The prospect of recession may loom over the global economy today, but the rich world's difficulties over growth are graver still. The long-run rate of growth has dwindled alarmingly, contributing to problems including stagnant living standards and fulminating populists. Between 1980 and 2000, GDP per person grew at an annual rate of 2.25% on average. Since then the pace of growth has sunk to about 1.1%.

如今，經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的前景可能籠罩著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)，但發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在增長(zhǎng)方面的困難更加嚴(yán)重。長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)率驚人的下降，導(dǎo)致了生活水平停滯不前和民粹主義者的猛烈抨擊等問題。1980—2000年，人均GDP年均增長(zhǎng)2.25%。從那時(shí)起，增長(zhǎng)速度已經(jīng)下降到大約1.1%。

Although much of the slowdown reflects immutable forces such as ageing, some of it can be reversed. The problem is that, as we write this week, reviving growth has slid perilously down politicians' to-do lists. Their election manifestos are less focused on growth than before, and their appetite for reform has vanished.?

盡管經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩在很大程度上反映了老齡化等不可改變的因素，但其中一些因素是可以逆轉(zhuǎn)的。問題在于，正如我們本周所寫的那樣，重振經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)已經(jīng)從政客們的任務(wù)清單上滑到了危險(xiǎn)的位置。他們的競(jìng)選宣言不再像以前那樣關(guān)注經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，他們對(duì)改革的興趣也消失了。20世紀(jì)下半葉是經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的黃金時(shí)代。

The latter half of the 20th century was a golden age for growth. After the second world war, a baby boom produced a cohort of workers who were better educated than any previous generation and who boosted average productivity as they gained experience. In the 1970s and 1980s women in many rich countries flocked into the workforce. The lowering of trade barriers and the integration of Asia into the world economy later led to much more efficient production. Life got better. In 1950 nearly a third of American households were without flush toilets. By 2000 most of them could boast of owning at least two cars.?

20世紀(jì)下半葉是經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的黃金時(shí)代。二戰(zhàn)后，嬰兒潮產(chǎn)生了一批比以往任何一代人都受過更好教育的工人，他們?cè)讷@得經(jīng)驗(yàn)的同時(shí)提高了平均生產(chǎn)力。20世紀(jì)70年代和80年代，許多富裕國(guó)家的女性涌入勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)。后來，貿(mào)易壁壘的降低和亞洲融入世界經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來了更高效的生產(chǎn)。生活變得更好了。1950年，近三分之一的美國(guó)家庭沒有抽水馬桶。到2000年，他們中的大多數(shù)人都可以夸耀自己至少擁有兩輛汽車。

Many of those growth-boosting trends have since stalled or gone into reverse. The skills of the labour force have stopped improving as fast. Ever more workers are retiring, women's labour-force participation has flattened off and little more is to be gained by expanding basic education. As consumers have become richer, they have spent more of their income on services, for which productivity gains are harder to come by. Sectors like transport, education and construction look much as they did two decades ago. Others, such as university education, housing and health care, are lumbered with red tape and rent-seeking.

自那以來，這些促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)的趨勢(shì)中有許多已經(jīng)停滯不前或出現(xiàn)了逆轉(zhuǎn)。勞動(dòng)力的技能已經(jīng)停止了快速的提高。隨著越來越多的工人退休，女性的勞動(dòng)力參與率已經(jīng)趨于平穩(wěn)，而通過擴(kuò)大基礎(chǔ)教育所能獲得的好處微乎其微。隨著消費(fèi)者變得更加富有，他們把更多的收入花在了服務(wù)業(yè)上，而服務(wù)業(yè)的生產(chǎn)率提高則更難實(shí)現(xiàn)。交通、教育和建筑等行業(yè)看起來與20年前沒什么兩樣。其他方面，如大學(xué)教育、住房和醫(yī)療，則因繁文縟節(jié)和尋租而步履蹣跚。

Ageing has not just hurt growth directly, it has also made electorates less bothered about GDP. Growth most benefits workers with a career ahead of them, not pensioners on fixed incomes. Our analysis of political manifestos shows that the anti-growth sentiment they contain has surged by about 60% since the 1980s. Welfare states have become focused on providing the elderly with pensions and health care rather than investing in growth-boosting infrastructure or the development of young children. Support for growth-enhancing reforms has withered.?

老齡化不僅直接損害了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，也讓選民不再那么在意GDP了。增長(zhǎng)對(duì)未來有職業(yè)生涯的工人最有利，而不是對(duì)固定收入的養(yǎng)老金領(lǐng)取者。我們對(duì)政治宣言的分析顯示，自20世紀(jì)80年代以來，宣言中包含的反增長(zhǎng)情緒飆升了約60%。福利國(guó)家已開始專注于為老年人提供養(yǎng)老金和醫(yī)療保健，而不是投資于促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施或幼兒的發(fā)展。對(duì)促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)的改革的支持已經(jīng)萎縮。

Moreover, even when politicians say they want growth, they act as if they don't. The twin problems of structural change and political decay are especially apparent in Britain, which since 2007 has managed annual growth in GDP per person averaging just 0.4%. Its failure to build enough houses in its prosperous south-east has hampered productivity, and its exit from the European Union has damaged trade and scared off investment. In September Liz Truss became prime minister by promising to boost growth with deficit-financed tax cuts, but succeeded only in sparking a financial crisis.

此外，即使政客們說他們想要增長(zhǎng)，他們的行為卻好像他們不想要一樣。結(jié)構(gòu)變化和政治衰敗的雙重問題在英國(guó)尤為明顯，自2007年以來，英國(guó)的人均GDP年增長(zhǎng)率僅為0.4%。它未能在繁榮的東南部建造足夠的房屋，這阻礙了生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展，它退出歐盟損害了貿(mào)易，嚇跑了投資。去年9月，利茲·特拉斯(Liz Truss)憑借承諾通過赤字融資的減稅來促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)而當(dāng)選首相，但結(jié)果只是引發(fā)了一場(chǎng)金融危機(jī)。

Ms Truss fits a broader pattern of failure. President Donald Trump promised 4% annual growth but hindered long-term prosperity by undermining the global trading system. America's government introduced 12,000 new regulations last year alone. Today's leaders are the most statist in many decades, and seem to believe that industrial policy, protectionism and bail-outs are the route to economic success. That is partly because of a misguided belief that liberal capitalism or free trade is to blame for the growth slowdown. Sometimes this belief is exacerbated by the fallacy that growth cannot be green.

特拉斯符合一個(gè)更廣泛的失敗模式。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普(Donald Trump)承諾每年增長(zhǎng)4%，但破壞了全球貿(mào)易體系，阻礙了長(zhǎng)期繁榮。僅去年一年，美國(guó)政府就出臺(tái)了1.2萬項(xiàng)新法規(guī)。今天的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人是幾十年來最集權(quán)的，他們似乎相信產(chǎn)業(yè)政策、保護(hù)主義和紓困是經(jīng)濟(jì)成功的途徑。這在一定程度上是因?yàn)橐环N錯(cuò)誤的信念，即自由資本主義或自由貿(mào)易是增長(zhǎng)放緩的罪魁禍?zhǔn)?。有時(shí)，“增長(zhǎng)不可能是綠色的”的謬論加劇了這種信念。

In fact, demographic decline means that liberal, growth-boosting reforms are more vital than ever. These will not restore the heady rates of the late 20th century. But embracing free trade, loosening building rules, reforming immigration regimes and making tax systems friendly to business investment may add half a percentage point or so to annual per-person growth. That will not put voters in raptures, but today's growth is so low that every bit of progress matters—and in time will add up to much greater economic strength.

事實(shí)上，人口結(jié)構(gòu)的下降意味著自由的、促進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)的改革比以往任何時(shí)候都更重要。這將不會(huì)恢復(fù)20世紀(jì)末令人興奮的利率。但是，擁抱自由貿(mào)易、放松建筑規(guī)則、改革移民制度和使稅收制度有利于商業(yè)投資，可能會(huì)為人均年增長(zhǎng)率增加0.5個(gè)百分點(diǎn)左右。這不會(huì)讓選民欣喜若狂，但如今的增長(zhǎng)如此之低，以至于每一點(diǎn)進(jìn)步都很重要——隨著時(shí)間的推移，這些進(jìn)步將積累成更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力。

For the time being the West is being made to look good by autocratic X and Russia, which have both inflicted deep economic wounds on themselves. Yet unless they embrace growth, rich democracies will see their economic vitality ebb away and will become weaker on the world stage. Once you start thinking about growth, wrote Robert Lucas, a Nobel-prize-winning economist, "it is hard to think about anything else". If only governments would take that first step.

就目前而言，專制的X和俄羅斯讓西方看起來很好，這兩個(gè)國(guó)家都給自己造成了嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)創(chuàng)傷。然而，除非富裕的民主國(guó)家擁抱增長(zhǎng)，否則它們的經(jīng)濟(jì)活力就會(huì)減弱，在世界舞臺(tái)上會(huì)變得更弱。諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主羅伯特?盧卡斯(Robert Lucas)寫道，一旦你開始考慮增長(zhǎng)問題，“就很難再去考慮其他問題”。如果政府能邁出第一步就好了。