Journal of Economic Theory 2023年第1期

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——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

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1.Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic

流行病期間的均衡社會(huì)活動(dòng)

David McAdams, Yangbo Song, Dihan Zou

During an infectious-disease epidemic, people make choices that impact transmission, trading off the risk of infection with the social-economic benefits of activity. We investigate how the qualitative features of an epidemic's Nash-equilibrium trajectory depend on the nature of the economic benefits that people get from activity. If economic benefits do not depend on how many others are active, as usually modeled, then there is a unique equilibrium trajectory, the epidemic eventually reaches a steady state, and agents born into the steady state have zero expected lifetime welfare. On the other hand, if the benefit of activity increases as others are more active (“social benefits”) and the disease is sufficiently severe, then there are always multiple equilibrium trajectories, including some that never settle into a steady state and that welfare dominate any given steady-state equilibrium. Within this framework, we analyze the equilibrium impact of a policy that modestly reduces the transmission rate. Such a policy has no long-run effect on society-wide welfare absent social benefits, but can raise long-run welfare if there are social benefits and the epidemic never settles into a steady state.

在傳染病流行期間，人們會(huì)做出影響傳播的選擇，權(quán)衡感染風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與活動(dòng)的社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。我們研究了流行病納什均衡軌跡的定性特征如何依賴于人們從活動(dòng)中獲得的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的性質(zhì)。如果經(jīng)濟(jì)利益不依賴于其他有多少人活躍，就像通常建模的那樣，那么就有一個(gè)獨(dú)特的均衡軌跡，流行病最終達(dá)到一個(gè)穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)，而出生在穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)中的代理人的預(yù)期終身福利為零。另一方面，如果隨著其他人更積極活動(dòng)(“社會(huì)福利”)的增加，并且疾病足夠嚴(yán)重，那么總是會(huì)有多個(gè)平衡軌跡，包括一些永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)穩(wěn)定到穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)，福利主導(dǎo)任何給定的穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)平衡。在這個(gè)框架內(nèi)，我們分析了適度降低傳導(dǎo)率的政策的均衡影響。在沒有社會(huì)福利的情況下，這樣的政策對(duì)全社會(huì)福利沒有長(zhǎng)期影響，但在有社會(huì)福利且疫情從未穩(wěn)定下來的情況下，可以提高長(zhǎng)期福利。

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2.Pledge-and-review bargaining

承諾和審查的討價(jià)還價(jià)

B?rd Harstad

This paper presents a novel dynamic bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before all pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge maximizes an asymmetric Nash product. The weights on others' payoffs increase in the uncertainty, but decrease in the correlation of the shocks. The weights vary pledge to pledge, and this implies that the outcome is generically inefficient. The Nash demand game and its mapping to the Nash bargaining solution follow as a limiting case. The model sheds light on the Paris climate change agreement, but it also applies to negotiations between policymakers or business partners that have differentiated responsibilities or expertise.

本文提出了一個(gè)新穎的動(dòng)態(tài)談判博弈，在所有承諾必須一致通過之前，各方只提出自己的貢獻(xiàn)。我證明，在延遲容忍不確定的情況下，每個(gè)均衡承諾最大化了一個(gè)非對(duì)稱納什乘積。在不確定性中，對(duì)他人收益的權(quán)重增加，但沖擊的相關(guān)性降低。各個(gè)質(zhì)押的權(quán)重不同，這意味著結(jié)果通常是低效的。納什需求博弈及其與納什談判解的映射是一個(gè)極限情形。該模式揭示了巴黎氣候變化協(xié)議，但它也適用于負(fù)有不同責(zé)任或?qū)ｉL(zhǎng)的決策者或商業(yè)伙伴之間的談判。

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3.Homophily and influence

同質(zhì)性和影響力

Arnold Polanski, Fernando Vega-Redondo

We study how learning and influence co-evolve in a social network by extending the classical model of DeGroot (1974) in two fundamental ways:

(a) opinions are multidimensional and the learning time-span is arbitrary;

(b) the effective social network is endogenously shaped by opinion-based homophily.

Our analysis starts by establishing the existence of an equilibrium where, following (a)-(b), the learning outcome and the social network are jointly determined. This is followed by its characterization in some simple contexts. Next, we show that, at equilibrium, the strength of the link between any two agents is always given by its “support” – roughly, the amount of third-party (indirect) influence impinging on both agents. This result leads to the key insight that distinct groups may fail to integrate if their (possibly many) cross-group links lack sufficient support. Building on this, we identify sets of conditions for which social fragmentation is robust (i.e. dynamically stable) or even the unique equilibrium.

本文從兩個(gè)方面擴(kuò)展了DeGroot(1974)的經(jīng)典模型，研究了學(xué)習(xí)和影響力如何在社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中共同演化:(1)觀點(diǎn)是多維的，學(xué)習(xí)的時(shí)間跨度是任意的;(b)有效社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)內(nèi)生性地受到基于意見的同質(zhì)性塑造。我們的分析首先建立了一個(gè)均衡的存在，在(a)-(b)之后，學(xué)習(xí)結(jié)果和社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)是共同確定的。接下來是在一些簡(jiǎn)單的上下文中對(duì)其進(jìn)行表征。接下來，我們表明，在均衡狀態(tài)下，任何兩個(gè)代理之間的聯(lián)系強(qiáng)度總是由其“支持”給出——大致來說，就是影響兩個(gè)代理的第三方(間接)影響的數(shù)量。這一結(jié)果導(dǎo)致了關(guān)鍵的見解，即如果不同的群體(可能很多)的跨群體聯(lián)系缺乏足夠的支持，那么他們可能無法整合。在此基礎(chǔ)上，我們確定了社會(huì)分裂是穩(wěn)健(即動(dòng)態(tài)穩(wěn)定)甚至是獨(dú)特均衡的一系列條件。

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4.Comment on “A theoretical foundation of ambiguity measurement”

“模糊度測(cè)量的理論基礎(chǔ)”述評(píng)

Ruonan Fu, Bertrand Melenberg, Nikolaus Schweizer

In this paper, we study asymptotic expansions for distorted probabilities under ambiguity, revisiting the framework and analysis of Izhakian (2020b). We argue that the first order terms in these expansions need to be corrected and provide alternatives. We also revisit later results in this paper on the separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes. We argue that a crucial lemma is flawed implying that Izhakian's ambiguity measure??2?is not an equivalent way of representing the preferences it is supposed to represent.

本文研究了模糊條件下失真概率的漸近展開式，回顧了Izhakian (2020b)的框架和分析。我們認(rèn)為，這些展開中的一階項(xiàng)需要修正，并提供替代方案。我們還回顧了本文稍后關(guān)于歧義和歧義態(tài)度分離的結(jié)果。我們認(rèn)為一個(gè)關(guān)鍵引理是有缺陷的，這意味著伊扎克ian的模糊性度量?2不是表示它應(yīng)該表示的偏好的等效方式。

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5.On perfect pairwise stable networks

在完美成對(duì)穩(wěn)定網(wǎng)絡(luò)上

Philippe Bich, Mariya Teteryatnikova

We extend standard tools from equilibrium refinement theory in non-cooperative games to a cooperative framework of network formation. First, we introduce the new concept of?perfect pairwise stability. It transposes the idea of “trembling hand” perfection to network formation theory and strictly refines the pairwise stability concept of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Second, we study basic properties of perfect pairwise stability: existence, admissibility and perturbation. We further show that our concept is distinct from the concept of strongly stable networks introduced by Jackson and Van den Nouweland (2005), and perfect Nash equilibria of the Myerson network formation game studied by Calvó-Armengol and ?lk?l?? (2009). Finally, we apply perfect pairwise stability to sequential network formation and prove that it enables a refinement of?sequential pairwise stability, a natural analogue of subgame perfection in a setting with cooperative, pairwise link formation.

本文將標(biāo)準(zhǔn)工具從非合作博弈的均衡細(xì)化理論擴(kuò)展到合作網(wǎng)絡(luò)形成框架。首先，我們引入了完全兩兩穩(wěn)定的新概念。它將“顫抖的手”完美的概念轉(zhuǎn)換為網(wǎng)絡(luò)形成理論，嚴(yán)格提煉了Jackson and Wolinsky(1996)的兩兩穩(wěn)定概念。其次，我們研究了完全兩兩穩(wěn)定的基本性質(zhì):存在性、容許性和攝動(dòng)性。我們進(jìn)一步表明，我們的概念不同于Jackson和Van den Nouweland(2005)提出的強(qiáng)穩(wěn)定網(wǎng)絡(luò)的概念，也不同于Calvó-Armengol和?lk?l??(2009)研究的Myerson網(wǎng)絡(luò)形成博弈的完美納什均衡。最后，我們將完美成對(duì)穩(wěn)定性應(yīng)用于順序網(wǎng)絡(luò)形成，并證明了它可以改進(jìn)順序成對(duì)穩(wěn)定性，這是在合作成對(duì)鏈接形成的環(huán)境中子博弈完美的自然模擬。

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6.Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem

在穩(wěn)健的委托代理問題中，隨機(jī)化是最優(yōu)的

Ashwin Kambhampati

A principal contracts with an agent, who takes a hidden action. The principal does not know all of the actions the agent can take and evaluates her payoff from any contract according to its worst-case performance. Carroll (2015) showed that there exists a linear contract that is optimal within the class of deterministic contracts. This paper shows that, whenever there is an optimal linear contract with non-zero slope, the principal can strictly increase her payoff by randomizing over deterministic, linear contracts. Hence, if the principal believes that randomization can alleviate her ambiguity aversion, then restricting attention to the study of deterministic contracts is?with?loss of generality.

委托人與代理人簽訂合同，代理人采取隱蔽行動(dòng)。委托人并不知道代理人可以采取的所有行動(dòng)，并根據(jù)最壞情況下的表現(xiàn)來評(píng)估她從任何合同中獲得的回報(bào)。Carroll(2015)的研究表明，在一類確定性契約中存在一個(gè)最優(yōu)的線性契約。本文表明，當(dāng)存在斜率為非零的最優(yōu)線性契約時(shí)，委托人可以通過對(duì)確定性線性契約的隨機(jī)化嚴(yán)格增加其收益。因此，如果委托人認(rèn)為隨機(jī)化可以減輕她對(duì)模糊性的厭惡，那么將注意力限制在確定性契約的研究上就失去了一般性。

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7.Information design through scarcity and social learning

通過稀缺和社會(huì)學(xué)習(xí)進(jìn)行信息設(shè)計(jì)

Alexei Parakhonyak, Nick Vikander

We show that a firm may benefit from strategically creating scarcity for its product, in order to trigger herding behaviour from consumers in situations where such behaviour is otherwise unlikely. We consider a setting with social learning, where consumers observe sales from previous cohorts and update beliefs about product quality before making their purchase. Imposing a capacity constraint directly limits sales but also makes information coarser for consumers, who react favourably to a sell-out because they infer only that demand must exceed capacity. Consumer learning is then limited even with large cohorts and unbounded private signals, because the firm acts strategically to influence the consumers' learning environment. Our results suggest that in suitable environments capacity constraints can serve as a useful tool to implement optimal information design in practice: if private signals are not too precise and capacity can be changed over time, then in large markets the firm's optimal choice of capacity delivers the same expected sales as the Bayesian persuasion solution.

我們的研究表明，企業(yè)可以從戰(zhàn)略性地為其產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)造稀缺性中獲益，以在其他情況下不太可能引發(fā)消費(fèi)者的羊群行為。我們考慮一個(gè)具有社會(huì)學(xué)習(xí)的環(huán)境，在這個(gè)環(huán)境中，消費(fèi)者觀察以前群體的銷售情況，并在購買之前更新對(duì)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的信念。施加產(chǎn)能限制會(huì)直接限制銷售，但也會(huì)讓消費(fèi)者的信息更加粗糙，他們對(duì)售罄的情況反應(yīng)積極，因?yàn)樗麄冎皇峭茢嘈枨蟊仨毘^產(chǎn)能。因此，即使在大群體和無界私人信號(hào)的情況下，消費(fèi)者的學(xué)習(xí)也受到限制，因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)會(huì)策略性地影響消費(fèi)者的學(xué)習(xí)環(huán)境。我們的結(jié)果表明，在合適的環(huán)境中，容量限制可以作為實(shí)踐中實(shí)施最優(yōu)信息設(shè)計(jì)的有用工具:如果私人信號(hào)不太精確，容量可以隨著時(shí)間的推移而改變，那么在大型市場(chǎng)中，企業(yè)對(duì)容量的最優(yōu)選擇可以提供與貝葉斯說服解決方案相同的預(yù)期銷售。

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8.Symmetry in n-player games

N個(gè)參與者的博弈中的對(duì)稱性

Asaf Plan

This paper regards symmetry in games with more than two players. It is often said that a two-player game is symmetric if it looks the same to both players. However, there are?n-player games, such as Salop's circle model, that seem intuitively to look the same to all players, but do not meet the common definition of a symmetric?n-player game. This paper proposes a more general symmetry condition that is satisfied by such models. Previous authors have established that games which are symmetric in the common sense have a number of useful properties relating to equilibrium characterization and comparative statics. With few exceptions, those properties continue to hold in the richer class of games that meet the symmetry condition proposed here.

本文考慮了兩個(gè)以上參與人博弈的對(duì)稱性。我們常說，如果一個(gè)雙人游戲在兩個(gè)玩家看來都是一樣的，那么它就是對(duì)稱的。然而，也有一些n人游戲，如Salop的circle模型，在所有玩家看來似乎都是一樣的，但卻不符合對(duì)稱n人游戲的一般定義。本文提出了這類模型所滿足的更一般的對(duì)稱性條件。以前的作者已經(jīng)確定，在常識(shí)上對(duì)稱的博弈具有許多與平衡表征和比較靜態(tài)學(xué)有關(guān)的有用性質(zhì)。除了少數(shù)例外，這些性質(zhì)在滿足這里提出的對(duì)稱條件的更豐富的博弈中仍然成立。

9.Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms

策略型擇校機(jī)制中的損失規(guī)避

Vincent Meisner, Jonas von Wangenheim

Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria. We find that non-truthful preference submissions can be strictly optimal if and only if they are top-rank monotone. In equilibrium, inefficiency or justified envy may arise in seemingly stable or efficient mechanisms. Specifically, students who are more loss averse or less confident than their peers obtain suboptimal allocations.

有證據(jù)表明，策略證明匹配機(jī)制的參與者使用主導(dǎo)策略。為了解釋這些數(shù)據(jù)，我們將基于預(yù)期的損失厭惡引入學(xué)校選擇設(shè)置，并描述選擇適應(yīng)個(gè)人平衡。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)非真實(shí)偏好提交是頂級(jí)單調(diào)時(shí)，非真實(shí)偏好提交是嚴(yán)格最優(yōu)的。在平衡狀態(tài)下，看似穩(wěn)定或有效的機(jī)制可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生無效率或合理的嫉妒。具體而言，與同齡人相比，更不愿損失或更不自信的學(xué)生獲得了次優(yōu)分配。

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10.Epidemics with behavior

行為的傳染

Christoph Carnehl, Satoshi Fukuda, Nenad Kos

We study social distancing in an epidemiological model. Distancing reduces the individual's probability of getting infected but comes at a cost. Equilibrium distancing flattens the curve and decreases the final size of the epidemic. We examine the effects of distancing on the outset, the peak, and the final size of the epidemic. First, the prevalence increases beyond the initial value only if the transmission rate is in the intermediate region. Second, the peak of the epidemic is non-monotonic in the transmission rate. A reduction in the transmission rate can increase the peak. However, a decrease in the cost of distancing always flattens the curve. Third, both a reduction in the transmission rate as well as a reduction in the cost of distancing decrease the final size of the epidemic. Our results suggest that public policies that decrease the transmission rate can lead to unintended negative consequences in the short run but not in the long run. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between interventions that affect the transmission rate and interventions that affect contact rates.

我們?cè)诹餍胁W(xué)模型中研究社會(huì)距離。保持距離降低了個(gè)人被感染的可能性，但也付出了代價(jià)。均衡距離使曲線變平，最終減小了疫情規(guī)模。我們研究了距離對(duì)疫情開始、峰值和最終規(guī)模的影響。首先，只有當(dāng)傳播率在中間區(qū)域時(shí)，流行率才會(huì)超過初始值。二是疫情高峰期傳播速率非單調(diào)性。降低傳輸速率可以提高峰值。然而，距離成本的降低總是會(huì)使曲線變平。第三，傳播速度的降低以及保持距離成本的降低都降低了疫情的最終規(guī)模。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，降低傳播率的公共政策可能會(huì)在短期內(nèi)而不是在長(zhǎng)期內(nèi)導(dǎo)致意想不到的負(fù)面后果。因此，重要的是要區(qū)分影響傳播率的干預(yù)措施和影響接觸率的干預(yù)措施。

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11.Communication with endogenous deception costs

內(nèi)生欺騙的溝通成本

Ran Eilat, Zvika Neeman

We study how the suspicion that communicated information might be deceptive affects the nature of what can be communicated in a sender-receiver game. Sender is said to?deceive?Receiver if she sends a message that induces a belief that is different from the belief that should have been induced in the realized state. Deception is costly to Sender and the cost is endogenous: it is increasing in the distance between the induced belief and the belief that should have been induced. A message function that induces Sender to engage in deception is not credible and cannot be part of an equilibrium. We study credible communication with state-dependent and state-independent Sender's preferences. The cost of deception parametrizes the sender's ability to commit to her strategy. Through varying this cost, our model spans the range from cheap talk, or no commitment (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) to full commitment (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011).

我們研究的是，在發(fā)送者和接收者之間的游戲中，對(duì)傳遞信息可能具有欺騙性的懷疑如何影響傳遞信息的本質(zhì)。如果發(fā)送者發(fā)送的信息誘導(dǎo)了一個(gè)信念，而這個(gè)信念與在已實(shí)現(xiàn)狀態(tài)下應(yīng)該誘導(dǎo)的信念不同，那么發(fā)送者就被認(rèn)為欺騙了接收者。欺騙對(duì)發(fā)送者來說是昂貴的，而且這種成本是內(nèi)生的:它在誘導(dǎo)的信念和本應(yīng)誘導(dǎo)的信念之間的距離上增加。誘導(dǎo)發(fā)送者參與欺騙的信息功能是不可信的，不可能是平衡的一部分。我們研究了基于國(guó)家依賴和國(guó)家獨(dú)立發(fā)送者偏好的可信溝通。欺騙的代價(jià)參數(shù)化了發(fā)送者執(zhí)行策略的能力。通過改變這一成本，我們的模型涵蓋了從廉價(jià)談話或不承諾(Crawford and Sobel, 1982)到完全承諾(Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011)的范圍。

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12.Decentralizability of efficient allocations with heterogeneous forecasts

具有異質(zhì)性預(yù)測(cè)的有效分配的分散性

Shurojit Chatterji, Atsushi Kajii

Do price forecasts of rational economic agents need to coincide in intertemporal perfectly competitive complete markets in order for markets to allocate resources efficiently? To address this question, we define an efficient temporary equilibrium (ETE) within the framework of a two period economy. Although an ETE allocation is intertemporally efficient and is obtained by perfect competition, it can arise without the agents' forecasts being coordinated on a perfect foresight price. With time-separable utilities, we show that there is a one dimensional set of ETE allocations for generic endowments. Moreover, these efficient allocations can be supported by forecasts that disagree up to one degree of freedom. Thus, strong as efficiency and perfect competition may appear, they do not imply perfect foresight, but they do add explanatory power to temporary equilibrium, since they select a small subset out of the Pareto efficient allocations, which generally have higher dimension.

在跨期完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)中，理性經(jīng)濟(jì)主體的價(jià)格預(yù)測(cè)是否需要一致才能使市場(chǎng)有效配置資源?為了解決這個(gè)問題，我們?cè)趦善诮?jīng)濟(jì)的框架下定義了一個(gè)有效的臨時(shí)均衡(ETE)。雖然ETE配置是完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的跨期有效配置，但它可能在沒有完全預(yù)見價(jià)格協(xié)調(diào)的情況下產(chǎn)生。在具有時(shí)間可分效用的條件下，我們證明了泛型稟賦存在一個(gè)一維的ETE分配集合。此外，這些有效的分配可以得到一個(gè)自由度上不一致的預(yù)測(cè)的支持。因此，盡管效率和完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可能表現(xiàn)得很強(qiáng)，但它們并不意味著完全預(yù)見，但它們確實(shí)增加了對(duì)暫時(shí)均衡的解釋力，因?yàn)樗鼈儚呐晾弁行逝渲弥羞x擇了一個(gè)小子集，而帕累托效率配置通常具有更高的維度。

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13.Bargaining in small dynamic markets

在充滿活力的小市場(chǎng)中討價(jià)還價(jià)

Francesc Dilmé

This paper studies trade in endogenously evolving markets exhibiting few traders at any given point in time. Traders arrive in the market and bargain until they complete a trade. We find that, unlike large markets, small markets feature trade delay and price dispersion, even when sellers and buyers are homogeneous and matching frictions are small. We characterize transaction prices as a function of the endogenous evolution of the market composition and economic conditions, providing several novel comparative statics results. Our analysis highlights the need to incorporate sub-market structures into the theoretical study of job, real estate, and rental markets, where trade opportunities are typically constrained by both the geographical location and individual characteristics of each trader.

本文研究了在任何給定時(shí)間點(diǎn)上交易者很少的內(nèi)生演變市場(chǎng)中的交易。交易者進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)討價(jià)還價(jià)，直到完成交易。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，與大型市場(chǎng)不同，小型市場(chǎng)具有交易延遲和價(jià)格離散的特征，即使在買賣雙方同質(zhì)且匹配摩擦較小的情況下也是如此。我們將交易價(jià)格刻畫為市場(chǎng)構(gòu)成和經(jīng)濟(jì)條件內(nèi)生演化的函數(shù)，提供了幾個(gè)新穎的比較靜態(tài)分析結(jié)果。我們的分析強(qiáng)調(diào)了將子市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)納入就業(yè)、房地產(chǎn)和租賃市場(chǎng)的理論研究的必要性，在這些市場(chǎng)中，貿(mào)易機(jī)會(huì)通常受到地理位置和每個(gè)交易員的個(gè)人特征的限制。

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14.Task allocation and on-the-job training

任務(wù)分配及在職培訓(xùn)

Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee, Leeat Yariv

We study dynamic task allocation when providers' expertise evolves endogenously through training. We characterize optimal assignment protocols and compare them to discretionary procedures, where it is the clients who select their service providers. Our results indicate that welfare gains from centralization are greater when tasks arrive more rapidly, and when training technologies improve. Monitoring seniors' backlog of clients always increases welfare but may decrease training. Methodologically, we explore a matching setting with endogenous types, and illustrate useful adaptations of queueing theory techniques for such environments.

我們研究提供者的專業(yè)知識(shí)通過培訓(xùn)內(nèi)生發(fā)展時(shí)的動(dòng)態(tài)任務(wù)分配。我們描述了最佳分配協(xié)議的特征，并將其與酌情程序進(jìn)行比較，在這些程序中，是客戶選擇其服務(wù)提供者。我們的結(jié)果表明，當(dāng)任務(wù)到達(dá)得更快、培訓(xùn)技術(shù)提高時(shí)，集中化帶來的福利收益更大。監(jiān)控老年人積壓的客戶總是會(huì)增加福利，但可能會(huì)減少培訓(xùn)。在方法論上，我們探索了一個(gè)具有內(nèi)生類型的匹配設(shè)置，并說明了排隊(duì)論技術(shù)在這種環(huán)境下的有用適應(yīng)性。

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15.Global manipulation by local obfuscation

通過局部混淆進(jìn)行全局操作

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Fei Li, Yangbo Song, Mofei Zhao

We study adversarial information design in a regime-change context. A continuum of agents simultaneously chooses whether to attack the current regime. The attack succeeds if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. A designer manipulates information about the regime's strength to maintain the status quo. Our optimal information structure exhibits local obfuscation: some agents receive a signal matching the regime's true strength, and others receive an elevated signal professing slightly higher strength. This policy is the unique limit of finite-signal problems. Public signals are strictly suboptimal, and in some cases where public signals become futile, local obfuscation guarantees the collapse of agents' coordination, making the designer's information disclosure time consistent and relieving the usual commitment concern.

我們研究了政權(quán)更迭背景下的對(duì)抗信息設(shè)計(jì)。一個(gè)連續(xù)的代理人同時(shí)選擇是否攻擊當(dāng)前的政權(quán)。當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)攻擊者的數(shù)量超過敘利亞政權(quán)的力量時(shí)，攻擊才會(huì)成功。設(shè)計(jì)師通過操縱有關(guān)政權(quán)實(shí)力的信息來維持現(xiàn)狀。我們的最優(yōu)信息結(jié)構(gòu)表現(xiàn)出局部混淆:一些代理接收到與政權(quán)真實(shí)強(qiáng)度相匹配的信號(hào)，而另一些代理接收到強(qiáng)度略高的高信號(hào)。該策略是有限信號(hào)問題的唯一極限。公共信號(hào)是嚴(yán)格次優(yōu)的，在某些公共信號(hào)無效的情況下，局部混淆保證了代理人協(xié)調(diào)的崩潰，使設(shè)計(jì)者的信息披露時(shí)間一致，緩解了通常的承諾擔(dān)憂。

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——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)