The Morning

: A new bank panic?

《早晨》：新的銀行恐慌？

March 13, 2023

By David Leonhartd

2023年3月13日

作者：戴維·萊昂哈特

Good morning. Is the U.S. at risk of another financial panic? We’ll learn more today.

早上好。美國是否有另一場金融恐慌的風險？今天我們將了解更多。

Silicon Valley Bank.

Jim Wilson /

The New York Times

硅谷銀行。

吉姆·威爾遜 /《紐約時報》

Boom and bust, again

又是繁榮與蕭條

Today is a day of uncertainty for the American economy. 今天是美國經濟充滿不確定性的一天。 Will more banks have to close, as Silicon Valley Bank did last week and Signature Bank did yesterday? How will financial markets react? What will the federal government do? And will the current turmoil prove to be fleeting — or turn into a true crisis? 是否會有更多的銀行不得不像上周的硅谷銀行（Silicon Valley Bank）和昨天的簽名銀行（Signature Bank）那樣倒閉？金融市場將作何反應？聯邦政府會怎么做？當前的動蕩會被證明是短暫的，還是會變成一場真正的危機？ In today’s newsletter, I’ll walk through the basics of the potential financial panic sparked by the failure of SVB (as Silicon Valley Bank is known). 在今天的通訊中，我將梳理一下SVB（硅谷銀行）破產引發(fā)的潛在金融恐慌的基本情況。

What happened?

發(fā)生了什么？

SVB, founded in California in 1983, became one of the country’s 20 largest banks mostly by lending money to start-ups. SVB was sometimes willing to back start-ups that more traditional banks were not — and some of those companies went on to great success. SVB于1983年在加州成立，主要通過向初創(chuàng)企業(yè)提供貸款，成為美國最大的20家銀行之一。SVB有時愿意投資一些傳統銀行不愿投資的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)——其中一些公司后來取得了巨大成功。 SVB’s problems date to 2021, when many technology start-ups were flush with cash and deposited large amounts of it with the bank. SVB, in turn, tried to increase its profits by investing those deposits elsewhere. But as the Federal Reserve increased interest rates to fight inflation over the past two years, SVB’s investments began to lose value. SVB的問題可以追溯到2021年，當時許多科技初創(chuàng)企業(yè)現金充裕，并將大量現金存入了該銀行。 反過來，SVB試圖通過將這些存款投資于其他地方來增加利潤。 但隨著美聯儲（Federal Reserve）在過去兩年提高利率以抗擊通脹，SVB的投資開始貶值。 The bank’s clients became worried in recent days that it would no longer have enough money to repay its customers, and a classic bank run occurred. On Friday, federal regulators said they would take over SVB. 最近幾天，該銀行的客戶開始擔心它將不再有足夠的資金償還客戶，于是發(fā)生了典型的銀行擠兌。上周五，聯邦監(jiān)管機構表示，他們將接管SVB。 Bank runs are especially dangerous because they feed on themselves, sowing panic as people worry that their own deposits may be at risk. Even healthy banks can become endangered because they also do not keep enough cash on hand to repay all customers at once. If banks kept all their deposits locked up in a safe, they could not earn the money that allows them to pay interest. 銀行擠兌尤其危險，因為它們會自我吞噬，在人們擔心自己的存款可能面臨風險之時播下恐慌的種子。即使是健康的銀行也可能面臨危險，因為它們手頭也沒有足夠的現金能一次性償還給所有客戶。如果銀行把所有的存款都鎖在保險箱里，他們就賺不到錢來支付利息。

Janet Yellen, the Treasury secretary.

Valerie Plesch for

The New York Times

珍妮特·耶倫，財政部長。

瓦萊麗·普萊什為《紐約時報》報道

Halting the crisis …

終止危機……

Federal regulators — at the Fed, Treasury Department and other agencies — tried to stem the worries last night by announcing that all customers of both SVB and Signature would have access to their money today. Before the announcement, it was unclear what would happen to deposits of greater than $250,000; a pre-existing guarantee from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation covers only deposits below that amount. 美聯儲、財政部和其他機構的聯邦監(jiān)管機構昨晚宣布，SVB和簽名銀行的所有客戶今天都可以使用他們的資金，并試圖消除這種擔憂。 在此之前，尚不清楚超過25萬美元的存款將會如何處置；聯邦存款保險公司（Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation）預先提供的擔保只覆蓋低于這一數額的存款。 Some SVB clients had indicated that they would be unable to pay their employees if they lost their money, which could lead to spiraling economic problems. SVB的一些客戶表示，如果他們沒了錢，將無法支付員工的工資，這可能會導致螺旋式的經濟問題。 Last night’s announcement has the benefit of reducing the likelihood of a panic today. It also prevents seemingly innocent victims — the workers and executives at companies that used SVB or Signature as their bank — from being hurt. Federal officials emphasized that they would not use taxpayer money to repay those companies. Ultimately, the money will instead come from a mix of the two banks’ assets and from a broader insurance program financed by other banks. 昨晚的聲明有一個好處，那就是減少了今天出現恐慌的可能性。它還可以防止看似無辜的受害者——那些使用SVB或簽名銀行作為銀行的公司的員工和高管——受到傷害。聯邦官員強調，他們不會用納稅人的錢來償還這些公司。最終，這筆資金將來自兩家銀行的資產組合，以及由其他銀行提供資金的一個更廣泛的保險計劃。 But if the panic spreads, taxpayers would be on the hook, as happened during the financial crisis of 2007-9, because the insurance program would be too small to cover the losses. That risk highlights the fact that there are two different policy questions to keep in mind in coming days — one immediate and one longer term. 但如果恐慌蔓延，納稅人將陷入困境，就像2007年至2009年金融危機期間發(fā)生的那樣，因為保險計劃規(guī)模太小，無法彌補損失。這一風險凸顯了一個事實，即在未來幾天，有兩個不同的政策問題需要牢記——一個是近期的，一個是長期的。 The immediate question is how to keep this situation from turning into a full-blown crisis. History suggests that an aggressive and generous government response, like the guaranteeing of all SVB deposits, probably has the best chance of success. The 2007-9 crisis never turned into a depression, partly because of the aggressiveness of the Fed and both the Bush and Obama administrations. 當前的問題是如何防止這種情況演變成全面危機。歷史表明，積極而慷慨的政府應對措施，比如為SVB的所有存款提供擔保，或許最有可能成功。2007- 09年的危機從未演變成蕭條，部分原因在于美聯儲以及布什和奧巴馬政府的積極行動。

… and avoiding the next one

……并避免下一場危機

The longer-term question is how to reduce the chance of future crises, and the historical lessons here are different. The U.S. has suffered so many financial panics over the past few decades, dating to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, because the country tends to regulate its banks so lightly. 更長期的問題是如何降低未來發(fā)生危機的可能性，這方面的歷史教訓有所不同。美國在過去幾十年經歷了如此多的金融恐慌，可以追溯到上世紀80年代的儲蓄和貸款危機，因為美國對銀行的監(jiān)管往往過于寬松。 In the case of SVB, regulators allowed it to make risky bets with its deposits (while the bank’s executives insisted that the bets weren’t risky). More generally, SVB and other banks are often not required to maintain enough of a financial cushion to withstand a crisis. Financial cushions — effectively, cash or other forms of insurance — tend to reduce banks’ profits, which is why bankers resist them. But without a healthy cushion, a bank can collapse during a crisis, and taxpayers must sometimes bail it out. When that happens, the bankers and their investors often emerged unscathed. 以SVB為例，監(jiān)管機構允許它用存款進行高風險的押注（而該銀行的高管堅稱這些押注沒有風險）。更普遍地說，瑞典國家銀行和其他銀行通常不需要維持足夠的財務緩沖來抵御危機。金融緩沖——實際上是現金或其他形式的保險——往往會降低銀行的利潤，這就是銀行家抵制它們的原因。但如果沒有健康的緩沖，銀行可能會在危機中倒閉，納稅人有時必須拯救它。當這種情況發(fā)生時，銀行家及其投資者往往毫發(fā)無損。 Once SVB began to falter, financial industry executives and investors again began clamoring for government help. In the short term, the government may indeed need to step in to avoid a spreading crisis. But the less immediate questions may be uncomfortable for the bankers: How can the people who caused this crisis bear financial responsibility for it? And how can the U.S. economy end this cycle of booms that benefit banks and busts that hurt everyone else? SVB一開始步履蹣跚，金融業(yè)高管和投資者就又開始呼吁政府出手相助。從短期來看，政府可能確實需要介入，以避免危機蔓延。但一些不那么直接的問題可能會讓銀行家們感到不安：引發(fā)這場危機的人如何承擔金融責任？美國經濟如何才能結束這種讓銀行受益、讓其他所有人受損的繁榮周期？ Noah Smith, an economist and Substack writer, offers this useful bit of history in his newsletter: 經濟學家兼Substack作家諾亞·史密斯在他的時事通訊中提供了這段有用的歷史: In 2008, the bankers who made the bad decisions that led to the financial crisis generally got to keep their (very lucrative) jobs after getting bailed out. And their banks continued to exist as well, and even got government to guarantee them some profits going forward. Even as normal people suffered mass unemployment and the loss of their careers and livelihoods, many of the people responsible for the disaster kept collecting million-dollar checks and being in respected positions of power, now with government guarantees. If that seemed unfair, it’s because it

was

unfair.

2008年，那些做出了導致金融危機的錯誤決定的銀行家們在獲得救助后，一般都保住了他們（非常賺錢的）工作。 他們的銀行也繼續(xù)存在，甚至得到了政府的保證，讓他們繼續(xù)盈利。 正當普通人遭受大規(guī)模失業(yè)、事業(yè)和生計的損失時，許多對這場災難負有責任的人仍在領取數百萬美元的支票，并身居要職，現在還有政府的擔保。 如果這看起來不公平，那是因為它

本來

就不公平。

Thanks for spending part of your morning with The Times. See you tomorrow.

謝謝你早上花時間看《紐約時報》。明天見。

Matthew Cullen, Lauren Hard, Lauren Jackson, Brent Lewis, Claire Moses, Ian Prasad Philbrick, Tom Wright-Piersanti and Ashley Wu contributed to The Morning. You can reach the team at themorning@nytimes.com.

馬修·卡倫、勞倫·哈德、勞倫·杰克遜、布倫特·劉易斯、克萊爾·摩西、伊恩·普拉薩德·菲爾布里克、湯姆·賴特-皮爾桑蒂和阿什利·吳為《早晨》雜志撰稿。您可以通過themorning@nytimes.com與團隊聯系。

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