，利用和從其他民族身上吸血的文化和政治。

Gumilev claimed that the Jews had manipulated the Mongols into conquering and oppressing the Slavic peoples, so that the Jews could then parasitically feed off the Slavic peasantry as tax collectors and merchants of monopolies, such as in alcohol.

谷米廖夫聲稱猶太人曾經(jīng)誘導(dǎo)蒙古人來征服并壓迫斯拉夫民族，從而讓猶太人可以通過當(dāng)征稅官和從事像酒這樣的壟斷商業(yè)來吸斯拉夫農(nóng)民的血。

It should be pointed out, if it wasn't obvious is enough already, that this is completely false ahistorical nonsense.

應(yīng)該指出，如果還不夠明顯的話，這些都是完全的偽歷史胡扯。

In part, this claim by Gumilev draws on the anti-semitic publication “on the Jewish question” by Karl Marx;

谷米廖夫的這些聲張一部分來自于卡爾馬克斯的反猶太著作“猶太人問題”；

Which describes Judaism as a religion that merely provides some spiritual wishy-washy justification to what is actually a material practice by the Jews of being money hoarders and schemers.

這個(gè)文章里把猶太教描述成猶太人作為財(cái)閥和陰謀家物質(zhì)行為的精神粉飾。

It is in fact often forgotten today that Marx reinforced the anti-semitic stereotype of the Jews as money hoarders and manipulators.

今天被很多人遺忘的是，馬克斯對猶太人作為財(cái)閥和陰謀家的刻板印象起到了推波助瀾的作用。

From the perspective of soviet Marxist scholars, Jews were a group of people who had developed a distinctive cultural and ethnic consciousness, that made it difficult for Jews to develop a class consciousness.

從蘇修馬克斯學(xué)者的角度看，猶太人是一個(gè)有著獨(dú)特文化和民族認(rèn)知的人群，從而使得他們難以發(fā)展出階級認(rèn)知。

Because of this, Jews were categorized in the Soviet Union as a special nationality group, and were often surveilled and treated with suspicion across communist countries.

因此，猶太人在蘇聯(lián)內(nèi)被分成一個(gè)特殊的民族，并經(jīng)常被監(jiān)視，在共產(chǎn)主義國家中飽受猜疑。

The Communists believed that they had to break a Jewish ethnic consciousness to replace it with a class consciousness.

蘇共認(rèn)為他們需要破壞猶太人的民族意識并用階級意識取而代之。

You can see this attitude towards Jews as inherently part yet apart reflected in modern Russia to this day, where Jews are often described and shown as both part of society, but also different and separate from society.

你能在現(xiàn)代俄羅斯發(fā)現(xiàn)這種既把猶太人當(dāng)作社會的一部分又和社會相分離的看法，猶太人既被描繪成社會的一部分，但總和社會的其他分子不同并相獨(dú)立。

It is also reflected among a certain type of modern Marxist in our day and age, who believe they have the authority to select and categorize Jews as either good Jews with class consciousness, and bad Jews who want to preserve and define a Jewish cultural identity.

這也在當(dāng)今某種馬克斯主義者身上有所反映，他們相信他們有權(quán)力去挑選并給猶太人分類，分成有階級意識的好的猶太人，和想保留并定義一個(gè)猶太文化身份的壞的猶太人。

This anti-semitic idea of Gumilev is very much in line with these notions and was very popular in Soviet Russia.

谷米廖夫的這種反猶思想和這些觀念一致，并在蘇俄很受歡迎。

You will find for example that Solzhenitsyn evoked this idea in his own writings about Russian Jews.

作為例子你能夠在索爾仁尼琴的作品中找到這些對于俄國猶太人的觀念。

Gumilev also based much of his ideas on interpretations of geography.

谷米廖夫很多觀點(diǎn)也來自于他對地理的解讀。

He used meteorological statistics and temperature measurements to draw a line straight across Europe, that conveniently went straight through the border of Western and East Germany, and claimed that because of the colder temperatures east of that line, Siberia began in Germany.

他用天氣數(shù)據(jù)和氣溫測量花了一條切開歐洲的線，而它正好經(jīng)過了東西德的邊界，然后他聲稱由于這條線以東溫度更低，西伯利亞是從德國開始的。

East of that line, he claimed, Winters were colder, peasants had to work harder, agriculture was more widespread, therefore peasant culture prevailed, storage economies were more necessary, and because of these supposedly geographic factors, these places had an easier start into communism;

這條線以東，他說，冬天更冷，農(nóng)民需要更賣力工作，農(nóng)業(yè)更加廣泛，所以農(nóng)民文化占主流，存儲型經(jīng)濟(jì)成為了必須，而因?yàn)檫@些似乎是地理的源因，這些地方更容易轉(zhuǎn)型進(jìn)入共產(chǎn)主義。

While those living to the west of this line had more comfortable lives, richer harvests, access to the seas and therefore stagnated into capitalism.

同時(shí)生活在這條線以西的人日子過得更舒服，農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)出更高，能夠進(jìn)入海洋，所以停滯于資本主義。

This is also nonsense.

這些也是扯淡。

Famines were widespread and regular all across Europe before the Colombian Exchange brought potatoes, maize and corn.

饑荒在歐洲所有地方都曾經(jīng)經(jīng)常性地發(fā)生，直到哥倫布帶回了土豆和玉米。

But also, if you look at European metrological data, you will realize that by the standards of Gumilev, you can pretty much draw the borders of his imagined Siberia everywhere.

不光如此，如果你去看歐洲的氣象學(xué)數(shù)據(jù)，你會發(fā)現(xiàn)根據(jù)谷米廖夫的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，你可以把他想象中的西伯利亞邊界放到任何地方。

You can just as well declare Norway, Iceland and Switzerland to be part of Siberia by his imagined geographic standards.

根據(jù)他腦海里的地理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，你也能宣稱挪威、冰島和瑞士是西伯利亞的一部分。

Gumilev's final contribution to the rebranding of Eurasianism didn't come from ripping measurements out of any scientific field like geography, but from weird esoteric writings about astrology.

谷米廖夫?qū)χ匦掳b歐亞主義的最后貢獻(xiàn)并不是來自套用像地理這樣的科學(xué)數(shù)據(jù)，而是通過奇怪的神秘天文學(xué)。

He claimed that the success or failure of a civilization depended on cosmic energy emitted from the Sun, that once every few centuries the sun emitted a burst of energy that would hit Earth, and energize a people into greatness.

他聲稱一個(gè)文明的成功與失敗取決于來自太陽的星空能量，每隔幾個(gè)世紀(jì)太陽就會爆發(fā)出一波能量，擊中地球，然后給一個(gè)民族的崛起充能。

The cosmic rays that had invigorated European civilization happened long ago during the Roman age.

給歐洲文明充能的星空輻射發(fā)生在很早以前的古羅馬時(shí)代。

Europe's cosmic energy was therefore decaying and spent.

所以歐洲的“星能量”已經(jīng)衰敗透支。

The west was therefore a dying civilization that had run out of cosmic energy.

所以西方是一個(gè)花光了星能量的瀕死文明。

But the Russians had not received but inherited the cosmic rays and energy of the Mongols, through being conquered and mixed with the Mongols.

但是，俄羅斯人不是收到，而是通過被蒙古人征服并混血而繼承了蒙古人的星空射線和能量。

Therefore, the Russians were the youngest and most cosmically energetic of all civilizations.

所以，俄羅斯人是所有文明里最年輕和最具有星能量的文明。

And it was with this Cosmic Mongol energy that the Russians will carry communism into the world.

而俄羅斯人將會帶著這股“星空蒙古能量”將共產(chǎn)主義傳遍全球。

As the historian Timothy Snyder described his summarized theories: “Gumilev believed that it was Russia's Destiny, as a civilization, to conquer the west and turn it into Mongolia.”

就像歷史學(xué)家蒂莫西·斯奈德描述他的綜述那樣：“谷米廖夫相信俄羅斯文明的命運(yùn)是將征服西方并把它變成蒙古帝國?！?/p>

if you ever heard “Marxists” ramble about Eurasian civilization or the Mongolian civilizational mission of Marxism, as mad as these ramblings may sound, they are based on actual political theories written by a Marxist thinker, namely Lev Gumilev.

如果你聽見過“馬克斯主義者”說著什么歐亞文明，或是馬克斯主義的蒙古文明使命，雖然這些自言自語聽上去毫無理智可言，它們的確是基于一個(gè)“馬克斯思想家”寫的政治理論，那就是列夫·谷米廖夫。

Gumilev's rebranding of Eurasianism made it part of the soviet Marxist canon.

谷米廖夫?qū)W亞主義的再包裝把它變成了蘇修馬克思主義正史的一部分。

It is the reason why you find Eurasianism advocated in some Marxist corners to this day, in particular those circles that still adhere to soviet communism.

這是某些馬克思主義的角落里仍然有人宣揚(yáng)歐亞主義的原因，尤其是那些仍然堅(jiān)持蘇聯(lián)式共產(chǎn)主義的圈子。

The Russian lawlessness was rebranded as a Russian progress, or as a means by which Russia was uniquely able in the world to advance communism by overcoming others.

俄羅斯的不法性被套上了俄羅斯的先進(jìn)性的套子，或是被說成一種俄羅斯獨(dú)特于世界的，通過克服他人來發(fā)展共產(chǎn)主義的方式。

As a result, you still have Marxists today who argue in defense of Russia under the Putin regime, even though it has little to do with Marx's doctrine anymore.

結(jié)果是，今天你仍然能看到馬克思主義者為普京政權(quán)下的俄羅斯辯護(hù)，即使它已經(jīng)和馬克斯的理論風(fēng)馬牛不相干了。

Gumilev provided Marxists with a rebranded, enlightened nationalism of sorts.

谷米廖夫給馬克思主義者提供了一種重新包裝過的，‘進(jìn)步的’國家主義

The idea of Russia's unique positioning through history as the vessel of a civilizational mission in destroying Western capitalism, formulated by Lev Gumilev, plays the central role in this phenomenon.

由列夫·谷米廖夫闡述的，俄羅斯在歷史中的特殊性給了它作為摧毀西方資本主義的文明載體這個(gè)思想，是這種現(xiàn)象的中心原因。

Gumilev's Eurasianism remains popular in Russia to this day.

谷米廖夫的歐亞主義至今在俄羅斯都很受歡迎。

He is widely commemorated and celebrated by the Putin regime.

他被普京政府廣泛紀(jì)念并頌揚(yáng)。

Putin has stated that he believes in Gumilev's theories, and that Gumilev's writings are the foundation of how he views geopolitics.

普京說過他相信谷米廖夫的理論，且谷米廖夫的作品是他對地緣政治的見解的基石。

Gumilev's Eurasianism is Putin's Eurasianism, minus the Marxism.

谷米廖夫的歐亞主義就是普京的歐亞主義，除了馬克斯那部分。

?

In internal politics, how he views the role of state, society, politics and Russia's role, Putin still relies heavily on Ivan Ilyin.

在內(nèi)政上，關(guān)于它是如何看待政府的作用，社會，政治和俄羅斯的角色，普京仍然非常依賴伊萬·伊林。

But on foreign policy and what Russia's role in the world ought to be, Gumilev plays a significant role.

但是對于外交政策和俄羅斯在世界上應(yīng)有的立場，谷米廖夫起到了很大的作用。

In some ways Putin combines the ideas of a Fascist and a Marxist political theorist in his regime's politics.

某種意義上普京在他的政權(quán)政策中融合了來自法西斯和馬克斯主義政治理論家的思想。

There's a final influential thinker whose influence can be seen in modern Russia, specifically in its preservation of lawlessness.

有最后一個(gè)有影響力的思想家的影子可以在現(xiàn)代俄羅斯看到，尤其是在它對不法性的保持上。

This one, however, isn't Russian, but German: Karl Schmidt.

不過這一個(gè)不是俄國人，而是德國人：卡爾·施密特。（噔噔咚）

?

Karl Schmidt was a Nazi law professor, and became the chief legal theorist of the Nazi German State.

卡爾·施密特是一個(gè)納粹法律學(xué)教授，并成為了納粹德國的首席法律理論家。

He provided the legal justification and framework for Hitler's seizure of absolute dictatorial powers, was instrumental in creating the legal framework and theories of the Nazi State;

他提供了讓希特勒奪取絕對獨(dú)裁權(quán)力的法律理由和架構(gòu)，對構(gòu)建納粹政府的法律框架和理論不可或缺；

And after the second world war, Schmidt remained an unrepentant Nazi, a committed fascist and vicious anti-semite.

并且在二戰(zhàn)后，施密特仍然是個(gè)頑固不化的納粹，一個(gè)堅(jiān)定的法西斯和極端的反猶太者。

This barred him from any work in Germany, so he worked as a law professor at a university in Franco’s Spain, where he formulated more theories.

這使得他沒辦法在德國工作，所以他在佛朗哥的西班牙的一所大學(xué)里當(dāng)法學(xué)教授，并在那里寫了更多理論。

（譯注：他在納粹發(fā)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)爭和開始種族清洗前就因?yàn)檎姴缓媳婚_除黨籍，所以沒有被審判）

Carl Schmidt's influence, specifically the influence of his writings, is far more widespread than many first assume.

卡爾·施密特的影響力，尤其是他著作的影響力，比大部分人所一開始設(shè)想的要大得多。

To historians who study law or legal history, Karl Schmidt is sort of an unwelcome ghost of sorts, or a kind of potent doom.

對于學(xué)習(xí)法律或法學(xué)歷史的歷史學(xué)家而言，卡爾·施密特就像是個(gè)不受歡迎的鬼魂一樣，或是某種在即的末日。

His writings always creep up and appear among politicians when something really bad is about to happen.

他的著作總在某些非常壞的事情發(fā)生前在政客之中露出頭腳來。

The most infamous example is that Karl Schmidt's legal theories can be found in the constitution that Pinochet forced on Chile.

最臭名昭著的例子是卡爾·施密特的法律理論能在皮諾切特強(qiáng)加給智利的憲法中找到。

Karl Schmidt’s theories in geopolitics can also be found, reflected and discussed in the school of international relations called realism.

卡爾·施密特的地緣政治理論也在名叫現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的國際關(guān)系學(xué)派中找到并被討論。

Not just popular in the far right, his theories have also been repeated and used in the far left.

不光在極右圈子里面收到歡迎，他的理論也被極左所重復(fù)并被使用。

You will for example find the influence of Karl Schmidt's work in the writings of Michelle Foucault.

舉個(gè)例子，你能夠在米歇爾·?？碌闹髦姓业娇枴な┟芴刈髌返挠绊?。

His legal theories are also frequently discussed as a negative example to criticize Richard Nixon's Watergate scandal, Kissinger's foreign policy in South America and East Asia, and the War on Terror.

他的法律理論也被頻繁地作為反例用來批評理查德·尼克森的水門事件，基辛格在南美和東亞的外交政策，和反恐戰(zhàn)爭。

Karl Schmidt's most influential body of work, as a political and legal theorist, are attacks against parliamentary democracy, liberal democracy, and a liberal world order, popular sovereignty and constitutional rule of law.

卡爾·施密特作為政治和法律理論家影響最大的成果，是針對議會制民主，自由派民主，以及一個(gè)自由派世界秩序，民眾主權(quán)和憲法法治的攻擊。

Among these is his state theory of the “state of emergency”.

在這之中是他的國家理論，“應(yīng)急事態(tài)政府”。

（譯注：state既作國家、政府之意也取事態(tài)、狀態(tài)之意。）

During the chaos of the Weimar Republic, Schmidt proclaimed that rule of law was an unfit construct to provide security in times of crisis, and therefore fostered insecurity.

在魏瑪共和國的混亂中，施密特宣稱法治是一個(gè)不適合在危急關(guān)頭提供保障的架構(gòu)，所以它促進(jìn)了不安定。

Therefore, it was an unfit construct to govern a society in general.

所以，它普遍上講不是一個(gè)適合來治理一個(gè)社會的架構(gòu)。

The liberal order of a state, through rule of law and accountability, is according to him too weak to preserve a sovereign and permanent social order;

一個(gè)國家通過法制和責(zé)任制實(shí)現(xiàn)的自由主義秩序，據(jù)他所說過于軟弱，不能保障一個(gè)永久的主權(quán)社會秩序。

Because politics to Schmidt is nothing more than struggles over power.

因?yàn)閷κ┟芴貋碚f，政治就只是對權(quán)力的爭奪。

He invented the legal concept of a “state of emergency” which you all are probably familiar with, but he expanded it from being a temporary state of affairs into being the permanent status quo of a state.

他發(fā)明了一個(gè)叫做“應(yīng)急事態(tài)制度”的法律概念，而這個(gè)你們應(yīng)該都很熟悉；但是他把它從一個(gè)臨時(shí)的狀態(tài)擴(kuò)展成了一個(gè)永久的政府狀態(tài)。

He declared that sovereignty can only be achieved through ignoring law, and the destruction of rule of law by a leader;

他宣稱主權(quán)只能夠通過無視法律，并由一個(gè)首領(lǐng)來摧毀法治才能夠達(dá)成；

That a political leader, to secure the state must place themselves above the law, act without the constraints of law, and be unshackled from any accountability to law;

一個(gè)政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，為了保護(hù)國家必須把他自己置身于法律之上，不受法律管控行動(dòng)，并不被任何對法律的責(zé)任所禁錮；

To guarantee true sovereignty of the state, the leader must be placed in a state of exception.

為了保證一個(gè)國家真正的主權(quán)，首領(lǐng)必須處在一個(gè)例外的狀態(tài)中。

In the words of Schmidt, “sovereignty is defined by he who decides the exceptions.”

按施密特所說，“主權(quán)由決定例外的人所定義?！?/p>

The state ought to become a permanent state of emergency, so that the leader can secure the state through having absolute power, rather than society succumbing to endless struggles over power.

國家應(yīng)當(dāng)成為一個(gè)永久的應(yīng)急事態(tài)政府，這樣首領(lǐng)就能通過擁有絕對權(quán)力來保護(hù)國家，而不是社會因?yàn)闊o窮無盡的權(quán)力斗爭而分崩離析。

Schmidt's writings are known to have been read and appealed to many Russian political leaders of the 1990s, who saw the state of Russia during the chaos of the Yeltsin era reflected in the chaos of Weimar Germany.

我們知道施密特的著作曾被很多90年代的俄羅斯政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人所閱讀并欣賞，他們在葉利欽時(shí)代俄羅斯的混亂中看到了魏瑪?shù)聡靵y的影子。

Schmidt's writings about the solutions to the chaos of Weimar were seen and interpreted in Russia as solutions to the chaos of Yeltsin.

施密特關(guān)于魏瑪混亂的解決方案在俄羅斯被理解為解決葉利欽混亂的方法。

Ilyin may have provided a spiritual and philosophical justification for a leader to emerge with absolute powers within a fascist state, Karl Schmidt provides a legal and political justification for a fascist leader above the Law, and in preservation of Russia's lawlessness to ensure the very existence of Russia as a sovereign entity.

伊林也許提供了一個(gè)精神和哲學(xué)上的理由來讓一個(gè)首領(lǐng)在一個(gè)法西斯政府中獲得絕對權(quán)力，卡爾·施密特提供了一個(gè)法律和政治上的理由讓一個(gè)法西斯首領(lǐng)站在法律之上，并維持俄羅斯的不法來保護(hù)俄羅斯作為一個(gè)主權(quán)主體的存在。

It is very much of note how Ilyin and Schmidt, both of them were pioneers of fascism, came to a very similar conclusion on law; and both embraced lawlessness and the destruction of the rule of law.

非常值得注意的是，伊林和施密特，兩個(gè)法西斯主義的先驅(qū)，關(guān)于法律都到達(dá)了一個(gè)非常相似的結(jié)論；兩人也都信封不法和法治的毀滅。

But ultimately it is also not surprising, from Mussolini's march on Rome to the violence of brown shirt Nazi street gangs, fascism ultimately is a movement of violent lawlessness.

但是最終這一點(diǎn)也不讓人驚訝，從墨索里尼的羅馬行軍到納粹棕襯衫街頭幫派的暴行，法西斯主義終究是一個(gè)暴力不法的運(yùn)動(dòng)。

Might is what makes right, the will to exercise power is what matters, and the restraints on power dictated by the liberal state are something to be destroyed, so that the fascist can exercise power without restraint.

強(qiáng)權(quán)就是公理，使用權(quán)力的意志才是關(guān)鍵，而自由派國家政府所規(guī)定的對權(quán)力的限制是個(gè)需要被摧毀的東西，這樣法西斯才能不受約束地使用權(quán)力。

As a different Nazi legal theorist, Hitler's personal lawyer Hans Frank once said: “Law is whatever serves the race.”

就像另外一個(gè)納粹法律理論家，希特勒的個(gè)人律師漢斯·佛蘭克曾說的那樣：“為種族服務(wù)的就是法律?！?/p>

Ilyin viewed lawlessness almost like a religious blessing, Schmidt provided a secular justification for it.

伊林把不法幾乎當(dāng)作宗教賜福來看待，施密特給它提供了一種世俗的辯護(hù)。

He was in some sense, the lawyer who abolished law.

他在某種意義上是那個(gè)廢除了法律的律師。

For political thinkers with an interest in unrestrained power, or those who wish to overcome restraints of power or obsessed over the dynamics of power, Karl Schmidt always had a very seductive appeal.

對于那些對不受限制的權(quán)力感興趣的政治思想家，或是那些想克服對權(quán)力的限制或是癡迷于權(quán)力動(dòng)態(tài)的人來說，卡爾·施密特一直有非常強(qiáng)的誘惑力。

For those who see their society as threatened, and believe an act of lawlessness and unrestrained power can save them, Schmidt has the greatest of appeals.

對于那些自認(rèn)為他們的社會受到威脅，并相信不法的行為和不受控的權(quán)力可以拯救他們的人來說，施密特的吸引力是最大的。

Russia must have an absolute leader above the law, because Russia is under threat from outside;

俄羅斯必須有一個(gè)法律之上的絕對首領(lǐng)，因?yàn)槎砹_斯收到了外部威脅；

And therefore, Russia must have the absolute leader above the law or it will be demolished, and cease to exist as a sovereign entity.

所以，俄羅斯必須有一個(gè)法律之上的絕對首領(lǐng)，否則它將被肢解，并作為主權(quán)個(gè)體不復(fù)存在。

The dear leader above the law not only exists in Ilyin's divine mission from God, but with Schmidt's theories, the leader above the law also exists to ensure that Russia can continue to exist despite its enemies.

親愛的法律之上的首領(lǐng)不僅僅存在于伊林上帝的神圣任務(wù)里，而且根據(jù)施密特的理論，法律之上的首領(lǐng)也是因?yàn)橐ＷC俄羅斯在敵人環(huán)繞的環(huán)境中能繼續(xù)存在而存在。

The sense of outside threat and outside enemies also plays a key role in the writings of Carl Schmidt’s political ideas.

對于外部威脅和外部敵人的意識也在卡爾·施密特的政治著作里有重要的地位。

He believed that all politics must always begin and be defined through identifying the enemy of the group.

他相信所有的政治必須從找到群體的敵人開始，并被其定義。

This is a direct attack on the liberal democratic order, which advocates for governance through change in leadership, popular sovereignty, consensus and compromise.

這是對自由派民主秩序的直接攻擊，它宣揚(yáng)通過交替領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層，民眾主權(quán)，共識和折衷來進(jìn)行統(tǒng)治。

There can be no such thing as compromise in Schmidt's politics.

在施密特的政治里，沒有妥協(xié)與折衷。

Society is in a constant struggle for power between groups, and for the body national to be preserved it must identify the enemy group.

社會一直處在群體之間的權(quán)力爭奪之中，而如果民族主體想要被保護(hù)，它必須要辨識出敵對的群體。

Besides serving the purpose of securing the state from any and all threats, the identifying and pursuit of an enemy also provides a foundation of common unity in struggle to the group that makes up the body National.

不光是為了從所有威脅中保護(hù)國家，對敵人的識別和尋找也提供了一個(gè)讓民族主體共同團(tuán)結(jié)的基礎(chǔ)。

Politics must be understood as war.

政治必須被理解為戰(zhàn)爭。

There are no people who you can have disagreements with, those who you have disagreements with are in fact your enemies.

你不能和任何人有意見不同，和你有異見的人實(shí)際上是你的敵人。

The enemy can only ever be an outsider, and you must rally your group against the enemy.

敵人只能是一個(gè)外人，而你必須要召集你的群體來抵抗你的敵人。

Finally, there are also his theories on geopolitics.

最后，是他的地緣政治理論。

Karl Schmidt saw the modern world as divided into spheres of influence.

卡爾·施密特認(rèn)為現(xiàn)代世界被分割成了幾個(gè)勢力范圍。

These spheres of influence, which he called great spheres, are geopolitically dominated by a great power, that dominates over the geographic landscape of that great sphere.

這些勢力范圍，他稱之為“勢力圈”，在地緣政治中由一個(gè)支配這個(gè)勢力圈地緣面貌的大國所主導(dǎo)。

The West, mainly through the conquest and colonization of the Americas, managed to create the first true international order in which the western concept of the nation-state became the predominant global order.

西方國家，通過征服和殖民美洲，創(chuàng)造了第一個(gè)真正的國際秩序，而西方的民族國家概念成了主導(dǎo)全球的政治秩序。

But the system of nation states did not replace the system of great powers and great spheres.

但是民族國家的體系并沒有代替由大國和勢力圈組成的系統(tǒng)。

Great power still continues to determine the political outcomes and course of the smaller nation states within their own great sphere.

強(qiáng)權(quán)大國仍然在決定著在他們勢力圈里小國的政治走向和結(jié)果。

The politics and ideologies of these spheres are therefore Irrelevant, in terms that the smaller nation-states do not get to pick them.

這些勢力圈的政治和意識觀念是無足輕重的，因?yàn)槟切┬〉拿褡鍑也⒉荒軌蛉ミx擇。

If a great sphere adheres to a certain ideology, it is because that great sphere has a great power with that ideology.

如果一個(gè)勢力圈遵循某種意識形態(tài)，那是因?yàn)檫@個(gè)勢力圈有一個(gè)有這種意識形態(tài)的大國。

Schmidt believed Eurasia was a great sphere with the great power of Russia, and Russia as a communist state therefore gets to decide the politics and ideology of everyone in that great sphere, be it Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Finland, Kazakhstan or the Baltic states.

施密特相信歐亞是一個(gè)以俄羅斯為中心的勢力圈，而俄羅斯作為一個(gè)共產(chǎn)國家就理應(yīng)決定它勢力圈中所有人的政治和意識形態(tài)，包括波蘭，烏克蘭，芬蘭，哈薩克斯坦還是波羅的海國家。

What the rulers of Warsaw, Kiev, Tallin or Helsinki want, or what the peoples of their countries want is irrelevant, because it must be decided or bow to the whims and demands of the great power of that sphere.

在華沙，基輔，塔林或是海爾辛基的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人想要什么，或是他們國家的人民想要什么無關(guān)緊要，因?yàn)樗仨毐粍萘θχ械拇髧鶝Q定，或是向它卑躬屈膝。

So, in the end, Moscow gets to decide for all of them.

所以到最后，莫斯科可以給他們所有人做決定。

Karl Schmidt's writings on spheres of influence and great powers were not a defense of the communist Soviet Union.

卡爾·施密特關(guān)于勢力圈和大國的著作并不是給蘇聯(lián)做辯護(hù)。

He was, after all, an unrepentant Nazi right up to his death in the 1980s.

畢竟他是一個(gè)直到在80年代他死之前都不曾悔改的納粹。

No. His theory on geopolitics was an attack on the liberal west, liberal democracy, and the idea of liberal universalism;

不。他的地緣政治理論是一個(gè)對自由主義西方，自由主義民主和自由普世主義的攻擊；

Because at its core, this idea by Karl Schmidt attacked the idea of there being a universal humanity, a core component of the liberal framework.

因?yàn)榫科浔举|(zhì)，卡爾·施密特的這個(gè)思想攻擊了人類文明的普世性，自由主義架構(gòu)的核心構(gòu)成之一。

Specifically, he attacked the idea of there being an international law, which he described as little more than a thin veneer to disguise American imperialism.

具體地說，他攻擊了理應(yīng)存在國際法律這個(gè)思想，他將其描述為美國帝國主義的一層薄面紗。

There cannot be a rules-based world order, let alone one based on liberal values, because there are no rules, only geopolitical power and the exercising of that power for great powers, in the global game of power dynamics.

以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的世界秩序不能存在，更不用說一個(gè)基于自由主義的秩序，因?yàn)槭郎蠜]有規(guī)則，在全球的權(quán)力游戲中只有地緣政治勢力和大國對權(quán)力的運(yùn)用。

The liberal West cannot apply its values universally, because this would lead to direct confrontation and war with those great Powers who do not share its values.

自由主義西方不可能普世地應(yīng)用它的價(jià)值觀，因?yàn)檫@將導(dǎo)致和其他不認(rèn)同它價(jià)值觀的大國的沖突和戰(zhàn)爭。

The liberal state must therefore compromise and accept that its values do not apply to all, and thereby surrender its liberal core claim to universality of values, and thereby expose itself as a lie.

自由主義的國家因此必將妥協(xié)并接受它的價(jià)值觀不能對所有人有效，繼而放棄它的自由主義對普世價(jià)值觀的核心主張，繼而將它自身作為謊言揭穿。

According to Karl Schmidt, geopolitics and the politics of great Powers will ultimately destroy the liberal West by forcing it into positions of hypocrisy.

根據(jù)卡爾·施密特，地緣政治以及大國間的政治將通過把自由主義的西方放在自我矛盾的立場上而最終摧毀它。

The more the liberal West will concede to other great Powers, the more its own political foundations of rule of law will be undermined and eroded, by being increasingly exposed as worthless.

自由主義的西方越是像其他大國低頭，它自己的法制政治基礎(chǔ)就越被侵蝕，因?yàn)樗絹碓斤@得一文不值。

Hypocrisy on the international stage will lead to hypocrisy on the domestic stage, which will erode the foundation of domestic politics.

國際舞臺上的虛偽導(dǎo)致國內(nèi)的虛偽，而這會侵蝕內(nèi)政的根基。

To defeat the west and its liberal order, the West must surrender to the whims of anti-democratic great powers within what Schmidt saw as their spheres of influence.

要想打敗西方和它的自由主義秩序，西方必須在施密特所劃分的反民主大國勢力圈中向這些強(qiáng)權(quán)屈服。

It is not difficult to see how this theory falls on very open ears in the Kremlin.

不難看出為什么這個(gè)理論在克里姆林宮被洗耳恭聽。

It is not difficult to see how it appeals to both the anti-democratic left and the anti-democratic right.

也不難看出為什么它對那些反民主的左派和右派有吸引力。

With this theory in mind, and knowing that this is how those who rule Russia see the world, one can understand why Putin went through so much effort to ensure that Assad would step over Obama's Infamous Red Line.

知道了這個(gè)理論，并了解了這就是俄羅斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人看世界的方式，你就能夠理解為什么普京花費(fèi)這么多的努力來確保阿薩德越過奧巴馬臭名昭著的紅線。

The universal claim of a common humanity and rules-based order was surrendered in Syria and forced to not apply to Syrians in opposition to the regime of Basha al-assad.

對于人類普世性的宣稱和以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的秩序在敘利亞被放棄了，并被強(qiáng)迫地不對敘利亞人和他們對巴沙爾阿薩德政府的反對生效。

If the democratic ambitions of the Ukrainian people can also be crushed under a Russian boot, then not only does this mean that Ukraine must subordinate to the rules of a series of power game, in which it is merely a chess piece played by the great power for Russia;

如果烏克蘭人民的民主愿望也可以被踩在俄國軍靴下，那么這不光意味著烏克蘭必須服從一系列權(quán)利游戲的規(guī)則，而它在其中只不過是一個(gè)被大國俄羅斯所掌握的棋子；

No, it also means that the idealism of the west is at its core a lie, and must be surrendered to rules of a game of power between great powers, in which nothing but the exercise of power matters.

不，這也意味著西方的理想主義在其核心是個(gè)謊言，且必須在大國之間權(quán)力游戲的規(guī)則面前被放棄，而在這之中除了權(quán)力的行使以外沒有任何重要的東西。

To Schmidt, an international set of rules or an idea of universal human rights and laws are little more than a disguise of American imperialism, of power politics with the intention of destroying the sovereignty of other great powers.

對于施密特而言，一個(gè)國際規(guī)則體系或是普世的人權(quán)或法律只是掩飾美國帝國主義的一個(gè)偽裝，是意圖摧毀其他大國主權(quán)的權(quán)力政治的一個(gè)工具。

To Schmidt, both in internal politics and in international politics, all that matters is the dynamics and exercising of raw power.

對于施密特，無論在內(nèi)政還是國際政治里，唯一重要的就是純粹權(quán)力的動(dòng)態(tài)和運(yùn)用。

?

These are the three main political theorists who influenced Putin's vision for Russia.

這是影響普京對俄羅斯的理解的三個(gè)主要政治理論家。

What so curious to me is that much of this was very much in the open.

對我來說尤其奇怪的是這些都非常的公開。

As mentioned before, Putin was never quiet about his admiration of Ivan Ilyin.

像之前提到的那樣，普京從來沒有避免提起他對伊萬·伊林的崇拜。

I'm also pretty sure that some of those in the audience who have read the books of Alexander Dugan had their jaws drop a few times.

我也很確定你們觀眾中讀過亞歷山大·杜根的書的那些人下巴掉了好幾次。

Let me explain to you and all those who have not read Dugan's books.

讓我給你們沒讀過杜根書的人解釋一下。

Close to nothing that Dugan wrote is original.

杜根基本沒寫過任何原創(chuàng)的內(nèi)容。

Almost everything in Dugan's books is just ripped from Ivan Ilyin, Lev Gumilev and Karl Schmidt, in particular from Karl Schmidt.

幾乎所有杜根的書都是抄的伊萬·伊林，列夫·谷米廖夫和卡爾·施密特，尤其是卡爾·施密特。

There's not a single original thought or political theory in anything that Dugan has ever written.

杜根寫過的所有東西沒有一點(diǎn)原創(chuàng)的思想或政治理論。

He basically just summarizes political theorists that have influence over modern Russian politics, and tries to market these ideas as his own.

他基本上只是總結(jié)了對當(dāng)下俄羅斯有影響的政治理論家，然后試圖把這些理論當(dāng)成他自己的去推廣。

Dugan's role in Russia is vastly overestimated in the west.

杜根在俄羅斯的作用在西方被大幅地高估了。

He is not the Kremlin Whisperer, as some may say.

他不是克里姆林的耳語者，像某些人說的那樣。

Putin cites Ilyin and not Dugan.

普京引用伊林，不是杜根。

Dugan is merely a sort of brand manager and marketer, something Russians call a political technologist.

杜根就只是某種品牌管理和銷售員，一個(gè)俄羅斯人稱之為“政治科技家”的東西。

I like to think of Dugan as more of a useful bigot.

我愿意將杜根理解成一個(gè)有用的老頑固。

His English translator was the wife of the American fascist Richard Spencer, and Dugan has ties to various European fascist circles, from the late French-Romanian fascist Pavileshku, who was one of the founding thinkers behind “generation identity”, To the Canadian fascist Lauren Southern, to many others.

他的英文翻譯是美國法西斯理查德·斯奔賽的老婆，而且杜根和各種歐洲法西斯圈子有交集，從最近去世的法國-羅馬尼亞人法西斯帕韋列什庫、“一代身份”的創(chuàng)始思想家之一，到加拿大法西斯勞倫·蘇澤倫，以及很多其他人。

I believe the reason he is prominent in the west is because the Russian regime would like him to be prominent in the west, as a salesman of the ideas behind Russia's new fascism.

我相信他之所以在西方這么顯著是因?yàn)槎砹_斯政權(quán)想要讓他在西方變得出名，作為俄羅斯新法西斯背后思想的推銷員。

In Russia itself, Dugan only has a minuscule political role if any at all, which is why rather than calling him the Kremlin Whisperer, I prefer calling him the Kremlin's useful bigot.

在俄羅斯內(nèi)部，杜根只有一個(gè)很微小甚至不存在的政治角色，這就是為什么與其叫他克里姆林耳語者，我更愿意叫他克里姆林的順手頑固。

?

There's a final note I wish to give on all of this.

我想表達(dá)一個(gè)最后的重點(diǎn)。

The most baffling thing about all of this to me, is how widely unnoticed it went.

這件事對我而言最令人不解的方面，就是（俄羅斯的政治轉(zhuǎn)變）如此地不受關(guān)注。

The Trotsky series from 2017 is something that really catches my attention, and I'll get into why.

2017年的托司機(jī)電視劇尤其引起我的注意，而我會解釋為什么。

This series is an overt piece of fascist Cinema, there is absolutely no doubt about this.

這個(gè)電視劇是一個(gè)公然而然的法西斯宣傳影片，一點(diǎn)懷疑的空間都沒有。

It depicts the Russian Revolution as inherently Jewish.

它把俄羅斯革命描繪得有內(nèi)在猶太性。

It depicts the Jew, through the figure of Trotsky, as the grand schemer and shady manipulator of Lenin.

它通過托司機(jī)的角色描繪了猶太人，作為陰謀大師并從陰影里操縱列寧。

The revolution is driven and manipulated from the shadows by the Jew Trotsky, the Jew Trotsky is responsible for the violence and terror of the revolution, and the Jew Trotsky creates Stalin as a sort of Golem to help him in his Shady schemes and acts of violence, The Jew Trotsky then loses control over his terrifying creation.

革命被猶太人托司機(jī)從陰影里驅(qū)使并控制，猶太人托司機(jī)對革命中的暴力和恐怖負(fù)責(zé)，而且猶太人托司機(jī)創(chuàng)造了斯大林作為某種傀儡來幫助他執(zhí)行他陰暗的計(jì)謀和暴力的行徑，然后猶太人托司機(jī)失去了對他可怕造物的控制。

（譯注：Golem出自猶太教傳說，一個(gè)城里的猶太拉比為了保護(hù)ghetto（猶太區(qū)）里的族人造出了土石傀儡，最后因?yàn)樵诒Ｗo(hù)猶太人的過程中傀儡殺了人而被拉比所封印，并令其在猶太人受危難時(shí)再度蘇醒。故事較長建議自查資料。）

The Russian Revolution is presented here as “that time that the Jews were in charge of Russia”, as a sort of Jewish mistake, and presented it is something Russia had to redeem itself from.

俄羅斯革命被展現(xiàn)成了“那段猶太人主導(dǎo)俄羅斯的日子”，成了某種猶太人的錯(cuò)誤，然后把它描述成了一個(gè)俄羅斯需要為自己贖罪的事。

It also presents the idea and notion that communism was a sort of western degenerate idea that infected Russia, which was promoted and driven primarily by the schemes of Jews.

它還展示了一種‘共產(chǎn)主義是某種感染了俄國的墮落西方思想，而且主要通過猶太人的陰謀被推動(dòng)’的思想。

And don't forget that this entire narrative of this film is told and presented from the imagined perspective of the fascist political theorist Ivan Ilyin.

而且別忘了整個(gè)電影的旁白都是從法西斯政治理論家伊萬·伊林想象中的視角出發(fā)的。

You really can't get more in your face fascist than that.

你沒法比這個(gè)還要明擺著法西斯了。

This is fascist cinema; It belongs into the same category as the Goebbels film “Jud Sü?” (Jew Suss) and the KKK movie “Birth of a Nation”.

這就是法西斯影視；它和戈培爾的電影“猶太佬”和三K黨的電影“一個(gè)國家的誕生”屬于同一類。

The reason this series stands out to me so much, in all of the contexts that we just discussed, is because we live in a time in which post-modern cultural politics is very popular.

之所以這個(gè)電視劇對我來講這么刺眼，即便考慮到我們之前探討的環(huán)境也是如此，是因?yàn)槲覀兩钤谝粋€(gè)后現(xiàn)代文化政治極受歡迎的時(shí)代。

The study of fascism through its history and its political theorists is widely discarded.

通過歷史和政治理論家對分析師進(jìn)行的研究被廣泛地拋棄了。

I bet you most self-declared anti-fascists watching this video have in fact never even heard of Ivan Ilyin or Karl Schmidt.

我打賭你們這些自我宣稱的反法西斯者大多數(shù)從沒有聽說或伊萬·伊林或者卡爾·施密特。

Instead, politics is increasingly understood as a process driven by art and culture, and therefore the study of movies and fiction of artistic narratives and the supposed hidden political meanings of them is emphasized.

相對地，政治更多地被理解為一個(gè)由藝術(shù)和文化驅(qū)動(dòng)的過程，于是乎對電影和藝術(shù)性創(chuàng)作以及其設(shè)想中隱藏的政治意義被當(dāng)作重點(diǎn)。

The study of politics has increasingly been surrendered to pop culture critics, literary critics and artists.

對政治的研究被逐漸讓位給了流行文化批評家，文學(xué)批評家和藝術(shù)家。

From Umberto Eco's famous list, to Slavoj Zizek's interpretations of films, to also a countless series of essayists that you will also find here on YouTube.

從安伯托·艾柯著名的名單，到斯拉沃熱·齊澤克對電影的解讀，到油管上數(shù)不可數(shù)的寫手們。

Throughout all of them, people will tell you how to recognize a fascist based on a set of aesthetics or pop culture phenomena, rather than based on the interpretation of any real political theory, text or practice.

他們所有人都會告訴你如何去辨識一個(gè)法西斯，通過一系列審美觀或是流行文化現(xiàn)象，而不是基于對任何真正的政治理論、書本或行為的了解。

And it is almost funny to me how you have this almost massive industry, of sorts, of pop culture critics and essayists, educated and specialized in art college in how to find the hidden political meanings and the hidden fascisms within modern pop culture, and yet not a single one of them recognized a piece of overt fascist cinema made in our time.

而對我來講幾乎可笑的是，這幾乎一條產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈上的各種流行文化評論家和寫手，在大學(xué)接受教育并專門學(xué)習(xí)了如何在現(xiàn)代流行文化里找到那些隱藏的意義和隱藏的法西斯，然而他們中沒有一個(gè)人認(rèn)出了一份當(dāng)代制造的不加掩飾的法西斯宣傳影片。

They universally failed at the one thing that they claimed to be their purpose of existing.

他們普遍地失敗于他們自稱存在的意義。

The only people you will find who recognize this series for the piece of fascist cinema that it is are people whose background lies in history and political science;

你會發(fā)現(xiàn)只有那些有歷史和政治科學(xué)背景的人才識別出了這個(gè)法西斯影片。

In particular the historian Timothy Snyder has been sounding the alarm bells for years on the sinister implications of Putin's obsession with Ivan Ilyin, and was one of the few people who recognized this series for the piece of fascist cinema that it actually is.

尤其是歷史學(xué)家蒂莫西·斯奈德從好幾年前就關(guān)于普京對伊林的癡迷開始敲響警鐘，且他是為數(shù)不多辨識出這個(gè)電視劇是法西斯宣傳的人之一。

So, one takeaway when it comes to the study of politics and history, is that maybe we should listen more to actual historians and political scientists, rather than just pop culture critics.

所以，這個(gè)視頻關(guān)于學(xué)習(xí)政治和歷史的一個(gè)教訓(xùn)就是我們應(yīng)該更多地聽聽真正的歷史學(xué)家和政治科學(xué)家，而不只是流行文化評論家。

I would however also blame a willful widespread ignorance, especially where I live in Europe.

我也想批評一種普遍的自發(fā)性無知，尤其是在我所生活的歐洲。

Cultural politics may be more of an American problem, but it cannot be denied that many European advocates of liberal democracy were in a state of self-denial over the direction that Russia was heading into.

文化政治可能是一個(gè)更加美國的問題，但是無法否定很多歐洲的自由主義民主支持者對待俄羅斯發(fā)展的方向上曾處在一種自我否定的狀態(tài)里。

European, in particular western European policy towards Russia was dominated by assumptions of an inevitable democratization of Russia.

歐洲，尤其是西歐對俄羅斯的政策被俄羅斯終將民主化的假設(shè)所主導(dǎo)。

All the Putin regime did were just criminal excesses, that would fade away with the eventual demise of Putin in a decade or so.

普京政權(quán)所做的一切就只是犯罪的放縱，在十幾年普京死后就會逐漸消失。

Whatever nonsense he spewed was irrelevant, because the neoliberal economics of shared trade would generate prosperity, a middle class, and consequently democracy in Russia anyway.

他說的一切屁話都無關(guān)緊要，因?yàn)楹笞杂芍髁x經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的開放通商將生成財(cái)富，一個(gè)中產(chǎn)階級，因此也遲早會在俄羅斯形成民主。

This was probably one of the most demonstrably stupid foreign policy approaches in recent history.

這是近代歷史上能夠證實(shí)的最愚蠢的外交政策方針之一。

I am certain that a few years from now Schroeder’s and Merkel’s approach to Russia will be remembered in the same way as Chamberlain's appeasement approach to Hitler, and his notorious peace of our time.

我很確信幾年后施羅德和默克爾對俄羅斯的態(tài)度將會被人們和張伯倫對希特勒的綏靖政策對等，以及他臭名昭著的“我們時(shí)代的和平”廁紙。

It is almost a symbol of an enormous problem in modern European foreign policy.

它幾乎是現(xiàn)代歐洲外交政策一個(gè)巨大問題的縮影。

We Europeans like to arrogantly point at the Americans as supposed enablers of foreign dictatorships, and go very silent when we are asked how French Mirage fighter jets ended up in the hands of Saddam Hussein and apartheid South Africa, where they were used to bomb Kurds and Angolan villages;

我們歐洲人喜歡自大地指責(zé)美國人是外國獨(dú)裁政權(quán)的使能犯，然而當(dāng)人問起法國的幻影戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)是怎么跑到薩達(dá)姆和種族隔離南非的手里，并用來轟炸庫爾德人和安哥拉村莊時(shí)緘默不語；

How Pinochet used helicopters that he bought from Germany to murder dissidents;

抑或是皮諾切特如何用他從德國買來的直升機(jī)來謀殺抗議者；

Or that throughout the 2000s, Italy sold billions of modern weapon systems for tanks to the Syrian Assad regime, where they were used against the Syrian people;

或是2000年到2010年間意大利向敘利亞阿薩德政權(quán)出售了上億美元的現(xiàn)代坦克武器系統(tǒng)，而他們被用在了敘利亞人民身上；

Or that the French were actually just about to sell an amphibious assault ship to Russia right up to 2014.

或是法國2014年前差一點(diǎn)就要把一艘兩棲作戰(zhàn)艦賣給俄羅斯。

The majority of my subscribers and audience are European and I really want to hammer this point in, especially to you.

我的訂閱者和觀眾里大部份都是歐洲人，所以我真的想把這一點(diǎn)傳達(dá)清楚，尤其是給你們。

Our foreign policy towards dictatorships, especially in Western Europe, is dangerous and hypocritical.

我們對獨(dú)裁政府的外交政策，尤其是西歐，是非常危險(xiǎn)且虛偽的。

We have a long tradition of stupid European foreign policy regarding this.

關(guān)于這個(gè)問題，我們有一長竄愚蠢的歐洲外交歷史。

Capitalism and market integration are not some magical potion that will create democratic institutions out of thin air, especially if you sell weapons to dictators.

資本發(fā)展和市場整合不是什么能夠憑空創(chuàng)造民主制度的魔法藥水，尤其是當(dāng)你把武器賣給獨(dú)裁者的時(shí)候。

The German practice of buying Russian hydrocarbons in fact amplified the increasing Russian wealth inequality, and consequent degrading of the last remaining democratic institutions of Russia.

德國購買俄國天然氣的做法實(shí)際上加劇了俄羅斯人逐漸變大的貧富差距，而因此削弱了俄羅斯最后僅剩的一點(diǎn)民主體制。

There's this funny incident from a few years ago, which I believe is very symbolic of Western Europe's, and in particularly Germany's, mistaken assumptions on Russia.

曾有這么一個(gè)可笑的事情發(fā)生在幾年前，而我相信這是西歐，尤其是德國對俄羅斯的錯(cuò)誤猜想的象征。

That was when the Russian foreign minister Lavrov visited Germany, gave a speech at some gathering, and in that speech, said that the German reunification of West and East Germany was actually illegal and should not have happened.

那就是當(dāng)俄國外交部長拉夫羅夫造訪德國的時(shí)候，在某個(gè)集會上做了個(gè)演講，而在那個(gè)演講里說到東西德國的再統(tǒng)一實(shí)際上是不合法的，并且本不應(yīng)該發(fā)生。

Everyone in the audience started laughing. “Ja! What a funny joke, ze funny Russian man.”

觀眾里的所有人都開始笑?！翱谘?！真是個(gè)好笑話，那俄羅斯人真幽默?！?/p>

But barely anyone noticed that Lavrov was not laughing. He was being serious!

但是幾乎沒有人注意到拉夫羅夫沒有在笑。他是認(rèn)真的！

This is what his government actually believes, and when someone tells you who they are, it is best for you to listen, rather than arrogantly presume the right to interpret who they are for them.

他的政府是真的這么相信的，而當(dāng)某個(gè)人告訴你他們是誰，你最好認(rèn)真聽，而不是自大地假設(shè)自己有權(quán)利替他們詮釋他們是誰。

Because if you do that, in the end, you will only lie to yourself, and this is a very valuable lesson that I hope we now learn as a result of recent events.

因?yàn)槿绻氵@么做，到最后你只能騙你自己，而鑒于近期發(fā)生的事件，我希望我們現(xiàn)在學(xué)到了這寶貴的一課。

A Russian friend of mine who really wanted me to make this video, and sent me screencaps of Ilyin in her University textbooks insisted that I should not give her a shout out;

?

But asked me instead to promote her favorite LGBT charity, that helps gay, lesbian and trans Russians, who as you can probably guess, live rather difficult lives in Russia.

?

You will find a link to it in the description. If you enjoyed this video, don't forget to like it and share it. you can support my channel through Patreon, channel membership or a donation, and I hope to see you soon again.