? ? ? ? 本篇文章由我翻譯，全文共16頁，本篇為節(jié)選的第一部分約8頁內(nèi)容，原文為英文并附于末尾，紅色標(biāo)注為原文附帶的注釋，藍(lán)色標(biāo)注為我添加的補(bǔ)充和注釋。文章中引用部分若已有漢譯本，則一概使用漢譯本的翻譯，并補(bǔ)充標(biāo)注漢譯本的引用文獻(xiàn)。由于專欄編輯器中不能設(shè)置斜體，我用加粗來代替斜體。為了方便，我會(huì)在正文中加入頁碼，表示方法如【502】。

逃離黑格爾主義：回應(yīng)*

?【502】

????????限于篇幅，我在這里跳過預(yù)備內(nèi)容，直接對(duì)個(gè)別評(píng)論進(jìn)行回應(yīng)，并在合適的時(shí)候再重新引入這些預(yù)備內(nèi)容。

????????在所有批判文章中，Paul Diesing基本上完全沒有理解我的觀點(diǎn)。Diesing反而首先將所謂我的“思維方式”("ways of thinking")與他自己的區(qū)分開來，并在接下來的絕大部分篇幅里詳細(xì)地闡述了后者。他得出的結(jié)論是，這兩種“思維方式”是完全互斥的，以至于“在它們之間做出的任何妥協(xié)都是不可能的”(378)——除非我從他在文末提出的建議中意識(shí)到這一點(diǎn)。

????????然而，我并沒有在《逃離黑格爾》一文中闡述我的“思維方式”。我只是提供了一種對(duì)黑格爾主義哲學(xué)的解讀并對(duì)其進(jìn)行了批判（實(shí)際上，我只是對(duì)在其他地方發(fā)展起來的這些解讀和批判進(jìn)行了總結(jié)），緊接著，在我看來是高度矛盾的，分析了它與馬克思政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)發(fā)展之間的關(guān)聯(lián)，尤其是與價(jià)值、貨幣和資本理論之間的關(guān)聯(lián)。我的解讀很可能是片面的、誤導(dǎo)性的或完全錯(cuò)誤的，而我的批判則由于這些或那些原因，可能是不合理的。但要想證明這一點(diǎn)就只能進(jìn)入具體的討論之中，假定其中的錯(cuò)誤存在于我對(duì)馬克思和黑格爾的解讀之中，并將我的解讀與它的對(duì)象即黑格爾主義哲學(xué)和馬克思主義政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中與之相聯(lián)系的部分進(jìn)行比較。盡管也確實(shí)存在著“讀者回應(yīng)”式批判以及其他文學(xué)領(lǐng)域的方式，但這一論證規(guī)則不僅適用于對(duì)理論文本的分析，還適用于其他任何旨在獲取知識(shí)的實(shí)踐中——或者說是從廣義上說的任何“科學(xué)”實(shí)踐中。如果并非如此的話，我們就僅僅只是在“交換意見”，相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的不同解讀最多也只能像畫展中的畫作一樣并排擺放【503】而不存在任何共同的基礎(chǔ)來評(píng)判它們，甚至沒有任何理由來分析它們之間的差別。(1)

? ? ? ? 無論如何，Diesing沒有提出任何論據(jù)來支持他針對(duì)我對(duì)黑格爾的解讀所提出來的所謂反對(duì)意見。實(shí)際上，他基本上沒有在這方面做出任何解釋，以至于人們不禁要問，他和我的分歧到底在哪里。我從他的開篇中看到，主要的爭(zhēng)議點(diǎn)在于，黑格爾的“辯證法”究竟是一種“非常壞的思維方式”，正如我解讀的那樣，還是一種“非常好的思維方式”，就像他認(rèn)為的那樣。當(dāng)然，黑格爾的“辯證法”是一種“壞的思維方式”并非我的解讀——盡管如果我的解讀確實(shí)是正確的話，基于我在批判中給出的理由，我肯定不會(huì)推薦它。

????????如果Diesing不同意我所得出的結(jié)論，那么他就應(yīng)該代表他們這些反對(duì)者針對(duì)我所提出來的理由進(jìn)行反駁。我對(duì)黑格爾的“辯證法”大體上是如何通過概念矛盾的“自我揚(yáng)棄”的內(nèi)在過程運(yùn)作的的解讀（見Rosenthal, 1999, 289-91; 以及更進(jìn)一步的闡述，見Rosenthal, 1998, ch. 8）實(shí)際上并無不尋常之處。這一解讀基于黑格爾自己的方法論文本，因此既不會(huì)讓絕大多數(shù)黑格爾學(xué)者感到驚訝，也不會(huì)冒犯他們。但我與黑格爾學(xué)術(shù)圈主流觀點(diǎn)的不同之處在于，我認(rèn)為黑格爾的敘述實(shí)際上并沒有遵循像他自己所說的方法論原則。黑格爾所承諾的內(nèi)在的“概念辯證法”("dialectic of concepts")在他的敘述中并未實(shí)現(xiàn)。相反，黑格爾自詡的概念規(guī)定“推導(dǎo)”一直依賴于目的論原則和對(duì)滿足這些原則的——無論是邏輯的、自然的、法律的還是諸如此類的——預(yù)先給定的形式反復(fù)無常的尋求，或者至少在保留了內(nèi)在表象的情況下，倒錯(cuò)地運(yùn)用了所謂的“三段論”的術(shù)語中的歧義。

????????我對(duì)這種黑格爾主義論證的分析——如果你愿意的話，也可以叫它“辯證法”——為我拒絕這種似是而非的論證提供了依據(jù)。在《逃離》(2)一文中，我只是以總結(jié)的方式陳述了這些依據(jù)，并將讀者引向《神話》(3)一書，在這本書中，我以更多的例子為基礎(chǔ)，詳盡地闡述了這些依據(jù)。在《逃離》一文中，我對(duì)黑格爾主義論證的討論實(shí)際上只是我對(duì)馬克思是如何使用黑格爾主義論證的這一問題的初步分析，這是我的主要研究順序。盡管如此，如果有人想要為黑格爾辯護(hù)，使其免受我對(duì)其的具體指控，那么他就至少應(yīng)當(dāng)解決這些指控。在這一點(diǎn)上，Diesing確實(shí)說過，“羅斯塔爾將這種普遍—特殊—個(gè)別的辯證法稱為‘目的論’”，他接著說道，“我不清楚他在說什么”。然而，他是在講述了一個(gè)他自己列舉的有關(guān)于政策制定與實(shí)施的故事之后寫下的這幾句話【504】——仿佛我一直在討論Diesing而不是黑格爾一樣！

? ? ? ? 更不用說，對(duì)黑格爾“辯證法”的性質(zhì)、意義以及，我認(rèn)為最重要的，有效性的辯論，必須以在黑格爾身上找到的“辯證法”的證據(jù)作為根本標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。值得注意的是，在英語世界的馬克思主義討論中，實(shí)際上反而是那些自封的黑格爾馬克思主義者在一直違反這一顯而易見的原則，他們的“黑格爾主義”似乎很大程度上都是從二手文獻(xiàn)和其他黑格爾馬克思主義者中挑揀出來的。因此，例如，在研討會(huì)上，Michael Williams指責(zé)我忽視了“文獻(xiàn)”。但他唯一一次對(duì)黑格爾的引用卻僅僅只是轉(zhuǎn)引Tony Smith針對(duì)我對(duì)黑格爾的解讀所提出的反例，而Smith引用的卻是未經(jīng)修訂的英譯版中的黑格爾文本，可能會(huì)令他們感到遺憾的是，他們所引用的那些能夠支撐他們解讀的關(guān)鍵文本恰好是錯(cuò)誤的。[1] 具有代表性地，Williams甚至指責(zé)我將黑格爾的哲學(xué)“還原為”“絕對(duì)唯心主義”，并把這一表述放進(jìn)了引號(hào)里，仿佛是我創(chuàng)造了這一觀點(diǎn)一樣。然而“絕對(duì)唯心主義”正是黑格爾他自己最常用來表明自己哲學(xué)立場(chǎng)的表述。[2]

????????Diesing所公開宣稱的“黑格爾主義”對(duì)黑格爾本人毫無尊敬之心，這一點(diǎn)從他的評(píng)論以及他對(duì)“東西辯證法”("dialectic of things")和“思維辯證法”("dialectic of thinking")的區(qū)分就能清楚地看出來。黑格爾的唯心主義除了證明現(xiàn)實(shí)——“東西”領(lǐng)域(the domain of "things")——不僅由思想統(tǒng)治，而且“沒有任何東西”("nothing")獨(dú)立于思想以外，還能包含些什么？Diesing甚至認(rèn)為邏輯學(xué)某種程度上與黑格爾主義“辯證法”無關(guān)(376)：這種否定甚至與他自稱對(duì)《法哲學(xué)原理》中所展現(xiàn)出來的“方法”的欽佩完全矛盾。而事實(shí)上，《法哲學(xué)原理》只不過是對(duì)《哲學(xué)科學(xué)百科全書》第三部第二節(jié)的闡述，其出發(fā)點(diǎn)——并非如Diesing所認(rèn)為的那樣，是“自由意志”("free will")和“不自由的東西”("unfree things")，而是法權(quán)(right)概念——應(yīng)當(dāng)從體系先前的發(fā)展中得出，當(dāng)然，這一體系開始于邏輯學(xué)的基本規(guī)定。按照黑格爾本人的說法，他在這里所遵循的方法同樣明確地是邏輯學(xué)中所闡述的方法?！斑@里同樣以邏輯學(xué)中所闡明了的方法為前提。根據(jù)這種方法，”他寫道，“在科學(xué)中，概念是從它本身發(fā)展起來的，這種發(fā)展純粹是【505】概念規(guī)定內(nèi)在的前進(jìn)運(yùn)動(dòng)和產(chǎn)物?！?Ph. R., §31) [3] (4)

? ? ? ? Diesing對(duì)我對(duì)馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中對(duì)資本范疇的推導(dǎo)的分析的反駁與我的分析或推導(dǎo)也完全無關(guān)，這一點(diǎn)我將留給讀者來證明。在這里，Diesing又一次僅僅只是用一個(gè)完全無關(guān)的敘述來取代我的分析，并向讀者保證，在所討論的段落中，馬克思實(shí)際上是在“描述一個(gè)辯證的歷史過程”，其中的敘述應(yīng)當(dāng)是歷史的概要。但是，在Diesing引用的文本及其上下文中，馬克思正在“做”這件事的證據(jù)在哪里？馬克思明確地表示，他正在分析貨幣范疇，并嘗試表明，貨幣是由于其“內(nèi)在的本質(zhì)”——而非偶然的歷史因素——而“必須轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)椤辟Y本。我們可以就這種論證是否取得成功進(jìn)行討論。但如果根本不承認(rèn)馬克思曾經(jīng)嘗試進(jìn)行過這樣的論證，那就根本不可能就這一問題進(jìn)行討論。

????????在討論其他反對(duì)意見之前，我只想提請(qǐng)讀者注意一下Diesing在他語境下的指控，即我正在“尋找某種邏輯論證”(377)，“當(dāng)然”我并沒能找到，因?yàn)椤斑@（指的應(yīng)該是馬克思的文本）并非論證，而是對(duì)辯證過程的歷史描述”。它“將邏輯論證和經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究完全區(qū)分開來”，這里寫的應(yīng)該就是我的“思維方式”的特征。Diesing繼續(xù)寫道：“他的辯證法的概念是康德的；他想要一個(gè)非經(jīng)驗(yàn)的演繹過程?！?376)這顯然也是在寫我。（對(duì)于哲學(xué)史的學(xué)生而言，Diesing在這里所說的“康德辯證法”顯然是不恰當(dāng)?shù)摹＃〥iesing甚至寫了“羅森塔爾的邏輯論證概念”，仿佛是我——而不是柏拉圖或亞里士多德——有幸發(fā)現(xiàn)了有效論證的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

????????如果我的個(gè)人偏好——即所謂我“想要”的東西——在這里有任何意義的話，我也可以做出回答，我當(dāng)然不反對(duì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究，也不反對(duì)使用經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究的成果。我沒有在后者和邏輯分析之間做出任何選擇，盡管這兩者當(dāng)然是有區(qū)別的。然而，在面對(duì)什么是論證以及在我看來這些論證具有理論意義的地方，我確實(shí)有興趣確定它們是正確的還是錯(cuò)誤的。我希望大多數(shù)從事理論研究的人都能夠擁有這種興趣。

????????【506】在《逃離》一文中，我試圖證明馬克思對(duì)貨幣必然“轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)椤必泿刨Y本的論證是錯(cuò)誤的，這一必然性本身也是錯(cuò)誤的，而且在某種程度上反映了黑格爾主義對(duì)他的影響。我真的沒有想到，會(huì)有人懷疑這是論證。讀者可以在我引用的文本中找到那些獨(dú)特的邏輯標(biāo)志：“由于”(als)、“因此”(daher)、“出于這一原因”(deswegen)、“從而”(also)。不能認(rèn)出這些段落是論證，就如同不能認(rèn)出“你好”是問候或“出去！”是命令一樣。

????????無論何種情形，說一位理論家做出了一個(gè)論證，就只不過是在說他/她在試圖證明他/她的理論中所包含的命題。對(duì)馬克思來說，認(rèn)為他沒有做出正確的論證，肯定比認(rèn)為他沒有做出任何論證更好一些。當(dāng)然，黑格爾也是如此。（“命題”[Satz]這一術(shù)語對(duì)于黑格爾而言是一個(gè)具有豐富內(nèi)涵的詞，他拒絕命題形式，因?yàn)樗鼰o法“表達(dá)”真理。盡管如此，整體話語——真理應(yīng)當(dāng)在其中得到表達(dá)——即使在黑格爾這里，也依然是由命題組成的。）黑格爾“辯證法”的具體特征就是所謂獨(dú)特的證明原則，當(dāng)然這絕不是一種對(duì)證明的回避！黑格爾反復(fù)提到他對(duì)概念的“演繹”(Deduktion)和“推導(dǎo)”(Ableitung)，正因這些概念都是推導(dǎo)得來的，而非被視為理所當(dāng)然的，所以在這里對(duì)特定主體的哲學(xué)闡述應(yīng)當(dāng)是存在的?！霸谡軐W(xué)的認(rèn)識(shí)中，”黑格爾寫道，“概念的必然性是主要的事情；生成運(yùn)動(dòng)的過程，作為結(jié)果來說，是概念的證明和演繹?！?Ph. R., §2R)(5)我已經(jīng)指出過，黑格爾的證明方法實(shí)際上并不像他所認(rèn)為的那樣在原則上是統(tǒng)一的，而且，他在實(shí)際闡述過程中所典型地運(yùn)用的那種論證方法，要么是內(nèi)在但似是而非的，要么可能是有效但并非內(nèi)在的。以上批判為黑格爾帶來的更多的是肯定，而非不容反對(duì)者置疑的所謂欽佩。

????????Tony Smith比起Diesing花了更大的力氣來刻畫我的分析。但不幸的是，他盡管表面上贊同了我的觀點(diǎn)，但對(duì)我的刻畫在很大程度上也是錯(cuò)誤的，甚至往往是純粹的虛構(gòu)。例如，我并沒有在任何地方主張“黑格爾主義主題”在且僅在《資本論》中的“唯一一個(gè)地方”發(fā)揮作用(489)。我甚至沒有提及過《資本論》中“黑格爾主義主題”。相反，我關(guān)注的是，更確切地說，我希望關(guān)注的是黑格爾主義特有的或獨(dú)特的“公式”：例如，“實(shí)在的普遍性”或語法公式，根據(jù)這些公式，“特殊”就是“一般[或普遍]的表現(xiàn)形式”。我將這些“公式”系統(tǒng)性地與黑格爾主義的論證方式區(qū)分開來。我的觀點(diǎn)是，前者雖然不是后者，【507】但在馬克思經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的發(fā)展中，更具體地說，在他的價(jià)值理論的發(fā)展中，前者依舊扮演了重要的角色。我認(rèn)為之所以如此，是因?yàn)楸M管在黑格爾的用法中，它們具有著形而上學(xué)的含義，但它們恰好“完美地適合于”把握住馬克思價(jià)值理論主要對(duì)象的現(xiàn)象結(jié)構(gòu)：即“價(jià)值形式”，或者更通俗地說，貨幣。

????????馬克思的價(jià)值理論絕不僅限于《資本論》中的“唯一一個(gè)地方”，當(dāng)然，馬克思對(duì)以上所討論的公式的應(yīng)用也絕不僅限于《資本論》中的“唯一一個(gè)地方”。相反，價(jià)值理論是馬克思整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)理論的基石。馬克思所分析的所有后續(xù)經(jīng)濟(jì)形式（價(jià)格、工資、利潤(rùn)、地租、利息等等）都只是更加具體的（黑格爾主義者則可能會(huì)說，“進(jìn)一步發(fā)展了的”）“價(jià)值形式”。由于貨幣仍然恰好是它們的實(shí)體，因此它們當(dāng)然必須反映出后者的本體論特征，并因此為馬克思提供了充分的機(jī)會(huì)來利用他有關(guān)于黑格爾主義公式的知識(shí)。這一點(diǎn)在馬克思對(duì)《資本論》第二卷中資本流通形式的分析中表現(xiàn)得尤為明顯。然而，也并不出乎意料，在《資本論》的所有章節(jié)中，有關(guān)價(jià)值形式的那部分，即第一卷第一章第三節(jié)，對(duì)黑格爾主義公式的使用最為明顯。我不知道馬克思在這里是否，就像Smith所說的那樣，是“故意”地使用了典型的黑格爾主義公式——我只知道他確實(shí)使用了。[4]

????????Smith繼續(xù)寫道：“按照羅森塔爾的說法，黑格爾的思想在某種程度上將抽象歪曲地(perversely)置于活生生的人類主體之上，這與貨幣，一種‘現(xiàn)實(shí)的抽象’，歪曲地統(tǒng)治了資本主義中的社會(huì)個(gè)體極其相似?！?489-90)我不清楚這到底是怎么“按照我的說法”得出來的。這一批判可能為批判黑格爾提供了一個(gè)依據(jù)，但它并非我的依據(jù)?！盎钌娜祟惔嬖凇庇锌赡苁墙栌昧笋R克思早期在1844手稿中對(duì)黑格爾的“人道主義”批判——但我對(duì)這一問題沒有說過一個(gè)字。我指責(zé)的黑格爾的“歪曲”("perversions")僅僅只是邏輯上的歪曲，但這一點(diǎn)并沒有被他注意到。如果你愿意的話，這些“歪曲”中的一種——因馬克思繼費(fèi)爾巴哈之后將之稱為“主謂倒裝”("subject-predicate reversal")而聞名，即將既存事物視為一般規(guī)定性的特征而非反之亦然——就很適合于把握住那些“歪曲的”（我遵循馬克思的說法，將其稱為“顛倒的”("inverted")）經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值現(xiàn)象。[5]在商品—貨幣體系中——正如之前已經(jīng)指出的那樣，就是在馬克思在分析中所明確假設(shè)的那種貨幣體系中——作為貨幣的貨幣，盡管其由實(shí)物組成，實(shí)際上就是商品本身的一般經(jīng)濟(jì)“本質(zhì)”的特征，即它們的價(jià)值。貨幣是交換體系賦予后者的實(shí)在形式【508】：與其說貨幣“具有價(jià)值”，不如說價(jià)值具有貨幣（形式）。無論如何，正如讀者能夠找到的那樣，在我的論述中所討論的與價(jià)值抽象具有“顛倒”關(guān)系的特殊并非特殊的人類主體，而是特殊的商品。[6]

????????Smith針對(duì)我的分析詳細(xì)闡述了三個(gè)所謂的批判。然而，如前所述，其中的第一點(diǎn)不需要過多討論就可以直接跳過。顯而易見，在提及他之前的描述時(shí)，他寫道：“羅森塔爾并非第一個(gè)斷言黑格爾邏輯學(xué)中的最終范疇反映了由馬克思所充分描述的資本統(tǒng)治的人?！?491)我不清楚Smith到底是如何理解“黑格爾邏輯學(xué)中的最終范疇”的這一表述的——他反復(fù)重復(fù)這一表述，仿佛應(yīng)當(dāng)重視它一樣。他并沒有告訴我們“黑格爾邏輯學(xué)中的最終范疇”到底是認(rèn)知(cognition)、意愿(volition)還是絕對(duì)理念(absolute idea)(6)——我猜這并不是他想指的東西。但，無論如何，我根本沒有做出過Smith所認(rèn)為的任何斷言，因此我也就不可能是第一個(gè)做出如此斷言的人， Smith認(rèn)為這一斷言站不住腳的理由也就完全不用在意了。

????????其次，Smith指責(zé)我在對(duì)黑格爾自己的論證（或“方法論”）中不恰當(dāng)?shù)丶僭O(shè)“黑格爾的”普遍性、特殊性和個(gè)別性“范疇”“所指的就是類、種和個(gè)體的傳統(tǒng)范疇”。這一指控則僅僅得到了我在對(duì)金屬和鋅之間關(guān)系的“討論”中的暗示的支撐。實(shí)際上，我根本沒有“討論”這一關(guān)系，而只是把它當(dāng)作一個(gè)例子，來闡述馬克思所屈服的那種黑格爾主義邏輯謬誤。我們暫時(shí)回到這個(gè)例子的意義上。無論如何，Smith向我們保證，“黑格爾明確地、一貫地以及不斷地否認(rèn)世界可以用靜態(tài)的形式分類”如類、種和個(gè)體“來充分地理解”?；蛟S的確如此。但事實(shí)卻是黑格爾本人正是在類、種和樣本的意義上使用了對(duì)普遍性、特殊性和個(gè)別性的區(qū)分。值得注意的是，Smith在回應(yīng)一篇引用了黑格爾文本的文章時(shí)否定了這一點(diǎn)【509】，而這篇文章的引用中包含了這樣一段關(guān)于太陽系的文本：“在物質(zhì)世界中，是類、同時(shí)又是單個(gè)客體及其機(jī)械過程的個(gè)別普遍性的，正是中心體?！?S.L., II, 423/722)(7)如果黑格爾將“類”和“普遍性”當(dāng)作可相互替代的詞，并進(jìn)而將它們與“單個(gè)客體”對(duì)照，那么我們還需要什么證據(jù)來證明在這一用法中普遍（和普遍性）確實(shí)具有與類(genus)（和一般性(generality)(8)）一樣的含義？這一用法在黑格爾的敘述中十分常見，而且實(shí)際上在《自然科學(xué)》中也十分泛濫——這并不奇怪，因?yàn)樽匀谎芯烤褪菑倪@樣的分類體系中衍生出來的領(lǐng)域——其中類(genera)或類(kinds)(Gattungen)(9)被明確地寫為“普遍”，并與作為“特殊”的物種(Arten)相區(qū)別，等等。“在其自在地存在著的普遍性內(nèi)，”黑格爾寫道，“類(Gattung)把自己特殊化為種(Arten)……”(En. N., §368)[7]Smith的明顯疏忽再次指出了證據(jù)基礎(chǔ)的問題，即我的黑格爾主義反對(duì)者們支持的所謂“黑格爾主義”只不過是建立在空中樓閣之上。它看起來就像一種沒有黑格爾的“黑格爾主義”。

????????然而，我還是對(duì)使用類、種和樣本的術(shù)語來對(duì)黑格爾的用法作一個(gè)全面一般的說明持謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度，因?yàn)楸M管這些術(shù)語有著明顯的邏輯學(xué)詞源，但它們帶有太多的自然科學(xué)分類體系的含義。因此，它們會(huì)使人聯(lián)想到客體的經(jīng)驗(yàn)給定性，即個(gè)體或“單純性”（它指的是尚未分類的個(gè)體）、特殊——種和類可以從中“通過抽象”（即，從它們的獨(dú)特特征或“特殊性”中）得到區(qū)分。這種生物學(xué)的含義在黑格爾所使用的德語同義詞中(Gattung, Art, Individuum)表現(xiàn)得更加突出：正如之前提到過的，不出所料地大多出現(xiàn)在黑格爾討論有機(jī)自然的章節(jié)中，偶爾也會(huì)出現(xiàn)在這些章節(jié)之外（例如上文引用的那段對(duì)機(jī)械系統(tǒng)的討論中）。在他對(duì)個(gè)別性的使用中，黑格爾實(shí)際上系統(tǒng)性地借鑒了他自己所說的“自然”個(gè)體的含義，其自己獨(dú)特的特征與“概念的個(gè)別性”形成了反差(見Rosenthal, 1998, 102-3 and ch. 9, passim)。但我在黑格爾對(duì)一般性、特定性和個(gè)別性的討論中所發(fā)現(xiàn)的混淆，絕不建立在對(duì)特定自然類屬和個(gè)體的參照之上。

????????

????????注釋：

????????* 所有對(duì)黑格爾的引用都來自Hegel, 1969，即《黑格爾全集》的Suhrkamp版。英文譯文則是我翻譯的。單行本的縮寫如下：En. L.: 《哲學(xué)科學(xué)全書綱要》，第一部：《邏輯學(xué)》；En. N.: 《哲學(xué)科學(xué)全書綱要》，第二部：《自然科學(xué)》；En. S.: 《哲學(xué)科學(xué)全書綱要》，第三部：《精神哲學(xué)》；Ph. R.: 《法哲學(xué)原理》；S. L.:《邏輯學(xué)》。一般而言，我會(huì)標(biāo)記出自哪個(gè)段落。段落標(biāo)注之后的"R"代表黑格爾的“說明”（通常相對(duì)于正文縮進(jìn)），而"A"則代表所謂的“附釋”。因此可以很容易地找到翻譯版中的相應(yīng)段落。由于《邏輯學(xué)》沒有遵循這種排版方式，因此我同時(shí)引用了英文版的Hegel, 1970中的頁碼，在德文版頁碼后添加斜線和數(shù)字表示。

????????[1] Williams所提出的結(jié)論在原文中實(shí)際上只是一個(gè)從句。“一方面，哲學(xué)的發(fā)展實(shí)歸功于經(jīng)驗(yàn)科學(xué)，”黑格爾寫道——然后繼續(xù)寫道：“另一方面，哲學(xué)賦予科學(xué)內(nèi)容以最基本的形式：思維的自由（思維的先驗(yàn)因素）和必然性的保證” (En. L., §3)（黑格爾，賀麟譯，《小邏輯》，上海人民出版社，第69頁，譯文有改動(dòng)，同時(shí)參照了北京大學(xué)出版社版的《哲學(xué)科學(xué)全書綱要》。該句是由羅森塔爾從德文翻譯為英文的，與現(xiàn)在通行的英文版略有區(qū)別；中文版與英文版也略有區(qū)別）。

????????[2] 見En. L., §45A：“這種對(duì)于事物的看法，同樣也是唯心主義，但有別于批判哲學(xué)的那種主觀唯心主義，而應(yīng)稱為絕對(duì)唯心主義?！保ê诟駹枠?biāo)注的重點(diǎn)）（黑格爾，賀麟譯，《小邏輯》，上海人民出版社，第133-4頁，譯文有改動(dòng)，同時(shí)參照了人民出版社版的《哲學(xué)全書》第一部分。同上，羅森塔爾、英文版與中文版的翻譯都略有區(qū)別。據(jù)說這些附釋中的一部分是后來附會(huì)上去的，而我對(duì)黑格爾和黑格爾哲學(xué)史毫無了解，所以我并不清楚這段附釋是否出自黑格爾之手或者是否符合黑格爾的本意，而且整本《小邏輯》中僅有的兩個(gè)“絕對(duì)唯心主義”均出現(xiàn)在附釋中，另一個(gè)出現(xiàn)在第160段的附釋中，請(qǐng)讀者留意。）

????????[3] （黑格爾，范揚(yáng)、張企泰譯，《法哲學(xué)原理》，商務(wù)印書館，第46頁。羅森塔爾的翻譯以及英文版在語序上與中文版略有不同）在同一段中，黑格爾寫了一句話，這句話顯然與Diesing邏輯學(xué)僅僅只是為了提供“可用于經(jīng)驗(yàn)的思想運(yùn)動(dòng)”的主張相矛盾：“這個(gè)進(jìn)程，既不因?yàn)橛懈鞣N情況存在，于是得到保證而發(fā)生，也不由于普遍物應(yīng)用于從別處接受來的素材而發(fā)生。”

????????[4] 更詳細(xì)地，見Rosenthal, 1998, ch. 11；以及關(guān)于馬克思對(duì)連接特殊與普遍的特定句法公式的使用，Rosenthal, 1998, ch. 14.

????????[5] 盡管Smith提到的黑格爾的“歪曲”表明了他間接地暗指了這一點(diǎn)，但實(shí)際上，我并沒有在《逃離》中對(duì)其進(jìn)行討論，而是在Rosenthal, 1998, chs. 12 and 14中對(duì)其進(jìn)行了討論。

????????[6] Smith再次虛構(gòu)了我的觀點(diǎn)，他寫道：“羅森塔爾提出了這一事實(shí)，黑格爾的辯證法包括了回溯性解釋，揭示了其與理論‘前進(jìn)’（或‘內(nèi)在’）運(yùn)動(dòng)內(nèi)在地相矛盾。”(494n)我沒在任何地方說過“回溯性解釋”，Smith也沒有解釋我討論中的什么內(nèi)容值得用這一稱呼以及為什么。據(jù)我猜測(cè)，他看到了我所說的目的論論證。但黑格爾的目的論論證中的問題以及它們與黑格爾闡述中內(nèi)在性的主張相矛盾的原因，并非是它們?cè)凇跋蚯啊被颉跋蚝蟆薄卑椎卣f，我認(rèn)為隱喻術(shù)語對(duì)邏輯分析并沒有多少用——而是它們建立在簡(jiǎn)單的要求之上：例如，“概念”中的“特殊性的環(huán)節(jié)”必須獲得一個(gè)獨(dú)立的化身，等等。

????????[7] （黑格爾，薛華譯，《哲學(xué)科學(xué)全書綱要》1830年版，北京大學(xué)出版社，第263頁，譯文有改動(dòng)）另見§§368-375, passim，還有En.L., §24A2以及En.L., §221A.

????????

????????譯者注：

????????(1) 作者所闡述的是一種學(xué)術(shù)化的爭(zhēng)論方式，讀者能夠從這樣的爭(zhēng)論中獲取到更多的知識(shí)，而不只是看到了雙方的立場(chǎng)。

????????(2) 即《逃離黑格爾》(“The Escape from Hegel”)一文，我正在對(duì)這篇論文進(jìn)行翻譯。

????????(3) 即《辯證法的神話：對(duì)馬克思與黑格爾關(guān)系的再解讀》(“The Myth of Dialectics：Reinterpreting the Marx-Hegel Relation”)一書，我曾對(duì)該書的第13章進(jìn)行過翻譯，未來可能會(huì)繼續(xù)對(duì)該書的部分其他章節(jié)進(jìn)行翻譯。

????????(4) 該段中的“邏輯學(xué)”在原文中均為斜體且首字母大寫的“Logic”，我不清楚這里各處表示的究竟是黑格爾的“《邏輯學(xué)》”這本書還是對(duì)黑格爾“邏輯學(xué)”方法的強(qiáng)調(diào)，我更傾向于后者。但問題出在這段最后對(duì)《法哲學(xué)原理》的引用中，根據(jù)羅森塔爾的翻譯，句中的“Logic”依然是首字母大寫且斜體的，但在英文版中，“l(fā)ogic”一詞并未大寫且也不是斜體，也就是說既沒有強(qiáng)調(diào)，指的也不是《邏輯學(xué)》這本書；中文版中同樣將這個(gè)詞翻譯為“邏輯學(xué)”，并沒有添加書名號(hào)，也沒有強(qiáng)調(diào)；德文版中為“Logik”，同樣沒有斜體（德文中名詞的首字母都要大寫），因此這句引用中的斜體“Logic”要么表示的是羅森塔爾自己添加的強(qiáng)調(diào)，要么就是翻譯失誤或印刷錯(cuò)誤。我在這里暫且認(rèn)為羅森塔爾是在強(qiáng)調(diào)新黑格爾馬克思主義者對(duì)黑格爾的無知，所以將其翻譯為“邏輯學(xué)”。請(qǐng)注意，盡管羅森塔爾的表述可能存在著一些問題，但黑格爾在這里所說的在《法哲學(xué)原理》中所使用的“邏輯學(xué)”方法當(dāng)然指的是他在《邏輯學(xué)》中所闡述的那種方法，羅森塔爾在這里所表達(dá)的意思沒有任何問題。

????????(5) 黑格爾，鄧安慶譯，《法哲學(xué)原理》，《黑格爾著作集》第七卷，人民出版社，第20頁，譯文有改動(dòng)。

????????(6) 這三個(gè)詞的中文參考自先剛譯《大邏輯》。

????????(7) 黑格爾，《邏輯學(xué)》下，商務(wù)印書館，第408頁，譯文有改動(dòng)。

????????(8) “一般性”與“普遍性”的區(qū)別請(qǐng)參見我在《逃離黑格爾》中補(bǔ)充的注釋。

????????(9) 拜不同學(xué)科之間的壁壘所賜，同一詞的翻譯在不同學(xué)科中常常不一樣，這里的英文“genera”和德文“Gattungen”均為生物學(xué)中“界門綱目科屬種”中的“屬”的復(fù)數(shù)形式，但在黑格爾文本中則常常被翻譯為“類”，“kinds”則是作為“genera”的同義詞放在這里并列的。普遍性(universality)、特殊性(particularity)、個(gè)別性(individuality)[類(genera)、種(species)、個(gè)體(individual)]在生物學(xué)中的對(duì)應(yīng)就是屬、物種和生物個(gè)體，比如貓屬、貓種、我家的那只白貓。

REFERENCES

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????????Diesing, Paul. 2000. "Comments on Rosenthal's 'The Escape from Hegel'." Science & Society, 64:3 (Fall), 374-378.

????????Giannotti, Jose Arthur. 2000-2001. "John Rosenthal's Myth." Science & Society, 64:4 (Winter), 497-501.

????????Hegel, G. W. F. 1969-. Werke in zwanzig Bünden. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

????????----. 1970. The Science of Logic. London: Allen & Unwin.

????????Marx, Karl. 1973. Grundrisse. Middlesex: Penguin.

????????MEW. Marx-Engels Werke. 1956-. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

????????Rosenthal, John. 1998. The Myth of Dialectics: Re-Interpreting the Marx-Hegel Relation. New York: St. Martin's.

????????----. 1999. "The Escape from Hegel." Science & Society, 63:3 (Fall), 283-309.

????????Smith, Tony. 2000-2001. "On Rosenthal's 'Escape from Hegel'." Science & Society, 64:4 (Winter), 489-496.

????????Turchetto, Maria. 2000. "The Historicity of Marx's Categories." Science & Society, 64:3 (Fall), 365-374.

????????Williams, Michael. 2000. "No Escape from the ' Post-Hegelian' Dialectic." Science & Society, 64:3 (Fall), 357-365.

THE ESCAPE FROM HEGELIANS: REJOINDER*

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????????Given space limitations, I will dispense with preliminaries and immediately launch into my responses to the individual comments, "bundling" them where it seems appropriate.

????????Of all the contributions, Paul Diesing's gives the least sign of engagement with what I actually wrote. Instead, Diesing sets out by distinguishing my alleged "way of thinking" from his own and devotes the greater part of his comments to elaborating upon the latter. He concludes that these two "ways of thinking" are so incompatible that "any dialogue between them would seem to be impossible" (378) - unless, I gather from his closing suggestion, I manage to gain self-awareness about mine.

????????I was not, however, in "The Escape from Hegel" expounding my "way of thinking." I was offering an interpretation and critique of Hegelian philosophy (in fact summarizing an interpretation and critique developed at greater length elsewhere) and analyzing its, to my mind highly ambivalent, relevance to the development of Marx's political economy and, more specifically, the theories of value, money and capital. My interpretation might well be partial or misleading or just plain wrong and my criticism, for these or other reasons, unjustified. Why not? But the way to demonstrate this would be to enter into the details of the discussion and, supposing it is in the interpretive aspects that the problem is supposed to lie, to compare them against their intended objects: viz. Hegelian philosophy and the relevant parts of Marxian political economy. "Reader response" criticism and other fashions of the literary academy notwithstanding, the rules of evidence apply to the analysis of theoretical texts as much as to any other practice oriented to achieving knowledge - or what could be broadly designated any "scientific" practice. If they did not, we would be reduced merely to "trading assurances" and competing interpretations could at best be juxtaposed to one another, like paintings in an exhibition, without there being any common basis upon which to adjudicate among them or even indeed any reason to consider their differences.

????????In any case, Diesing provides no evidence in support of his supposed disagreement with my interpretation of Hegel. Indeed, he so little engages the details of this interpretation that one is left wondering just wherein the disagreement is supposed to lie. I gather from his opening remarks that the principal point of contention is whether Hegelian "dialectic" is "a very bad way of thinking/' as allegedly according to my interpretation, or "a very good way of thinking," as according to him. It is not, of course, my interpretation that Hegelian "dialectic" is a "bad way of thinking" - though if my interpretation is correct, then for the reasons laid out in my critique, I would surely not recommend it.

????????If Diesing disagrees with my conclusions in this regard, he ought to have addressed the grounds I offer on their behalf. My actual interpretation of how the Hegelian "dialectic" is supposed in principle to operate, viz. through an immanent process of "self-sublating" conceptual oppositions (see Rosenthal, 1999, 289-91; and, in greater detail, Rosenthal, 1998, eh. 8), is in fact unexceptional. It is based on Hegel's own methodological remarks and would neither surprise nor cause offence to the overwhelming majority of Hegel scholars. Where I part ways from the mainstream of Hegel scholarship, however, is in suggesting that Hegel's exposition does not in practice obey the methodological canon which he says it should in principle. The promised immanent "dialectic of concepts" fails to materialize. Instead, Hegel's self-styled "derivation" of conceptual determinations persistently relies upon teleological principles and a capricious casting about for pre-given forms - whether logical, natural, legal or what have you - supposed to satisfy them or, where it at least retains the appearance of immanence, paralogically exploits ambiguities built into the terms of the so-called "syllogism."

????????My analyses of characteristically Hegelian argumentation - "dialectics," if you wish - lay out my grounds for rejecting such argumentation as specious. In "Escape," I state these grounds merely in summary fashion, referring readers to The Myth, where they are elaborated in detail and on the basis of numerous examples. In "Escape," the discussion of Hegelian argumentation is in fact just preliminary matter to an analysis specifically of Marx's use of the same, which was my main order of business. Nonetheless, anyone wishing to defend Hegel from the specific charges I make against him ought at least to have addressed those charges. At one point, Diesing does remark, "Rosenthal calls this universal-particular-individual dialectic ' teleological '," and he continues, "I do not know what he means." He says this, however, after narrating a story about policy-making and implementation of his own devising - as if all along I'd been writing about Diesing rather than Hegel!

????????It should go without saying that debate on the character and significance and, most importantly as far as I am concerned, validity of Hegelian "dialectics" must take as its ultimate standard the evidence of "dialectics" to be found in Hegel. It is remarkable how persistently this obvious principle is violated in the Anglophone Marxist discussions and indeed precisely by self-styled Hegelian Marxists, whose "Hegelianism" seems for the most part to be culled from secondary sources and other Hegelian Marxists. Thus, for example, in his contribution to the symposium Michael Williams takes me to task for ignoring "the literature." But the only citation of Hegel which he offers byway of counter-example to my Hegel interpretation (362) is from Tony Smith, who in turn cites it unmodified from an English-language translation, which - regrettably for the Williams-Smith line - is faulty in precisely those respects crucial to their construal of it. [1] Symptomatically, Williams even accuses me of "reducing" Hegel's philosophy to "absolute idealism" and puts the expression in quotes as if I had coined it. But "absolute idealism" is, of course, just the expression with which Hegel himself most often designated his philosophical standpoint. [2]

????????Just how little regard Diesing's avowed "Hegelianism" has for Hegel is clear right from the outset of his comments and his distinguishing of a "dialectic of things" from a "dialectic of thinking." What else is Hegel's idealism supposed to consist in but a demonstration that reality - the domain of "things" - is not only thought-governed, but literally "nothing" independent of thought? Diesing even goes so far as to dismiss the Logic as somehow irrelevant to an assessment of Hegelian "dialectics" (376): a dismissal which is especially difficult to harmonize with his professed admiration for the "method" displayed in the Philosophy of Right. The latter is in fact just an elaboration of part 3, section 2 of the Philosophical Encyclopedia whose point of departure - not, as Diesing suggests, the "free will" and "unfree things," but the concept of right - is supposed to be derived as result from the previous development of the system starting, of course, from the basic determinations of the Logic. The method followed is likewise supposed expressly, according to Hegel himself, to be laid out in the Logic. "The method," he writes, "whereby in science the concept develops itself from itself and is only an immanent progression and engendering of its determinations ... is here presupposed from the Logic" (Ph. R., §31). [3]

????????I will leave it for the reader to confirm just how little Diesing's putative refutation of my analysis of Marx's Grundrisse deduction of the concept of capital has to do either with my analysis or that deduction. Here again, Diesing's procedure is simply to substitute a wholly unrelated narrative and to assure the reader that in the passage in question Marx is in fact "describing a dialectical historical process," of which the narrative is supposed to be a resume. But where is the evidence in the passage cited or the surrounding text that Marx is "doing" this? Marx clearly indicates that he is analyzing the concept of money and attempting to show that for a reason "inherent to its nature" - not on account of contingent historical causes - money "must become" capital. We can argue over whether this demonstration is successful or not. But no debate can take place on the matter at all without at least the acknowledgment that the attempt at such a demonstration is made.

????????Before moving on, I want only to draw attention to Diesing's charge in this context that I am "looking for some sort of logical argument" (377), which "of course" I have not been able to find, since "it [presumably, the Marx passage] isn't an argument, but a historical description of a dialectical process." This is supposed to be characteristic of my "way of thinking," which "makes a sharp distinction between logical argumentation and empirical research." Apparently writing of me, Diesing remarks: "His conception of the dialectic is Kantian; he wants a non-empirical deductive process" (376). (The inappropriateness of Diesing's talk of a "Kantian dialectic" in this connection will be obvious to students of the history of philosophy.) Diesing even writes of "Rosenthal's conception of logical argument," as if I had the honor - as opposed, say, to Plato or Aristotle - of having discovered the norms of valid inference.

????????If my personal preferences - what I am alleged to "want" - are of any interest here, I surely am not opposed to empirical research, nor to using the findings thereof. I have nowhere suggested that there is any choice to be made between the latter and logical analysis, although there is, of course, a distinction. However, when dealing with what are arguments and where these arguments seem to me of theoretical significance, I do have an interest in establishing whether they are valid or fallacious. I hope this is an interest that will be shared by most others who are engaged in theoretical inquiry.

????????In "Escape," I tried to show that Marx's argument concerning the necessity of money "becoming" money-capital is fallacious and indeed fallacious in a manner which reflects its Hegelian inspiration. It truly did not occur to me that one could doubt that it is an argument at all. The reader will be able to confirm the presence in the passage I cited of what are customary logical markers: "since" (als), "therefore" (daher), "for this reason" (deswegen), "thus" (also). To fail to recognize the passage as an argument is somewhat akin to failing to recognize "hello" as a greeting or "get out!" as a command.

????????In any event, to say that a theorist has made an argument is no more than to say that s/he has attempted to demonstrate the propositions of which his or her theory consists. To suggest that Marx has not done this is surely less flattering to him than to say that in some instance he has failed. The same, of course, holds for Hegel. (The term "proposition" [Satz] is a loaded one for Hegel, who rejected the propositional form as inadequate to the "expression" of truth. Nonetheless, the whole discourse in which truth is supposed to gain expression even in Hegel consists, needless to say, of propositions.) What is specifically characteristic of Hegelian "dialectics" is an allegedly unique canon of proof, most certainly not an eschewal of proof! Hegel continually refers to his "deduction" (Deduktion) and his "derivation" (Ableitung) of concepts and it is precisely in the fact that these concepts have been derived, rather than taken for granted, that the specificity of the philosophical exposition of a subject matter is supposed to lie. "In philosophical cognition," Hegel writes, "the necessity of a concept is the main issue and the course by which it emerges as result, is its proof and deduction" (Ph. R., §2R). I have suggested that Hegel's proof procedure is not as unitary in practice as he suggests it ought to be in principle and, furthermore, that the argumentational strategies he characteristically employs in the actual course of his exposition are either immanent, but specious or perhaps valid, but not immanent. Such criticism surely does Hegel more honor than a professed admiration which sees no arguments at all.

????????Tony Smith makes greater effort to characterize my analysis than Diesing. Unfortunately, however, his characterizations, even when apparently sympathetic, are for the most part mischaracterizations and often even pure inventions. I have not, for instance, anywhere claimed that "Hegelian themes" play a role in "one and only one place" in Capital (489). I have not even written about "Hegelian themes" in Capital. Rather, I have written, more precisely I hope, of characteristically or distinctively Hegelian "formulae": such as, for instance, that of "real universality" or the syntactical formula according to which some "particular" is the "form of appearance of the [or a] universal." I systematically distinguish these "formulae" from Hegelian patterns of argumentation. My claim is that the former, though not the latter, play an important role in the development of Marx's economics and, more specifically, of his value theory. I suggest that they do so because, though of metaphysical significance in Hegel's usage, they happen to be "perfectly suited" to grasping the phenomenal structure of the primary object of Marx's value theory: namely, the "value-form" or, more colloquially, money.

????????Inasmuch as Marx's theory of value is by no means limited to any "one place" in Capital, neither, of course, is Marx's employment of the formulae in question. On the contrary, the theory of value is the basis of Marx's entire economic theory. All the subsequent economic forms that Marx analyzes (price, wages, profit, land-rent, interest, etc.) are just so many more specific (the Hegelians would probably say, "further developed") "forms of value." Inasmuch as money remains their very substance, they must, of course, reflect the ontological peculiarities of the latter and hence they provide Marx ample occasion to draw upon his stock of Hegelian formulations. This is especially conspicuously the case, for instance, in Marx's analysis of the forms of the capital circuit in Volume 2 of Capital Not surprisingly, however, the use of Hegelian formulae is most conspicuous of all in that part of Capital especially devoted to the value-form: viz. Vol. 1, Ch. 1, section 3. I do not know if Marx there "deliberately," as Smith puts it, makes use of typically Hegelian formulae - I just know that he does. [4]

????????Smith goes on to write: "According to Rosenthal, Hegel's thought perversely grants abstractions priority over flesh and blood human subjects in a way that exactly parallels the way money, a 'real abstraction,' perversely dominates social agents in capitalism" (489-90). I am not sure how this is supposed to be "according to me." The accusation may well provide a reason for criticizing Hegel, but it does not figure among my reasons. The "flesh and blood human beings" are presumably a loan from Marx's early "humanist" critique of Hegel in the 1844 Manuscripts - but I say nothing about them. The "perversions" of which I accuse Hegel are, less dramatically, just logical perversions. One of these "perversions" - what Marx, following Feuerbach, famously called the "subject-predicate reversal," i.e., the treatment of existing things as the attributes of general determinants rather than vice-versa - turns out to be appropriate for grasping the "perverted," if you wish (following Marx, I actually say "inverted"), phenomena of economic value. [5] In a system of commodity-money - which, as noted, is the sort of monetary system clearly assumed in Marx's analysis - money as money, though consisting of physical objects, is in fact an attribute of the general economic "essence" of commodities as such, viz. their value. Money is the real form assigned the latter by the exchange system: money does not so much "have value" as value has (the) money (-form). In any case, as readers will be able to confirm, the particulars whose "inverted" relation to the value abstraction was at issue in my treatment were not particular human subjects, but particular commodities. [6]

????????Smith elaborates upon three alleged criticisms of my analysis. In light of the foregoing, however, the first of these points can be passed over without comment. Apparently with reference to his earlier characterization, he writes: "Rosenthal is hardly the first to assert that the culminating categories of Hegel's Logic mirror the domination of capital so compellingly described by Marx" (491). I am not sure what exactly Smith understands by the expression "the culminating categories of Hegel's Logic1 - an expression he repeats as if importance were meant to be attached to it. He does not tell us and literally the "culminating categories of Hegel's Logic' are cognition, volition, and the absolute idea - which I do not imagine are what he has in mind. But, in any case, as I simply do not assert what is here attributed to me, I cannot have been the first to do so and Smith's reasons for finding the position untenable are irrelevant.

????????Second, Smith accuses me in my critique of Hegel's own argumentation (or "methodology") of inappropriately supposing that "Hegel's categories" of universality, particularity, and individuality "map the traditional categories of genus, species, and individual." This allegation is supported merely by an allusion to my "discussion" of the relationship between metal and zinc. In fact, I do not "discuss" this relationship at all, but use it as an example in order to clarify a characteristically Hegelian logical fallacy to which Marx succumbs. I will return to the significance of the example momentarily. In any case, Smith assures us that "Hegel explicitly, consistently, and repeatedly denied that the world can be adequately comprehended in terms of static formal classifications" such as genus, species, and individual. Perhaps. But the fact is that Hegel himself uses the distinction of universality, particularity, and individuality precisely in the senses of genus, species, and specimen. It is remarkable that Smith would deny this in responding to an article that cites Hegel saying, for instance, with reference to the solar system: "In the material world it is the central body that is the genus, but it is the individual universality of the single objects and their mechanical process" (S.L., II, 423/722). If Hegel uses "genus" and "universality" as substitutes, and contrasts them, furthermore, to "the single objects," what more evidence does one need that in such usage universal (and universality) indeed carries the same connotation as genus (and generality)} This usage is common in Hegel's exposition and in fact rampant throughout the Philosophy of Nature - unsurprisingly, since the study of nature is the domain from which such classificatory systems are derived - where genera or kinds (Gattungen) are explicitly written of as "universais" and distinguished from their species (Arten) as their "particulars," and so on. "In its implicit universality," Hegel writes, "the kind [Gattung] particularizes itself in species [Arten]. . . ." (En. N., §368). [7] Smith's apparent oversight again raises the question of the evidentiary basis on which the supposed "Hegelianism" of my Hegelian opponents is meant to lie. It seems to be a "Hegelianism" without Hegel.

????????I would, however, be cautious about employing the language of genus, species and specimen to give a completely general account of Hegelian usage, only because, despite the obvious logical etymology of these terms, they too heavily bear the connotation of the classificatory systems of the specifically natural sciences. Hence, they suggest the empirical givenness of objects, viz. individuals or "bare" (which is to say, unclassified) particulars, from which "by abstraction" (viz. from their unique features or "particularities") sorts and genera are distinguished. The especially biologistic connotation is even more salient with the Germanic equivalents (Gattung, Art, Individuum) which Hegel uses: as noted, unexceptionally, in those sections where he is discussing organic nature, but also at times, so to say, "out of area" (e.g., as cited above, in the discussion of mechanical systems) . In his use of individuality, Hegel in fact systematically draws on the connotation of what he himself calls the "natural" individual, whose own sui generis character is negatively contrasted to the "individuality of the concept" (see Rosenthal, 1998, 102-3 and ch. 9, passim). But the confusions that I identify in Hegel's treatment of logical relations of generality, specificity and individuality in no way depend upon reference to specifically natural kinds and individuals.

????????

????????* All citations from Hegel are to Hegel, 1969 - the Suhrkamp edition of Hegel's Works. The translations are mine. Individual volumes are abbreviated as follows: En.L.: The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part I: Science of Logic; En.N.: The Encyclopedia . . . , Part II: Philosophy of Nature, En.S.: The Encyclopedia . . . , Part HI: Philosophy of Spirit, Ph.R.: The Philosophy of Right, S.L.: The Science of Logic. In general, I have cited paragraph numbers. An WR" following these numbers stands for Hegel's explanatory "remark" (typically indented from the main paragraph) and an "A" for a so-called "addition." The equivalent passages in translation can thus be easily found. As this system is not followed in the Science of Logic, I have cited page numbers, followed by a slash and then page numbers for Hegel, 1970, an English edition.

????????1 What Williams presents as a conclusion is in fact in the original passage a subordinate clause. "While philosophy owes its development to the empirical sciences," Hegel writes - and then continues: "it gives their contents the most essential form of the freedom (that is to say, the a priori character) of thought and the preservation of necessity" (En.L., §3).

????????2 See En.L., §45A: "This conception is likewise to be described as idealism, although, in contrast to the subjective idealism of the critical philosophy, as absolute idealism1 (Hegel's emphasis).

????????3 In the same paragraph Hegel writes, in a remark that clearly contravenes Diesing's assertion that the Logic is merely meant to provide "movements of thought that could be used empirically": "The progression does not occur through the assurance that different relations are given and then through the application of the universal to such material which has been taken from elsewhere."

????????4 At greater length, see Rosenthal, 1998, eh. 11; and on Marx's use specifically of the syntactical formula relating particular to universal, Rosenthal, 1998, eh. 14.

????????5 Though Smith's reference to Hegel's "perversions" suggest he is obliquely alluding to this matter, in fact I do not discuss it in "Escape," but rather in Rosenthal, 1998, chs. 12 and 14.

????????6 In yet another invention, Smith writes that "Rosenthal presents the fact that Hegelian dialectics includes retrospective justifications as a damning revelation that inherently contradicts the 'forwards' (or 'immanent') movement of the theory" (494n). I nowhere say anything about "retrospective justifications" and Smith does not explain what in my discussion deserves this appellation and why. Presumably, he has in mind what I refer to as teleological argumentation. But the problem with Hegel's teleological arguments and the reason they indeed contradict the claims for the immanence of Hegel's exposition, is not they go "forward" or "backward" - metaphorical language which, frankly, I do not find of much use for the purpose of logical analysis - but rather that they rely on simple stipulates: e.g., that the "moment of particularity" in "the concept" must gain an independent embodiment, etc., etc.

????????7 See also §§368-375, passim, as well as En.L., §24A2, and En.L., §221A.