The Journal of Industrial Economics 2022年第12期

Volume70,?Issue4

December 2022

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——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

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1.Input Price Discrimination, Demand Forms, And Welfare

投入價(jià)格歧視、需求形式與福利

Germain Gaudin,?Romain Lestage

We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous findings related to discrimination in final-goods markets to the case of discrimination in input markets. Then, we examine the impact of input price discrimination on welfare. A key determinant of the effects of input price discrimination corresponds to the sum of demand curvature and pass-through elasticity. We provide examples relying on derived demands with constant curvature, including demands with constant pass-through rates.

在上游壟斷者以不同程度的效率向下游企業(yè)銷售產(chǎn)品的典型模型中，我們分析了投入價(jià)格歧視的影響。我們首先在我們的背景下改寫了一系列現(xiàn)有的結(jié)果，將先前有關(guān)最終產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)歧視的發(fā)現(xiàn)擴(kuò)展到投入市場(chǎng)歧視的情況。然后，我們考察了投入價(jià)格歧視對(duì)福利的影響。投入價(jià)格歧視效應(yīng)的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵決定因素是需求曲率和傳遞彈性之和。我們提供的例子依賴于具有恒定曲率的導(dǎo)出需求，包括具有恒定通過(guò)率的需求。

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2.Fostering the Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies: Evidence from the Licensing of the Transistor Patents

促進(jìn)通用技術(shù)的擴(kuò)散:來(lái)自晶體管專利許可的證據(jù)

Markus Nagler,?Monika Schnitzer,?Martin Watzinger

How do licensing and technology transfer influence the spread of General Purpose Technologies? To answer this question, we analyze the diffusion of the transistor, one of the most important technologies of our time. We show that the transistor diffusion and cross-technology spillovers increased dramatically after AT&T began licensing its transistor patents along with symposia to educate follow-on inventors in 1952. Both these symposia and the licensing of the patents itself played important roles in the diffusion. A subsequent reduction in royalties did not lead to further increases, suggesting that licensing and technology transfer were more important than specific royalty rates.

許可和技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓如何影響通用技術(shù)的推廣?為了回答這個(gè)問(wèn)題，我們分析了晶體管的擴(kuò)散，這是我們這個(gè)時(shí)代最重要的技術(shù)之一。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在AT&T于1952年開(kāi)始授權(quán)其晶體管專利并舉辦研討會(huì)以教育后續(xù)發(fā)明家之后，晶體管擴(kuò)散和跨技術(shù)溢出顯著增加。這些研討會(huì)和專利許可本身都在傳播中發(fā)揮了重要作用。后來(lái)特許權(quán)使用費(fèi)的減少并沒(méi)有導(dǎo)致進(jìn)一步的增加，這表明許可和技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓比具體的特許權(quán)使用費(fèi)更重要。

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3.Bundling with Resale

捆綁轉(zhuǎn)售

Drew Vollmer

How does resale affect multiproduct bundling? I investigate using a model of monopoly bundling with costly resale. Consumers purchase in the primary market while anticipating resale, then participate in a resale market with market-clearing prices. Resale forces the monopolist to balance the additional profit from a discounted bundle against the opportunity for consumer arbitrage. In equilibrium, the monopolist may still offer a discounted bundle, but resale reduces the returns to bundling and has an ambiguous effect on consumer and total welfare. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of resale, it is possible for consumers to resell in equilibrium.

轉(zhuǎn)售如何影響多產(chǎn)品捆綁?我使用壟斷捆綁與昂貴的轉(zhuǎn)售模型進(jìn)行研究。消費(fèi)者在一級(jí)市場(chǎng)購(gòu)買，同時(shí)期待轉(zhuǎn)售，然后以市場(chǎng)出清價(jià)格參與轉(zhuǎn)售市場(chǎng)。轉(zhuǎn)售迫使壟斷者在折扣套餐帶來(lái)的額外利潤(rùn)與消費(fèi)者套利機(jī)會(huì)之間做出平衡。在均衡狀態(tài)下，壟斷者仍可能提供打折的捆綁銷售，但轉(zhuǎn)售降低了捆綁銷售的回報(bào)，并對(duì)消費(fèi)者和總福利產(chǎn)生模糊的影響。當(dāng)消費(fèi)者有異質(zhì)轉(zhuǎn)售成本時(shí)，消費(fèi)者有可能進(jìn)行均衡轉(zhuǎn)售。

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4.Incentivized Mergers and Cost Efficiency: Evidence from the Electricity Distribution Industry

激勵(lì)性并購(gòu)與成本效率:來(lái)自配電行業(yè)的證據(jù)

Robert Clark,?Mario Samano

We propose an endogenous merger algorithm to evaluate the impact of government-provided incentives on consolidation patterns for services such as electricity distributors, school boards, hospitals and municipalities. The algorithm replicates the observed industry reconfiguration, with calibrated parameters used to simulate consolidation patterns that would have resulted from policy incentives. We apply the method to the case of Ontario, where transfer tax reductions have been proposed to incentivize consolidation of electricity distributors. We find that the proposed incentive would have no impact on efficiency and consolidation, and even subsidies would still leave many more electricity distributors than desired by policy makers.

我們提出了一種內(nèi)生合并算法，以評(píng)估政府提供的激勵(lì)措施對(duì)電力分銷商、學(xué)校董事會(huì)、醫(yī)院和市政當(dāng)局等服務(wù)的合并模式的影響。該算法復(fù)制了觀察到的行業(yè)重新配置，并使用經(jīng)過(guò)校準(zhǔn)的參數(shù)來(lái)模擬政策激勵(lì)可能導(dǎo)致的整合模式。我們將該方法應(yīng)用于安大略的案例，在安大略，已提出減少轉(zhuǎn)讓稅以激勵(lì)電力分銷商的整合。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，擬議中的激勵(lì)措施對(duì)效率和整合沒(méi)有任何影響，即使是補(bǔ)貼也會(huì)留下比決策者期望的更多的電力分銷商。

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5.Learning by Selling, Knowledge Spillovers, and Patents

通過(guò)銷售學(xué)習(xí)，知識(shí)溢出和專利

Yves Guéron,?Jihong Le

We examine the incentives for experimentation in the context of innovation and market competition. A monopolist chooses whether to sell early-stage product or perform costly scale-up R&D. Early market participation facilitates learning about demand but invites knowledge spillovers and competitors, while R&D acts as a barrier to entry. The firm's optimal policy can exhibit both under- and over-experimentation?vis-à-vis?the socially optimal policy. Patents can control the pace of innovation and restore efficient experimentation. When the surplus from R&D is large, rewarding early-stage innovation encourages market experimentation and limits wasteful R&D investment. We offer a theory of two-tier patent policy involving ‘petty’ patents.

我們?cè)趧?chuàng)新和市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的背景下研究實(shí)驗(yàn)的動(dòng)機(jī)。壟斷者可以選擇是銷售處于早期階段的產(chǎn)品，還是進(jìn)行成本高昂的大規(guī)模研發(fā)。早期的市場(chǎng)參與有助于了解需求，但會(huì)帶來(lái)知識(shí)溢出和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，而研發(fā)則是進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)的障礙。相對(duì)于社會(huì)最優(yōu)政策，企業(yè)的最優(yōu)政策可以表現(xiàn)出不足和過(guò)度實(shí)驗(yàn)。專利可以控制創(chuàng)新的步伐，并恢復(fù)有效的實(shí)驗(yàn)。當(dāng)來(lái)自研發(fā)的盈余很大時(shí)，獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)處于早期階段的創(chuàng)新可以鼓勵(lì)市場(chǎng)試驗(yàn)，并限制浪費(fèi)的研發(fā)投資。我們提出了涉及“小”專利的雙層專利政策理論。