一、將下列段落譯為漢語(yǔ)(25分)

Nevertheless, instead of expanding north, the Japanese moved south. By 1937, the conflict had spread to all of eastern China and the war had begun in earnest. Anti-Japanese feeling was exacerbated by the attack by the Japanese on Chinese soldiers and civilians at the Marco Polo Bridge, next to which was a vital railway line, in July 1937. Because of its strategic importance (it was only ten miles west of Beijing), Japanese troops in northern China had been conducting manoeuvres in the area. However, on 7 July 1937, after a Japanese night manoeuvre during which the Chinese had fired some shells, a Japanese soldier went missing. In retaliation, the Japanese attacked and war commenced. This may rightly be designated the first battle of the Second World War.

By the end of July, Japanese soldiers had not only seized the bridge but taken control of the entire Tientsin–Peking region. The speed with which Japanese troops conquered parts of China was astounding. By 1938, Canton had ‘fallen’ and, despite notable military victories, including one in the town of Taierzhuang in southern Shantung, where 30,000 Japanese soldiers were killed by Nationalist Chinese troops, the Chinese were at a distinct disadvantage. The Japanese military was vastly superior. As late as 1940, China had only 150 military aircraft compared with the Japanese total of over 1,000. By the end of 1939, the whole of the north-eastern quarter of China was under Japanese occupation. Still, the Chinese did not surrender, forcing Japan to move still further inland, lengthening supply routes and stretching manpower to absolute limits. What followed was a war of attrition. (268 words)

二、將下列短文譯為漢語(yǔ)(50分)

Thailand: An Exceptional Case?

A few years ago a graduate student named Kanchana came to my office to see if I would be willing to supervise a paper she wanted to write on legal protections for cultural artifacts taken from Thailand, her native country. After an interesting discussion about possible approaches to her paper, I asked Kanchana a question that, in retrospect, would probably be grounds for a lawsuit under today’s standards of political correctness—I asked whether she was an ethnic Chinese.

Kanchana’s reply: “But the Thai are Chinese.” She then instantly retreated: “Well—part Chinese. I have Chinese blood. Everyone in Thailand does. Well … almost everyone does.”

Thailand is a fascinating case. On the one hand, it shares with the other Southeast Asian countries the phenomenon of a wildly disproportionately wealthy, market-dominant Chinese minority. The Chinese in Thailand today, although just i o percent of the population, control virtually all of the country’s largest banks and conglomerates. All of Thailand’s billionaires are ethnic Chinese. On the other hand, as Kanchana’s comments suggest, unlike elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese have assimilated quite successfully into Thailand, and there is relatively little anti-Chinese animus. In Thailand today, many Thai Chinese speak only Thai and consider themselves as Thai as their indigenous counterparts. Intermarriage rates between the Chinese and the indigenous majority (many of whom, at least in Bangkok, have some Chinese ancestry already) are much higher than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Perhaps most strikingly, the country’s top political leaders, including a recent prime minister, are often of Chinese descent, although they usually have Thai- sounding surnames and speak little or no Chinese.

Although interethnic socializing and intermarriage may seem perfectly normal to Westerners, it bears emphasizing how markedly Thailand differs in this regard from her Southeast Asian neighbors. In Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, rates of intermarriage between the Chinese and the indigenous majority are close to zero. The Chinese in these countries remain a conspicuously insular minority, living, working, and socializing entirely separately from the indigenous majorities.

Many have speculated about the reasons for the starkly different rates of intermarriage and assimilation. According to one professor of law from Singapore, the main reason is the “pork factor.” “Indonesians and Malaysians are mostly Muslims,” he explains, “and they don’t eat pork. The Chinese love pork; they eat it all the time. And for Chinese, eating is a huge part of their lives. Thus, social interactions are impossible.” This professor was being facetious, but he is clearly right that religion has played an important role: Thailand is not Muslim but largely Buddhist, a cultural affinity that has made assimilation much easier for the Thai Chinese, many of whom adhere to a syncretic combination of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism.(455字)

三、將下列段落譯為英語(yǔ)(25分)

胡錦濤在主持學(xué)習(xí)時(shí)發(fā)表了講話。他指出，金融是現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)的核心。隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化深入發(fā)展，隨著我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)快速發(fā)展和工業(yè)化、城鎮(zhèn)化、市場(chǎng)化、國(guó)際化進(jìn)程加快，金融日益廣泛地影響著我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)生活的各個(gè)方面，金融也與人民群眾切身利益息息相關(guān)。在金融對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)發(fā)展的作用越來(lái)越重要、國(guó)內(nèi)外金融市場(chǎng)聯(lián)系 和相互影響越來(lái)越密切的形勢(shì)下，做好金融工作，保障金融安全，是推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)又好又快發(fā)展的基本條件，是維護(hù)經(jīng)濟(jì)安全、促進(jìn)社會(huì)和諧的重要保障，越來(lái)越成為關(guān)系全局的重大問(wèn)題。 (227字)

四、將下列短文譯為英語(yǔ)(50分)

在近日新華社的另一篇報(bào)道中，記者在黃河流域一些省區(qū)采訪時(shí)就發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)奇怪的現(xiàn)象：污染企業(yè)“扎堆”的地方，環(huán)保部門衣食無(wú)憂;而在污染企 業(yè)被大量關(guān)停的地方，環(huán)保人員卻連工資都發(fā)不出來(lái)，以至于“治污越好環(huán)保部門越窮”。究其原因在于，這些地方的環(huán)保部門，或是財(cái)政預(yù)算“黑戶”，或是財(cái)政撥款嚴(yán)重不足，主要靠“自收自支”維持生存。那么，為何會(huì)出現(xiàn)“財(cái)政不養(yǎng)環(huán)?！蹦?報(bào)道引用有關(guān)專業(yè)人士的說(shuō)法認(rèn)為：“關(guān)鍵是在一些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)眼中，環(huán)保和發(fā)展 是對(duì)立的，花錢搞環(huán)保不如投資上項(xiàng)目，有的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)甚至提出‘寧可嗆死，不能餓死’的觀點(diǎn)。”

因而，某些環(huán)保部門為污染企業(yè)說(shuō)話，某些環(huán)保局長(zhǎng)更像是污染企業(yè)的代言人，這絕不能簡(jiǎn)單看成是“個(gè)別部門職能錯(cuò)位”的結(jié)果，更不能以“個(gè)別執(zhí)法人員素質(zhì)低下”為由搪塞了事，相反，應(yīng)當(dāng)引起我們的高度警惕和深刻反思———其背后所揭示出的是一些地方環(huán)保執(zhí)法的尷尬困局。

無(wú)疑，只有正視這樣的執(zhí)法困局，只有努力想辦法化解這樣的執(zhí)法困局，我們的環(huán)保工作才有可能獲得良好的執(zhí)法環(huán)境，我們才有可能真正走出“先污染、后治理”或者“邊治理、邊污染”的怪圈。(461字)