題目：Corruption and Firms（腐敗與公司）

摘要：We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti-corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil using rich micro-data on corruption and firms. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in the number of firms concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships and public procurement. Through the estimation of geographic spillovers and additional tests, we show that audits operate via both a direct detection effect as well as through indirect deterrence channels. Politically connected firms suffer after the audits. Our estimates indicate the anticorruption program generates significant local multipliers which are consistent with the presence of a large corruption tax on government-dependent firms.

研究問題：腐敗對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和公司增長的影響

研究動(dòng)機(jī)：盡管已有很多研究關(guān)注這一問題，但是卻難以建立兩者之間的因果關(guān)系，本文運(yùn)用對(duì)于地方政府的隨機(jī)審計(jì)能夠很好探究因果效應(yīng)

研究設(shè)計(jì)：多時(shí)點(diǎn)DID

研究貢獻(xiàn)：豐富了對(duì)腐敗的影響，公司的政治關(guān)聯(lián)以及經(jīng)濟(jì)中的資源配置等研究文獻(xiàn)