It was a criminal’s paradise. In June 2020 a firm in Milan secured a €60,000 ($63,300) government loan to cope with the pandemic-induced downturn. But the business did not exist. The Italian government had in fact sent cash to the ’Ndrangheta Mafia of Calabria. The same month six French citizens swindled €12m in unemployment benefits by claiming funds for employees at 3,600 shell companies. A Texan man filed loan applications for 15 made-up firms and pocketed $24.8m in government support.

那是罪犯的天堂。?2020年6月，米蘭的一家公司獲得了6萬歐元(63,300美元)的政府貸款，以應(yīng)對疫情——引發(fā)的低迷。?但是這個生意并不存在。?事實上，意大利政府曾向卡拉布里亞的“Ndrangheta黑手黨”(Ndrangheta Mafia)送過錢。?同月，6名法國公民通過向3600家空殼公司的員工索要資金，騙取了1200萬歐元的失業(yè)救濟金。?一名德州男子為15家虛構(gòu)的公司提交了貸款申請，并獲得了2480萬美元的政府支持。 ?

As countries scale back unparalleled emergency-relief programmes there is growing interest in where the funds went. The IMF estimates that since January 2020 governments have doled out $15.5trn in nonhealth-care spending and loans in response to the covid-19 pandemic. The rush to support households and firms led to poor procurement, messy programmes and inadequate oversight. The best estimates of fraud, so far, are from Britain and America; other countries, where wrongdoing may well have been more prevalent, lack audits tracing where the money went. In America at least 4.5% of funding under the CARES Act, the largest pandemicstimulus bill, went to cheats. applying that figure globally suggests that nearly $700bn could have ended up in the wrong hands.

隨著各國縮減前所未有的緊急情況——救濟項目，人們對資金流向的興趣日益濃厚。?國際貨幣基金組織估計，自2020年1月以來，各國政府已發(fā)放了15.5萬億美元的非衛(wèi)生-醫(yī)療支出和貸款，以應(yīng)對covid-19大流行。?急于支持家庭和企業(yè)導(dǎo)致了糟糕的采購，混亂的項目和不充分的監(jiān)督。?到目前為止，對欺詐行為最好的估計來自英國和美國;?在其他國家，不法行為可能更為普遍，但缺乏追蹤資金去向的審計。?在美國，最大規(guī)模的刺激法案——《關(guān)懷法案》(CARES Act)下至少4.5%的資金流向了欺詐行為。?在全球范圍內(nèi)應(yīng)用這一數(shù)字表明，近7000億美元可能最終落入壞人之手。 ?

In Britain fraud and error—losses due to crime and mistaken payments—across five economic-relief schemes exceed ￡16bn ($21bn), roughly a tenth of the ￡166bn spent, according to official reports. That tally could well rise: the National Audit Office calculates that fraud from just one of the programmes, the Bounce Back Loan Scheme—whose reported losses account for a quarter of the sum—could reach ￡26bn, 55% of its total spending, when investigations come to a close.

官方報告顯示，在英國，五個經(jīng)濟項目中的欺詐和錯誤(犯罪和錯誤支付造成的損失)救濟計劃超過160億英鎊(合210億美元)，約為支出1660億英鎊的十分之一。?這一數(shù)字很可能還會上升:國家審計署估計，在調(diào)查結(jié)束時，僅從其中一個項目，即“反彈貸款計劃”(Bounce Back Loan programme)——其報告的損失占總金額的四分之一——的欺詐行為就可能達到260億英鎊，占總開支的55%。 ?

Spending in America was larger—and so was the waste. The Secret Service reckons $100bn has been stolen from the $2.2trn CARES Act. If pre-pandemic fraud levels were sustained, at least $87bn in unemployment insurance—which got a budgetary bump during the pandemic—would have been captured by crooks. Auditors reckon the true fraud rate is much higher.

美國的支出更大，浪費也更大。?美國特勤局(Secret Service)估計，價值2.2萬億美元的《關(guān)懷法案》(CARES Act)中有1000億美元被盜。?如果大流行前的欺詐水平持續(xù)下去，那么至少870億美元的失業(yè)保險——在大流行期間預(yù)算有所增加——將會被騙子竊取。?審計人員認(rèn)為真實的欺詐率要高得多。 ?

Scams and mismanagement are inevitable in programmes of such a scale. But past stimulus efforts were cleaner. In the decade since the financial crisis, investigators recovered only $57m in fraudulent funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, an $840bn stimulus package. Cheats continue to be exposed over time, but even if all cases still being audited are confirmed as criminal, the programme’s fraud rate will reach only 0.6%. Other government schemes lose less, too. The rate of total health-care fraud in America hovers at around 3%. Britain mistakenly overpaid around 1.5% of work and pension benefits a year in the decade to 2019.?

在如此規(guī)模的項目中，欺詐和管理不善是不可避免的。 但過去的刺激措施要干凈得多。 在金融危機爆發(fā)后的10年里，調(diào)查人員僅從8400億美元的經(jīng)濟刺激方案《2009年美國復(fù)蘇與再投資法案》(American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009)中追回了5700萬美元的欺詐性資金。 隨著時間的推移，欺詐行為不斷被曝光，但即使所有仍在審計的案件都被確認(rèn)為刑事案件，該項目的欺詐率也只會達到0.6%。 其他政府計劃的損失也較小。 在美國，醫(yī)療欺詐的比率()徘徊在3%左右。 在截至2019年的十年間，英國錯誤地每年多支付了1.5%的工作和養(yǎng)老金。??

The covid19 stimulus waste estimates, by contrast, are alarming—especially as the true extent of fraud could take years to uncover. But some misspending may have been unavoidable. When crisis struck economists urged governments to do whatever it took to avoid colossal damage. Speedy action did just that. America distributed stimulus cheques to 90m people in less than a month. In rich countries real disposable income per person rose by 3% in 2020. That kind of offset might not have been possible with slower, more carefully crafted policies.?

相比之下，2019冠狀病毒19刺激計劃浪費的估計數(shù)字令人擔(dān)憂，尤其是考慮到欺詐的真實程度可能需要數(shù)年才能發(fā)現(xiàn)。 但一些開支的浪費可能是不可避免的。 當(dāng)危機襲來時，經(jīng)濟學(xué)家敦促政府采取一切措施避免巨大的損失。 迅速的行動做到了這一點。 美國在不到一個月的時間里向9000萬人發(fā)放了經(jīng)濟刺激支票。 在富裕國家，人均實際可支配收入在2020年增長了3%。 如果采取更緩慢、更謹(jǐn)慎的政策，這種抵消可能是不可能的。??

More scrutiny is coming. In March three dozen Republican senators demanded more transparency about how funds were spent before signing up to more pandemicrelated funding. Joe Biden has appointed a chief prosecutor to take down criminals who tried to profit from the pandemic. And some justice is already being served. The French fraudsters were arrested and the Texan creator of fictional firms pleaded guilty to money-laundering. As for the Mafia in Milan? The Italian government caught on and froze their assets.

更多的審查即將到來。 3月，36名共和黨參議員要求在簽署更多與流行病相關(guān)的資金之前，提高資金使用的透明度。 喬·拜登任命了一名首席檢察官，以抓獲試圖從疫情中獲利的罪犯。 一些正義已經(jīng)得到了伸張。 這兩名法國詐騙犯已被逮捕，一名虛構(gòu)公司的得克薩斯州創(chuàng)始人承認(rèn)犯有洗錢罪。 米蘭的黑手黨呢? 意大利政府發(fā)現(xiàn)了，凍結(jié)了他們的資產(chǎn)。