文章來源：《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》Mar 18th 2023 期 Leaders 欄目 What's wrong with the banks

Only ten days ago you might have thought that the banks had been fixed after the nightmare of the financial crisis in 2007-09. Now it is clear that they still have the power to cause a heart-stopping scare. A ferocious run at Silicon Valley Bank on March 9th saw $42bn in deposits flee in a day. svb was just one of three American lenders to collapse in the space of a week. Regulators worked frantically over the weekend to devise a rescue. Even so, customers are asking once again if their money is safe.

僅僅在十天前，你可能還認(rèn)為銀行在經(jīng)歷了2007-2009年金融危機(jī)的噩夢(mèng)之后已經(jīng)得到了修復(fù)?，F(xiàn)在很明顯，它們?nèi)匀挥心芰χ圃炝钊诵募碌目只拧?月9日，硅谷銀行發(fā)生了一場(chǎng)慘烈的擠兌，一天之內(nèi)就有420億美元的存款“外逃”。SVB只是一周內(nèi)倒閉的三家美國(guó)銀行之一。整個(gè)周末，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)都在瘋狂地工作，以試圖設(shè)計(jì)出一套紓困方案。即便如此，客戶們還是一再質(zhì)疑他們的錢是否安全。

?

Investors have taken fright. Fully $229bn has been wiped off the market value of America’s banks so far this month, a fall of 17%. Treasury yields have tumbled and markets now reckon the Federal Reserve will begin cutting interest rates in the summer. Share prices of banks in Europe and Japan have plunged, too. Credit Suisse, which faces other woes, saw its stock fall by 24% on March 15th and on March 16th it sought liquidity support from the Swiss central bank. Fourteen years since the financial crisis, questions are once again swirling about how fragile banks are, and whether regulators have been caught out.

投資者已經(jīng)感到恐慌。本月到目前為止，美國(guó)銀行的市值已經(jīng)蒸發(fā)了2290億美元，跌幅達(dá)到17%。美國(guó)國(guó)債收益率已經(jīng)大幅下跌，市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)在預(yù)計(jì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將在夏季開始降息。歐洲和日本銀行的股價(jià)也大幅下跌。面臨其他困境的瑞士信貸，其股價(jià)在3月15日下跌了24%，并于3月16日向瑞士央行尋求流動(dòng)性支持。自金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來已經(jīng)過去了14年，人們?cè)俅钨|(zhì)疑銀行的脆弱程度以及監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)是否被欺騙。

?

The high-speed collapse of svb has cast light on an underappreciated risk within the system. When interest rates were low and asset prices high the Californian bank loaded up on long-term bonds. Then the Fed raised rates at its sharpest pace in four decades, bond prices plunged and the bank was left with huge losses. America’s capital rules do not require most banks to account for the falling price of bonds they plan to hold until they mature. Only very large banks must mark to market all of their bonds that are available to trade. But, as svb discovered, if a bank wobbles and must sell bonds, unrecognised losses become real.

SVB的快速倒閉揭示了該體系中一個(gè)被低估的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在利率低、資產(chǎn)價(jià)格高的時(shí)候，這家加州的銀行大量買入長(zhǎng)期債券。隨后，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)以40年來最快的速度加息，債券價(jià)格暴跌，銀行遭受了巨大損失。美國(guó)的資本規(guī)則并不要求大多數(shù)銀行對(duì)他們計(jì)劃持有直至到期的債券價(jià)格下跌作出解釋。只有非常大的銀行才必須將其所有可交易的債券按市價(jià)計(jì)價(jià)。但是，正如SVB所發(fā)現(xiàn)的那樣，如果一家銀行“波動(dòng)”，必須出售債券，未確認(rèn)的損失就會(huì)成為真實(shí)損失。

?

Across America’s banking system, these unrecognised losses are vast: $620bn at the end of 2022, equivalent to about a third of the combined capital cushions of America’s banks. Fortunately, other banks are much further away from the brink than svb was. But rising interest rates have left the system vulnerable.

在整個(gè)美國(guó)銀行體系中，這些未確認(rèn)的損失是巨大的: 到2022年底，損失為6200億美元，相當(dāng)于美國(guó)各銀行緩沖資本總額的三分之一左右。幸運(yùn)的是，與SVB相比，其他銀行離破產(chǎn)的邊緣要遠(yuǎn)得多。但不斷上升的利率使體系變得脆弱。

?

The financial crisis of 2007-09 was the result of reckless lending and a housing bust. Post-crisis regulations therefore sought to limit credit risk and ensure that banks hold assets that will reliably have buyers. They encouraged banks to buy government bonds: nobody, after all, is more creditworthy than Uncle Sam and nothing is easier to sell in a crisis than Treasuries.

2007-2009年的金融危機(jī)是不計(jì)后果的放貸和房地產(chǎn)泡沫破裂的結(jié)果。因此，危機(jī)后的監(jiān)管試圖限制信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，并確保銀行持有可靠的有買家的資產(chǎn)。他們鼓勵(lì)銀行購(gòu)買政府債券: 畢竟，沒有人比"山姆大叔"更有信譽(yù)，在危機(jī)中沒有什么比國(guó)債更容易出售。

?

Many years of low inflation and interest rates meant that few considered how the banks would suffer if the world changed and longer-term bonds fell in value. This vulnerability only worsened during the pandemic, as deposits flooded into banks and the Fed’s stimulus pumped cash into the system. Many banks used the deposits to buy long-term bonds and government-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities.

多年的低通脹和低利率意味著，很少有人考慮到，如果世界發(fā)生變化，長(zhǎng)期債券價(jià)值下跌，銀行將遭受怎樣的損失。這種脆弱性在疫情期間進(jìn)一步惡化，因?yàn)榇婵畲罅坑咳脬y行，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的刺激措施向金融體系注入了大量現(xiàn)金。許多銀行用這些存款購(gòu)買長(zhǎng)期債券和政府擔(dān)保的抵押貸款支持證券。

?

You might think that unrealised losses don’t matter. One problem is that the bank has bought the bond with someone else’s money, usually a deposit. Holding a bond to maturity requires matching it with deposits and as rates rise, competition for deposits increases. At the largest banks, like JPMorgan Chase or Bank of America, customers are sticky so rising rates tend to boost their earnings, thanks to floating-rate loans. By contrast, the roughly 4,700 small and mid-sized banks with total assets of $10.5trn have to pay depositors more to stop them taking out their money. That squeezes their margins—which helps explain why some banks’ stock prices have plunged.

你可能認(rèn)為未變現(xiàn)虧損無關(guān)緊要。其中一個(gè)問題是，銀行用別人的錢(通常是存款)購(gòu)買了債券。持有到期債券需要與存款相匹配，隨著利率上升，對(duì)存款的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也會(huì)加劇。在摩根大通或美國(guó)銀行等大型銀行，客戶具有粘性，因此利率上升往往會(huì)提高他們的收入，這要?dú)w功于浮動(dòng)利率貸款。相比之下，總資產(chǎn)約為10.5萬億美元的約4700家中小銀行必須向儲(chǔ)戶支付更多費(fèi)用，以阻止他們?nèi)〕龃婵?。這就擠壓了銀行的利潤(rùn)——這也解釋了為什么一些銀行的股價(jià)暴跌。

?

The other problem affects banks of all sizes. In a crisis once-loyal depositors could flee, forcing the bank to cover deposit outflows by selling assets. If so, the bank’s losses would crystallise. Its capital cushion might look comforting today, but most of its stuffing would suddenly become an accounting fiction.

另一個(gè)問題影響著各種規(guī)模的銀行。在危機(jī)中，曾經(jīng)忠誠(chéng)的儲(chǔ)戶可能會(huì)逃離，迫使銀行通過出售資產(chǎn)來彌補(bǔ)存款外逃。如果是這樣，銀行的損失將會(huì)“具體化”。它的資本緩沖在今天看起來可能令人欣慰，但它的大部分內(nèi)容會(huì)突然變成會(huì)計(jì)虛構(gòu)。

?

That alarming prospect explains why the Fed acted so dramatically last weekend. Since March 12th it has stood ready to make loans secured against banks’ bonds. Whereas it used to impose a haircut on the value of the collateral, it will now offer loans up to the bonds’ face value. With some long-term bonds, this can be more than 50% above market value. Given such largesse, it is all but impossible for the unrealised losses on a bank’s bonds to cause a collapse. And that means that the bank’s depositors have no reason to start a run.

這一令人擔(dān)憂的前景解釋了美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為何在上周末采取了如此戲劇性的行動(dòng)。自3月12日以來，它已準(zhǔn)備好以銀行債券為抵押發(fā)放貸款。盡管它過去對(duì)抵押品的價(jià)值進(jìn)行了扣減，但現(xiàn)在它將提供債券面值相當(dāng)?shù)馁J款。對(duì)于一些長(zhǎng)期債券，這可能比市場(chǎng)價(jià)值高出50%以上。鑒于其如此慷慨，銀行債券的未變現(xiàn)損失幾乎不可能導(dǎo)致破產(chǎn)。這意味著銀行的儲(chǔ)戶沒有理由開始擠兌。

?

The Fed is right to lend against good collateral to stop runs. But such easy terms carry a cost. By creating the expectation that the Fed will assume interest-rate risks in a crisis, they encourage banks to behave recklessly. The emergency programme is supposed to last only for a year but, even after it has expired, banks competing for deposits will search for high returns by taking excessive risks. Some depositors, knowing that the Fed has stepped in once, will not have much reason to discriminate between good risks and bad.

美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)以優(yōu)質(zhì)抵押品為抵押發(fā)放貸款以阻止擠兌的做法是正確的。但如此簡(jiǎn)單的條款是有代價(jià)的。通過制造美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將在危機(jī)中承擔(dān)利率風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的預(yù)期，他們鼓勵(lì)銀行不計(jì)后果地行事。該緊急計(jì)劃本應(yīng)只持續(xù)一年，但即使在該計(jì)劃到期后，爭(zhēng)奪存款的銀行仍將通過過度冒險(xiǎn)來尋求高回報(bào)。一些存款人知道美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)已經(jīng)介入過一次，他們沒有太多理由區(qū)分好的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和不良風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

?

Regulators must therefore use the year ahead to make the system safer. One step is to remove many of the odd exemptions that apply to mid-sized banks, some of which were the result of post-crisis rules being rolled back amid much lobbying in 2018 and 2019. The rescue of depositors in svb demonstrates that policymakers think such banks pose systemic risks. If so, they should face the same accounting and liquidity rules as the megabanks—as they do in Europe—and be required to submit to the Fed plans for their orderly resolution if they fail. In effect, this would force them to increase their safety buffers.

因此，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)必須利用未來一年的時(shí)間讓金融體系更加安全。其中一個(gè)步驟是取消許多適用于中型銀行的奇怪豁免，其中一些是在2018年和2019年的大量游說中取消危機(jī)后規(guī)則的結(jié)果。對(duì)SVB儲(chǔ)戶的救助表明，政策制定者認(rèn)為此類銀行構(gòu)成系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如果是這樣的話，它們就應(yīng)該像大型銀行一樣，面對(duì)同樣的會(huì)計(jì)和流動(dòng)性規(guī)則（就像它們?cè)跉W洲所面臨的那樣），如果它們破產(chǎn)，就必須向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)提交有序的解決方案。實(shí)際上，這將迫使它們?cè)黾影踩彌_。

?

Regulators everywhere must also build a regime that recognises the risks from rising interest rates. A bank with unrealised losses will be at greater risk of failure during a crisis than one without such losses. Yet this disparity is not reflected in capital requirements. One idea is to stress-test what might happen to a bank’s safety cushion were its bond portfolios marked to market, and if rates rose further. Policymakers could then consider whether on this measure the system has enough capital.

各地的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)還必須建立一種認(rèn)識(shí)到利率上升風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的機(jī)制。在危機(jī)中，有未實(shí)現(xiàn)虧損的銀行比沒有此類虧損的銀行倒閉的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更大。然而，這種差異并沒有反映在資本要求上。其中一個(gè)想法是，對(duì)一家銀行的債券投資組合按市價(jià)計(jì)價(jià)以及利率進(jìn)一步上升時(shí)，其安全緩沖可能發(fā)生的情況進(jìn)行壓力測(cè)試。然后，政策制定者可以考慮在這一衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)上，銀行體系是否擁有足夠的資本。

?

Bankers will hate the idea of yet more capital buffers and rulemaking. But the gains from safety are vast. Depositors and taxpayers from Silicon Valley to Switzerland are facing a mighty scare. They should not have to live with the fear and fragility they thought had been consigned to history years ago.

銀行家們會(huì)討厭更多的資本緩沖和規(guī)則制定的想法。但安全帶來的好處是巨大的。從硅谷到瑞士，儲(chǔ)戶和納稅人都面臨著巨大的恐慌。他們不應(yīng)該生活在恐懼和脆弱中，他們認(rèn)為這種恐懼和脆弱早在幾年前就已成為歷史。