題目：East, West, Home’s Best: Do Local CEOs Behave Less Myopically？

摘要：We test whether CEOs working near their childhood homes are less likely than nonlocal CEOs to make myopic decisions. Place attachment theories suggest that people develop mutual caretaking relationships with their birthplaces. Also, executive labor markets face less information asymmetry about local CEOs, resulting in lower pressure on local CEOs for quick profits. Consistent with the prediction, we find that local CEOs are less likely to cut R&D expenditures for beating analyst forecasts or avoiding earnings decreases. In their last year of office, local CEOs are significantly less likely to cut R&D than nonlocal CEOs. The CEO locality effect is stronger when more local business interests are embedded in the firm and when the residents of the CEO’s birth state have stronger local social bonds. Local CEOs’ longer horizons are consistently manifested in their other decisions, such as paying more state tax and being more socially responsible in business operation.

研究問(wèn)題：本地CEO是否更少短視（We test whether CEOs working near their childhood homes are less likely than nonlocal CEOs to make myopic decisions.）

研究動(dòng)機(jī)：已有研究聚焦于合約式解決方案（正式制度），本研究探究非合約式因素（社會(huì)文化類）對(duì)管理者短視行為的影響。（Prior research focuses on examining contractual solutions to containing managerial myopia. In this study, we examine whether a noncontractual factor, i.e., CEO locality, reduces CEOs’ myopia tendencies.）

研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：本地CEO更不可能削減研發(fā)投入以實(shí)現(xiàn)業(yè)績(jī)達(dá)標(biāo)；本地CEO對(duì)于短視治理效應(yīng)在本地居民具有更強(qiáng)的本地投資偏好以及公司本地業(yè)務(wù)更為集中時(shí)較為凸顯；也在本地居民流動(dòng)性較小和社會(huì)資本相對(duì)更高的地區(qū)中更加顯著；最后還發(fā)現(xiàn)擁有本地CEO的企業(yè)具有更好的財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效和更高的公司價(jià)值。（We find that firms with local CEOs are significantly less likely to cut R&D for beating performance benchmarks. We perform two lines of cross-sectional tests to corroborate our main results. First,we find that the CEO locality effect on myopia is greater when the state’s residents have a stronger preference for investing in local stocks and when the firm’s business is more concentrated within the state.Second,our tests show that the CEO locality effect on myopia is greater when the state has relatively lower population mobility and when it boasts relatively more social capital. Finally, we find that local CEOs’ firms have better financial performance and higher valuation than those with nonlocal CEOs.）

研究貢獻(xiàn)：本文從非合約視角拓展了管理者短視行為的研究，也豐富了管理層風(fēng)格與企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)（Our paper contributes to the lite****** by identifying a noncontractual factor—CEOs’ locality—that affects managerial myopia.Our paper adds to the burgeoning lite****** on whether managers imprint their idiosyncratic styles on their firms’ operation）