Over the past decade owning a house has meant easy money. Prices rose reliably for years and then went bizarrely ballistic in the pandemic. Yet today if your wealth is tied up in bricks and mortar it is time to get nervous. House prices are now falling in nine rich economies. The drops in America are small so far, but in the wildest markets they are already dramatic. In condo-crazed Canada homes cost 9% less than they did in February. As inflation and recession stalk the world a deepening correction is likely—even estate agents are gloomy. Although this will not detonate global banks as in 2007-09, it will intensify the downturn, leave a cohort of people with wrecked finances and start a political storm.

在過去的十年里，擁有一棟房子意味著容易賺錢。價(jià)格穩(wěn)定地上漲了多年，然后在大流行期間奇怪地飆升。然而今天，如果你的財(cái)富被套牢在房屋上，那你就該感到緊張了。九個(gè)發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的房價(jià)正在下跌。到目前為止，美國的下跌幅度還很小，但在最瘋狂的市場(chǎng)，房價(jià)下跌幅度已經(jīng)非常大了。在熱衷于公寓的加拿大，房價(jià)比2月份下降了9%。隨著通貨膨脹和經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退在世界范圍內(nèi)蔓延，調(diào)整很可能進(jìn)一步加劇，甚至房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人也對(duì)此感到悲觀。盡管這不會(huì)像2007-2009年那樣引爆全球銀行，但它會(huì)加劇衰退，讓一群人的財(cái)務(wù)陷入困境，并引發(fā)一場(chǎng)政治風(fēng)暴。

The cause of the crunch is soaring interest rates: in America prospective buyers have been watching, horrified, as the 30-year mortgage rate has hit 6.92%, over twice the level of a year ago and the highest since April 2002. The pandemic mini-bubble was fuelled by rate cuts, stimulus cash and a hunt for more suburban space. Now most of that is going into reverse. Take, for example, someone who a year ago could afford to put $1,800 a month towards a 30-year mortgage. Back then they could have borrowed $420,000. Today the payment is enough for a loan of $280,000: 33% less. From Stockholm to Sydney the buying power of borrowers is collapsing. That makes it harder for new buyers to afford homes, depressing demand, and can squeeze the finances of existing owners who, if they are unlucky, may be forced to sell.

緊縮的原因是利率飆升: 在美國，30年期抵押貸款利率已經(jīng)達(dá)到6.92%，是一年前水平的兩倍多，是2002年4月以來的最高水平，潛在的買家一直在觀望，驚恐萬分。降息、刺激資金和對(duì)更多郊區(qū)空間的追逐，助長了這場(chǎng)疫情帶來的迷你泡沫。現(xiàn)在，這一趨勢(shì)正在逆轉(zhuǎn)。舉個(gè)例子，一年前一個(gè)人每月可以支付1800美元的30年期抵押貸款。那時(shí)他們可以借42萬美元。如今，這筆款項(xiàng)僅夠償還28萬美元的貸款: 減少了33%。從斯德哥爾摩到悉尼，借款人的購買力正在崩潰。這使得新買家更難買得起房子，從而抑制了需求，并可能減少現(xiàn)有房主的財(cái)務(wù)，如果他們不走運(yùn)，可能會(huì)被迫出售。

The good news is that falling house prices will not cause an epic financial bust in America as they did 15 years ago. The country has fewer risky loans and better-capitalised banks which have not binged on dodgy subprime securities. Uncle Sam now underwrites or securitises two-thirds of new mortgages. The big losers will be taxpayers. Through state insurance schemes they bear the risk of defaults. As rates rise they are exposed to losses via the Federal Reserve, which owns one-quarter of mortgage-backed securities.

好消息是，下跌的房價(jià)不會(huì)像15年前那樣在美國造成一場(chǎng)史詩般的金融崩潰。這個(gè)國家的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款較少，資本狀況較好的銀行沒有大量購買不良次級(jí)抵押貸款證券。山姆大叔現(xiàn)在承?；蜃C券化了三分之二的新抵押貸款。最大的輸家將是納稅人。通過國家保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃，他們承擔(dān)了違約的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。隨著利率的上升，他們將通過美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)遭受損失，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)擁有四分之一的抵押貸款支持證券。

Some other places, such as South Korea and the Nordic countries, have seen scarier accelerations in borrowing, with household debt of around 100% of gdp. They could face destabilising losses at their banks or shadow financial firms: Sweden’s central-bank boss has likened this to “sitting on top of a volcano”. But the world’s worst housing-related financial crisis will still be confined to X, whose problems—vast speculative excess, mortgage strikes, people who have pre-paid for flats which have not been built—are, mercifully, contained within its borders.

其他一些地方，如韓國和北歐國家，則出現(xiàn)了更可怕的借貸加速，家庭債務(wù)已達(dá)到GDP的100%左右。他們可能面臨銀行或影子金融公司的不穩(wěn)定損失: 瑞典央行行長將這比作“坐在火山口上”。但是，世界上最嚴(yán)重的與房地產(chǎn)相關(guān)的金融危機(jī)仍然局限在X，其問題在于大量的投機(jī)過度，抵押貸款罷工，購房者預(yù)付了尚未建成的公寓，不過這些問題被控制在其境內(nèi)。

Even without a synchronised global banking crash, though, the housing downturn will be grim. First, because gummed-up property markets are a drag on the jobs market. As rates rise and prices gradually adjust, the uncertainty makes people hesitant about moving. Sales of existing homes in America dropped by 20% in August year on year, and Zillow, a housing firm, reports 13% fewer new listings than the seasonal norm. In Canada sales volumes could drop by 40% this year. When people cannot move, it saps labour markets of dynamism, a big worry when companies are trying to adapt to worker shortages and the energy crisis. And when prices do plunge, homeowners can find their homes are worth less than their mortgages, making it even harder to up sticks—a problem that afflicted many economies after the global financial crisis.?

然而，即使沒有全球銀行業(yè)同步崩潰，住房市場(chǎng)的低迷也將是嚴(yán)峻的。首先，糟糕的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)拖累了就業(yè)市場(chǎng)。隨著利率上升和價(jià)格逐步調(diào)整，這種不確定性讓人們對(duì)搬家猶豫不決。8月份美國成屋銷量同比下降了20%，房地產(chǎn)公司Zillow的報(bào)告顯示，新掛牌的房屋數(shù)量比季節(jié)性常態(tài)減少了13%。在加拿大，今年的銷售量可能會(huì)下降40%。當(dāng)人們無法移動(dòng)時(shí)，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的活力就會(huì)被削弱，當(dāng)企業(yè)試圖適應(yīng)工人短缺和能源危機(jī)時(shí)，這是一個(gè)很大的擔(dān)憂。當(dāng)房價(jià)真的暴跌時(shí)，房主會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)他們的房子的價(jià)值低于他們的抵押貸款，這使得他們更難遷居別處，這是一個(gè)在全球金融危機(jī)后困擾許多經(jīng)濟(jì)體的問題。

Lower house prices also hurt growth in a second way: they make already-gloomy consumers even more miserable. Worldwide, homes are worth about $250trn (for comparison, stockmarkets are worth only $90trn), and account for half of all wealth. As that edifice of capital crumbles, consumers are likely to cut back on spending. Though a cooler economy is what central banks intend to bring about by raising interest rates, collapsing confidence can take on a momentum of its own.

較低的房價(jià)還會(huì)以第二種方式損害經(jīng)濟(jì)增長:使本已沮喪的消費(fèi)者更加痛苦。在全球范圍內(nèi)，房屋價(jià)值約為250萬億美元(相比之下，股票市場(chǎng)價(jià)值僅為90萬億美元)，占所有財(cái)富的一半。隨著資本大廈的倒塌，消費(fèi)者很可能會(huì)削減支出。盡管央行希望通過提高利率來實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)降溫，但信心崩潰本身也可能帶來動(dòng)力。?

A further problem is concentrated pain borne by a minority of homeowners. By far the most exposed are those who have not locked in interest rates and face soaring mortgage bills. Relatively few are in America, where subsidised 30-year fixed-rate mortgages are the norm. But four in five Swedish loans have a fixed period of two years or less, and half of all New Zealand’s fixed-rate mortgages have been or are due for refinancing this year.?

另一個(gè)問題是，少數(shù)房主承受了集中的痛苦。到目前為止，受影響最大的是那些沒有鎖定利率、面臨飆升抵押貸款賬單的人。在美國，這種情況相對(duì)較少，因?yàn)樵诿绹?，有補(bǔ)貼的30年期固定利率抵押貸款是一種常態(tài)。但五分之四的瑞典貸款的固定期限是兩年或更短，而新西蘭的固定利率抵押貸款中有一半已經(jīng)或即將在今年進(jìn)行再融資。

When combined with a cost-of-living squeeze, that points to a growing number of households in financial distress. In Australia perhaps a fifth of all mortgage debt is owed by households who will see their spare cashflow fall by 20% or more if interest rates rise as expected. In Britain 2m households could see their mortgage absorb another 10% of their income, according to one estimate. Those who cannot afford the payments may have to dump their houses on the market instead.

再加上生活成本的緊縮，這意味著越來越多的家庭陷入財(cái)務(wù)困境。在澳大利亞，可能有五分之一的抵押貸款是由家庭所欠，如果利率如預(yù)期上升，他們的閑置現(xiàn)金流將減少20%甚至更多。根據(jù)一項(xiàng)估計(jì)，在英國，200萬家庭可能會(huì)看到他們的抵押貸款再吸收其10%的收入。那些無力償還貸款的人可能不得不將自己的房子拋售到市場(chǎng)上。

That is where the political dimension comes in. Housing markets are already a battleground. Thickets of red tape make it too hard to build new homes in big cities, leading to shortages. A generation of young people in the rich world feel they have been unfairly excluded from home ownership. Although lower house prices will reduce the deposit needed to obtain a mortgage, it is first-time buyers who depend most on debt financing, which is now expensive. And a whole new class of financially vulnerable homeowners are about to join the ranks of the discontented.

這就是政治因素發(fā)揮作用的地方。房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)是一個(gè)戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)。繁瑣的繁文縟節(jié)使得在大城市建造新房變得非常困難，從而導(dǎo)致住房短缺。發(fā)達(dá)國家的一代年輕人感到他們被不公平地排除在擁有住房之外。盡管較低的房價(jià)將降低獲得抵押貸款所需的押金，但首次購房者最依賴債務(wù)融資，目前債務(wù)融資成本很高。一個(gè)全新的經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱的房主階層即將加入不滿的行列。

Dangerous propertiesHaving bailed out the economy repeatedly in the past 15 years, most Western governments will be tempted to come to the rescue yet again. In America fears of a housing calamity have led some to urge the Fed to slow its vital rate rises. Spain is reported to be considering limiting rising mortgage payments, and Hungary has already done so. Expect more countries to follow.

在過去的15年里，大多數(shù)西方國家的政府已經(jīng)多次對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)行了紓困，現(xiàn)在他們可能會(huì)再次出手救助。在美國，對(duì)房地產(chǎn)災(zāi)難的擔(dān)憂已經(jīng)促使一些人敦促美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)放慢其至關(guān)重要的加息速度。據(jù)報(bào)道，西班牙正在考慮限制不斷上漲的抵押貸款支付，匈牙利也已經(jīng)這樣做了。預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)有更多國家效仿。

That could see governments’ debts rise still further and encourage the idea that home ownership is a one-way bet backed by the state. And it would also do little to solve the underlying problems that bedevil the rich world’s housing markets, many of which are due to ill-guided and excessive government intervention, from mortgage subsidies and distortive taxes to excessively onerous planning rules. As an era of low interest rates comes to an end, a home-price crunch is coming—and there is no guarantee of a better housing market at the end of it all.

這可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致政府債務(wù)進(jìn)一步上升，并助長房屋所有權(quán)是由政府支持的單向押注的想法。而且，這也無助于解決困擾發(fā)達(dá)國家房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的根本問題，其中許多問題都是由于引導(dǎo)不當(dāng)和過度的政府干預(yù)，從抵押貸款補(bǔ)貼、扭曲的稅收到過于繁重的規(guī)劃規(guī)定。隨著低利率時(shí)代的結(jié)束，房價(jià)危機(jī)也即將到來，而且沒有人能保證在這一切結(jié)束時(shí)，房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)可以好轉(zhuǎn)。